

**Relations of Power and Competing Knowledges
Within the Academy:
Creative Writing as Research**

Sue North

**A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy**

November 2004

**Division of Communication and Education
University of Canberra**

© Sue North 2004

Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to explore the politics of discourse within Australian universities with particular reference to the position of creative writing as a research discipline. My thesis argues that some discourses have more power than others, with the effect that some forms of knowledge are seen as valid research and others as invalid, at least in research terms.

Academic research has been increasingly dichotomised in the short history of research in Australian universities through issues of public versus private funding, and university concern for sector autonomy. The growing influence on university research, stemming from a global market economy, is one that privileges applied research. Creative writing's position within a basic/applied dichotomy is tenuous as its practitioners vie for a place in the shrinking autonomous research sector of universities.

I show the philosophical understanding of creativity (with specific reference to creative writing) from a historical perspective and explore this understanding in the current climate. This understanding of creativity confounds creative writing's position as research, for this highlights the obstacles faced in certifying it as a valid form of knowledge. I investigate the current status of creative writing in the area of university research in relation to research equivalence, and examine the terminology, the social structures and individual experiences surrounding creative writing as a form of research.

Acknowledgements

Firstly, I wish to acknowledge with deepest gratitude the assistance and advice I have received from my primary supervisor, Dr Jennifer Webb. Her support and guidance during the period of my candidacy has been remarkable in all ways. Jen has been consistent in her encouragement, in her commendation of my work to others, and in communicating her trust in my ability to accomplish this thesis. She has given her time unfailingly, and I am especially grateful for this sacrifice during her sabbatical. Jen has listened to my ideas and read my words, warts and all, with consistent considered critique throughout. I admire her wholeheartedly and laud her effort on my behalf.

I am also particularly grateful to Dr Bethaney Turner who, even though joining my supervisory panel at a late stage, has given valuable consideration to, and critique of, my work at a very busy time of the academic year.

My warmest thanks go to Bethaney and to Jordan Williams, for friendships that I treasure: their camaraderie, lively discussion, insight, understanding, fellowship, joviality and hospitality that made my many trips to Canberra so wonderful.

I am much obliged to the Division of Communication and Education at the University of Canberra who allocated me an Australian Postgraduate Award Scholarship and a subsequent University Completion Scholarship.

I would also like to thank all those who agreed to participate in the focus group discussions that formed the basis for this thesis.

My thanks to my good friends Drs Joelle Vandermensbrugghe and Pauline Griffiths who helped keep me inspired: to Joelle for reading an early version of Chapter One; to Pauline for listening to ideas for later ones. Also, thanks to Grant Courtney for being only a phone call away and for taking on the job of full-time father.

Thanks to my sister, Lisa North, for her support over this time, and to her and my sister-in-law, Sue Mulligan, for their help in proofing the final stages of this thesis.

Lastly, and most importantly, I wish to thank my daughter, Ellie, who has lived this process with me, who has been waiting for me to help her write her own book(s), whose patience and understanding far outweigh her nine years, and who won't believe that this is all finally over.

CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	v
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	viii
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER ONE	
CREATIVE WRITING'S WEB OF RELATIONS	18
The Field of Research	21
Autonomy/Heteronomy and the Academy	24
The Measure of Creative Writing	27
The Dominant Principle in Research	29
Early Universities	35
Early 20 th Century	45
Post World War Two	53
<i>The Murray Report</i>	55
<i>The Martin Report</i>	59
Universities and the Federal Government	63
Conclusion	71
CHAPTER TWO	
THE CONFLICT OF THE FACULTIES	72
The Contingency of Knowledge	74
Rationalism versus Empiricism	79
The Aesthetic	83
Copernican Fallout	88
Useful and Useless Knowledge	94
Academic Habitus	105
The Corollary of the Aesthetic	112
The Wildness of the 'Doing' Subject	118
The Doxa of Creativity	124
Conclusion	129
CHAPTER THREE	
IN TERMS OF VALUE	130
Value and Capital	132
Neoliberalism and the Inalienability of Creative Writing	137
Research in a Neoliberal Climate	141
Economic Value	144
The Circulation of Knowledge	148
National Research Priorities	156
Power	165
University Research Priorities	173
Science and Technology: Alienated Forms of Knowledge	179
Conclusion	186

CHAPTER FOUR	
THE DUMB BEAST ON THE COUCH	188
Creative Writing as Value	191
The Dumb Beast	
<i>The Idea of Tactics and Strategies</i>	200
<i>The Illusion of the Absolute</i>	206
<i>Creative Writing is Practice and Theory</i>	212
<i>Writing as the Zoo of Society</i>	224
<i>The Use of Tactics against Strategies</i>	230
On the Couch	
<i>A Pluralised Society</i>	234
<i>Creativity as Innovation</i>	237
<i>A Virtue of Necessity</i>	241
<i>Creativity as a Tactic</i>	245
Conclusion	251
CONCLUSION	253
BIBLIOGRAPHY	258
APPENDICES	286

List of Abbreviations

AAH	Australian Academy of the Humanities
AAWP	Australian Association of Writing Programs
ALP	Australian Labor Party
ARC	Australian Research Council
AUC	Australian Universities Commission
AVCC	Australian Vice-Chancellor's Committee
CHASS	Council for Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences
CSIRO	Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation
DCA	Doctor of Creative Arts
DEET	Department of Employment, Education and Training
DEETYA	Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs
DEST	Department of Education, Science and Training
DETYA	Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HEC	Higher Education Council
IGS	Institutional Grants Scheme
NBEET	National Board of Employment, Education and Training
NHMRC	National Health and Medical Research Council
NRP	National Research Priorities
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
RQ	Research Quantum
RRTMR	Research and Research Training Management Report
RTS	Research Training Scheme
SET	Science, Engineering and Technology
SS&H	Social Science and Humanities
TEC	Tertiary Education Commission
UTS	University of Technology, Sydney

Introduction

I wonder if anyone can recall first experiencing the joy of learning? I doubt it, although Andrew Taylor (1999) claims his father can remember his own first bath, so I suppose it is possible. I cannot recall either of these firsts, but discovery and baths bring to mind a wonderful children's book, *Mr Archimedes' Bath* (Allen, 1980). In it, Mr Archimedes sets out to resolve a puzzle: the bath floods every time someone gets in, which challenges his expectations of what should happen.

I came to this book as a parent, using it to expand my child's horizons and to prompt her to question her expectations. Many books in my childhood had done that; many people as well. My grade five teacher was one person who encouraged us to question our expectations. He challenged us to prove that the trees we saw in the distance were not four inches tall – as we had found from measuring by sight through the window of our classroom, holding up our hands to capture the image of a tree in the space between forefinger and thumb with one eye shut. This memory is distinct, as it was the first time I had to challenge a given perception. I knew trees were always many feet high, and surely they did not shrink when you walked away from them, as Mr Thomson said, but the challenge to prove him wrong was what captured my interest.

At a conference in my Honours year, I was struck again by a challenge to a given perception. It was a postgraduate seminar on creative practice in the university, and Dennis Strand had delivered an exposé on his detailed report to government concerning this topic (Strand, 1998). His investigation looked at the meaning of research in the creative arts, and also at funding arrangements and performance indicators for this discipline area. It encompassed many creative practices that had been increasing in

popularity in universities over the previous decade, but one practice his work failed to address was creative writing.

The seminar proceeded, and discussion turned to people's thoughts on the requirement of an exegesis (or accompanying essay) for creative work submitted for consideration as research. One speaker stated that this requirement extirpated any interpretation of the creative work other than that of its creator. I was sitting in the darkened theatre, next to one of my lecturers. Her muttered response to this comment was that this view of the reception of the accompanying essay was solipsistic. I was taken aback by both comments. Was this why creative writers could not do Honours or postgraduate work in their chosen area (which was true of many universities in 1999)? Did those in other disciplines think creative writers only opposed the exegesis because of postmodern tenets about not imposing one's interpretation on someone else? I thought objections to the thesis were on a different level to that: for a start, that creative writing is not accepted as research because of funding guidelines set by government; its place in relation to other disciplines is relegated as such by the attitude to creativity Western society has held since the time of the Enlightenment; and its place in the university is changing because of its links to economic viability; in short, creative writing is not valued in the academy.

Later, thinking about those comments on the exegesis in the seminar took me back to the trees and Mr Thomson. I agreed with my lecturer – we do share views with others; in a peer review situation, we are not projecting our views onto a *tabula rasa*. We share our interpretations, but where do we get these perceptions from, and how do we conclude they are right? I view creative work as far more than just an expression of the artist 'laid bare'. I see creative writing (the practice that particularly concerns me) as the outcome of a plethora of experience and knowledge, and hence as a valuable contribution to the research area of a university: that area that strives to understand and *find* out. I want to investigate social perceptions of creative writing because it was the practice that Dennis Strand *left* out.

What Strand's work argued was that creative practices could be encompassed at the research level in universities if one allowed their work to be 'research equivalent' (Strand, 1998:xvi). Strand points to three approaches in the debate about research in the creative arts, which summarised are:

1. *The conservative approach*, which classifies work as research only if it is *about* something;
2. *The pragmatic approach*, which accepts work as research *in* a creative area provided it is accompanied by work *about* that area;
3. *The liberal approach*, which views research *in* creative work as a vital contribution to university life and which should be classified as research (Strand, 1998:40).

Strand states that most debate is between the pragmatic and liberal approaches.

This summary shows that debate is bifurcated into research *in* and research *about*, which stems from the divide between 'practitioners' and 'scholars' (Strand, 1998:42). Its occurrence in the current climate is largely the result of government policy. When the government forced the merger of universities and colleges in 1988 with their policy on a unified national system, the issue of what constituted research was ill thought out (if thought out at all). Areas of study carried out in colleges, such as the creative arts, did not meet the funding criteria set by the government funding bodies (the currently named Department of Education, Science and Training, and the Australian Research Council) on what constituted research.

In the area of creative writing, the pragmatic approach has won out in relation to creative writing research at the postgraduate level, with most Doctor of Philosophy degrees (PhDs) requiring an accompanying essay. In the area of academic research output, the conservative approach has prevailed, with categorisation and weighting of work being given funding only if it meets traditional, conservative criteria (scholarly books and book chapters, journal articles, and conference papers). Why is it that creative writing, already in written form (unlike other creative arts), cannot be accepted as a piece of research in itself at academic or postgraduate level in universities? The

exegesis as the ‘written component’ of a research higher degree is a tautology when it comes to creative writing. My challenge, this time around, is to show what it is that makes it possible to think of creative writing as insignificant to the research area of universities. For me, creative writing has become those trees outside the grade five classroom window, and I want to show that creative writing research practice, like the trees, breathes out the stuff on which the world feeds.

At the time of Dennis Strand’s publication, little had been done to address the issue of creative practice, and even less had been done on looking at how creative writing would fit into the research area in universities: there was no consensus on how funding criteria might need to change, or the sort of format in which creative writing might be presented as a research degree. The Australian Academy of the Humanities publication, *Knowing Ourselves and Others: The Humanities in Australia into the 21st Century* (1998) did not mention creative writing in the section on the arts, and in the English studies section the reference made to creative writing concerned its relationship with (or rather its divorce from) the study of literary works: ‘After all, what author would want to embrace a movement that made its reputation by killing off the author?’ (White, 1998:103).

Work that *has* specifically addressed creative writing includes a book by Kevin Brophy (1998), which explores the cultural construction of society’s notions about creative writing from the perspective of psychoanalysis (and was a very ‘stand-alone’ book at the time). Paul Dawson’s PhD thesis (2001) looks at the practice of creative writing in relation to the older, more established course of English. Also, articles on the subject of creative writing are published in the Griffith University-based online journal, *Text*, a twice-yearly publication launched in 1997. *Text* is produced by a small number of dedicated members of the Australian Association of Writing Programs (AAWP), the peak body representing creative writing programs in Australian universities formed in 1996. Those who have publicly declared their interest in the issue of where creative writing stands in relation to more traditional research have generally had articles published in *Text*.

Among these are: Perry (1998), who states that a compulsory accompanying essay for a creative doctorate privileges ‘one kind of writing over another’; Dawson (1999), who aligns creative work with writing done *in* literary studies rather than a separate, equally rigorous area of scholarship; Taylor (1999), who talks about the complex relationship between creative writing degrees and government funding (an important, even critical point – funding for research is vital to its continuation, and if there are not any categories in which to fit one’s research, then there is all likelihood it will be phased out); and Krauth (2000), who toys with the idea of Australian creative writing programs following the American development of creative writing. His description of the United States (US) programs shows their separation from English, Humanities and Cultural Studies departments, and how the publishing houses watch these courses closely. It seems the US creative writing degrees are geared to creative writing as a business practice rather than a research practice.

I see creative writing higher degrees in Australia being more literary and experimental than those Krauth describes in the US, therefore, less likely to win a commercial contract. Creative writers in the Australian academy are concerned to align their practice with research interests rather than commercial ones, which fits quite well in a university where non-commercial ‘art’ is more valued than in the economic sphere. In concentrating on creative writing in the field of university research in this thesis, my concern is more with autonomous research – that which has traditionally been seen as disinterested scholarship – because if writing were geared to commercial aspects, writers would not be looking to produce their work within a university setting.

In the current climate creativity has been linked to innovation and seen as a positive thing that moves institutions forward. The Romantic notion of creativity as divine inspiration is outmoded, and with it, the idea that the creative genius needs to work in isolation. The corollary of this change has two opposing effects. In one direction, the deduction is that creativity can be taught, which reduces it to a generalisable skill that can be on tap and put to good (economic) use. This means that creativity must be something that can be ‘commercially distributed’, which is problematic for creative

writers in universities (Kroll, 2002). In the other direction, creativity (a skill of inexplicable origins) is seen as an outpouring from the unconscious self and so is unpredictable (Brophy, 1998). The notion of creativity I am exploring in this thesis is in between these two positions – not a vocational skill able to be put to good use for industry; nor an ivory tower, isolated musing that comes from some place no one can identify. I see creativity as part of the social realm: it helps explain it, expand on it and captures insights into it. But creativity is not part of the social structure in terms of a learned skill that can be performed at will, such as walking and talking.

In the context of this thesis, creative writing is a narrative told in a fictional way and regarded for its use of, and skill with, language (its ‘literariness’). I do not use the term *creative writing* to comment on the process of writing, but on the outcome of the process – the produced result. Whether the writing is done in a similar manner to more ‘text-like’ written works, or emerges in a different manner is not relevant in the context of this thesis. My concern is with creative writers whose product is ‘literary’: they are not interested in commercial success, but in literary and artistically experimental work, in trying out new ideas and working with language. Because they eschew the market, they are necessarily placed at an economic disadvantage, but they can make a virtue out of this by highlighting the importance of the artistic side of their work (or in the case of creative writers in universities, the intellectual side of their work). I draw a distinction between market and ‘literary’ orientations of creative writers to show the different relations and structures that inform them and how each can influence the research structure of the university.

For the purpose of this study, I am limiting the scope of higher education to that of the university system in Australia. I pay particular attention to the research area of universities, the reason being my interest in the survival of research and how this plays out with its dependence on funding, especially through the Federal government. My use of the term ‘university’ will be a generic one, and interchangeable with ‘universities’, ‘academia’, ‘the university’ and ‘the academy’. If I intend to single out one university, it will be named.

Krauth refers to statistics that show creative writing degrees have been one of the biggest growth areas in undergraduate enrolments in universities in the 1990s, but he ends his article saying:

What I'm not sure we have yet achieved is our solid status in that elite echelon of academia which focuses on research excellence and which, to a significant extent, gives universities their 'real' reason to exist. (Krauth, 2000)

Kroll (2002), in addressing this issue, discusses Strand's idea of 'research equivalence' and how the use of this term does not change creative writing's position in relation to other disciplines that are in line for research honours. She asks, 'What kind of cultural capital is writing?' My question is, what value does the university and the broader community give to creative writing? The dilemma seems to be whether creative writing in universities fulfils the role of cultural capital at all.

