



This is the author(s) refereed version of a paper that was accepted for publication:

YOUNG, R., & Grant, J. (2015). Is strategy implemented by projects? Disturbing evidence in the State of NSW. *International Journal of Project Management*, 33(1), 15-28.  
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2014.03.010>

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<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2014.03.010>

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# **Is strategy implemented by projects? Disturbing evidence in the State of NSW**

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# Is strategy implemented by projects? Disturbing evidence in the State of NSW

## Abstract

*This research has replicated an earlier study examining the effectiveness of project investment frameworks and provided a second case showing that in a normal environment (using private sector managerial techniques) projects contribute little to the realisation of strategic goals. The replication has implications for both the public and private sector.*

*A promising new finding is that 'in some environments (with stable strategies and central oversight) projects make some contribution to the realisation of strategic goals'. However the contribution is smaller than expected and more research is required to explore how projects can contribute more to strategy.*

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## 1. Introduction

Projects are increasingly being undertaken to implement business strategy (Jamieson & Morris, 2007; Kwak & Anbari, 2009). However, Young, Young & Jordan (2012) have found evidence that suggest projects may not actually be contributing to strategy. Their paper is disturbing because their evidence was from an exemplary case, the State of Victoria.

Victorian project management and investment frameworks were found to be comparable with and sometimes better than 'best practice'. However no evidence was found to suggest any strategic goals had improved despite very aggressive project investment (\$100B) over a ten year period. The implication is that projects may not be contributing to the realisation of strategic goals more generally.

The basis of the argument by Young et al. (2012) is that if strategic results had been achieved, the results would have been reported. Their argument seems credible but their analysis was limited in both time and scope and further research was recommended to try to replicate the results. This paper addresses the call for further research and studies in detail five Agencies in the State of NSW. If

findings are replicated in this second case, the evidence will be much stronger with implications for at least the Australian public sector, possibly for the public sector in the English speaking world and possibly for projects generally.

This research has replicated the methodology of the original study and the nine year period to be studied is from 2001 to 2010. The first part of this period from 2001 to 2006 is directly comparable to Young et al. (2012). However, the second period from 2007 to 2010 was characterised by a new strategic approach known as 'Whole-of-Government' (WG). The literature review which follows will describe the development of WG initiatives and provide the context to compare NSW and Victoria. The literature will also review a major methodological consideration, the selection and reporting of performance measures.

## **2. Literature Review**

### **2.1 Origins of Whole-of-Government**

A common perception amongst laymen is that Government is incapable and inefficient. This view is of course highly speculative; but as Winston Churchill once quipped, "a politician needs the ability to foretell what is going to happen tomorrow, next week, next month, next year and to have the ability afterwards to explain why it didn't happen" (Langworth, 2011). When *foretelling's* don't happen, the public understandably gets upset and frequently demands enquiry. And when the scope of the failure is large enough, enquiry can lead to public-sector reform.

It was the failure of public policy in the UK during the 1980's and 90's that prompted the overhaul of the public sector and led to the approach that is now known as New Public Management (NPM) (Mongkol, 2011). The objective of NPM was to address key implementation failures by applying private-sector economic and managerial techniques to the public sector to improve efficiency and target results-driven action (Barrett, 2004; Hood, 2007; O'Donnell, O'Brien, & Junor, 2011).

The merits of NPM were immediately recognised by Governments globally, and NPM spread rapidly across the Anglo Saxon world. Early adoption of NPM occurred in Australia, New Zealand and the UK. Elsewhere, NPM emerged as ‘reinvented government’ in the U.S. and ‘effect-oriented administration’ in Switzerland and Austria (Fábián, 2010). Greve and Hodge (2007) identified the State of Victoria as a leader in NPM.

NPM lived up to some of its promise by shifting the focus of public management away from institutions perceived to be inert and too large to manage. In their place grew nimbler, free-market styled public-private partnerships (PPP) that concentrated on results, efficiency gains and a corporate-like approach to policy implementation (Fábián, 2010; Holmes & Shand, 1995; Mongkol, 2011). However, NPM wasn’t always integrated successfully and many critics questioned its feasibility (Mongkol, 2011).

There was evidence that many PPP projects were not good value for money (Cable, 2004; Musson, 2009). The Bates review, an assessment of 650 projects in the UK during the NPM period identified widespread project failure. The review exposed fragmented Project Management, redundancy across Government agencies and poor project performance (Bates, 1997; Miller & Hobbs, 2005).

Elsewhere, criticism of NPM centred on the prominence of financial and economic reporting in Government strategy; resulting in policy implementation focus shifting to low-level budgetary requirements rather than the realisation of benefits. Competition and protectionism increased and siloed mentalities followed. This resulted in a fragmented environment where agencies competed for funding and other economic resources rather than an environment that promoted better public-sector outcomes (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004; Christensen & Lægheid, 2007).

The Bates review in 1997 identified the need for a more centralised role of Government to combat many of these policy implementation failures. The review noted that too many institutional players existed across the public sector that resulted in task duplication and the redundancy of efforts. The review recommended the establishment of a new treasury task force with both a projects and policy arm to coordinate policy implementation between agencies (Bates, 1997; Miller & Hobbs, 2005).

The Blair Government embraced the Bates recommendations seeking to maximize public value from public-sector operations. Priorities were set to improve project efficiency, address public risk and ensure best practice spread throughout Government. Part of this centralization of operations included the introduction of collaborative public reform in 1997 then known as ‘joined-up Government’ (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007).

Joined-up Government was seen as a rebalancing of NPM; a restructuring aimed at dissolving the siloed agency structures that resulted from NPM policies. This shifting of strategic focus gave greater emphasis to behavioural and social considerations, agency collaboration and shared objectives to facilitate service delivery (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007). The Australian Connecting Government report describes joined-up Government efforts as an ‘integrated Government response to particular issues’ (MAC, 2004).

Joined up Government later became known as Whole-of-Government (WG) reform in the UK, Australia and New Zealand; and ‘Collaborative Management’ in the U.S.(Christensen & Lægreid, 2007). Examples of WG efforts include the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the UK’s Social Exclusion Unit which is comprised of representatives from the Departments for Education, the Environment and the Home Office (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007; Pollitt, 2003).

## **2.2 Separating Policy Environments**

Two years after the first Bates review prompted the UK Government to centralise project coordination and policy oversight, a second Bates review reported that 75% of projects met managerial expectations and were successfully completed on time (Bates & Britain, 1999; Miller & Hobbs, 2005). While these figures have not been directly credited to the implementation of WG policy shifts, the correlation between the initiation of these programmes and improvements in project delivery should not be overlooked.