In terms of valuing capital engendered from research output, there is an increasing link to economic rather than cultural value. Taylor states, 'Knowledge, rather than Capital is, it seems, the cutting-edge of human endeavour' (2000). I argue, in this thesis, that knowledge *is* capital. Taylor goes on to say:

It is not entirely clear to me how what is now being called Knowledge differs from what Americans seventy or eighty years ago called know-how, or what savvy Italians seven hundred years ago thought might be a useful thing to harness if they were going to produce the Renaissance. In fact, if we look back and take the time to read Plato's Dialogues, we might find something of a Knowledge Economy at work there: those who had the knowledge had the power. (Taylor, 2000)

The difference between those times and the current situation is that knowledge, while still linked to power, is, in the Western world, largely reduced to an economic commodity, and the knowledge that can attract the greatest economic capital has the greatest power. For research, and particularly for disciplines in the humanities and the arts, this has the potential to create adverse effects:

In part, the alarm the “knowledge economy” might cause in the humanities could arise from an appropriative act. What happens to the idea of knowledge, its meaning and place in the world, when the signifier “knowledge” is taken up by a different, even rival, discursive practice? What role will the university play if it is no longer the main site of knowledge definition, legitimation, and production? These questions are not purely conceptual; they have very real effects on the funding of particular disciplines at degree and doctoral levels. (Birchall, 2003:14)

More and more, public perception of research and rhetoric involving government policy on research in universities aligns good research and worthy research as that which can be commercialised. Innovation, communication and technology are the key concepts; good research is that which can be commercialised.

The discipline of creative writing in the university is one that could be detrimentally affected by this economic paradigm. Many discussions in *Text* have addressed the issue of creative writing in the research area in universities (see Exegetical Debate, 2004), but none specifically address the discipline’s relationship with other knowledges in the academy in terms of the constraints and opportunities placed on creative writing in the light of the social structure of research and creativity. My primary research involved gauging the current situation in relation to these issues. I considered this could best be done through speaking to those involved in the practice of creative writing in the research area in universities. The methodology I chose to follow was conducted for the following reasons.

In discussions and analysis documented about methodologies in research, much has been made of the division between quantitative and qualitative work. Quantitative methodologies are linked to the kind of objectivity promoted in the sciences. Qualitative methodologies are linked to the study of particular cases, and not seen as generalisable to the rest of the population. Neither methodology fitted the approach I wished to take in my primary research. I did not want to restrict respondents’ possible answers by setting up a research tool ‘pre-programmed’ by the researcher, which would guide and predetermine answers to some extent. I did not want to miss out on

something, just because I was not aware of it, so quantitative methods were out. But I did want my findings to be applicable to all writing programs in Australia – as Krauth (2001) has pointed out, there has been a long time of disparate study in the discipline of creative writing in Australia and now there needs to be some form of unification. I wanted to incorporate the best of both – establishing social facts, so not making it restrictive in the sense of guiding the participants, or in the sense of being able to apply the findings to one group only.

Robert Merton, a colleague of Lazarsfeld, is credited with pioneering a research technique, the focus group interview, that incorporated cultural influences on groups and individuals in those groups with empirical understanding. Merton and Kendall, in their first published work on focus group methodology, state:

To separate off quantitative work from qualitative work is not good procedure, but to turn one against the other, as a political divide, is destructive to the life of the mind. (Merton & Kendall, 1946:556)

They did not believe in the intellectual separation of the two approaches and saw ‘focus group research as integrating both qualitative and quantitative approaches in a single practice’ (Morrison, 1998:148).

Like survey research results and unlike qualitative work such as ethnography, results from focus group research can be generalised. The reason for this is the practical nature of the focus group. In its structure it can elicit a greater variety of responses than that of individual interviews, or ethnographic observation of one particular group. The variety of responses and interaction between participants is seen as representative of a larger population.

The focus group interview is a form of research that closes the divide between traditional quantitative and qualitative strategies. It has, for much of its documented life, been associated with market research, and so was eschewed as a practice linked to industry and business. But focus groups have the ability to reveal the social structure

and its effects on individuals who are constituted as players in the field – in this case, as researchers and creative writers.

Focus groups also give the researcher insight into social processes that people experience in order to come to an understanding of something, and how others can influence them in this process (Kitzinger, 1994:117). In my focus group research, I calculated that each participant's contribution to discussion would be influenced by objectivisms – such as the social construction of the group, or the social definitions of what it means to be an academic, student and writer; and subjectivisms – such as personal reactions to other individuals in the group, or personal experiences of writing and/or research. All participants' comments tell the story of the field from the positions they occupy within it. At times throughout the thesis there is a difference between how they see their actions and how I see them. This is due to my interpretation of their stories, which is influenced by objectivisms and subjectivisms related to *my* placement within the field.

I chose to invite as participants in the focus groups academics and postgraduate students who faced the issue of getting their work accepted within the field of research. I contacted two universities in each state (except for Western Australia, Northern Territory and Tasmania), which were chosen because they offered creative writing at the highest postgraduate level. My initial request to focus group participants was to have separate discussions for academics and postgraduate students, but this did not eventuate. The reason I wished to separate these groups was to record any differing views without the added component/influence of the hierarchical relationship of student and teacher. The outcome of my focus group discussions *was* influenced by the student/teacher relationship: of the nine discussions that eventuated, five of them consisted of a mix of students and teachers. I am unable to gauge to what extent this limited, or changed, opinions within the groups. Some researchers using focus group techniques stress the need for homogeneity in group members, which, they say, increases the confidence of members to disclose, especially about sensitive issues

(Hughes & Dumont, 1993; O'Brien, 1993). For example, in one group the following interaction occurred:

I'm looking at this from a research student's point of view. [A more senior academic member of the group interjected, then] I've just completely forgotten what I was going to say. (Kathy, 2001:B,4)

Others argue against homogeneity, asserting that the hallmark of a focus group is the interaction generated between group members (Morgan, 1988; Stewart & Shamdasani, 1990). There was positive evidence of this in my focus groups as well. This is demonstrated in the following interchange, where Emily (an academic and supervisor) had just finished describing a methodological process in the creative writing higher degree. From my observation, it was clear that Emily's description helped the students present at the focus group discussion (Amanda and Lisa) see the process from a different, and more useful, angle:

Amanda: If you could put what you just said into writing for us, I think that would be a great help.
Emily: If you have a look at the guidelines for examination for the PhD for creative writing ...
Lisa: It's just the beautiful way you just put it. (Focus Group, 2001:D,19)

The interaction between student and teacher often highlighted students' interests and concerns that may not have otherwise emerged.

One member of a focus group questioned my choice of participants. He thought I should have been talking to those who did not accept creative writing into the research field:

If I were you, I'd be interested in talking to the other universities, the ones who aren't offering creative writing at postgraduate level. You're talking about the problems that are being had at the postgraduate level. We know that to some extent, that those problems are to do with just the swirl of politics and universities orienting themselves within the situation. (Nick, 2001:E,2)

I argue that it is precisely this 'swirl of politics and universities orienting themselves within the situation' that needs to be untangled and explained in order to paint a clearer

picture of why creative writing is not accepted as research. And who better to articulate the problems faced by writers than those actually in the position.

The methodological approach of using focus groups also fits with the theoretical approach I take throughout the thesis, which is based on Bourdieu's work. Bourdieu has theorised an epistemological approach that takes account of objectivity and subjectivity. It is comparable to a position between the two, without relapsing into one or the other. Bourdieu's term for how individuals and groups orient themselves within and between positions is the habitus. Habitus, Bourdieu explains, is our social practice (1991:12-14). He stipulates that no practice is either totally objective, or wholly subjective. The way people act, and the things they do, are not totally dictated or structured by society, nor are they wholly open to the whims of free will. The way people go about living their lives is through a combination of structural and individual influences. We go to work, we go to school, we look after family, we socialise, all under the rubric of society's structure, but we each add our own individual touch.

I also apply Bourdieu's work in respect of his analysis of fields. He is closely associated with identifying, defining and analysing how fields are divided into autonomous and heteronomous poles, and how these are related to cultural and economic capital respectively. I discuss how this pans out in the area of research and knowledge production. My interest in this thesis is with creative writers in autonomous positions in their field. This limitation excludes many writers worthy of the term if a looser definition pertained. The reason my work is restricted to creative writers at the autonomous pole is my concern to help creative writers whose legitimation in the field of research depends on acceptance of their creative product rather than on heteronomous principles such as gaining economic reward. My argument questions the need for the dominance of a neoliberal paradigm that sees a free market economy as beneficial for all, specifically looking at how this impacts on the development of creative writing in the research area of Australian universities.

I show, in this thesis, that the ideas that came through in the focus groups about creative writing and its relation to other forms of knowledge produced in the university are what forms the basis of the social structure of research and creativity. What this thesis looks at is how these ideas are forces that have shaped the university climate. The conditions and constraints today are a product of thinking about creative work and research and their place in society that has been ongoing since creative workers were given their own sense of agency and research became a part of what university scholarship stood for. In my investigation, I wish to expose the social basis of how creative writing is understood in relation to more traditionally accepted research. In order to do this, I will give an historical and sociological explanation of how understandings change and how practice and logic that promulgate research have been linked together by social contexts and values. I wish to show how ideas, thought, and their cultural expression are based in social relations.

Issues surrounding creativity and logic are not my only concern. I wish to highlight the disparity in the way different knowledges are valued. Compare the ideas produced in a ground-breaking novel like James Joyce's *Ulysses*, and those produced from writing a few articles about this work. In the context of research funding in universities, the articles would attract funds, whereas the novel would be worthless. This was an issue that threaded through several of the focus groups:

There was this wonderfully eloquent inflammatory sort of letter published in *The Australian Review of Books* where the writer had worked out that the entire output of James Joyce would get him the equivalent of three refereed articles. (Michelle, 2001:B,11)

It used to be with the DETYA [now DEST] point system that you got half a point for producing a novel (I don't think you get any points now) and yet one point for writing a review. So you could write the novel and get your half point, and I'd review it and get my one point. You know, there's a structural problem with the understanding of knowledge. (Tom, 2001:A,12)

I used the focus group discussions as the instrument for determining my theoretical application to the practice of creative writing and research. The discussions were held in eight universities throughout the central and eastern parts of Australia in 2001, with a mix of old ('sandstone') and new ('gumtree') universities (Marginson & Considine,

2000). I have not pointed to this difference in my references to discussions (apart from two specific references to sandstone institutions made by participants from those institutions), because there was no overall difference in attitude or outlook in regard to the issues relevant to this thesis. Although the ideas raised in the focus groups were current at the time I undertook my research, and may have changed somewhat, I have endeavoured to keep issues current by keeping up-to-date with policies on research from government and universities.

The two issues of importance I chose to investigate from the focus groups were: the problem of generating cultural value for creative writing in the research field which is increasingly changing; and creative writing's relationship to knowledge, the accepted view seemingly demonstrated in university requirements of an exegesis for postgraduate research in creative writing and the omission of any creative categories in government funding of university research output. A compulsory exegesis diminishes the credibility of creative work as making a new contribution to knowledge, and has ramifications for creative writing as academic research work.

The requirement of an exegesis affects postgraduate creative writers; the government specifications on funding categories for research writing affects both postgraduate and academic creative writers. Throughout this thesis I sometimes abbreviate my reference to creative writers in the research area of universities in such a way that when referring to the exegesis, I mention postgraduates, and when referring to publication categories, I refer to academics. This is not to create a difference between academic and postgraduate creative writers: I see the issues raised as being of importance to both. My only reason for not mentioning the two groups simultaneously is as a measure of brevity.

There is a discrepancy in value given to different forms of research work produced within the university. Economic capital is gaining greater bargaining power, and other forms of capital, such as cultural capital (found in the humanities and the arts) are either being ignored or are being forced to change to such an extent to fit an economic

framework. As a corollary, there is an increasing paradigm shift from the nation-state to the market-state (Bobbit, 2002). This greatly affects higher education and the types of knowledge that emanates from universities, which I see as an important area to address.

In this thesis, I am not trying to arrive at an answer to the problems of creative writing being assessed as research, or to argue a case for creative writing as research equivalence. What I am trying to show is the historical development of ideas that have led to the current thinking about what is and is not knowledge, and how creative writers might use these ideas to develop an argument to include creative writing as research in the field.

The scope of this thesis is limited by the ideas voiced on creative writing and creativity in the focus group discussions held in 2001. In Chapter One, I look at Bourdieu's structure of fields and apply that to the research field in the university. I show that positions in the field of research, like Bourdieu's field of cultural production, are on a continuum that ranges from an autonomous position, vying for cultural capital (produced within the field), to the heteronomous, vying for economic capital. I analyse creative writing's position in relation to this autonomous/heteronomous dichotomy. I argue that what holds power as knowledge does not remain static, and demonstrate this by describing the development of knowledges in Australian universities from the 1850s to the merger of universities and colleges in 1989, which came to be known as the Dawkins' reform.

In Chapter Two, I focus on knowledge, and show that it is contingent on what holds greatest legitimacy and power in the structure of society. As scientific paradigms gained greater legitimacy from the time of the Enlightenment, what came to be valued as knowledge changed too. Scientific understandings could utilize rational or empirical worldviews, but creativity and the imagination were not part of explanations for either creed. Creativity began to be investigated during the Enlightenment through the

philosophy of aesthetics, initiated by Baumgarten. Kant developed these ideas in his *Critique of Judgement*, stating taste was a universal but subjective experience.

I expound on two ideologies that emerged from the Enlightenment's centring of humanity, extensions of rational and empirical worldviews: idealism and utilitarianism. I have labelled these two ideological points of view when used to describe research practices as 'useless' and 'useful' (from Young, 1996). 'Useful' correlates to applied research, and 'useless' to basic, or pure, research. I show how Kant's ideas on art further divided creativity from knowing: art could be a craft, a practice, a skill that cannot be taught, a doing or play, but never a form of knowing. I disclose the difficulty this imposes on creative writing in attempting to fit it with the research paradigm encompassing 'useful' and 'useless'.

The idea of useless and useful is extended in Chapter Three to incorporate value, and particularly economic value that predominates in the current climate. I explain how the value system generated by the monetary market affects university research, and within that, creative writing. Drawing on Marx's labour theory of value, I expound on the changes to use and exchange value incurred by abstract value and abstract need. I show how the current episteme equates economic failure with cultural failure: government policies on research funding push an agenda that privileges university disciplines that will generate economic growth; knowledge is increasingly 'corporatised', tying universities to business and government. Analysing the government's research priorities illustrates how creativity – outside the innovation parameter – is discounted or ignored. I look at three university research policies and discuss their representation of research practices in the light of an increasing economic framework demanded by government. I expound on the difficulties of trying to match research from all disciplines to a mould that will be economically beneficial, and how this limits the scope and understanding of research.

In my final chapter, I argue that the value of creativity in broader society, where it is viewed as part of the everyday, contributes to how it is valued in the field of research.

This argument reiterates Bourdieu's autonomous and heteronomous positions in relation to creative writing. I theorise the practice of creative writing in the field of research to show how practitioners have assented to an exegesis in exchange for acceptance within the field.

I argue that creative writing is already both a 'doing' and a 'knowing', a combination of practice and theory, and pursue this in terms of espousing creative writing as cultural capital. If creativity is only valued in terms of innovation, this limits its use; if the notion of creativity is only accepted at its extremes – either considering it as a generalisable skill (and so available to everyone), or relegating it to artistry (which makes a virtue of the necessity of beauty) – this again limits its use.

Most of the developing argument in each chapter is led by comments from the focus groups. The major thread of discussion throughout this thesis is to show the history of the development of ideas of knowledge and utility as the foundations for how universities are constituted, and the forces that have shaped the capacity of creative writing practice and programs to achieve any sort of credibility in the university research sector.

Creative Writing's Web of Relations

One might surmise that the role of a university is to provide a pathway of accumulating learning in any discipline it espouses. If a discipline is worth studying, it is worth studying at all levels. (Krauth, 2000)

Creative writing has, since the amalgamation of universities and colleges in the late 1980s, become relatively established as a discipline within the university system. However, when it comes to its role in the field of research, its position is not as established as that of other university disciplines. Creative writing lacks the sorts of parameters that are found in the sciences or social sciences, which means there are fewer 'formulaic' steps available to its practitioners. There is, for instance, no obligation to follow the pattern of hypothesis, literary review, method, observation and analysis as is the convention even in closely related disciplines. Researchers who submit creative writing as their research product have a broad range of possibilities in the approach to, and presentation of, their work. This does not mean their job is more difficult or easier than comparable work in other disciplines. But they must negotiate the difficulty inherent in pinning the product of the creative process down to just one genre. Creativity does not have one definition, or even one discipline framework. Instead it is marked by a myriad of contesting ideas, values and practices, which is reflected in how it is practised in the research area of universities.