The Whole of Government approach is an integrated agency response to tackle social issues. It is also an acknowledgment that the issues affecting society are more complex than the boundaries in which

single Government agencies operate (VICSTA, 2007). Evidence suggests that tackling crime, for example, yields superior results when strategies are jointly addressed by Social Services, Police, Judicial and Mental Health departments over singular agencies acting alone (Berry, Briggs, Erol, & van Staden, 2011).

WG initiatives are characterised by collaboration between public-sector agencies. Collaboration has been cited as a key success factor in project delivery and WG promotes traits that increase the likelihood of project success (Dietrich & Eskerod, 2010; Uzzi, 1997). These traits include the adoption of common communication protocols, trust and commitment between partners, common standards in reporting and practice methodologies, and increased cross-organisational knowledge sharing (Dietrich & Eskerod, 2010; Vaaland, 2004).

Within NSW, the architecture for WG was introduced through the 2006 NSW State Plan. The State Plan outlined the means for how the State public-sector jointly addresses specific criteria of greatest public concern. Under the plan, public-sector agencies were given explicit responsibilities for meeting quantified criteria, and agencies were jointly tasked with State-specified, strategic priorities. For example, a top-level priority in NSW was to build a higher quality transport system by improving road safety. Under the State Plan, the Roads and Transport Authority (RTA) partnered with NSW Police and the courts to address the target of reduced road fatalities.

Acting under the State Plan's guidelines, the State led agency collaboration and introduced several important strategy and project innovations. These included centralised performance tracking, centralised project approval and oversight, and strategies that remained stable throughout the plan's lifespan. To enhance project accountability and issue exposure, the State Plan also introduced publically available performance metrics, project data and metrics linked directly to strategy. A project management office (PMO) was established to centralise project approval, ensure projects aligned to strategy and strengthen project accountability. To assess the effectiveness of the changes in the State Plan, the State tracked sets of metrics that linked operational data directly to the high level strategic objectives and priorities. These strategic objectives were linked to the agencies and the

specific projects meant to address the objectives. The result was that the NSW State plan made the connection between projects and policy.

At least at a high level, the reorganisation of the NSW public sector under the State Plan strongly resembles the reorganization and re-prioritization of the UK Government in 1997 following the first Bates review. Since the recommendations set forth by the Bates reviews significantly impacted successful project delivery and policy implementation, a separate analysis of policy environments in NSW between NPM and WG periods is justified. The following schematic (figure 1) based on NSW shows the implementation of WG initiatives are sufficiently different from those implemented under NPM.

### **2.3 Measuring Value**

This paper is responding to Young et al.'s (2012) call for further research to evaluate whether projects are contributing to strategy. Their original research suggested projects were not contributing to strategy because no improvements had been reported over a 10 year period. Their finding is based on the assumption that strategic improvements would have been reported if they had occurred. Their assumption although reasonable, may not be valid because strategy and strategic goals can change over time. Projects may indeed have contributed to strategy but not be reported because the strategic goals had changed. At the highest level strategic goals such as reducing crime or increasing literacy are stable and do not change. However, Young et al. (2012) found at the operational and project level, the metrics being targeted for improvement changed significantly from year to year. This next section explores how best to assess whether strategic value is being realised.

Attributing value to either a project directly, or to the outcomes that result from a project's execution is difficult. The traditional project management practice is to credit value to projects that meet the triple constraints of time, scope and cost (Thiry & Deguire, 2007). However, these three metrics are narrowly focussed and fail to encapsulate the larger strategic value that results after a project's execution (Cooke-Davies, 2002; Thomas & Fernández, 2008).



During the 1960's, USAID identified five requirements a project must satisfy to be fulfilled: A project must be efficient, effective, relevant, have impact and be sustainable. Samset (2008) describes Project Management's 'triple constraints' as belonging to the tactical or 'efficient' requirement of successful project delivery while the four other USAID project requirements measure project performance strategically. These strategic measures require a successful project to be relevant – objectives must align with priorities; to be effective – the project's goals should be realised as planned; to have impact - by meeting market and stakeholder demands; and to be sustainable - continuing to add value after project completion (Samset, 2008).

Young et al.'s (2012) Victorian public-sector study looked for bigger-picture values to assess a project's contribution to strategy. These values included metrics like improved literacy rates and reduced crime – values that reflected the outcomes of project delivery rather than a project's specific output. However these values were not reported in annual reports against strategic goals. Young et al. may have been overly optimistic because it is atypical for a single metric to be used to evaluate a strategic goal (such as improved health care). Instead, value is typically inferred from a combination of lower-level metrics. Literacy in NSW, for example is measured by 10 different metrics segmented by demographic, while at the other end of the spectrum, Alaskan airlines uses nearly 50,000 data points to measure strategies aimed at improving on-time performance (DET, 2008; Mouawad, 2013).

NPM adoption and the growing number of PPP projects across the public sector increased a trend toward using performance measures as indicators of successful policy implementation (Barrett, 2004). Specifying measurable targets removed ambiguity from project and policy evaluation and clearly defined what was to be expected by project delivery strategically. Accordingly, the number and collection of metrics used to measure successful implementation also increased. Within the NSW public sector during the WG policy period, quantifiable performance targets were common, and quantifiable measures of strategic success within the State were self-prescribed and decisive.

However the use of metrics as sole indicators of strategic performance is contentious. Causal relationships are often incorrectly made given a set of seemingly related data (Silver, 2012). For example, falling crime rates during the 90's in the United States were widely attributed to tougher

crime policies and leadership decisions; yet it has been suggested the drop is a result of legalized abortion in the early 1970's that kept unwanted children and potentially problematic people out of society (Levitt, 2004). Criticism is also directed at the notion of working toward pre-defined targets. Barret (2004) suggests that figures are often skewed or manipulated in the public sector as agencies work toward suspiciously defined success indicators. For instance, it is commonplace to juggle lists of hospital wait times or patient's bedtime usage since these metrics are often used to reflect the state of the healthcare system. Some assert "what gets measured is what gets managed, and what gets managed is what gets done." Kay (2004) however, questions the effectiveness of measurement driven approaches with the observation that "the most profitable companies are not the most profit-oriented, and the happiest people are not those who make happiness their main aim."

We conclude that there may be problems with the effectiveness of a metric-driven strategy and in correlating metrics to strategy. However, at a high-level, there is little else to quickly and effectively assess the impact of initiatives across the public-sector. The issue of effectiveness may be less relevant when studying the impact of past investments and we believe the best approach is to choose a mixture of metrics that are easy to understand, representative of the strategy and collected at regular intervals.