In 2001 I conducted focus group discussions with academics and postgraduate students on the extent to which creative writing can be counted among the research disciplines in

Australian universities; what emerged were many, often opposing, views. This was partly expected, but what particularly interested me was the range of positions from which opinions arose within the area of creative writing. These opinions can be summarized as follows. Creative writing was seen as:

- part of the evolution of the academy for ‘the masses’ (particularly in respect of undergraduate creative writing courses);
- dependant on originality;
- that which is capable of saying something about who we are and how we perceive ourselves;
- not fitting into the old ‘Oxbridge’ model;
- only endorsed because of its popularity at undergraduate level and potential as a money spinner;
- in its finest form, research;
- not capable of achieving publication points in the funding stakes;
- a self-indulgent process;
- a critical engagement with contemporary culture;
- a process of connecting writing with story;
- lacking a research component in the absence of an exegesis;
- having a research component with or without exegetical attachments;
- involving a leap from theory to the creative that does not *involve* knowledge;
- not *producing* knowledge;
- not a form of critique;
- similar to other forms of writing in that they all have constraints, restrictions, formulae and expectations;
- something anyone can do;
- that which is not driven by theory;
- the presentation of ideas that often precede official discourse;
- a ‘doing’ rather than a ‘thinking about’;
- part of all writing which is informed by a personal framework;
- having the same processes as research – they are both investigations;
- getting in to the research area by the back door;
- a craft;
- not a craft.

In much the same manner, the term ‘creativity’ was subjected to a number of often contradictory definitions, and used to undergird a variety of positions. Creativity, they said, was:

- a side issue in universities – something done alongside the real reason for research;
- a vital part of research – but this is usually discipline dependent;

- only able to be judged subjectively;
- aligned with passion, not systematic thought;
- part of the OECD¹ definition of research;
- something that just flows out of our heads;
- not as rigorous as other work.

Given that these many views come from academics and postgraduate students deeply involved in creative writing in the university sector, it is clear firstly that the practice is treated very differently in different universities, and secondly that there cannot be said to be even a hint of consensus about its role, position and form. What this also means is that the extent to which creative writing can be understood as a research discipline, or its successes measured against the traditional university norms (funding, research profile) is deeply problematic. This area is so interwoven with ideas from contesting positions that there can be no simple predictors for the success or failure of creative writing within the academy. Rather, numerous criteria are applied, determined by the various interests of those involved in doing the evaluation.

In this chapter, I will outline the theory I use in analysing the place of creative writing within the ‘cultural field’ that is university research. I will explain why, in this thesis, I have termed research a ‘field’, making use of Bourdieu’s notion of modelling the field to show some of the constraints – and opportunities – creative writing must face in taking up a position within the academy. In order to understand how notions of creative and research practice arise within the academy it is useful to trace their trajectories. What holds power as ‘knowledge’ in the academy does not remain static. The influences from the autonomous and heteronomous poles in the field of research affect and change what comes to be termed knowledge. I will show this by outlining the changing nature of knowledge in Australian universities throughout their 150-year history, and the ways in which the bifurcation of the research field into autonomous and heteronomous poles has delimited the opportunities available to creative writers for a place in that field.

¹ Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

The Field of Research

Researchers, creative writers, teachers and administrators – all those who perform as agents in the university sector – do not operate in a vacuum; rather, they are constituted as agents through their interactions with others in what Bourdieu terms ‘fields’ (1993:6). Fields are the (metaphorical) site of practices and discourses that constitute particular meanings because of their location in the social system. Each field will have its own set of rules, codifications, behaviours, skills and talents that produces these practices and discourses. Each agent in the field takes a position in relation to others – their colleagues and competitors – and their struggle to maintain or change their position means the field is in a constant state of flux. Any change in position necessarily changes the structure of the field (Bourdieu, 1993:6). This happens as a consequence of competition for the resources of the field. A discipline that gains acceptance in the field of university research, for example, will change the focus and orientation of research to fit its needs and expectations, and therefore create a hierarchy of desirable research attributes: a technological focus will benefit disciplines that have measurable outcomes; an artistic focus will benefit disciplines that express creative outcomes.

All position-takings are constituted from positions that operate as a system of relations of power, structured on the distribution of different forms of capital and in differing amounts (Bourdieu, 1991:57). The capital that is valuable to each position in a field will differ according to how each position wishes to gain recognition. Capital circulates in the research field in the form of peer recognition, for example, or public recognition. All those who participate in the struggle for positions in the field must believe in the value of their position, and therefore, in the value of the capital that they aspire to receive in these positions (Bourdieu, 1991:14). Creative writers in the research field aspire to receive peer recognition for their contribution to knowledge, rather than public recognition through commercial success.

In this thesis, I will term the area of university research a *field* because I wish to highlight the complex web of relations within this area that constitute complex and conflicting position-takings and positions (which are inseparable from each other – Bourdieu, 1993:30). Fields, in Bourdieu's analysis, are in some ways similar to the sociological term 'social institutions' in that they generally encompass areas of relations that operate autonomously, such as law, medicine and education, the latter being the field with which university research would normally be identified. In my analysis, the research field is determined by varying discourses and practices, and by different forms of capital.

Capital is not restricted to material interests. As Bourdieu's analysis demonstrates, it encompasses a range of values, including cultural and symbolic capital as well as economic, with degrees of transferability across their forms. Cultural capital includes the recognised acquisition of skills and knowledge of a field that allows one to operate with a degree of competence and acceptance. It is that which is associated with culturally authorised tastes, consumption, skills and awards. Symbolic capital is the prestige, status and authority bestowed on someone, and operates from the principle of mutual recognition. An academic being asked to speak in their area of expertise has acquired symbolic capital in their field. They have earned their reputation from an accumulation of cultural capital. The cross over, or transferable element, of symbolic capital can be seen in the instance where that same academic may also be asked to make a judgement on good places to dine out. Both forms come by winning the approval of others in the field, but cultural capital is much more the material or tangible objects: skills, prizes, degrees; symbolic capital is the reputation. Economic capital simply refers to material wealth, and along with the other forms of capital, is unevenly distributed throughout the field (Bourdieu, 1993:7).


All fields operate within the overarching field of social relations, and are hierarchically determined by their relation to the field of power, that area of the society which is defined by its access to economic capital and political power. The field of power is, in Bourdieu's analysis of society, in the dominant position because of its economic and

political wealth. Universities also occupy a dominant position in relation to other fields because of their cultural and symbolic capital. But they are, in Bourdieu's terms, the 'dominated among the dominant' (1993:164) because of their relative lack of economic capital. This notion of the 'dominated of the dominant' has been critiqued by Frow, who states that the intellectual class is not coextensive with the bourgeoisie, but 'a knowledge class', a 'new middle class'. Although it is weakly formed as a class because its cohesion centres on knowledge rather than property, it does have a common class interest in a 'commitment to the institutions of cultural capital' (Frow, 1995:121,125,130). Universities have traditionally operated with a degree of autonomy from other fields (even from the field of power) because of their capacity to generate cultural capital and, therefore, have valued this capital above other forms. The research field, upon investigation, operates similarly; although with increasing pressure from governments for research to be anchored to business and industry, a more complex structure of capital accretion is emerging.

Individuals within the field of research aspire to some form of consecration, that is, recognition of the value of their research and some form of esteem being bestowed upon them. Consecration, depending from which area of the field it comes, can be in the form of cultural or economic recognition. Consecration by one's peers is cultural; when sanctioned by the dominant field, which brings with it associated wealth, the consecration comes in the form of economic rewards. Within the field of research is an aspiration to maintain autonomy as a field, such as has been the aspiration of those in university positions, from which consecration in the form of cultural recognition is the desired form. The field of cultural production (that of the arts and literature), which Bourdieu analysed over a number of years, also has a main concern to disavow forms of economic consecration in favour of those valued by the autonomous sector of the field, such as disinterestedness – which is an interest in things of 'higher' merit than economics (Bourdieu, 1993:79). These forms of consecration, coming from sectors of the field involved in the production of cultural capital (or autonomous positions) and economic capital (of heteronomous positions) are constituted and awarded on the basis of the 'principles of legitimation'.

Autonomy/Heteronomy and the Academy

Bourdieu states that the field of cultural production is organised according to ‘three competing principles of legitimacy’ (1993:50). He constructs a model of a cultural field which is bisected first vertically, with autonomous positions on the left and heteronomous positions on the right, and then horizontally, with highly consecrated positions at the top and low consecration at the bottom, as illustrated below. The legitimacy of positions is dependent on appealing to three of the four sectors created from these intersections (Bourdieu, 1993:51), i.e. highly consecrated positions that are autonomous, or any heteronomous position.



Bourdieu originally produced this model to explicate the work and functions of the field of cultural production, but it is equally applicable to the field of university research. The position with the greatest autonomy, and greatest consecration, has traditionally been one where production is driven by interior demands of the field and its values and, therefore, is designed to appeal to other (autonomous) producers rather than external bodies. It is work done without particular regard to social, political or economic pressures, and rewards available to autonomous practitioners are typically symbolic and cultural rather than financial.

There are two main forms of research in universities – basic and applied. Basic research – which is also the traditional view of research – is comparable to autonomous artistic practice because it is work produced out of secluded contemplation and without thought of immediate utility or direct monetary exchange value. Its value to the academy is that it contributes to the operations of the university – principally, the production of knowledge. Researchers in a university conducting basic research, and hence working in accordance with autonomous values, are likely to produce work that will give them credibility among their colleagues rather than having an immediate practical application. Their aim will be to produce ‘knowledge for knowledge’s sake’, which may be in the form of contributing articles to peer-reviewed journals, undertaking research of their choice, and participating in specialist conferences. They will usually acquire little if any economic capital, but will be in a position to claim cultural capital – recognition by their peers as practitioners with great knowledge and skill. This cultural capital can be exchanged for economic capital, though, in the form of bigger grants or higher salaries.

The other main form of research production is tied to the heteronomous position of high consecration and is, in Bourdieu’s terms, the ‘bourgeois’ position (Bourdieu, 1993:51). Bourgeois work is that which receives legitimation and rewards from the field of power, to some extent. Producers committed to this quadrant of the field work and compete for economic capital; but they also receive consecration from the ‘dominant fractions of the dominant class’ (Bourdieu, 1993:51): the government, for instance, or major industry, or other holders of positions of power and privilege. The research form that fits Bourdieu’s description of heteronomy is applied research: study undertaken with a preconceived use; increasingly the form expected by governments and other dominant agents. It is largely produced through university connections with industry.

Where basic research contributes to the operation of a university through producing knowledge – and hence cultural and symbolic capital – applied research has direct monetary exchange value and achieves practical outcomes (Throsby, 2001:23). Applied research, in its ability to be utilised by fields outside the university, gains status (within

and outside the university) through its capacity to be exchanged for economic capital. However, it is not purely economic: like basic research, it contributes to the production of knowledge and so also incorporates cultural value. Work done in this form – from the consecrated heteronomous position – is designed to have practical applications, but within a privileged occupation or discipline. In medical research, for example, discoveries have value in cultural terms as well as economic terms because these research positions hold a degree of consecration. Consecration is afforded to a position when it develops attributes and an outlook that is aspired to by others.

Research undertaken in accordance with heteronomous principles depends largely on capturing market interest, or attention and support from people and organisations outside the academic field. Funding from non-government bodies generates research in areas such as science and medicine, as well as funding from government bodies other than those involved in the field of education, such as the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) and the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC). Because the autonomous position in the field of research is not driven by economic desires, it is more dependent on consecration by those in the field. The areas of autonomous research that have a high consecration are those carried out under the auspices of ‘knowledge for knowledge’s sake’, such as philosophy and physics.

The last position in Bourdieu’s hierarchy of legitimacy is that of popular, heteronomous production. This position has low consecration because of its appeal to the masses, and because it is not perceived to have intellectual or creative freedom, but to operate almost entirely in accordance with the demands of market and/or sociopolitical forces. It is the polar opposite of the autonomous consecrated position. Research undertaken from this position might include political polls, advertising and public relations, and perhaps journalism. These disciplines have low consecration because they form part of the ordinary population’s everyday exposure to the social world, and are undertaken principally or even entirely for economic return, and so hold no special sense of consecration.

The position of autonomy and low consecration is different from the other three sectors in the field, as it attracts no legitimation at all: this position does not attract attention from either the ordinary population or the dominant fraction; nor can individuals in this position be placed with others who engage in disinterested scholarship and have earned the regard of their peers. Therefore, they do not earn the capital valued in heteronomous positions – economic – nor, in their autonomous position, are they placed to acquire cultural capital. In the field of research, autonomous positions with low consecration might find it difficult to attract any audience or support at all (Bourdieu, 1993:49), and this may be where creative writing presently sits. What this sector can be noted for is that individuals who hold these positions have a vested interest in changing what determines cultural capital. If the work they are producing gains peer acceptance, then their position will receive greater consecration, and the structure of the field will change to their advantage.

The Measure of Creative Writing

Creative writing's position in the field cannot be analysed independently of the conditions of the field of academic research. My concern is to point out how the bifurcation of autonomy/heteronomy and consecration in academia has had an ongoing effect on research, such that the work of creative writing in the university has been, one way or another, inflected by it. Creative writing's position has never been stable, and in my analysis of the place it is crafting for itself in the field of university research, it is important to highlight the arbitrary hierarchy of knowledges that is instituted through this bifurcation. Creative writing, during its short history in Australian universities, has been located within the humanities (although not in the same way as philosophy or theology, for example, both of which are regarded as theoretically underpinning much of humanities' work). Its position as an undergraduate course has become more prominent under the increasing domination of instrumental knowledge, and individual universities' responses to the economic pressures placed on academia, because it has been able to attract students and hence increase funding to the universities.

Creative writing's position in the university is compromised, though, because of its position outside the university, and the network of influences surrounding the field of cultural production – that area producing cultural works. As noted above, work in this field comes under the same principles of legitimation as does research: market success is often artistic failure, so the same issues, pressures and marks of distinction apply. What complicates the position of creative writers in the academy is that they must balance their desire to be successful within the field of cultural production in order to be successful within the field of research. The two fields, although both having autonomous and heteronomous sectors with corresponding levels of consecration, operate these principles under different criteria. Within the academy, research success is privileged; in the creative field it is artistic success. For both, though this is often disavowed, economic return (in the form of research grants and royalties) is an important marker of success.

Creative writing's straddling of the two fields further complicates the work done by its practitioners in the field of research because of notions regarding creative practices that circulate in the general community. Some of these notions encompass ideas of genius, some of unconventional avant-garde expression, and some a disconnection with reason and rationality. One member of the focus groups, a former editor in a publishing house, found that ordinary individuals view the creative writer as being the centre and point of origin of their narrative, and do not give any regard for the narrative's connection with knowledge:

We used to get 5000 unsolicited manuscripts a year. I've worked in large publishing houses where they got much more than that before they stopped taking them, back in the 70s. I would find people really had no concept of writing. What it was about was being the centre of your story, and so there was nothing in their heads that connected writing with story. (Sally, 2001:C,6-7).

In Sally's role as editor, she found that many people considered their manuscripts stories through the mere act of putting their lives into words; they had the notion that this was enough, that this constituted a story. These writers, Sally said, had no notion of the effect of words on the reader, and how a writer needs to craft a story – to 'connect

writing with story'. Along with this idea that creative writing is simply telling a story are the corollary arguments which set fiction in opposition to 'truth', and identify creative writing as a source of entertainment or abstraction rather than information. Also, fiction has not typically engaged with the world on a public stage, but gains public approval in the first instance by appealing to audiences privately. These designations of creative writing in the field of cultural production bring up practical and philosophical objections to creative writing's place in the field of research, and will be dealt with in greater detail in the next chapter. These notions of its social role, coupled with the principles of legitimation, complicate the case for creative writing in the research field.

The nature of all cultural fields is that there is a continuous struggle between commercial interests (economic capital), and acceptance by one's peers (cultural capital), which can accumulate to consecrate agents as an authority and to accord them a dominant position in the field – or symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1993:82-3). Individuals who vie for positions are in a constant tension over this conflict of 'small-scale' or 'restricted production' – which means the fight to gain cultural acceptance in the field – and 'large-scale production' – which is a challenge from economic imperatives to bring in monetary profit and its associated power (Bourdieu, 1993: 82,124).

The Dominant Principle in Research

Large-scale production pertains to the heteronomous pole because the capital of greatest importance to it (economic capital) is controlled outside the field, in and by the field of power. Restricted production is autonomous because the capital it relies on for advancement is that which the field, alone, produces; and which, to a large degree, is appreciated only within the terms of the logic of the field. Cultural capital in the field of research is acquired through publication in peer-reviewed journals, for example. But there is also an overlap between economic and cultural forms of capital. In the area of restricted production in research (the autonomous pole), an individual researcher may receive accolades from their peers for winning a grant to undertake research, which

necessarily involves economic capital (although the amount is often not as important as the actual receiving of it).

In the general social field, those industries that generate the greatest economic return will typically have the greatest power, because of their ability to influence the government and the media, and hence to set social standards, at least to some extent. Industry and business utilise universities because of the knowledge they produce. Universities create, critique, and consecrate knowledge. In the broader social space, their role as part of the education system helps to legitimise cultural practices. But, in the production of research, universities occupy an ‘ambivalent’ position. The symbolic capital of researchers in universities is dependent on what other field/s the research benefits in ‘the system of production and circulation of symbolic goods’ (Bourdieu, 1993:124). So, research in medicine will have more symbolic capital than research into audience demographics for the advertising industry.

A growing global politico-economic market gives knowledge a monetary value and this has affected the production of knowledge in the university. Greater emphasis is being placed on applied rather than basic research. Universities earn financial returns and gain economic value through their production of research, but their ability to do so is always dependent on what area of research is of greatest value to the dominant fractions of class relations. Universities, as the dominated of the dominant, do not have the capacity to determine what research is of most economic value. But they are well placed to generate research that attracts cultural value and enhances the university’s identity as a field of knowledge production.

Cultural value is not always commensurate with economic value, but they can have a symbiotic relationship within a field. Cultural capital can sometimes be exchanged for economic capital (someone who is a great artist, for instance, might be able to make money on a lecture circuit, or by endorsing products), but is usually associated with an autonomous pole operating in the field and is not determined by its utility or its price (Throsby, 2001:26). It is a value inherent in the skills and attributes that are

commensurate with a field, and the heteronomous pole in all fields is, to some extent, determined by it. As Milner states, 'in so far as the symbolic system is necessary to secure social order, the economic bourgeoisie proper cannot simply dispense with cultural capital' (1996:39).

The principles of legitimation work so that the dominant class can afford itself a larger degree of consecration than the dominated class, and thus remain dominant, regardless of whether cultural or economic capital defines this consecration, but the cultural capital pertinent to the field is a necessary attribute before one can occupy a consecrated position at either pole. For example, in the research field, gaining research skills and producing knowledge is necessary to allow one to accede to the position of a successful researcher, whether the research is considered 'pure' or 'applied'.

With regard to position-taking in any field, there is the struggle and conflict of its agents to acquire positions and hence value, in part by determining what counts as autonomous and what as heteronomous practice. The field of university research is no exception. One area of research – applied research – struggles to survive by winning public and private funding, with a greater emphasis on attracting private interest that reflects general trends in the broader community; this has a bigger chance of increasing the appeal of the research. The other side – basic (or 'pure' research) – eschews any 'chasing the dollar' investigations. The main interest here is to accrue cultural capital, even at the expense of economic capital (Bourdieu, 1993:83).

At the autonomous pole, a division operates between those in the consecrated position and those who are not. In Bourdieu's analysis of the field of cultural production, he places avant-garde artists and poets in the low consecration sector of the autonomous pole (1993:83). This division is equally relevant to the field of university research. There are those who occupy the dominant autonomous position within the academy, that of basic research, who have attained their position through their earlier accumulation of cultural capital:

As the field of restricted production gains in autonomy, producers tend, as we have seen, to think of themselves as intellectuals or artists by divine right, as 'creators', that is as *auctors* 'claiming authority by virtue of their charisma' and attempting to impose an *auctoritas* that recognizes no other principle of legitimation than itself (or, which amounts to the same thing, the authority of their peer group, which is often reduced, even in scientific activities, to a clique or a sect). (Bourdieu, 1993:124 – emphasis in original)

Then there is the dominated position through this division, occupied by newcomers to the field, whose greatest interest is to be accepted by those in the consecrated position (or who work to change what determines consecration): this, as I stated earlier, is where I would currently place creative writing in the field of university research.

One reason I state this is because of the notions of creative writing that emerged from the focus groups. There was a large discrepancy between how the creative writers valued their practice, and where they saw other researchers placing this work:

They think that a discipline that doesn't engage in some sort of meta-discourse doesn't produce knowledge. (Michelle, 2001:B,10)

Research requires a degree of creativity, but is not the same as creative writing which, in its popular use, is a different point of practice. (Hannah, 2001:F,1)

Having the exegesis as part of the creative writing PhD is a compromise. So the committee that finally approved the creative writing PhD still had to have proof that creative writing has a research component, where most of us would take that for granted. (Sandra, 2001:D,3)

What emerged from the discussions was that an acceptance of creative writing (without an accompanying essay) in the field of research would mean a change in the structure of the field because those currently holding consecrated positions do not accept any change in the parameters of research that may benefit the practice of creative writers. For example, in the postgraduate area of research creative researchers need to attach an extra piece of work to their creative piece in order for it to be accepted as research; and under the Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs (DETYA) and then the Department of Education, Science and Training (DEST) policy, the government will not fund any piece of creative writing at all.

Creative writers in universities have eschewed a more heteronomous position, which may have been available to them if they geared the writing for publication in the general market. In Australia, this is not standard practice. Creative writers in universities have staked their claim – they wish to have status as researchers. They have demonstrated this by not pursuing publication as their main objective, by accepting university guidelines on the requirements for postgraduate work, and by publishing scholarly articles to earn points for their departments. Creative writing, under these strictures, is carried on in a creative researcher's spare time.

Knowledge gained through operating in a university environment brings with it a certain degree of prestige, but not all knowledges in academia have the same capacity to derive cultural capital and the possibility therefore, of deriving symbolic capital. Social inequality affects the way knowledge is viewed, with 'formal learning' earning a greater amount of cultural capital than learning associated with everyday activities:

Because the cultural capital of knowledge is inequitably distributed, tending to favour those who occupy positions and dispositions that provide access to these socially legitimated and valued ways of knowing, knowledge becomes a marker of distinction and social privilege. (Webb, Schirato & Danaher, 2002: 110)

In the field of academic research, the level of symbolic capital that accrues to new knowledge largely depends on the department or faculty from which it emanates. Knowledges that are incorporated into legitimate culture (the culture of the dominating fraction of the dominant class) will be those that accrue the most symbolic capital. In the industrial, economic structure of contemporary Western culture, research that advances knowledge in the areas of science and technology is accorded more symbolic capital than research into creative or artistic pursuits. Those who speak from a socially privileged position have the ability to do so, not only because what they say is legitimate in terms of confirming orthodox beliefs, but also because they occupy a position of power to make those legitimate statements. For example, research findings on the effects of drought conditions for future farming will constitute greater symbolic capital than will a creative research piece on the same question because scientific

research can produce findings that can instigate changes in government policies, whereas ‘stories’ remain just stories (although they can, arguably, instigate changes in social attitudes). Social attitudes are not given attention until they transform ideas in a large portion of the population, thereby becoming powerful enough to effect change in hegemonic articulations (and sometimes this is done only to placate the disaffected position, and the status quo remains).

In order for social attitudes to have legitimacy within a culture, they must have symbolic power, which is a mark of distinction conferred upon them for their legitimating position within legitimate culture. For any discourse – whether it is scientific, religious or artistic – to possess symbolic power, its principles must converge with the dominant ideology of society. This exemplifies the importance it gives to itself (Bourdieu, 1991:72), and becomes, for society, a form of misrecognition. Misrecognition is the acknowledgment of someone’s level of consecration without simultaneously acknowledging that this level is arbitrarily measured. Society misrecognises symbolic power as being something legitimate, natural and given, rather than something that has been acquired through the authorising of orthodox positions. Science had symbolic power in the early twentieth century on the grounds that it was widely thought its knowledge would help to cure the world of illness and starvation. Religion in some instances retains symbolic power on the grounds that adherence to its standards will dictate one’s ‘after-life’.

Bourdieu writes, ‘There is no symbolic power without the symbolism of power’ (1991:75). Legitimate culture is not a static thing. Power structures change – and so do the symbols of power. The conferring of symbolic or cultural capital through legitimate culture means that what receives – or counts as – capital in one era may not do so in another. In the case of university research, the knowledge that generates the most cultural capital is relative to the changing relationship between this field and powerful institutions outside the university. This will be discussed further in Chapter Three. From within and outside this field, relations of power, both cultural and symbolic, galvanize a hierarchy in competing knowledges. This can best be demonstrated by

looking at the changing status of different knowledges within universities throughout the history of universities in Australia.

Early Universities

The development of legitimate knowledge within the university system in Australia was most greatly affected by three things: religious dispute and, therefore, a need for secular education; a concern over the moral character of the population, which brought with it the liberal ideal of education to improve one's mind; and a need to prove the university's worth in a society that valued utilitarian skills.

Education in the colonies prior to the 1850s was a battle between the Anglican and Catholic churches. Although the Church of England was the official religion, many people refused to send their children to Anglican schools because they felt these schools duplicated the oppressive system of rule that dominated Britain. 'The long association of the governors and the Church of England made the colonists suspicious that such alliances hampered religious and social development in the interests of an exclusive minority' (Hartwell, 1955:59). The ruling aristocracy in Britain was associated with the Church of England, especially by those of Irish and Scottish descent who formed a great proportion of the new population in Australia. A large proportion of the Irish-Australian population strived for the establishment of Catholic schools. And there was a growing number of dissenters within the Church of England and from Scottish stock who supported non-denominational education.

In order to allay controversy over the establishment of universities, it was thought provident, by the governing body in New South Wales in the late 1840s, to found its education on a secular basis. The Rev. Dr John Woolley, the first Principal of Sydney University, was opposed to the clergy maintaining any governing role within the university. He argued that a university with denominational colleges was a recipe for the strong colleges (and therefore, the strongest religions) to take over the university. Woolley advocated a change to a reformed Oxford model, which gave more power to

the university than the colleges, and where professors were teachers and instigators rather than 'mere examiner or tutor' (Gardner, 1979:48).

The success of education at the university level depended on a strong educational base at the primary and secondary levels. Education Acts (passed from 1860-1890) meant an increase in educated children. Australian society was becoming more educationally minded and, instead of going back to Britain after making money from the goldfields, people were choosing to stay and make something of their lives in Australia (Macmillan, 1968:3, 7). Universities struggled to survive though, because there was only a small population of secondary students from which to draw. Even by the end of the nineteenth century, when university places were increasing in number, there were still only three government-funded secondary schools in Australia (Shaw, 1962:24). Education after the primary level in the second half of the nineteenth century continued to be influenced by British tradition, which stipulated a religious influence. In Britain, an education based on the Christian ideals of the Church of England was reserved for the privileged few who could afford it, and the ideals imparted in these schools (of improving one's mind rather than learning skills) were continued on at university level. It was only through these ideals that religion could maintain a weakening influence on university development.

John Newman, an Oxford-educated professor, was one of the last influential writers to express this view in his *The Idea of a University* (1889/1976), where he emphasised the importance of ecclesiastical teachings in the university on the grounds that putting reason above divine knowledge was paramount to relativism (Simon, 1960:286). He considered religious learning the guiding and delimiting principle for all other areas of study taught in the university. Through the limits placed on knowledge by religious strictures, he argued, it was possible to judge all truths, and thereby judge what was good (Young, 1996:196-7):

A great good will impart great good. If then the intellect is so excellent a portion of us, and its cultivation so excellent, it is not only beautiful, perfect, admirable, and noble in itself, but in a true and high sense it must be useful to the possessor and to all around

him; not useful in any low, mechanical, mercantile sense, but as diffusing good, or as a blessing, or a gift, or power, or a treasure, first to the owner, then through him to the world. I say then, if a liberal education be good, it must necessarily be useful too. (Newman, 1976:144)

Newman believed that only those privileged enough to receive this kind of education could possibly understand and act on the plight of the underprivileged. This privileged position, one of distinction, endowed the benefactor with the symbolic capital to legitimate social justice issues. These issues were, in effect, only what the privileged deemed worthy of attention.

The role of the university in nineteenth-century England – and in its transported form, in nineteenth-century Australia – was to teach; and in particular, to teach the privileged few. The British heritage in higher education contained strict guidelines on what was considered appropriate knowledge, and did not acknowledge the role of universities as seats of research, although this was established at the time in Germany. Reforms made to Oxford and Cambridge in the mid-nineteenth century moved general teachings away from ecclesiastic directives, though the idea that education should produce a mind trained to greatness, nobility and beauty still dominated. A liberal education, as espoused by Matthew Arnold, recreated Newman's ecclesiastical ideals for a university education by drawing on culture and literature to fill this role rather than religion (Young, 1996:203). Arnold, wishing to maintain a 'religious perspective' without drawing on theological teachings, argued for secular teachings that would encompass roughly the same principles, thereby providing a university education that inculcated the ideals of a Christian gentleman (Simon, 1960:284). These would be expressed through measured contemplation and timely remarks:

It [culture] does not try to teach down to the level of inferior classes; it does not try to win them for this or that sect of its own, with ready-made judgements and watchwords. It seeks to do away with classes; to make the best that has been thought and known in the world current everywhere; to make all men live in an atmosphere of sweetness and light. (Arnold, 1869/1932:70)

Contemporaries of Newman and Arnold insisted that an education in the arts (which included classics, mathematics, natural science, and philosophy) would fit any person for their life's work, and would also be a prerequisite for any further specialised training, such as medicine or law.

These ideas on education in England were the basis of approaches to university education in Australia. The governing bodies in Australia charged with setting up universities accepted the Arnoldian ideals before the Newman ones, not only because Newman's stance was losing credence in Britain, but also because there were many more dissenting voices in Australia to the continuation of Anglican church domination. A letter from the Committee of Council of the University of Melbourne to the select committee in England (who had been appointed to find the university's first four professors) outlined their stipulations as to what kind of scholars they were looking to employ, and it included, 'they had to be men who were not in Holy Orders; of approved worth and moral standing; of such stability of character as to command respect' (Scott, 1936:21).

Secular education, though, was not an indication of lack of concern over moral education. The colony's governors in NSW were most concerned to instil in the population a reformation of character that would surmount its convict beginnings. Governor Bourke stated in 1833:

I may without fear of contradiction assert that in no part of the world is the general education of the People a more sacred and necessary duty of the Government than in New South Wales. The reasons are too obvious to require that I should state them. (Bourke, 1923:232)

I shall state them, nonetheless. Bourke's concern was the moral well being of the colony. An education in the arts, sciences and literature conferred improvement of moral character:

The ardent minds of the sons of the soil may be prevented from running to waste, may be raised above the unsatisfying pursuit of

sensual enjoyments to revel in the lofty and inexhaustible pleasures of the intellect. (Atlas, 1845, cited in Serle, 1973:24)

Moral life was incorporated into the university curriculum through the liberal attitudes (i.e. the consecration of an educated person) emanating from England, which were reinforced by the first university professors.

In the absence of the religious concern and economic backing of denominational colleges, such as those of Oxford and Cambridge in England, university education was necessarily a governmental concern. Although Australia's first two universities embraced the turn to secular education at this level, differences arose from the moment of their foundation due to the influences of the colonies in which they were placed, and by whom they were petitioned.

Sydney's university arose, in 1850, out of a convict colony in which a large proportion of its population held strong radical views. The first push for a university in Sydney came from the conservatives, in the form of one man, William Wentworth, a one-time radical turned conservative landowner, who advocated the continuation of the convict system because of the supply of cheap labour it allowed the pastoralists. He couched the idea of a university in terms that appealed to both conservatives and radicals. 'His British model was London University, which had grown out of the "radical infidel" University College on Gower Street, an institution which stank in all Oxbridge nostrils' (Gardner, 1979:14).

London University was formed on different principles from those of Oxford and Cambridge. These older universities maintained the traditional way of learning, based on ecclesiastical teaching, and drew their students from the aristocratic class (who were the only ones who could afford this education). These students attended university not because they needed an education to provide them with a profession, but because they could:

The university's function had by the nineteenth century come to be seen as providing young men with a version of the civility and

refinement which in former times they would have acquired from a sojourn at the royal Court. (Young, 1996:188-9)

London University eschewed the idea of higher education only for the privileged. It also turned away from religious education entirely, thereby dismissing the Church's authority (Young, 1996:189). It was formed from Jeremy Bentham's ideas on 'useful'² knowledge, which stressed advancement, change, and keeping up to date, rather than teaching the truth of the past, the classics and tradition, which was the province of Oxbridge (Young, 1996:192). Wentworth promoted London University for its model of education. This use of a secular model of higher education, though opposed by the colonial clergy, put his idea in good stead with the radicals because it was seen as opposing an ecclesiastical doctrine which was anathema to Sydney stock as it smacked of continuing British, Anglican domination. He also used Canada and the US as examples of countries that had successfully set up non-denominational universities (Gardner, 1979:14).