### **3. Methodology**

The case study methodology is being followed (Yin, 2008). This study will replicate and extend Young et al.'s (2012) methodology to evaluate whether the State of NSW will provide another case where projects do not contribute to the realisation of strategy. The State of Victoria, an exemplary case, provided the first evidence that projects did not contribute to strategy. If the same findings are found in the State of NSW, we may be justified in extending the finding to the Australian public sector and possibly to all jurisdictions practicing either NPM or WG.

This study will differ from Young et al.'s (2012) Victorian study in two major ways: Firstly, the study will perform separate analyses for different policy periods, one characterised by projects delivered in

the NPM policy environment (2001-2006) and the second in a WG environment (2007-2010). Secondly, the study will assess the impact of projects on strategy through lower-level performance metrics. Low-level metrics will be grouped and matched to agency strategies and assessed to evaluate whether projects are contributing to improvements in strategic outcomes. The same simplifying assumption is made that performance will remain constant if expenditure is only on business-as-usual activities and changes in performance are mainly due to project expenditure. In the initial analysis, we will also make the simplifying assumption that other potential factors such as economic development (including the financial crisis in 2008/2009), technological development and investments by other public bodies have much less impact on performance than project investments directed specifically on improving strategic goals. Data will be accessed from the same type of sources identified by Young et al. (2012). The majority of the documents will be sourced from agency websites, or retrieved from the NSW State Library. To manage the volume of data to be collected, data will only be collected from the top 5 NSW agencies by budgetary spend over the 9 years from 2001-2010. These agencies represent 67% of the total State budget. These agencies are the NSW Department of Health, NSW Department of Education, NSW Transport Department, NSW Roads and Transport Authority (RTA) and NSW Police.

The specific documents used in this study are listed below.

- NSW Treasury Budget Papers No 3, years 2001-2010.
- NSW Department of Health Annual Reports, years 2002-2010
- NSW Department of Education and Training Annual Reports, years 2002-2010
- NSW Ministry of Transport Annual Reports, years 2002-2010
- The Roads and Traffic Authority Annual Reports, years 2002-2010
- NSW Police Annual Reports, 2003-2010
- The NSW State Plan, 2006
- NSW State Plan Performance Report, 2010
- The Bureau of Transport Statistics Travel Survey Reports 2002-2010
- NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics Recorded Crime Reports 2002-2010

## **4. Results**

The results will follow the structure of Young et al. (2012). Firstly the size of investment in projects will be estimated. Then will be an evaluation of whether projects are commissioned to implement strategy. Finally will be an evaluation of whether projects have improved strategic outcomes. This final analysis will separately assess the effectiveness of projects under NPM and WG policy regimes.

### **4.1 Estimate of project investment**

From 2001 to 2010 the NSW Treasury allocated a total of \$419B to agency budgets. The proportion spent on projects is difficult to estimate. Unlike Victoria, where project expenditure was directly reported in Treasury documents, NSW does not publish project data. Project spend had to be estimated by studying Treasury document narratives and charts and figures from agency reports.

Table 1 summarizes our estimate of project spending in NSW in 2009 and 2010. These estimates suggest 19-29% of the overall budget is spent on projects. Applying this percentage to the total amount of \$419B, it would suggest NSW has spent between \$80B and \$122B on projects over the 9 year period of study. These findings are comparable to Young et al.'s (2012) estimate of project expenditure in Victoria.

### **4.2 The role of projects within the NSW public sector: to implement strategy**

The amount invested on projects in NSW appears to be very significant. We turn now to consider whether this expenditure is meant to implement strategy.

There are three strong pieces of evidence that suggest projects are undertaken to implement strategy: Treasury Budget narratives, the project approval process, and agency annual reports. Each is discussed below.

Firstly, Treasury budget narratives referring to projects often described them in the context of top level strategy. For example, the 2008 Treasury budget specifically mentions two RTA projects (1) to enhance road safety in high-frequency collision zones, and (2) projects to reduce illegal drug usage

amongst drivers. Both projects are described in the context of the State-level strategic priority 'NSW Safer Road' (Treasury, 2008).

The second piece of evidence is the project approval process. In 2006 the State established the high-level Project Management Office (PMO) and cabinet. These entities were specifically tasked with ensuring Agency-level projects aligned to State-level objectives and strategic priorities.

Finally, Agency Annual reports since 2006 have strongly suggested that projects are intended to implement strategy. Each agency publishes the high-level Government agendas that it is responsible for addressing. Under each agenda, each agency lists projects being implemented to meet each high-level strategic objective. These high-level agendas or 'themes' include: 'Keeping People Safe', 'Stronger Communities' and 'Better Transport and Liveable Cities'. The themes are broken down at the agency level to specific strategic priorities and projects are linked to the strategic priorities. For instance, the theme of Keeping People Safe comprised the strategic priorities of 'reduced rates of crime' and 'reduced re-offending', and specific projects under this strategy included 'drug diversion projects' and 'combating underage drinking'.

We conclude that the significant expenditure spent on projects is meant to contribute to strategy. We now turn to the question of performance; are projects actually contributing to strategy?

### **4.3 Identifying metrics to evaluate realisation of strategic goals**

To evaluate whether projects were contributing to strategy we first had to identify suitable metrics. We found over the 9-year period there were approximately 155 different sets of metrics that were stable enough to be used for this research (115 during the NPM period and 121 during the WG period). These included metrics such as teacher-student ratios in Education and elective surgery waiting times in Health. There were more metrics identified but most could not be used because they were not reported consistently from year to year over the period studied. Some metrics only had two measures and others were disjointed over multiple years e.g. reported only in 2001, 2005, 2006, etc. One specific example was reducing childhood obesity, a strategic goal listed in both the NSW State

Plan and NSW Health annual reports to address the strategic priority of improved health. However, the measurement was only reported once so improvement could not be evaluated.

Table 2 summarises the number of 'stable metrics' that were used in our analysis. The full list of stable metrics is listed in Appendix 1.

The remainder of this section is included for completeness and details how metrics changed from year to year and were therefore unsuitable for our study. Strategic measures were particularly unstable during the NPM period of the study (2001-2006). Table 3 provides a detailed example from NSW Health showing the changes in strategic priorities between 2003 and 2005. Only one third of the strategic priorities are the same from 2003-2004 and only 43% are the same from 2004-2005. In some cases, when the strategic intent appeared to be similar, the language differed significantly and made it unclear if the Agency was heading in a different direction or simply rephrasing existing priorities.

All five NSW agencies during the NPM period were found to have rapidly changing strategic priorities. The example of NSW Health is a more extreme example, but strategic instability was characteristic of all the other agencies. Table 4 shows that on average 34% of strategic objectives changed every year during the NPM period. The implication is that even under ideal circumstances with all projects aligned to strategy, a third of projects would be irrelevant the following year because the strategic priority would have disappeared.