Wentworth did not promote the London University model, though, in terms of equality of access to higher education. The London model was useful for pointing to the benefits of a practical education, but Wentworth intended this to be designed in Sydney only for the elite. In effect, his notion of a university education perpetuated the old class distinctions while also developing a group of people with useful skills. To the conservatives, Wentworth clothed his argument in terms of educating privileged youth so that the colony would continue to be governed similarly to its current status, and not be overrun by radical ideas and policies:

Should they fail to give them [the youth of the colony] that education which would furnish them with the knowledge of the responsibilities they undertook, the achievement of responsible Government would not be to achieve a blessing, but to achieve the greatest curse it was possible to conceive. (Wentworth, 1849:2)

The conservative population was not interested in an Oxbridge education, which trained the youth for entry into the clergy. They wanted a university that would produce

² I will elaborate on the term 'useful' in the next chapter.

leaders in professional, commercial and pastoral fields. Wentworth's initiative for the establishment of a university was fundamentally about maintaining the established 'democracy', and this entailed not the education of the many (as radical sentiment may have proposed), but the education of the few. He was for 'continuity, and therefore conservatism, in politics' (Gardner, 1979:15).

The orthodoxy of a liberal education was to dominate ideas on what knowledge should be established within the new universities in Australia – at that time, this meant only Sydney and Melbourne. Liberal education befitted one for public aspirations but only if one were from the leading (conservative) class could this opportunity arise, which carried on old British separatism.³ A liberal education was also how culture (and its values) continued. 'The repository of culture ... Arnold posits as nothing less than the material institution of the university itself' (Young, 1996:203). Liberal education was seen to form the student as civilized citizen, which study of a more vocational nature alone could not accomplish. The apparent drive to educate men for vocational reasons in Australia's initial push for university education was heavily underpinned by a drive for distinction – to form an educated, autonomous elite in the colony.

Woolley, Sydney's principal professor, was against studies that qualified one for a profession. He set up university subjects to include teachings from the liberal arts only, and professed that a liberal education was adequate for the training of any legal or medical mind. Woolley stated in his inaugural address:

The idea of a university is two-fold; it is first, what its name imports, a school of *liberal* and *general* knowledge, and secondly a collection of *special schools*, devoted to the learned professions. Of these, the former is the University, properly so called; the second is complementary and ministerial. The former considers the learner as an end in and for himself, his perfection as man simply being the object of his education. The latter proposes an end out of and beyond the learner, his dexterity, namely, as a professional man. (Woolley, 1902:34 – emphasis in original)

³ No women were admitted to universities in Australia at the time of Sydney's and Melbourne's foundation. They were only just being admitted to the University of London in 1868. The University of Adelaide was the first university in Australia to accept matriculated women students in 1874; Sydney and Melbourne both in 1881 (Turney, Bygott & Chippendale, 1991:184).

Here, the principle of autonomy dominates in the field of education; from that basis, there is the option to choose a heteronomous course, but without that basis, it would not be possible. Woolley went on to say, ‘The soundest lawyers come forth from schools in which law is never taught; the most accomplished physicians are nurtured where medicine is but a name’ (Woolley, 1902:34). It was almost as though culture had been given a utilitarian purpose (White, 1981:60). But this sense of utility was scorned by much of the population, who saw universities as a bastion of ecclesiastical and aristocratic domination brought out from England.

Although Sydney University was founded under the guise of radical views and modelled on London University, it retained a great emphasis on a liberal education (meaning a general rather than a vocational education), which very much emulated the Oxbridge tradition. At the inception of the university, three chairs were created which all provided teaching towards a Bachelor of Arts (BA) degree (Barff, 1902:89). The Faculty of Law was not established until 1890 (Barff, 1902:98), although law degrees had been awarded since 1855:

A rigorous protest against the establishment of the school [of medicine, in 1860] was made by the professors, chiefly on the ground that the medical school would retard the completion of the curriculum in the Faculty of Arts. (Barff, 1902:99)

The medical school was not begun until 1883. For most of the nineteenth century, ‘the history of the University is largely that of the Faculty of Arts’ (Farrell, 1952:7). Instruction in ‘culture’ was considered to be of great moralising benefit to the colony and, through university education, to produce well-bred, high-minded English gentlemen.

The founding of the University of Melbourne in 1853, only three years after Sydney’s, transpired in the grip of the gold rush and the presence of quantities of money, which allowed it to seek the privileges awarded to a more gentrified kind of life. In Melbourne, the Tories were those who felt the need to support the university without

having to appeal to the more radical element (whose greatest concern was with finding wealth in the goldfields). The University of Melbourne's experiences as a new institution were, in some ways, quite different from those of Sydney. The University of Melbourne did not have Sydney's hesitation about undertaking vocational training. Charles La Trobe, the Lieutenant-Governor of Victoria, was keen to facilitate the request by members of the governing body of the colony for the establishment of a university, not only for its moralising effects, but also for the cultivation of science (Blainey, 1957:3). Here, the difference with Sydney was again significant, in that the call for a university came from many rather than just one. The medical school was established in 1863. Although the Faculty of Law was not established until 1874, degrees in law had been presented since 1860 through students undertaking a BA that included some specific subjects in law (Scott, 1936:118). Instruction was given in architecture and civil engineering from 1860, although they were not established as faculties until 1882 (Scott, 1936:119).

With initial student numbers at Melbourne being small, and even dwindling by a third in its first year (Blainey, 1957:13), there was a great incentive to provide a broader education than a classical curriculum would allow. Here, the differences between colonies were more marked than in the areas of religion and morality. Melbourne's close association with the gold rush meant there was little opposition to scientific studies, such as engineering, and even though classical studies were a major part of the arts degree, there were several suggestions made by the professors of the time to drop classics and 'give an education which the public did not scorn' (Blainey, 1957:20-1). There was also greater wealth in a colony that had grown to be the centre of business in Australia. Universities petitioned their respective state governments for funding and were rewarded accordingly. Sydney's state government annual endowment in 1853 was £5 000, compared to Melbourne's £9 000 (which very soon after increased) (Macmillan, 1968:5).

These foundational differences were to continue, especially in the later established English departments, right through to the mid-twentieth century.

How different were the intellectual cultures of Melbourne and Sydney ... these differences, while not blanket, were so sharp that all the cultural history that usually went on as if you could talk about all Australian culture in one breath was nonsensical. (Docker, 1984:13, 14)

I will not elaborate on the differences between the universities in Australia, as this is a whole study in itself, and has been dealt with in dedicated university histories.⁴ I have pointed out the different influences in the establishment of these universities only to reiterate the effect of legitimating ideas in Australian society that underpin the changing power of knowledges in Australian universities.

Sydney's main foundational concern was with moral character (analogous to a 'legitimisable' practice rather than a 'legitimate' one, in Bourdieu's terms, due to seeking consecration not from the field where 'knowledge for its own sake' is valued – that would be true autonomy – but from the bourgeois, and those who are less legitimate in terms of the university itself – Bourdieu, 1990:95-8) because of the paucity of a 'leading' class. They did not want a continuation of old British values of distinction brought through the church, but they were still concerned to produce a leading class. Melbourne's main interest was utilitarian (or heteronomous knowledge). The large increase in population, and a corresponding large wealthy class, meant that the university could facilitate a useful education for this class already formed. These differences manifested in the development of different departments, or similar departments developing at different rates.

Chairs in modern literature (sometimes referred to as comparative literature) were established in both universities in the 1880s, which included studies of English, German and French literature and language (Milner, 1996:4). The value of learning the classics was questioned by those inside and outside the university, who argued they 'were redundant because they were not essential to the practice of any profession' (Blainey,

⁴ See Barff, 1902; Scott, 1936; Farrell, 1952; Nadel, 1957; Philp, Debus, Veideminis & Connell, 1964; Macmillan, 1968; Gardner, 1979; Blainey, 1989; Turney, Bygott & Chippendale, 1991.

1957:108). The University of Melbourne council turned down propositions to end the teaching of the classics, Greek and Latin, so the problem of attracting greater student numbers in the arts persisted. The establishment of professional and practical courses, such as medicine, law and engineering, drew an increasing numbers of students. By the turn of the century, the awarding of professional degrees outweighed those of arts degrees (Turney, Bygott and Chippendale, 1991).

Here began the conflict over higher education for the utility of moral, learned gentlemen or for the utility of a profession:

A sublime elevation versus a rational ground, a glorious truth versus vulgar utility, knowledge for its own sake versus debasing instrumentality, quality of mind versus practical needs, the universal versus the particular: such were the terms of the debate which, in spite of local variations, has remained the basis of discussions of university education. (Young, 1996:188)

Early 20th Century

From the depression years of the 1890s there developed a greater sense of national culture. This had less to do with the depression than with an increasing infrastructure for art in Australia, which came about due to the notion of art's civilising influence and the recognition by the art community – and the community in general – of Australian art (although not indigenous art) in this process (Gibson, 2001:36). In writing, this was most evident in the poetry of Henry Lawson and Banjo Paterson, for example, and in the proliferate number of periodicals that published creative literature, the *Bulletin* among them (Kingston, 1988:214). This sense of national culture was helped by community interest and involvement in mechanics' institutes, schools of arts and workingmen's colleges, of which there numbered over a thousand by 1900 (Kingston, 1988:208). This was where the interest in writing as a civilising influence was taking place.

In the US though, creative writing, known as English composition, was introduced into the university curriculum for the first time at Harvard in 1884 (Myers, 1996:47). It was

meant to go hand in hand with an understanding of literature, both being a break away from the study of English as grammar, language and rhetoric. This approach emphasised that ‘writing ought to be pursued for its own sake – for the sake of cultivation – and not for the purpose of gaining a livelihood or for a more specialized knowledge’ (Myers, 1996:7). Therefore, those undertaking this area of study were to eschew professional approaches to literature, which inside the academy involved research, and outside the academy involved materialistic pursuits. Creative writing was seen as the approach to writing that required ‘aesthetic and spiritual cultivation’ rather than a professional, scholarly one (Myers, 1996:7). Those opposing the introduction of creative writing in the US universities relied upon the essentialist ideas of creativity being inherent in a subject/person. The new approach called for a:

constructivist and anti-essentialist view of literature, believing that “power” and “beauty” were not given but obtainable ... the new writing instruction was not rhetoric but something else entirely, because it did away with everything else except instruction in pure writing. (Myers, 1996:39)

The same could not have been said for creative writing in Australian universities, because of the social circumstances of a newly forming nation. Literature and the arts were accepted as a civilising influence on the minds of the masses, but to distinguish themselves from the masses, the humanities professors in universities advanced that the liberal minds of the country’s future leaders were still best developed through the classics. In a growing sense of nationhood, though, universities were becoming more than places of elevated learning for the liberal mind, and increasingly incorporated utilitarian skills and vocational training into their curriculum. Identification with a national culture was reflected in the universities through their increased sense of national purpose. This was more for useful knowledge to produce leaders and professionals, rather than the literary words of Australian poets and writers or the liberal influence of the classics. Liberal education through the arts and sciences, although still seen through the eyes of the established intelligentsia as holding prime position in the education of ‘gentlemen’, was losing ground in terms of student numbers to vocational education.

The universities of Tasmania, Queensland and Western Australia, set up between 1890 and 1912, still looked to British universities as models for their institutions, but by then there existed in England the newer universities at Manchester and Liverpool (Macmillan, 1968:7), which had moved away from the Oxbridge model. The University of Western Australia gave an emphasis 'to "modern" rather than "traditional" subjects. This was shown in their controversial decision in 1912 to establish a Chair of Geology rather than one of Classics' (Macmillan, 1968:10). The first Chancellor of the University of Western Australia, John Winthrop Hackett, was very outspoken on his views of the role of a university education:

Unfortunately, throughout the British Empire, the extension of the true University idea has suffered, and suffered severely ... I believe that the influence of Oxford, Cambridge, and Dublin has been largely mischievous as far as the new countries of the empire are concerned. Those Universities devote themselves in a paramount measure to the study of the dead languages or to the pursuit of what is called the higher mathematics. (Hackett, cited in Alexander, 1963:20)

Hackett wanted university teaching to reflect national demands, which included modern subjects and practical work that was ultimately useful in the community (Turney et al, 1991:347).

Although all the newer universities were petitioned for by members of parliament and professional groups on the basis of the values of traditional liberal education (with its concomitant role of establishing a class of people who possessed disinterested distinction), many were forced by public pressure to jettison this idea. The founders had to subordinate their ideas of consecrated knowledge in favour of knowledge that had instrumental appeal, in order to receive backing from their contemporaries (Macmillan, 1968:12). Science, medicine, engineering and veterinary science were all incorporated into the curricula of these new universities.

The older universities of Sydney and Melbourne also reflected this change. Even those in positions of authority within the universities increasingly considered alternatives to the idea that liberal study was the only means of creating a well-rounded education. In 1902 the Chancellor of the University of Sydney stated:

Culture may very fairly be defined as that which teaches a man to think; and so long as any study is carried on in such a way as to develop a man's thinking powers, that study will infallibly be a means of culture, and thus we come to see the vast gulf which lies between the learned professions and the mechanical trades. The professions are, or ought to be, studied by the intellectual method: they ought to develop the thinking power of those who practise them and they are called liberal because each member is free to exercise his thinking faculty in the conduct of his business, and is expected to use that freedom in accordance with reason. And every practical art which can be conducted on the whole in this intellectual way may, as I believe, if circumstances permit, be considered to be not unworthy of the attention of the University. (MacLaurin, 1902:7)

Foundational ideas on the benefit of study in the classics were being replaced, but not with other areas of study in the humanities (such as English, the study of literature, or writing), but with study of a more practical nature. Members of MacLaurin's staff expressed similar sentiments for changing the accepted idea on what produced an 'educated' person:

For it seems pretty clear that there are very many mansions in the house of culture, and very many doors to each, moving 'on such strange geometrical hinges that you may open them both ways', as well by theory as by practice; and that access to them is afforded both by general knowledge and by specialism. (MacCallum, 1903:39)

The faculties and departments that received the greatest impetus for change and expansion from the turn of the century onwards were those most closely related to a vocation: medicine with all its subdivisions including pathology, biochemistry, obstetrics, psychiatry; dentistry; law; engineering, with its branches of civil, mechanical and electrical; architecture; economics; veterinary and agricultural sciences. 'Most of the new chairs and most of the vacant chairs between 1886 and 1911 were in those rapidly advancing sciences' (Blainey, 1957:132).

What was happening in the arts? Conservatism prevailed. Nothing much had changed in the structure of the arts curriculum since its inception. At both Sydney and Melbourne, the classics still dominated; the compulsory languages of Latin and Greek were still taught (Turney et al, 1991:504-5). By the first decade of the new century, there had been no new professors in Melbourne's arts schools for twenty-five years. In the other faculties during the same period, over half of the chairs had changed hands (Blainey, 1957:129-30). The arts faculty was criticised for contributing to the notion of the university as an 'exotic institution', because the arts did not lead graduates to profitable employment, and their continued insistence on the study of Greek deterred many students who had never had exposure to this language before coming to university. At the turn of the century, the numbers of students enrolling in the arts at Melbourne had more than halved from what it had been up to eleven years prior to that, and the registrar considered the future end to the arts course (Blainey, 1957:122-3). Unlike in the US universities, English studies, let alone creative writing, was not even mentioned.

The arts were left further behind when government took an interest in universities. For the first time, in World War One (WWI), the Commonwealth government looked to universities to help with industry and technological development. The government set up an Advisory Council of Science and Industry, and asked the universities for information on research they were undertaking that might be of benefit to the Council (Turney et al, 1991:419). This led, in 1920, to the formation of the Institute of Science and Industry, in which scientists and engineers from universities became involved. In 1926, the government changed the institute's name to the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, and in 1949, the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization, the name by which it is known today (Macmillan, 1968:13). 'The scientist, the engineer, the expert were replacing the common man as the hope of the world' (White, 1981:135). But as far as research in universities went, this was tied very much to government directives, such as those generated during the war, and there was no push to further it. At a meeting of the Australian Universities Standing Advisory

Committee in 1921, 'It was resolved that it is not desirable to establish a Ph.D. Degree in the Australian Universities' (1921:2). As Greenwood points out, the 'culture of the times mirrors an uncertainty about values apart from an emphasis upon utilitarian goals' (1955:299).

The effects of WWI (and the outbreak of Spanish influenza after the war) led to two defining characteristics of Australian society in the inter-war years: patriotism, and protection of the country. The 1920s in Australia was a time of increased wariness of all that was not either Australian or British. There emerged ideas of purity and innocence of the country and its inhabitants, and the need to protect this (White, 1981:140).

Protection came in the form of government policies on immigration, tariffs, and censorship. Access to literary works was greatly affected by government censorship policies. Socialist ideas were seen as a threat to the nation and any works with Marxist leanings were banned. There was an increase in moral censorship, and many groups such as churches and ex-armed services put pressure on the government to restrict literature that threatened Australian values on moral grounds (Gott & Linden, 1994:9). Over 5000 titles were banned in the 1930s, many on the grounds that they were 'blasphemous, indecent or obscene' (Pollack, 1990:17). In a 1929 lecture, *Australian Art: a Plea and an Indictment*, Will Dyson stated that, 'Australia, in its neglect of the creative literary artist, was stunting the growth of the other arts and depriving itself of the full benefit of science', and went on to say that, 'the culture that grew in universities was being stultified for lack of a medium of public expression' (Plea for Outlet, 1929:8).

Patriotism generated by the war augmented an interest in English studies, and a correlating decline in comparative studies (which included German). Melbourne already had a chair in English, established in 1911. Sydney established a chair in 1921 (Milner, 1996:5). The 'medium of public expression' for university culture was reflected in the introduction of a new area of study in the arts, that of journalism. At the

University of Sydney, the Senate and MacCallum⁴ approved its introduction in the 1920s as they were keen to remain on good terms with the *Sydney Morning Herald*, although MacCallum had previously vetoed such a course in 1913. Its numbers dwindled after the first two years, and it was eventually phased out after 1931 (Turney et al, 1991:477-9). Journalism was established as a diploma course at Melbourne University during this inter-war period (Blainey, 1957:165), and at the University of Western Australia in 1929 (Alexander, 1963:161).

Protectionism and patriotism both contributed to a cultural malaise that began in the 1920s and was felt in most aspects of the arts, including music, art and literature (Greenwood, 1955:298-9). The emphasis during this time was on material development. Highlights in social development saw corresponding highlights in the arts, and this period in Australia was noteworthy for lack of both. As Furnley Maurice wrote:

I have returned into my land of day,
And lo! It is not light!
And she who claims my homage is betrayed.
I went to furious fighting in far lands
To slay the beast that followed her with leering eyes,
But surely he sailed past me on the night wave
And piled my land in silent ruin cunningly

Australia, speak!
Surely you have not died in such a little while?
Why will you taunt me with your silences
That make all sacrifice seem vain? (Maurice, 1944:42)

This neglect of culture carried over to the universities. Even their move to accommodate English and journalism in the humanities was just a reflection of patriotism in the 1920s left over from the pre-war years, and a utilitarian outlook dominated:

Although the faculty of arts was by far the largest in the university
[of Melbourne], its claims for new chairs were continually

⁴ Mungo MacCallum, Professor of Modern Literature 1887 – 1920; Vice-Chancellor 1925 – 1927 (Turney et al., 1991:448)

neglected in favour of the claims of the more utilitarian courses. There had been three professors of the arts in 1855, and eighty years later there were only five. (Blainey, 1957:156)

Australian writers in the 1930s, such as Vance and Nettie Palmer, set out to change the role of writers in society from that of professionals to intellectual leaders in the formation of Australian culture (White, 1981:135). The 'Australianism' that had dominated up until the late 1930s professed 'mateship', the White Australia Policy, 'the cult of amateurism', anti-Communism, and the censorship of all literature 'that would offend the Christian patriotic family man – that grandson of the wild colonial boy' (Coleman, 1962:4-5). Writers such as the Palmers foreshadowed a turning away from 'Australianism' in the late 1930s, and this, coupled with economic growth and growing confidence as the country began to move out of the Depression (Coleman, 1962:1), gave rise to other changes in universities.

Up until this time, teaching had been the dominant function of a university. The effects of the Depression were felt within universities in terms of reduced student numbers, staffing and expansion of departments. Research was undertaken in a minor way only by the professors, with very few students being given the opportunity or even the incentive. But the cultural changes of the late 1930s had a major effect on the place of research in the university, because it was now understood to have a greater relevance to society. Its contribution to development in WWI meant research was beginning to be recognised as a priority for the growth of universities (Turney et al, 1991:544), but the Depression had halted its development because of fiscal constraints. When the economy improved again, 'research was assigned a higher priority ... and, correspondingly, more attention was directed at post-graduate study' (Turney et al, 1991:544). Commonwealth government grants for research in universities began in 1936 (Blainey, 1957:159).

By the outbreak of war in 1939, universities were moving ahead in several areas. The government was increasingly valuing the importance of university training in the sciences and technological areas. Not only was research in these faculties greatly

encouraged, but also undergraduate training in these areas was valued for their potential contribution to the war effort in ways that qualifications in the arts could not offer:

In the urgency of war the utilitarian trend was accelerated. Students in technical faculties were prevented from enlisting unless they had failed badly or graduated ... On the other hand, enrolments fell away in faculties such as arts, where students were only allowed to continue their studies if they were not required for war work. (Blainey, 1957:178)

Examples of the developments in university research in the areas of science and technology were evident in medicine, such as treating wounds and injuries, and in engineering, such as air machinery (Blainey, 1957:178).

Other areas of change included the government's decision to recruit university graduates in large numbers into the public service (Coleman, 1962:1; White, 1981:151). This was further recognition of the importance of the 'intellectual class' to the community (Frow, 1995). Of further interest to government in the progress of the war, and possibly the only area with connections to the humanities departments in universities, was that of communications (Blainey, 1957:179).

One of the largest benefactors to the University of Melbourne, Dafydd Lewis, gave £550 000 in 1941 to provide scholarships for students to attend the university, with the stipulation that these scholarships were not to be made available for students wishing to study 'arts, music and education' (Blainey, 1957:181). Expansion of the arts was curtailed once again.

Post World War Two

By the 1940s, many areas of study had expanded as a direct result of their application to social and economic development. Australian universities formed closer links to government departments in the areas of science and research, as mentioned above. In 1945 the first Australian PhD degree was established at University of Melbourne (Macmillan, 1968:14). But the arts were being left behind in this regard and had 'not

benefited from graduates as much as the founders of the university had hoped' (Blainey, 1957:203). They had only the old adage of liberal aspiration to call upon. It was like trying to argue for the continuation of uselessness amidst an area of gaining utility (Young, 1996). Blainey surmises, 'Perhaps the cause of this contrast is the nation as a whole rather than the university' (1957:203). What Blainey is referring to here is the concern of society as a whole for the utility of education. If universities were seen to forward disciplines reflective of old British traditions (with accompanying aristocratic distinctions), this would make the university 'despised and forgotten, an exotic institution' (Blainey, 1957:203). Certainly the utility of knowledge had received more community recognition than 'knowledge for its own sake' right from the beginning of university education in Australia.

Federal control increased during World War Two (WWII) because of national security purposes. This changed the balance of fiscal power because state governments were required to relinquish receipt and control of taxation income to the Commonwealth in 1942 (Macmillan, 1968:15). At the conclusion of WWII, the Federal government's superior financial position, due to a system of "uniform taxation", meant it needed to assume roles previously reserved for state governments. This included the funding of universities (Greenwood, 1955:412).

Although this meant the universities received funding from two government sources, there was a considerable increase in student numbers because many ex-servicemen were given the opportunity to attend university through the provision of government scholarships. Consequently, after the war, universities became overcrowded, understaffed and under resourced. The Mills Report, tabled in 1950, had been instrumental in establishing federal government funds for universities (Macmillan, 1968:14). It had taken from 1945 until then for any report to eventuate because of a change in government. After the Mills Report, funding was still inadequate, not only due to the increased student numbers, but because of the increasing prestige of university research in contributing to knowledge valued by the community. More government funds were needed in order to continue and advance research areas in universities, and for those

within these areas to maintain their newly consecrated positions⁵. Strategies to alleviate the funding situation resulted in two of the most important federal reports on universities until those of the late 1980s. These were the Murray Report of 1957, and the Martin Report of 1965.

The Murray Report

The Murray Report was the first published government commission on universities in Australia. On the advice of the Australian Vice-Chancellor's Committee (AVCC), Prime Minister Robert Menzies asked Sir Keith Murray, head of the Universities Grants Commission in Britain, to chair the Committee. Australia's continuing strong ties to Britain, especially in the area of university education, was shown in the choice of Murray to head this investigation.

The Murray Report identified the role of the university in the broader community. The anchors of a university education as identified in the report still bore a strong allegiance to the Oxbridge tradition that placed a liberal education at the pinnacle of a well-educated person's life:

It is the function of the university to offer not merely a technical or specialist training but a full and true education, benefiting a free man and the citizen of a free country ... It sometimes seems that while we have been advancing at a formidable speed in our knowledge of technical matters we have if anything been falling behind in our understanding and appreciation of human values. We can handle machines and physical nature beyond the dreams of previous generations, but we handle ourselves, our families and our fellow human beings in general no better, and perhaps less well, than our fathers did before us. Many of the most serious problems in the world to-day are moral problems and are problems of human relationships. The need for the study of humanities is therefore greater and not less than in the past. (Murray, 1957:para 6)

⁵ The degree of distinction given to research practices in universities was relatively new in Australian society in the 1940s. Research, at that time, had been a part of universities in other countries for varying lengths of time, and specifically in Germany for nearly one hundred years.

Murray's ideas on a 'full and true education' were steering it away from the vocational bent that had gained increasing momentum from the turn of the century. Here was a voice in favour of supporting the humanities.

The professional schools in universities were now well established, and the old argument about the benefits of a liberal education reasserted itself from a reviving interest in the arts and culture that had begun in the late 1930s. In the humanities, and especially in English departments, scholarship revolved around producing metaphysical analysis rather than giving any cultural or political considerations to the application of their work (Docker, 1984). Murray's emphasis on a liberal education reinforced metaphysical and humanist approaches in the humanities and strengthened English departments' application of this through the adoption of the Leavisite perspective, which had originated from FR and QD Leavis at Cambridge University in the 1920s and 1930s.

This impacted directly on the status of writing in universities, in terms of its connection to research. It was considered something that could be studied and analysed, and was certainly part of worthy scholarship in the humanities, but not something that could be taught or done as part of scholarly work. FR Leavis had promulgated the 'English tradition' of literature, thus prolonging the effects of the Romantic and idealist influences on the creative side of human development – the idea of the 'genius in the garret' who created literature as a spiritually civilising experience. Increasingly embedded in universities of the 1950s was an attitude to English literature and, by extension, creative writing, which bore the mark of Leavis' 1920s argument addressing why English literature should be included in the university curriculum. 'Literature was important not only in itself, but because it encapsulated creative energies which were everywhere on the defensive in modern "commercial" society' (Eagleton, 1983:32). The Leavises saw literature as the supremely civilizing pursuit:

That is, there must be a training of intelligence that is at the same time a training of sensibility; a discipline of thought that is at the same time a discipline in scrupulous sensitiveness of response to delicate organizations of feeling, sensation and imagery. Without

that appreciative habituation to the subtleties of language in its most charged and complex uses which the literary-critical discipline is, thinking – thinking to the ends with which humane education should be most concerned – is disabled. (Leavis, 1943/1961:38)

Even though the Leavisite ideal came to dominate English study within universities in Britain at the time, generally science continued to be privileged in the university system as a whole, thereby increasingly marginalizing English and its associated areas of study. The reaction from those in departments other than English in British universities in the 1920s to the Leavisite influence was, in a sense, one of ridicule, demonstrated by the response to the Leavises' publication of *Scrutiny*, a journal voicing their views. It:

viewed itself as “central” while being in fact peripheral, believed itself to be the ‘real’ Cambridge while the real Cambridge was busy denying it academic posts, and perceived itself as the vanguard of civilization while nostalgically lauding the organic wholeness of exploited seventeenth-century farm labourers. (Eagleton, 1983:36)

The Murray Report's ideas, in line with Leavisite idealism in English literature, sparked the dichotomous argument about education of a general or a specific nature and spilt over into the other main area of importance in academic life: research. The Murray Report saw basic research as the engine to drive knowledge:

It is obvious that most of the basic secrets of nature have been unravelled by men who were moved simply by intellectual curiosity, who wanted to discover new knowledge for its own sake. The application of the new knowledge usually comes later, often a good deal later; it is also usually achieved by other men, with different gifts and different interests. (Murray, 1957:para 8)

Murray also acknowledged the predominance of science in universities and noted that pure (basic) research that moves knowledge forward is commonly, if not almost exclusively, carried out in the sciences. Science was of great importance in the broader community because Australia, being an isolated nation and dependent on exports, required advances in technology to keep abreast of developments in Britain and the US. Science and technology were also vital to Australia's national defence (Murray,

1957:10-27). The Murray Report spoke out in strong support for university research, which it saw as a fundamental part of this process:

The academic scientists go on for years, some in a big, some in a small way, to use their techniques and record their discoveries in the learned journals for the information and benefit of one another ... Without the work of the academics the whole great process would lose its foundation and support. Every nation wants to enable its scientists to contribute a fair share to the total stock of human knowledge. (Murray, 1957:para 10)

Murray pointed out the importance of research to the vitality of university life. He stated that students:

want to be put into touch with the fountains of knowledge; they want to see and hear and talk with the men who are 'making' the modern knowledge ... they want to learn from the men who are working in the front lines of science, and it is right that they should do so. (Murray, 1957:10)

Without academics undertaking research in their own areas of interest, both undergraduate and postgraduate study would deteriorate:

He who learns from one occupied in learning, drinks of a running stream. He who learns from one who has learned all he is to teach, drinks the green mantle of the stagnant pool. (Truscott, 1945:115)

Murray's insistent masculinization of the discourse was consistent with all discourse about learning and research in universities at that time. It had ramifications for all language-based disciplines, but was particularly evident as time went on, in the decline of classics and literature in universities during the twentieth century with a corresponding increase in women students, especially in the arts.

Menzies accepted in full the Murray Report's financial recommendations for greater fiscal responsibility by the Commonwealth government, rather than the States, along with recommendations for an advisory committee to government on financial assistance for universities. This committee was formed in 1959 and was known as the Australian

Universities Commission (Davies, 1989:13-14). Along with financial matters, the government had been interested to find the Report's recommendations for technical education at university levels, which had been lobbied for by those working in technical disciplines to be set up in separate institutions (Murray, 1957:Appendix A). What the Murray Report uncovered was not expected: although there was a need for facilities for science and technology, which the government had placed as a high priority, there was as great a demand for facilities in the arts and medicine. Murray was concerned about educating those in the sciences and technologies away from the arts as this could narrow their outlook and impede their ability to see their work in a broader social context (Davies, 1989:10-12).

Murray's insistence on the importance of the arts, though, did not extend to the research level, and the report showed value in the arts only in terms of its liberal, civilising effects. This curtailed the development of the arts at the undergraduate level in terms of vocational training, and at the postgraduate level (in comparison to the sciences) in terms of its contribution to the broader community. In terms of the Murray analysis, the role of science at the research level (unlike the arts) was to begin a process of discovery that allowed for further developments outside the university.

An old divide between the universities and the mechanics institutes and colleges was continued in the Murray Report as it differentiated, in the science and technological areas, between 'professional training' and 'the more "practical" student ... the craftsmen, the technicians and others' (Murray, 1957:para 287). They recommended that these two forms of learning be kept separate, in universities and technical colleges, respectively. Similar ideas on 'professional' and 'practical' education can be found in the Martin Report which was to follow seven years later.

The Martin Report

The Martin Report was requested by the Prime Minister and set up in 1961 in order to find a way to curtail the growing financial burden of the universities on the Commonwealth government (Connell, Sherington, Fletcher, Turney & Bygott,

1995:69). Student numbers in universities were growing at unexpected rates. The Murray Report had been a useful first-stage indicator of what was needed to be done, but the population increase in the 15 – 19 year old age group was over 16% from 1952 – 1957, and projected to be nearly a 40% increase on that by 1962, as indicated in the Murray Report (1957:para 295). At the time any matriculating student could go to university, so in the early 1960s, universities introduced quotas in each faculty to reduce the growing number of students, and this, in turn, reduced the failure rate of first year students, another issue of concern to the government in trying to meet the financial demands of universities (Davies, 1989:30).

The Martin Report was instrumental in compounding and formalising the idea of basic (or pure) research. Martin, who had been educated at Cambridge under the tutorage of Lord Ernest Rutherford at the Cavendish Laboratory (Davies, 1989:47), brought with him Cavendish ideas on research:

The discovery of knowledge and its application were perceived by Cavendish men [those from Cavendish Laboratory at Cambridge] as distinct processes to be carried out by different people, who, they assumed, would require different types of training. They believed in a dual system of higher education: traditional universities on the one hand to train people to discover new knowledge, and higher technical institutions on the other to train people in the application of scientific knowledge in industry. (Davies, 1989:46)

CP Snow, also a Cavendish man, said of research in the sciences at Cambridge in the 1920s:

We prided ourselves that the science we were doing could not in any conceivable circumstances, have any practical use. The more firmly one could make the claim, the more superior one felt. (Snow, 1964:32)

Martin's idea of what a university should be bore little resemblance to the institutions that had been developed in Australia throughout the century. He saw higher education expanding, but in two different directions: universities and technical colleges. Research, he believed, was of vital importance to both, but in one – universities – it

would be carried out through disinterested scholarship, and in the other – the colleges – this new knowledge would be given its application:

The objective of the education provided by a technical college is to equip men and women for the practical world of industry and commerce, teaching them the way in which manufacturing and business are carried on and the fundamental rules which govern their successful operation. The university course, on the other hand, tends to emphasise the development of knowledge and the importance of research; in so doing it imparts much information which is valuable to the practical man but which is often incidental to the main objective. (Martin, 1964: para 5.137)

Martin's Cavendish approach to research was so influential in his government report that it instigated the reform of tertiary education. What resulted was the binary system comprising universities and colleges of advanced education, which placed the arts in colleges of advanced education, or in colleges of their own.