The WG policy period (between 2007-2010) provides a strong contrast to the NPM period (2001-2006). During the WG period, strategic priorities changed at an annual average rate of only 7%. The strategic stability during this latter period is probably because the majority of strategic priorities were identified and set at the State level rather than at the agency level.

#### **4.4 Mapping metrics against strategic goals**

Whenever possible, metrics were combined and mapped directly to a stated strategy. For example, one of NSW Police's strategic objectives was to 'reduce crime, particularly violent crime' and 5 WG metrics were mapped against this strategy:

1. Number of crimes against persons
2. Number of crimes against property
3. Number of urgent response calls
4. Number of calls to 000 (Australian emergency number)
5. Number of people charged

Most of the metrics at some point were directly linked to specific strategies in Agency Annual reports or State Plan reports. Metrics that weren't explicitly linked to strategy in Agency reports were matched where appropriate. For instance, measures counting the frequency of postnatal check-ups in newborn babies were linked to the Health Department's goal of 'increased focus on early intervention' and its strategic direction of 'Strengthening Primary health in the Community'.

We found of the 41 strategic priorities listed in agency reports, 25 strategic priorities had metrics that could be mapped to them. 16 strategic priorities had no quantifiable metrics. The strategic priorities lacking metrics are listed in appendix 2. The majority of these are not considered 'core' Agency priorities, and for the purposes of this research will be ignored.

Appendix 1 provides full details of our mapping of metrics against strategy. Table 5 provides a summary of the number of metrics mapped against each strategy. The mapping has been performed for each policy period.

There are a number of limitations in our mapping that could not be overcome. Firstly, the number of metrics was not balanced across agency strategies. For instance, 'Improving literacy and numeracy' in NSW was mapped to 10 metrics while 'Reducing Antisocial behaviour' is mapped to only 1 metric. Secondly: some metrics are not overly representative of strategy. For instance, the Department of

Health tracked improving Aboriginal Health with only one metric that counted the number of hearing tests given to newborns; and monitored childhood obesity rates by capturing adolescent, obesity data only once over a 5-year period. Clearly, these metrics alone aren't representative of the strategies they were designed to measure. However, we believe our mapping is the best that was possible given the data available.

#### **4.5 Evaluation of improvement of a strategic goal**

Having mapped the metrics the remaining task was to analyse the data and look for evidence of improvement. The approach was to plot the data for each metric in excel and then add a linear regression trend line using least-squares fit. The trend line generated an f-statistic which was accepted if the value was greater than the critical value of the f-distribution. The critical value was set at .10 when analysing both the NPM and WG periods, and .05 when analysing the entire 9-year period of study. These different critical values were set to accommodate the smaller data sets when reviewing the different policy periods.

In our analysis, the strategy was considered to have improved if more than half of the metrics trended correctly and were statistically significant. To illustrate Figure 2 displays the metrics of a successful and unsuccessful strategy:

- The top part of figure 2 shows the individual metrics relating to NSW Police's strategy, 'reducing crime'. This strategy had 5 metrics and 3 of 5 or 60% of the metrics are significant and trending correctly. The strategy of 'Reducing Crime' was therefore considered to have been successful.
- The bottom part of figure 3 shows individual metrics for the strategy 'Improve literacy and numeracy'. The strategy had 6 metrics but only 2 of 6 or 33% trended correctly. The strategic goal of improving literacy and numeracy was not considered to be successful.



The metrics used to denote successful strategy were examined from two perspectives. The first perspective considered relative performance in different policy environments. The second perspective looked at metrics by strategy.

The first analysis is summarised in Table 6. The analysis found in the NPM policy environment only 22 out of 115 metrics (19%) had improved. The remaining 93 metrics (81%) were either significantly negative or statistically insignificant showing no clear improvements. In the WG policy environment 41 out of 121 metrics (34%) had improved. The remaining 80 metrics (66%) were either significantly negative or statistically insignificant showing no clear improvements. Across the entire period 47 out of 155 metrics (30%) had improved, and 108 metrics (70%) did not. There is no evidence suggesting the 2008/2009 global financial crisis, technological change or outside influences had any systematic impact on performance. These statistics are detailed in full in Appendix 1.

Figure 3 presents graphically the analysis of successfully trending metrics in the NPM and WG periods by agency. All agencies had a very low proportion of successful to unsuccessful metrics in the NPM period. All agencies, other than the NSW Department of Education, showed significantly more successful metrics during the WG period. It seems clear that the WG policy environment had a positive effect. In addition to this, the data shows 1/3 of the metrics are improving which suggests projects may have contributed to strategy. We explore this further in the next perspective.

#### **4.7 Are Projects contributing to Strategy – analysis by strategy**

The number of successful metrics per strategy is shown in Table 7. This table is identical to Table 5 with the addition of the number of successful metrics shown as a fraction of the total metrics mapped to each strategy. Successful strategies, where half or more of the metrics are significant and trending in the right direction, are shaded.

The analysis shows 4 out of 21 strategies (19%) were successful during the NPM period, 11 out of 25 strategies (44%) were successful during the WG period, and 7 out of 25 strategies (28%) were successful over the 9-year period of study.

When the analysis in Table 7 is summarised by agency (Table 8), we see that Transport appears to have been the least successful in improving its strategic goals over the 9 year period of study. The other agencies appear to have improved approximately 40% of their strategic goals (i.e. around 2 out of 5) with the RTA and Department of Health being standout performers in the WG period.

The high level view of strategies may be deceptive because the strategies are not equally important. Education for example did not improve any of its strategic goals related to student performance. The two strategic goals that were improved (Excellent staff, sustainable management) are probably better considered enablers than core strategic goals. In the same way police managed to 'enhance capabilities' rather than 'reduce rates of crime'. It is to be hoped that improvements in enabling strategies will eventually lead to improvements in the core strategies. It is difficult to know whether the five years being studied has allowed enough time for the impact to become evident. The political discourse suggests that results are expected in this timeframe, however in similar analyses of policy-implementation restructuring in Norway, Samset (2008) advises that this is too soon to evaluate the effects. Our data suggests that only a third of core strategies have improved. If we confine our analysis to the more recent WG period, around two out of five core strategies have improved.

## **5. Discussion**

The evidence suggests 10 out of 25 strategies have improved over the nine year period of study. This is a very different finding to Young et al. (2012) who did not find any evidence that project investments lead to strategy implementation. We believe the difference in finding is mainly due to the methodology.

Judgement is required to assess whether it was worthwhile to invest around \$100B over the 9 year period of study to improve only 10 out of 25 strategies. Using schoolroom criteria this result would not be considered a passing grade.

### **5.1 Impact of methodology**

Young et al. (2012) concluded that projects were not contributing to strategy because there were no details in Annual Reports announcing that strategies were succeeding. This research has aggregated lower-level, performance data and linked it to strategy independent of Agency Annual Reporting. These different approaches have several implications:

Firstly, the methodology taken by Young et al. (2012) was predisposed to an 'all-or-nothing' type of conclusion. Either positive reports against strategy would be found or they wouldn't. Young et al. (2012) did not explore the year on year distortions that are created if agencies only publish positive results in their Annual Reports. This research addresses this issue because NSW makes public both positive and negative results.

Secondly, by investigating lower-level data sets in NSW, there are a larger number of measures and data points from which to interpret the impact of projects. It was always unlikely that the entire dataset would only have negative results, so it is to be expected that the NSW data would provide at least some signs of success.

These considerations lead us to believe that the NSW data is probably comparable to Victoria in similar policy environments. During the 2001-2006 NPM period in NSW, the number of strategies that showed any improvement was 19%. We suspect that if Young et al. had examined finer-grained metrics, they would have found similar results. If we are correct, Young et al. might have revised their conclusion from 'projects contribute nothing to the realisation of strategic goals' to 'projects contribute little to the realisation of strategic goals'.

## 5.2 Impact of policy environment

The research findings are consistent with Young et al. (2012) in the NPM environment but significantly different in the WG environment. It seems that projects are twice as effective in contributing to strategic goals when there are stable strategic priorities and centralised project oversight. In the case of NSW the improvement rose from 19% to 44%. These results resemble the UK Bates Review findings. Recommendations put forward by the Bates Review to centralize oversight and reduce the number of institutional players led to significant increases in project success rates (Bates & Britain, 1999; Miller & Hobbs, 2005).

We conclude that when the environment is right, projects do appear to make some contribution to strategy. This finding is not a cause for celebration because fewer than half the strategies were found to be improving but it is an important balancing view to findings of Young et al. (2012). Projects by definition are not business-as-usual and we are right to expect project investments will lead to improvements. Whether improvement in 44% of strategic goals is acceptable or not is a judgement call. We and others (Thorp, 2003) believe that the effort required to implement WG should lead to 80-90% of projects delivering the expected benefits.

This research is not able to discern which of the WG innovations had the most impact on the effectiveness of projects. We suspect that stable strategic goals is one of the most important factors and note with alarm that before WG, 30% of strategic priorities changed every year. If this was a common phenomenon, it would suggest that even under ideal circumstances where all projects align to strategy, 30% of projects would be irrelevant the following year because the strategic priorities would have disappeared. We believe Young et al. (2012) are correct in stating the State of Victoria is an exemplar, and we are not overly optimistic about the stability of strategic goals in most organisations. We believe the stability of strategic goals is a topic worthy of more research.

Stability of strategic goals is probably a direct result of the other major WG innovation – the establishment of a state-wide PMO and cabinet to lead collaboration between agencies. If true, it will

be interesting to explore whether this insight can be generalised. The process of determining strategic goals and building collaboration will be different between states and between the public and private sector. In addition to this, leadership and clarity of purpose is likely to be more important than the process itself. The process of developing stable strategic goals is a topic worthy of further research.

## **6. Limitations**

This research had to manage two main limitations.

Firstly in estimating project expenditure, this research had to overcome significant limitations in the data. An estimate was provided but the quality of the source data was poor. It seems reasonable to conclude that project expenditures in NSW are comparable to the State of Victoria. Limitations of the data prevent any deeper analysis.

This research has used a finer level of detail to assess whether projects are contributing to strategy. However, the assessment is still based on an indirect form of logic. The assumption is made that performance will remain constant if expenditure is only on business-as-usual activities. It is assumed that changes in performance are a result of project expenditure. This assumption is partially validated by the findings in the research which aligned specific projects against specific strategies. However, there was no direct assessment of whether specific projects are impacting on specific measures and directly contributing to specific strategies. This limitation seems acceptable given the scope of the research question but multiple longitudinal studies might be undertaken to provide more clarity.

## **7. Conclusion**

This research has replicated Young et al. (2012) to see if projects are contributing to strategy in the State of NSW. Five Agencies were studied in detail using lower level performance metrics mapped to agency strategies.

The research identified 155 metrics that could be mapped against 25 strategies in the nine year period between 2001 and 2010. Many other metrics were found but could not be used because data was not reported consistently from year to year. In the period 2001-2006, which is directly comparable to Young et al. (2012), it was found that 30% of strategic objectives would change every year.

The research replicated Young et al.'s (2012) finding from 2001-2006, but not from 2007-2010. This first period corresponded to a New Public Management (NPM) policy environment and the second to a Whole of Government (WG) policy environment. The main difference is that strategic goals were more stable under WG.

It was found that in the first environment (NPM), only one in five strategies were being positively impacted. It was inferred that Young et al.'s (2012) earlier finding should be modified to state 'projects contribute little to the realisation of strategic goals'.

However, it was found that in highly collaborative environments with stable strategic goals (WG), two in five strategies are positively impacted. It seems that in these environments 'projects make some contribution to the realisation of strategic goals'.

We conclude that Young et al.'s (2012) findings were partially replicated in the case of NSW. The research strengthens the evidence that projects contribute little to the implementation of strategy. The replication has implications for both the public and private sector because both cases are characterised by 'private sector economic and managerial techniques'. This finding is disturbing and applicable to all public sectors practicing NPM.

A promising new finding is that 'in some environments projects make some contribution to the realisation of strategic goals'. We note however that strategic goals such as reducing crime and reducing congestion have a very large impact on quality of life. We definitely do not believe it is acceptable for project investment to have only impacted on 19% of strategic goals as was the case between 2001 and 2006 where private sector tools and techniques were being used under NPM. Furthermore, we believe it is poor for project investment to have impacted on only 2 out of 5 goals in the more favourable WG environment (with stable strategies and central oversight). It is a fiduciary

duty of the board to ensure funds are well spent and when the amount invested is around \$100B the case for improvement is very strong indeed.

More research is required to identify whether the improvement was due to the WG environment and if so, which aspects of the WG environment caused projects to be strategically more effective. More research is also required to explore how projects in general can contribute more to strategy.