The Martin Report stated that the humanities should include all 'language and literature' subjects 'concerned with human culture; as grammar, rhetoric, poetry and especially the study of Latin or Greek' (1965: para 16.2). All universities offered English courses as part of a BA degree in 1964: Sydney was the only university to offer a linguistics course and Melbourne the only university to offer a course in rhetoric (Martin, 1965:1-2). The report acknowledged the humanities subjects for their role in 'fitting the community for its tasks and of making life in it worth living', but also noted that some branches of the humanities were defensive in extolling their own worth (Martin, 1965: para 16.10). What it did not acknowledge was that progress in funding and facilities for the sciences and some other areas of the arts was not matched in the humanities.

PhD candidates in the humanities in 1964 were still encouraged to study overseas, whereas science and social science PhDs were encouraged to stay in Australia. Martin claims the discrepancy was because of the access to 'comprehensive libraries' (1965: para 16.50).

Humanities was pushed in the technical colleges, but in line with what was a 'general' improvement of students, and not the specialities of subjects such as Latin or Greek. Martin states:

It is imperative that students of technology should learn how to express their thoughts clearly and with an economy of words; for this purpose essay writing and précis are important. The study of literary masterpieces would, no doubt, constitute an important component of such courses, but emphasis should be on the use of language as a means of communication. (Martin, 1964: para 5.138)

This creative emphasis on the humanities, as a 'means of communication', was something to be encouraged in colleges, but not at university level. Creativity, in the arts, was in closer contact with practical issues, and the reasoning for this, according to Martin, was historical: 'The European system of the academy of art was quickly incorporated in the schools of arts and crafts of the state education departments' (Martin, 1965: para 22.42).

In the area of music, and to some degree in art, Martin relents on this idea of theory and practice being separate. In 1964, there were both practical and academic courses in universities in music, and Martin even states: 'It is no longer imagined that academic studies alone are sufficient or, indeed, able to provide a university with a vital musical life' (Martin, 1965: para 22.23). In art, Martin acknowledges that art history and philosophy, only, are taught in universities and 'there is a case for a degree in art which combines practice with history and theory, as in music' (Martin, 1965: para 22.52). The theatrical arts were clearly separated into vocational and academic functions, although both were taught under the auspice of a university (1965: para 22.98). There was no mention of the written arts except in the context of English, Latin and Greek studies in the university (of an 'academic' bent), and the clear expression of the students of technology (of a practical nature).

The government was not keen to increase expenditure on research and wanted to ensure that colleges remained separate from universities on this score. The Martin Report was

instrumental in setting this up with a clear separation of tasks in regard to the professional and the practical.

Universities and the Federal Government

The period of the late 1960s and early 1970s saw an increased interest in the arts in society. It is notable as a time when government pronounced the importance of access to the arts by the general population, and so developed policies for its funding and administration (Gibson, 2001:97). Australian governments at all levels had a long history of involvement with literary and cultural policy, dating from the introduction of literacy programs and public libraries in the nineteenth century, through the establishment of the Commonwealth Literary Fund in 1908, to the various initiatives offered throughout the twentieth century. Policy approaches over this period were stable, with only occasional incremental adjustments until the Whitlam government's major commitment to the field in the mid-1970s. For example, the formation of the Australia Council took place in 1967, but its only objective was to fund the performing arts until Whitlam reformed the Council in 1972 to incorporate seven areas of the arts, including the function of the former Literary Fund (Gibson, 2001:76 & 99). As well as the arts, the Whitlam government took a more proactive role in tertiary education, taking over funding of universities and relieving the state governments of their commitments in this area.

The early 1970s also represented a time of questioning old values, through movements such as the Vietnam war protests, women's rights, antiracism and antinuclear protests that had all swept the Western world from 1968 and were founded on concepts such as equality, peace and conservation (Connell et al, 1995:98-9). Controversy arose in Australian society through several mediums: in television for example, with the current affairs program, *This Day Tonight*; with the theatrical production of *Hair*; and with the publication of Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring* (1962). The arts were an expression of the reorientation of the general public to cultural matters. The student protest movement that enacted these beliefs was instrumental in bringing about the need to rethink the

structure and content of many university courses, especially those in the social sciences and humanities (Connell et al, 1995:100). Universities expanded their arts departments to incorporate areas recognised as specifically creative, such as music, fine arts and theatre. This:

enlarged the notion of scholarship from the hitherto prevailing view that its essence lay in informed, intelligent criticism to a view that skilful and intelligent performance could also be an ingredient of it. (Connell et al, 1995:99)

At the University of Sydney, the English department employed scholars who were already established as writers and poets. For writers in the university, this could be seen as a turning point. Writers as teachers meant an acknowledgement of the importance of the practice of writing to the deliberation of it.

Universities were increasingly valued in society (especially by business and government) because their teaching produced a marketable product in the form of the student. From the 1960s and 1970s there also emerged increasing pressure by government on the universities to produce knowledge that would benefit the broader community. The Australian Universities Commission (AUC), set up in 1959 after the publication of the Murray Report in 1957, was responsible for distributing government grants to universities and giving advice to government on university needs. In the mid 1970s, the AUC began to reserve a large amount of its funds ‘for the encouragement of special research thrusts of a national significance consonant with “the broad objectives of government policy”’ (Connell et al, 1995:98). This began with their 1975 report, where the AUC divided research grants into two categories, Category A grants providing funds ‘to support the general research effort of universities’ and Category B grants to encourage universities ‘to develop areas of special research concentration’ that ‘will make a major contribution to the national research effort’ (AUC, 1975:para 14.27, para 14.29). The funds for that triennium were to total \$9.15 million for Category A, and \$8.6 million for Category B (AUC, 1975:para 14.53). Although the AUC recognised the importance of autonomy in research, ‘it slipped tentatively and almost

apologetically into a more directive policy, tiptoeing along the thin line between judicious guidance and university autonomy' (Connell et al, 1995:98).

The major change in the relationship between universities and government occurred in 1974 when the Commonwealth government took over the full funding of universities. Prior to this, funding had come from a combination of state and federal funding and student fees. Any negotiation between universities and government had been done through the State, although the universities were afforded a large degree of autonomy (Caro, 1989:2). After the Federal government took on sole financing responsibility for universities, it became easier to exercise control over their development and direction. The AUC's role changed from one of collecting university data in order to sustain universities, to a more authoritative approach that informed universities of the direction in which they were to develop (Connell et al, 1995:447).

In 1977, the AUC was abolished, to re-form with the advisory board of colleges of advanced education, renamed the Tertiary Education Commission (TEC) (Connell et al, 1995:382-3). The university and college sector each had a separate body to forward their interests, who were answerable to the TEC, but these were both without statutory powers and under the direction of the Commission (Connell et al, 1995:383). Universities were increasingly subjected to government control in relation to funding, but they remained the only tertiary institutions funded for research.

Creative writing, during this time, was situated generally in the college sector apart from Griffith University, which offered a BA and Honours in creative writing, and Deakin University, which, from the first year of its operation (1978), offered a BA, an MA and a PhD with a major in creative writing (Guide for Prospective 1978 Students, 1977:53; University Guide of Australia, 1979). Writing was generally called professional writing in the college system, and was studied under the umbrella areas of journalism, media studies, communication and business studies, so it may, at that stage, have not been creative at all. Professional writing's first appearance as a course was at the Canberra College of Advanced Education at this college's inception in 1970

(Department of Education & Science, 1970). By 1983, Deakin still offered creative writing as a subject, but the name of the major had been changed to journalism and media studies (Guide for Prospective 1983 Students, 1982). By the mid-1980s, there were no longer any tertiary institutions offering a degree in writing under the title 'creative' – all had changed to 'professional' writing (Commonwealth Department of Education, 1985).

In 1987, the Hawke Labor Party carried out a major reshuffle of government departments. Education was subsumed into the Department of Employment, Education and Training (DEET), headed by John Dawkins (Miller, 1995:9). He instigated educational reform through the now well-known green paper on Higher Education (1987), suggesting the streamlining of higher education through the amalgamations of universities and colleges of advanced education. The subsequent white paper, released in 1988, put this into practice:

Institutions that are part of the national system will benefit from the liberalised resourcing arrangements and a share of the growth of the system. Those that choose to remain outside the system will have no guaranteed base of Commonwealth funding and will be funded by contract for specified teaching activities. (Dawkins, 1988:28)

The link between money and government control was made explicit. It meant that all higher education institutions were eligible for government funding in the same way, and all could open their doors to academic research. Research was previously not a funded activity in colleges due to government legislation. The Minister implied in the green paper that although colleges had initially been set up to be teaching-oriented and vocationally based, they were now to do that, plus more – the 'more' being tasks usually identified with a university, such as offering degrees and having 'a capacity for high-quality applied research' (Dawkins, 1987:27). University teaching and research were encapsulated in government reform that had set its priorities on rebuilding the economy after the recession of the early 1980s:

Science and technology, in the late 1980s, was seen as the panacea of the nation's fiscal malaise. The higher education reforms

reflected this. A clear commitment to increasing the share of total higher education resources to 'those fields of study of greatest relevance to the national goals, of industrial development and economic restructuring' was espoused in John Dawkins' white paper of 1988. (Maslen & Slattery, 1994:57)

This shift in emphasis in higher education research, to subordinate 'finding out' under economic needs, was strongly contested by many academics from the traditional universities. They saw this reform as resulting in a narrowing of knowledge geared to the advancing skills that would be of use for industry and business (Finlay, 1997). This really brought to the fore the bifurcation of value regarding the autonomous and heteronomous positions of research. From the one perspective (autonomy), knowledge was narrowed if it was tied to technology and business. From the other (heteronomy), knowledge was useless if it did not have this practical application.

The TEC was abolished by Dawkins and in its place was set up the National Board of Employment, Education and Training (NBEET). Included in this board was the Higher Education Council (HEC) whose role was to give policy advice on universities to government, but the previous AUC and TEC role of allocating funds was rescinded. Responsibility for research funding was given to the newly established Australian Research Council (ARC), which subsumed the previous Australian Research Grants Scheme, was wholly under the direction of the DEET (Connell et al, 1995:414), and in 2004 continues to be the main government funding body for research carried out in universities.

Concerns raised in the wake of these changes questioned the continuing ability of university research to foster public dissent that could arise in the role of the researcher as disinterested critic (Caro, 1989:8). On a social and political level, university researchers felt their role as keepers of honest criticism was being undermined. Caro states:

I have the gravest suspicion of the notion that the areas of research tackled by a university should be limited to those chosen by an Australian Research Council of very restricted membership, or

that they should only embrace those areas thought by the government of the day to be good for the nation. (Caro, 1989:5)

Research in the 1980s was as restricted in area as teaching had been in Australian universities over one hundred years before. Even though universities are places that consecrate knowledge, what knowledge is available for consecration is decided by fields outside the university: those fields which exercise the greatest power in determining what counts as legitimate culture. In colonial times, it was those individuals whose way of life was most advantageous to the colony; in contemporary times, it is institutions within what Bourdieu terms the field of power – especially the government, finance markets and major industries.

The concerns of the university sector had little effect on government policy, and the 1992 Higher Education Funding Amendment Act announced an even tighter control on research than had been indicated in the Dawkins paper. Australian universities were being asked to produce knowledge through their research capabilities that would be economically beneficial to the nation and to Australia in its relations with other nations on the international market (Finlay, 1997). In 1996, with a new (conservative) government in power, the NBEET and HEC were abolished. Policy and funding for universities were both directed from the Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs (DEETYA, formally DEET, and since DETYA and now DEST). With only this one body responsible for all education, including universities, it meant easier streamlining of objectives and, therefore, the possibility of tighter controls.

University research in Australia today is largely influenced by government policy and funding. Areas that the Federal government deem important to national interests are given greater financial support. Universities that can redirect their research to fit the model of ‘national priorities’ not only receive monetary rewards, but enhanced prestige and standing in the broader community. The ARC’s 2003 priority areas of funding covered: nano- and bio-materials; genome/phenome research; complex/intelligent

systems; and photon science (ARC, 2003b)⁶. For the funding rounds in 2004-5, the emphasis on science and technology has not changed. The priorities cover the environment, health, frontier technologies for building and transforming Australian industries, and safeguarding Australia (ARC, 2004).

Government increasingly sees universities as institutions directly capable of providing social and economic reforms. This view has led to a greater participation by government in the administration of university funds. Universities are increasingly made accountable in their production of knowledge for the funds that governments provide to them. Knowledge, produced through university teaching, creates individuals who can contribute skills needed in a competitive global market. Knowledge, produced through university research, contributes worth through its application to fields deemed necessary for economic advancement. This worth, because of its social function, is the basis for the government's insistence on university accountability for the investments made in it by government and other fields. The link between knowledge and social improvement is a continuing and strengthening one, but the emphasis in the current 'knowledge climate' ties knowledge to research, and social improvement to economic improvement. Research outcomes have become a form of capital tied directly to economic market forces.

Consequently, universities have had to become competitive in the knowledge market. In order to increase their funding base, they have had to attract a greater number of students, and courses have evolved in many areas according to student demand. This gets back to the argument earlier in the chapter about what constitutes capital within a field. In the area of academe, there is a juxtaposition (and different capital value) between those in universities who are interested in the economic viability of the institution, and those whose interest is purely driven by knowledge. This juxtaposition also shapes opinion on what sort of knowledge earns the right to be called 'university' work, and therefore, entitled to enter the field of research. Interestingly, areas that have

⁶ The ARC funds a significant number of research projects that do not fall within these priority areas.

seen great amounts of growth have not always been those that will gain students a large amount of economic capital when they graduate. One example is creative writing: there has been a 45% increase in student numbers in creative arts studies since 1989 (Krauth, 2000), and the funds generated from these courses have helped to support university growth. This growth, in the university generally, incorporates the production of new knowledge generated by research. The irony is that student interest in popular courses like creative writing has created in them a desire to further the knowledge of these areas as well as the more traditional areas like science or literature. The nucleus of research has had to extend, and this stretches further the resources available for research, and hence drives greater competition between university disciplines for limited funding. An associated irony, stemming from government policy, is that the government's attempt to instrumentalise knowledge production has created a student population with a desire for knowledge, but their desire does not necessarily fit the constricted governmental mode of 'national research priorities'. This drive for knowledge has created a student demand for disinterested knowledge approached through autonomous practice.

Cunningham writes about the structure of government as divided into three main sectors. One is the central sector, in charge of 'coordinat[ing] the complex diversity of government activity and generat[ing] overarching policy'. The second is 'market-oriented' and deals with commerce and trade, regulating and stimulating economic wealth. The last is the 'line' departments, which depend on government expenditure for their continuation (Cunningham, 1992:24). These 'line' departments include welfare, sport and leisure. Up until the government reforms of the 1980s, higher education could very well have been placed in this latter category. Contemporary views of universities as industries, with academics becoming 'workers or employees', bargaining for productivity and working conditions between senior administrators and staff, and the push to increase applied research that has monetary value as well as prestige, puts the university into the government's 'market-oriented' category. This increases government wealth by relieving it of the burden of added weight in its 'line' department.

Looked at from this perspective, universities, and research, contribute to the broader community through two main objectives. One is economic, the other cultural. Gibson, in discussing the development of the arts in Australia, talks about the division in ‘policy between arts funding justified in terms of “humanistic” objectives and arts funding justified in terms of “economic” objectives’ (2001:74). The correlation to research funding (and subsequently, creative writing) is obvious. The material and ‘humanistic’ aspects of research – whether research takes place in science, humanities or the arts – are often treated as separate paths that can never interact.

Conclusion

The field of academic research is constructed, defended, challenged and changed by the contesting autonomous and heteronomous positions that exist within it. Knowledges that have been consecrated in the university, and given the added legitimacy of contributing to research have acquired this power through the associated autonomous and heteronomous positions of knowledge workers.

The development of research in the university has been on a similar trajectory to that of knowledge: a contestation over ‘civilising the population’, i.e. the development of a liberal education; or the need to make research (and universities) relevant to society, i.e. a utilitarian education. Over the past thirty years, governments have increasingly had input into saying what is worthy of the term ‘research’. Knowledge, produced through research, has become the province of the dominating fraction of the dominant class, who direct research from the heteronomous principle.