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**Table 1: Project Spending in NSW 2009 and 2010**

	2009				2010			
	Budget \$(000)	Capital Projects \$(000)	Soft Project \$(000)	Project spend as % of total budget	Budget \$(000)	Capital Projects \$(000)	Soft Projects \$(000)	Project spend as % of total budget
<b>Health</b>	13,151	780	716	11%	14,488	603	1,094	12%
<b>Education</b>	10,954	732	478	11%	11,928	2,666	1,480	35%
<b>Transport</b>	3,746	112	785	24%	4,422	222	1,087	30%
<b>RTA</b>	2,613	2,200	0	84%	2,785	2,550	33	93%
<b>Police</b>	2,361	158	324	20%	2,460	160	464	25%
<b>Total</b>	32,825	3,982	2303	19%	36,083	6,202	4,158	29%

**Table 2: Number of stable metrics by NSW Agency and policy period**

NSW Agency	# stable metrics		
	NPM (2001-2006)	WG (2007-2010)	2001-2010
Health	28	26	40
Education	34	32	39
Transport	23	27	27
Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA)	12	16	21
Police	18	20	28
<b>Total</b>	<b>115</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>155</b>

**Table 3: Changing strategic priorities of NSW Health**

<b>Strategic Priorities NSW Health 2003</b>	<b>Strategic Priorities NSW Health 2004</b>	<b>Strategic Priorities NSW Health 2005</b>
Realising the goals of NSW Health.		
Sharing a clear direction.		
	Improving health	Improve the health of the population by reducing health risk
Developing and maintaining a skilled valued workforce	Skilled and valued staff	Invest in a sustainable workforce
Developing working partnerships and engaging the community	Involving the community	
Enabling informed decision making.		
Embracing innovation.		
	Equity of access to service	Improve access to services and clinical efficiency
	Tackling complex issues through alliances.	
	Quality	
	Efficient use of resources	
		Implement administrative, structural and corporate services reform
		Pursue Commonwealth/State reforms, including aged care
		Improve mental health services
		Improve patient safety
		Improve Aboriginal health
<i>67% change - 6 strategic goals, 2 carried through to 2004</i>	<i>43% change - 7 strategic goals, 3 carried through to 2005</i>	

**Table 4: Changes in Strategic Priorities in NSW 2001-2010**

<b>NSW Agency</b>		<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>
Health	# strategic priorities	6	6	7	8	8	5	5	5	5
	% retained in next year	100%	33%	43%	100%	38%	100%	100%	100%	
Education	# strategic priorities	12	12	6	6	5	5	5	6	6
	% retained in next year	100%	17%	100%	33%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
Transport	# strategic priorities	7	6	3	3	6	6	6	6	6
	% retained in next year	14%	50%	100%	33%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
RTA	# strategic priorities	9	9	10	4	4	4	6	6	6
	% retained in next year	100%	89%	40%	100%	100%	50%	100%	100%	
Police	# strategic priorities	3	3	5	6	2	5	5	5	5
	% retained in next year	100%	66%	100%	33%	100%	100%	100%	100%	
All Agencies	# strategic priorities	<b>37</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>28</b>
	% retained in next year	<b>84%</b>	<b>47%</b>	<b>68%</b>	<b>63%</b>	<b>80%</b>	<b>92%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	
<b>Average change for all agencies</b>		<b>34%</b>				<b>7%</b>				

**Table 5: Number of metrics by strategy and agency**

Agency	Strategic Direction or Strategic Priority	# Metrics		
		2001-2006 NPM	2007-2010 WG	2001-2010 Overall
<b>Health</b>	Make prevention everybody's business	8	6	8
	Create better experiences for people using health services	11	12	18
	Strengthen primary health and continuing care in the community	7	4	10
	Make smart choices about the costs and benefits of health services	1	1	1
	Build a sustainable workforce	1	3	3
<b>Education</b>	Successful Students	16	16	21
	Indigenous student match or better broader population	8	7	10
	Vocational Education and Training for a skilled workforce	1	1	1
	Excellent Staff	2	2	2
	Responsible and sustainable management	7	6	5
<b>Transport</b>	Meeting Future Transport Needs	8	11	11
	Improving Service Delivery	3	4	4
	Providing Equity of Access	12	12	12
<b>RTA</b>	Safety	2	4	4
	Performance	6	7	7
	Environment	2	3	6
	Services	2	1	3
	Human Resources		1	1
<b>Police</b>	Reduced rates of crime, particularly violent crime	7	5	7
	Reduced perception and fear of crime	2	1	2
	Increased community confidence in police	7	6	11
	Safer public transport and roads	2	3	3
	A safe and supportive work environment		1	1
	- <i>Target antisocial behaviour</i>		1	1
	Enhanced capabilities		3	3
<b>25 strategic priorities</b>		<b>115</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>155</b>

**Table 6: Performance metrics for top 5 NSW State Agencies**

	<b>2001-2006 NPM</b>	<b>2007-2010 WG</b>	<b>2001-2010 Overall</b>
# Metrics	115	121	155
Trending positively	22 (19%)	41 (34%)	47 (30%)
Trending negatively or insignificant	93 (81%)	80 (66%)	108 (70%)



**Table 7: Number of successful metrics by strategy and agency**

Agency	Strategic Direction or Strategic Priority	2001-2006 NPM	2007-2010 WG	2001-2010 Overall
Health	Make prevention everybody's business	1/8	1/6	2/8
	Create better experiences for people using health services	4/11	2/12	6/18
	Strengthen primary health and continuing care in the community	1/7	3/4	3/10
	Make smart choices about the costs and benefits of health services	1/1	1/1	1/1
	Build a sustainable workforce	0/1	3/3	3/3
Education	Successful Students	4/16	2/16	7/21
	Indigenous student match or better broader population	1/8	1/7	0/10
	Vocational Education and Training for a skilled workforce	0/1	1/1	0/1
	Excellent Staff	2/2	2/2	2/2
	Responsible and sustainable management	2/7	2/6	4/5
Transport	Meeting Future Transport Needs	0/8	4/11	2/11
	Improving Service Delivery	0/3	2/4	2/4
	Providing Equity of Access	2/12	4/12	0/12
RTA	Safety	0/2	1/4	2/4
	Performance	0/6	4/7	2/7
	Environment	0/2	2/3	2/6
	Services	2/2	0/1	2/3
	Human Resources		1/1	0/1
Police	Reduced rates of crime, particularly violent crime	1/7	3/5	2/7
	Reduced perception and fear of crime	1/2	0/1	1/2
	Increased community confidence in police	0/7	0/6	0/11
	Safer public transport and roads	0/2	0/3	2/3
	A safe and supportive work environment		0/1	0/1
	<i>Target antisocial behaviour</i>		0/1	0/1
	Enhanced capabilities		2/3	2/3
Total successful strategies		4/21	10/25	10/25

**Table 8: Number of successful strategies by agency**

Agency	Successful Strategies					
	2001-2006 NPM		2007-2010 WG		2001-2010 Overall	
<b>Health</b>	1/5	20%	3/5	60%	2/5	40%
<b>Education</b>	1/5	20%	1/5	20%	2/5	40%
<b>Transport</b>	0/3	0%	1/3	33%	1/3	33%
<b>RTA</b>	1/4	25%	3/5	60%	2/5	40%
<b>Police</b>	1/4	25%	2/7	29%	3/7	43%
<b>Total successful strategies</b>	<b>4/21</b>	<b>19%</b>	<b>10/25</b>	<b>40%</b>	<b>10/25</b>	<b>40%</b>

## 1. Appendices

### 1.1 Appendix 1: NSW Agency Strategic Priority, Metrics and analysis of improvement

#### 1.1.1 NSW Department of Health

**Table 1: Health strategic priorities, metrics and analyses of improvement**

Strategic Priority	Goal	Metric	2001-2006 NPM	2007- 2010 WG	2001- 2010 Overall
Make prevention everybody's business	Improved health through reduced obesity, smoking, illicit drug use and risk drinking	Smoking	✓	✗	✓
		Obesity	✗	✗	✗
		Alcohol risk drinking	✗	✓	✗
	Reduced vaccine preventable conditions	Influenza	✗	✗	✗
		Pneumococcal	✗	✗	✓
		Child 1-year full immunisations	✗	✗	✗
	Reduced fall injuries among older people	Fall hospitalisations male	✗		✗
		Fall hospitalisations female	✗		
		Falls in hospital resulting in death			✗
Create better experiences for people using health services	Improved access to quality health care	Public hospital separations	✓	✗	✗
		Unplanned re-admission	✗	✗	✗
		Unplanned re-admission to ICU			✗
		Cancellations of planned surgery		✗	✗
		Ambulance response times		✗	✗
		Length of stay	✓		✓
	Emergency departments	Emergency Dept Attendance	✗	✗	✗
		Triage 2	✗	✗	✓
		Triage 3	✓		✓
		Triage 4	✓		✓
		Triage 5	✗		✓
	Elective surgery	Theatre utilisation		✗	✗
	Increased customer satisfaction with health services	Patient experience following treatment		✓	✓
	Ensuring high quality care	Incorrect Procedures Radiology		✗	✗
		Incorrect Procedures Surgery		✗	✗

Strategic Priority	Goal	Metric	2001-2006 NPM	2007- 2010 WG	2001- 2010 Overall
		Off stretcher time	x	✓	x
		Sentinel events (per 100,000 beds)	x	x	x
		Radiotherapy utilisation rate	x		x
Strengthen primary health and continuing care in the community	Improved health for Aboriginal communities	Otitis Screening (hearing)			x
		Improved outcomes in mental health	Patient Suicides	✓	x
	Ambulatory contacts		✓	✓	
	Mental health re-admission		x	x	x
	Increased focus on early intervention	Antenatal visits	x		x
		Antenatal visits aboriginal	✓		✓
		Low birth weight babies	x		x
		Low birth weight babies aboriginal	x		x
		Postnatal checkups	x	✓	✓
			Postnatal home visits	x	
Make smart choices about the costs and benefits of health services	Make the most effective use of resources for health	Average distance from health services	✓	✓	✓
Build a sustainable workforce	Build a sustainable Workforce	Workplace injuries	x	✓	✓
		Sick leave		✓	✓
		Aboriginal staff		✓	✓

## 1.1.2 NSW Department of Education

**Table 2: Education strategic priorities, metrics and analyses of improvement**

Strategic Priority	Goal	Metric	2001-2006 NPM	2007- 2010 WG	2001- 2010 Overall	
Successful Students	year 3 and 5 better literacy and numeracy benchmarks	Literacy year 3	x	x	x	
		Numeracy year 3	x	x	✓	
		Literacy year 5	x	x	x	
		Numeracy year 5	x	x	✓	
		Literacy year 7	x	x	x	
		Numeracy year 7	x	x	x	
		Literacy year 8	x		x	
		Numeracy year 8	x		x	
		Literacy year 9		x	x	
		Numeracy Year 9		x	x	
	more students in high achievement bands in school cert and higher cert	Literacy top 2 bands				✓
		math top 2 bands				x
		science top 2 bands				✓
		HSC Distinguished Achiever	✓	✓	✓	
	increased hsc completion rates	Awarded School Certificate	x	x	✓	
		Awarded HSC	x	x	x	
		aboriginal Cert	✓	✓	✓	
		Low socio	x	x	x	
		High socio	✓	x	x	
		rural central	✓	x	x	
rural remote		x	x	x		
Indigenous student match or better broader population	Indigenous literacy and numeracy benchmarks	> band 2+ literacy year 3	x	✓	x	
		> band 2 numeracy year 3	x	x	x	
		> band 3 literacy year 5	x	x	x	
		> band 3 numeracy year 5	✓	x	x	
		Literacy year 7	x	x	x	
		Numeracy year 7	x		x	
		Literacy year 8	x		x	
		Numeracy year 8	x		x	

Strategic Priority	Goal	Metric	2001-2006 NPM	2007- 2010 WG	2001- 2010 Overall
		Literacy year 9		x	x
		Numeracy year 9		x	x
Vocational Education and Training for a skilled workforce	greater participation in higher education/training/employment	education or training	x	✓	x
Excellent Staff	Improved Staff morale	Student: teacher Primary	✓	✓	✓
		Student: Teacher overall	✓	✓	✓
Responsible and sustainable management	Increased attendance		x	✓	x
	Access to technology	Computer : Student ratio	x		
	Reduced class size Kintergarten-year2	Kindergarten	✓	x	✓
		Year1	✓	x	✓
		Year2	✓	x	✓
	Cost of FT Student		x	x	x
Retention Rate		✓	✓	✓	

### 1.1.3 NSW Department of Transport

**Table 3: Transport strategic priorities, metrics and analyses of improvement**

Strategic Priority	Goal	Metric	2001-2006 NPM	2007- 2010 WG	2001- 2010 Overall
Meeting Future Transport Needs		Trips by public transport	x	✓	✓
		Trips by Car	x	✓	✓
		Bicycle	x	x	x
		Trips by car #	x	x	x
		No. Total Trips per day Sydney Wkday	x	x	x
		Train trips	x	✓	x
		Bus trips	x	x	x
		Ferry trips	x	✓	x
		Total km/day sydney (million km)			x
Avg work trip duration			x	x	

Strategic Priority	Goal	Metric	2001-2006 NPM	2007- 2010 WG	2001- 2010 Overall
		Avg total travel time (mins)		x	x
Improving Service Delivery		131500 Website visitors avg month		✓	✓
		Customer train satisfaction	x	✓	✓
		Customer Bus satisfaction	x	x	x
		Customer Ferry satisfaction	x	x	x
Providing Equity of Access		Full Train	x	x	x
		Child	x	x	x
		Free school pass	✓	x	x
		Free other	x	✓	x
		Concession OAP	x	x	x
		Concession student	x	x	x
		Full Bus	x	x	x
		Child	x	✓	x
		Free school pass	✓	✓	x
		Free other	x	x	x
		Concession OAP	x	x	x
		Concession student	x	✓	x

#### 1.1.4 NSW Roads and Transport Authority (RTA)

**Table 4: RTA strategic priorities, metrics and analyses of improvement**

Strategic Priority	Goal	Metric	2001-2006 NPM	2007- 2010 WG	2001- 2010 Overall
Safety	Halve the number of fatalities by 2010, based on 1999 figures.	fatalities / 100,000 people	x	x	✓
		fatalities / 100 million km vehicle's travelled	x	x	✓
	Increase community awareness and positive attitudes to road safety	% of fatalities where speed was a factor		x	x
		% of fatalities where alcohol was a factor		✓	x
Performance	Maintain average peak travel speeds in Sydney at existing levels	Travel speed: seven major routes AM peak (km/h, urban)	x	x	x

Strategic Priority	Goal	Metric	2001-2006 NPM	2007- 2010 WG	2001- 2010 Overall
		Travel speed: seven major routes PM peak (km/h, urban)	x	x	✓
	On-time and on-budget completion of major State Road network projects.	Major works completed within planned duration or within 10%	x	✓	x
	Ride quality rated 'good or better' for 88% of State Roads.	Ride quality: smoothness of State Roads (% good/% poor) (	x	✓	x
	The road network is maintained to the required condition	Maintenance and reconstruction expenditure per km \$(000)		x	x
	Heavy vehicle access to the road network is sustainable	Heavy vehicle inspection scheme (defecit free vehicles)	x	✓	x
		Heavy vehicle # of inspections	x	✓	✓
Environment	Achieve no infringements from State Government environmental regulators.	number of non-compliances with env. Licences	x	x	x
		number of major environmental incidents arising from RTA direct operation			x
	Contribute to a reduction in vehicle emissions	RTA Fleet environmental score			x
	Use less resources, reduce waste and reduce our footprint	RTA's total greenhouse gas emissions	x		x
	Alternative forms of transport are supported	Cycleway length offroad			✓
Cycleway length onroad				✓	✓
Services	90% of motor registry customers rate service as good or very good			x	x
	Accessibility of RTA information	Use of RTA Website (millions of hits)	✓		✓
		Percentage of vehicle registration renewals completed via the internet or telephone	✓		✓
Human Resources	Reduction in the number and severity of injuries.	Workplace injuries/100 employees		✓	x

### 1.1.5 NSW Police



**Table 5: Police strategic priorities, metrics and analyses of improvement**

Strategic Priority	Goal	Metric	2001-2006 NPM	2007- 2010 WG	2001- 2010 Overall	
Reduced rates of crime, particularly violent crime	Coordinate resources dedicated to crime prevention	#Emergency Calls	x	x	x	
		Crime against persons	x	✓	x	
		Crime against property	✓	✓	✓	
		Urgent response calls	x	x	x	
	Target alcohol and drug related crime	Drunk drivers charged	x		x	
	Continue to bring offenders to justice	People Charged	x	✓	✓	
Investigative outcomes 30 days -incidents finalised		x		x		
Reduced perception and fear of crime	Enable local solutions to local problems	Feeling safer walking or jogging at night	✓	x	✓	
		Perception of crime - no crime	x		x	
Increased community confidence in police	Respond to calls within a reasonable time	Respond to calls within 10 mins		x	x	
		Time to respond to 80% of calls			x	
		Urgent call response 50% threshold	x		x	
		Urgent call response 80% threshold	x		x	
	Provide professional customer service	Complaints			x	x
		Customer service complaints			x	x
		Satisfied by most recent police contact	x	x	x	
		Satisfied by police service	x	x	x	
		Confidence in police	x	x	x	
		Police treat people fairly	x		x	
Safer public transport and roads	Encourage responsible driving and behaviour on public transport	Crashes involving alcohol		x	x	
		Fatal Crashes	x	x	✓	
		Public transport feeling safe	x	x	✓	
A safe and supportive work environment	Progress a culture of workplace safety	Compensation claims		x	x	
	Target antisocial behaviour	Antisocial (Vandalism,Speeding,Louts,Drunks) - upper limits		x	x	
Enhanced	Foster workforce diversity to reflect our community	% Women		x	x	

Strategic Priority	Goal	Metric	2001-2006 NPM	2007- 2010 WG	2001- 2010 Overall
capabilities		% Non-native English		✓	✓
		% Aboriginal		✓	✓

## 1.2 Appendix 2: Strategic Directions with missing metrics

**Table 6: NSW Strategic directions with missing metrics**

Agency	Strategic Direction or Strategic Priority	Goal
Health	Be ready for new risks and opportunities	Ensure the NSW health system is ready for new risks and opportunities
	Informed decision making	
	Embracing innovation	
	Sharing a clear direction	
	Realising the goals of NSW Health	
	Skilled valued workforce	
	Build regional and other partnerships for health	
Police	Working partnerships and engaging the community	
	Deliver effective, appropriate, quality policing services.	
	Motivated workforce	
Education	Management and sustainability of results	
	Leadership by shaping national policy	
Transport	Delivering Safe and Reliable Services	On road inspections
	Delivering Rural and Regional Services	
	Protecting the Environment	
	Providing Strategic Management	

**Highlights:**

- Replication of Young et al (2012) to conclude projects contribute little to strategy
- Validate the minimal impact of projects on the realization of strategic goals
- Comparison of public-sector project effectiveness in different policy environments
- Centralized oversight and stable strategies leads to higher rates of project success
- In some environments projects contribute to the realization of strategic goals

Figure1 Whole of Government vs. New Public Management  
[Click here to download high resolution image](#)




Figure1 Whole of Government vs. New Public Management in NSW PPT







figure2\_successful\_unsuccessful\_strategies  
[Click here to download high resolution image](#)



Significant result



Significant result



Significant result




Significant result - wrong direction




Insignificant result


Successful strategy. NSW Police: 'Reduced Rates of Crime, Particularly Violent Crime'




Insignificant result




Significant result - wrong direction




Insignificant Result



Significant result



Significant result



Insignificant result

Unsuccessful Strategy. NSW Education: 'Improve Literacy and Numeracy'

Figure 3 Comparison\_of\_successful metricss

	NPM succ	Unsuccessf	WG succes:	unsuccessfi
Health	7	21	10	16
Education	11	23	8	24
Transport	2	21	10	17
RTA	2	10	8	8
Police	2	16	5	15