Creative writing’s inclusion in the field of research is the culmination of both autonomous and heteronomous influences on education: the improvement of the mind through the mechanics institutes at the end of the nineteenth century, and the liberal turn in universities in the 1950s; the vocational bent of the colleges in the late 1960s, and the amalgamation of universities and colleges in the late 1980s. Whether or not creative writing is viewed as a valid form of knowledge in the research field is determined by

the historical and social conditions that render this a possibility. What constitutes knowledge through these conditions is the subject of the next chapter.

2

The Conflict of the Faculties¹

In my family, as I grew up, all sorts of knowledge was important. I learned to play the piano, recognise dangerous spiders, bowl a cricket ball, and make ginger beer. The accepted sociological approach to the acquisition of more formal knowledge was to finish high school and continue on to that great knowledge institution, the university. What was valued as knowledge, or even defined as knowledge, became narrower the further I went into the education system. So now I find myself, in postgraduate study, confining my knowledge to the parameters of accepted academic research.

For a university to *be* a university, in a socially accepted sense, those within it need to undertake research. It is taken for granted that when someone is conducting research within a university, they are working under a particular paradigm, whether the research is in the area of science, law, technology, social science, or literature. The approach to research within each discipline may vary, but there is a doxa of research as it is expressed through narrative. Doxa is the conglomeration of arbitrary meanings which have succeeded in becoming naturalised to such an extent that they seem commonsensical or inevitable and, therefore, unnecessary to speak about. Doxa procures legitimacy through the seguing of agency and world-view, of subjective and objective positions. Doxa hides the politics, principles and practices that were evident when a particular knowledge acceded to its legitimacy. The research narrative in a

¹ From Kant's *The Conflict of the Faculties* (1798) and Bourdieu's *Homo Academicus*, Chapter 2 (1988). In Kantian terms, the conflict is over reason, understanding and the imagination; Bourdieu twists Kant's meaning to incorporate positions in the field of academe (autonomous and heteronomous), and the conflict over different types of capital this engenders.

university is a very particular form of narrative and, as with all narratives, dependent on doxa and on the immediate context.

In the right place, at the right time, the right words can gain the writer (or speaker) a great deal of cultural capital. The opposite is also true. For example, a skit from the Melbourne Comedy Festival will probably get you laughs in many places, but would not gain you any form of consecration if it formed part of your opening remarks in a law case at the High Court.

What interests me is how forms of narrative become aligned with an eligible position in a field. In Bourdieu's analysis of fields, there is constant jostling and realigning of positions by individuals in a field. Those occupying autonomous positions, whose main objective is to have their work consecrated by others in autonomous positions, vie for this under part of the 'principles of legitimation' (Bourdieu, 1988:48; 1993:46). Those who occupy positions of 'recognition' – the gatekeepers – oppose entry to the field by those who wish to change the terms of recognition. The only option for those who are yet to gain legitimacy for their work is to contest the status quo and push for changes to the dominant legitimating principles (Bourdieu, 1993:46).

In the university to which I am attached, the most common avenue for presenting postgraduate research in the humanities is the traditional research thesis, success in which earns the candidate the title – and status – of doctor of philosophy (PhD). But this is not the only option; those wishing to undertake postgraduate work in creative writing have the option to present a wholly creative thesis, for which the candidate may be awarded a doctor of creative arts (DCA); or they may submit a creative thesis with an attached critical essay (or exegesis), for which they can earn a PhD. Of course, within the field of restricted production in the university, those who undertake a PhD have a greater chance of being accepted into autonomous positions. A PhD that involves, wholly or in part, a critical essay, has much more capital than a DCA.

This capital gives those with a PhD greater power than those with a DCA to hold an autonomous position in the area of research. The subsequent consecration this position receives gives those who occupy it greater access to all the perquisites, and demands, of this position. Therefore, those holding a PhD often have, paradoxically, more chance of teaching creative writing courses in a university than those with a DCA. How can a creative narrative be eligible *as* narrative in some areas of the academy (for example, as part of undergraduate writing courses, as a component of a PhD research degree) but not others (i.e. as the entire product of a PhD research degree)? What is it about the academy that produces and reinforces such deeply ingrained notions about what constitutes research? In this chapter, I wish to explore where this doxa came from, how it affects those within the academy today, and what effects it has on the output of creative narrative.

The Contingency of Knowledge

Experience is a component of meaning making. There is a multitude of meanings emanating from human experiences. But multitudinous meanings give rise to a plethora of contestations, and have done so throughout history, as to whose experience gets to make *official* meaning, and why. The meanings that become official regulate or prescribe behaviour, beliefs and discourse that support these meanings. These official meanings constitute fields of operation. Every field is primarily concerned with creating meaning within itself and creating meaning of itself within the structure of society. In the field of research, producing research is constituted as the defining parameter. When I asked the focus groups what was the role of research, one participant stated:

That seems like a backward question to me, because in a way, for the writer, it's tempting to say, "Well, who gives a stuff what the role of research is." I guess the question we grapple with is how do we get what we do recognised in the institutional setting, and what kind of strokes does it get at the moment? And we have to say, "Well, not very many." (Sharon, 2001:B,2-3)

Writers in the university do have to understand what research is in order to gain acceptance into the field; they cannot dismiss research, as this is what constitutes the

operation of the field. Sharon acknowledged this in the second part of her statement, through questioning how creative writing can gain acceptance in the field of research. Some meanings of knowledge, by virtue of the reality through which they are created, gain the power to be called knowledge and can invest in themselves the right to say that other meanings are inadequate to the task of knowing something.

Knowledge gains legitimacy and power when connected to a priority of needs. These are dependent on our particular social formation which, in turn, is formed from the meanings that become official. Different cultural, political, and historical determinations will engender different realities. The reality that is effected will delimit what forms of knowledge are valued:

If creative work is a combination, or a particular combination of words, images, or ideas that you can parcel up, you can't do the same with science. It's not acceptable to take any combination of odd bits and pieces, parcel them up, and say this is a new and valuable contribution to science. There's a peer review part of all this which says in science you've got to produce something which opens up a new technology or a new application, or there's some economic basis for benefit of it; some sort of quantifiable way of looking at processes. And we don't do that with literary works. We just say this is original. (Simon, 2001:C,3-4)

Dominant knowledges legitimate social norms and practices embedded in legitimating structures such as law, business, government, and education. This allows them to operate as if they are *the* adequate knowledge, as if 'the object of investigation ... exists independently of knowledge of it, presuming a "reality" resistant to false or invalid methods, misinterpretations, or misrepresentation' (Grosz, 1995:28).

This process of knowledge operates as though there were understandings that have a pre-determined existence independent of our knowing them, and that only the right knowledge is capable of interpreting this understanding correctly (Mourad, 1997:78):

Knowledges lack the means to understand their own self-development as knowledges. They lack the means by which to understand their own historicity and materiality. Indeed, the history of knowledges is explicitly excluded as irrelevant to the contemporary forms of these knowledges. This absence has major strategic effects. If knowledges are not marked by the various, often widely disparate kinds of events that construct them into and

as disciplinary forms, they are unaffected by a political investment in knowledge; they remain, in a certain ironic sense, 'value-free'. (Grosz, 1995:29-30)

But no knowledge is value-free. All knowledges are a part of practice, and every practice is embedded with meaning, from birth to death, from cooking a meal to conducting scientific research.

There is not an 'essence of knowledge' to which we can come. It is, rather, something we do that is a 'circumstantial result of conditions outside the domain of knowledge' (Foucault, 1994:13). Knowledge is not a harmonious unification of things, but a constant struggle for dominance, in and across fields, which fluctuates and changes according to history and circumstance. Knowledge is not an end in itself – a thing to be possessed – but is an 'activity', a process (Foucault, 1994:13). Legitimate knowledge supports an existing reality and vice versa, creating a doxic belief in what constitutes knowledge.

The legitimate language that creates an attitude of acceptance of 'natural' meanings has to be set up as a position in a discourse against other positions, and therefore, contributes to legitimate culture. Legitimate culture becomes a conglomeration of many arbitrary meanings which have succeeded in their naturalisation, and which are helped to do so through cultural systems, such as how research operates in a university:

There are some very traditional areas within the department and I wonder if that comes back to some traditional hierarchy of the sandstone university that has tradition and ideals of what rigorous intellectual analysis constitutes. (Kathy, 2001:B,7)

Within academia there operate accepted ideas on what is academic work. These ideas are formed when one's sense of agency is exactly correlated to the view outside the academy as to its role in society. These ideas form a view of academia that becomes doxic.

The university, as a field of cultural production, has incorporated within it knowledge that gives those in the university a position within society that allows them to comment

on the exterior world. Although the sorts of knowledges that allow this are not stable (because the tenets of society are always changing), the university will adjust its knowledge base in the endeavour to maintain its position in the dominant culture. Knowledge that is highly valued is determinate with a particular reality, and a reality generated by a field inscribes certain knowledge as being the ‘most accomplished’ in terms of expressing itself (Bourdieu, 1996:265). Knowledges within universities have been incorporated into academia because of their success in shaping a general view, or understanding, of the world. For example, the area of science allows for the truth of an experiment but not for the truth of a religious text, whereas the area of anthropology would accommodate the truth of the religious text, if only as a way to explain ancient beliefs and understandings.

Scientific paradigms predominate in many approaches to research. The character of knowledge, applied to research, privileges judgement, reason and an instrumental, objective path to truth. The intellectual rigour of this type of research conforms to a science-based model, which is taken for the ‘generic’ model for research and which effectively excludes alternative models – in this case, particularly, that adopted by creative writers/researchers:

Practically all our applicants who had first class honours and who wanted to do a Masters in creative writing failed to get a scholarship, even though they were, in my opinion, top students; exceptionally gifted and bright; academically very bright. And that’s what people failed to recognise. You need an intellect to be a good writer. (Michelle, 2001:B,5)

Access to areas of knowledge related to the humanities, and in particular the arts, is limited under this definition of research.

These areas within the university have to change their approach to research and scholarship in order to fit their work into existing ‘generic’ guidelines. This is evidenced through the following comments from the focus groups:

Emily: It’s just in my postgraduate years a lot of us were creative writers. We just didn’t admit to it.

Sandra: You didn’t talk about it?

Emily: We didn't. We didn't let people know because it was shameful. Until you published and were successful and you know ...

Sandra: And in a sense that's still reinforced by the DETYA points because you don't get anything for creative writing. That's not real research. (Focus Group, 2001:D,7)

Creative writing, at the postgraduate level, is not recognised as 'real research' because the generic frame for research is based on scientific paradigms:

But ultimately you've got to actually write the thing and then represent it to somebody as being the product of some research, for the purposes of the framework we're talking about. And, it always boggles my mind that we can't get the decision makers in a room and say, "OK, Barbara, strut your stuff". Barbara brings out her boxes of research and her slides and her interview tapes and all this stuff and says, "Look, that wouldn't have happened without all of this. That's preparatory – plus all the thinking, the notes, the re-organisation, the discussions with fellows, whatever. This *book* did not just spill out of a 'wake up at midnight, I've got an idea' session". But we have a sales problem in DETYA, or the broader community, where something like that has to be articulated. (Simon, 2001:C,7)

The doxa of what constitutes research and its 'proper' approach affects not only academic and postgraduate work, but also other areas of the university whose reputation depends on the cultural capital acquired through the production of research. Here, again, creative work does not fit with the doxa of research, even outside the confines of the research area itself. Participants in the focus groups expressed their experiences of this in several areas, one example extending to publishing academic work:

We approached, with an anthology of graduate work, this university press and their response was, "Nope, we've never done fiction. We looked into that before. No way". (Michelle, 2001:B,14)

Even the university publishing house is caught up in what constitutes research, and this greatly curtails the ability of creative work (or workers) in the university to be able to achieve any form of field-specific capital.

Universities worldwide have different sets of criteria for valuing knowledge depending on a faculty's relationship to power and authority (Webb, Schirato & Danaher, 2002:132). Bourdieu's analysis of French higher education (1988) shows that it gives precedence to law, medicine and theology – which is a continuation of the structure of the mediæval university. Scottish universities in the Victorian era were noted because

they broke away from the traditional Oxbridge model, instigating ‘professional training’, with an ‘urban character [that] also made them socially diverse’ (Anderson, 1992:30).

The university model in Australia has been, since its inception, based on models developed in Britain, and specifically in England. The English model of universities distinctly promotes two opposing approaches to knowledge, thus constructing a dichotomy. One, based on knowledge promulgated through the Oxbridge tradition, values ‘knowledge for its own sake’, evinced through quiet contemplation that leads to discovery, and values this knowledge for its creation of a contemplative, cultivated mind. The other approach values knowledge for its pragmatic application, whether for discovery or a vocation:

An interesting thing to consider is making sure that research isn’t seen as this kind of monolithic idea, because there are different ways of understanding it. There’s the division between pure research and applied research and obviously there is currently more pressure to show how it can be applied. (Roger, 2001:B,10)

This dichotomy stems from epistemological debate dating back to ancient Greece. These arguments have plagued philosophy in its Western history and continue to influence cultural and social outlooks on life. To come to a better understanding of the contemporary university and creative writing’s position within it, I need to draw out how knowledge is identified from the basis of these epistemological points of view, and the correlative development of ideas on creativity.

Rationalism versus Empiricism

Epistemological answers stem from two basic worldviews. One holds that we come to know the world from the workings of our mind. The other is we can only know what is presented to us in a form perceptible by our senses. The former is known as rationalism, the latter as empiricism.

Rationalism works on the principle which states we can obtain knowledge from the ideas of things – knowledge is possible without direct experience, because there are ‘ideals’ to work towards (Palmquist, 2000). These ideals have been manifested in varied ways throughout history. The best-known rationalist in Western philosophy is Plato. He stated that in order to have knowledge, one must understand the ‘Forms’ – the true presentations of things. This understanding was only possible through reasoned thinking by those who had been trained to think that way. Truth was the recognition of the universal in the Forms. Any representation of a particular was necessarily an imitation. Imitations took one away from what was real, and could therefore be charged with deceit (Schaper, 1968:42-44). The notion of a God in the Christian, Islamic and Judaic religions is based on rationalist idealism, although the written teachings are not mimetic in the Platonic sense, but closer to the notion of the actual.

Empiricism, in contrast, works on the principle of realism. From examining the substance of things, we develop knowledge. Something can only be known through its form or construct (Palmquist, 2000). Epistemologically, this approach rejects the separation of mind and body found in rationalism. For empiricists, it is the body, as the knowing subject of examination, that brings us back to where we are and contextualises us. It is not possible to know something outside of appearances, because human inquiry does not have such a vantage point (Nussbaum, 2001:258). Another great ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle, was best known for championing this perspective. He stated:

Here, as in all other cases, we must set the appearances (*phainomena*) and, first working through the puzzles (*diaporēsantas*), in this way go on to show, if possible, the truth of all the beliefs we hold (*ta endoxa*) about these experiences; and, if this is not possible, the truth of the greatest number and the most authoritative. (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VII, 1145b1ff, cited in Nussbaum, 2001:240)²

² I have used Nussbaum’s version of Aristotle’s words, as it contains the Greek words in the text (which shows the development of ideas and language e.g. *ta endoxa*). Nussbaum refers to W.D. Ross’s translation (1925), and states she follows Ross, but this translation does not carry the Greek terms; nor does Apostle’s translation (1975).

In this statement it is possible to see that empiricism is grounded in the way things are (or rather, the way they appear to be). It is also possible to see how Aristotle's ideas have been the foundation for ideas that have developed in modern and recent times – the utilitarian ideal, evident in as freely competitive markets as possible in our current democracy³, and current theoretical understandings of practices.

Both pre-Enlightenment rationalism and empiricism located knowledge in things outside the self – for rationalism, in some higher power or form; for empiricism, in things as they appear to us. An apprehension of creative works was influenced by these two worldviews. Creativity, via the imagination, did not fit into either understanding of how we come to know. The imagination aroused suspicion in terms of its fit with knowledge (Cavallaro, 2001:160).

For the rationalists, all art was imitation. Imitation, or mimesis, could be achieved through learning the craft of an art, such as in guilds (for example, stone masonry or painting), or through the operation of the imagination. The imagination's ability to produce art was something to be feared or envied (Eldridge, 2003:2). This is particularly evident in Plato, and emerges in his dialectics (which in itself is interesting in terms of presenting an argument – he does so in a very creative, rather than a conventionally 'intellectual' or philosophical, way). He acknowledges that poetry can stir emotions, but:

that only such specimens of poetry as are hymns to the gods or praises of good men are to be received into a city. If you receive the pleasure-seasoned Muse of song and epic, pleasure and pain will be kings in your city instead of law and the principle which at all times has been decided by the community to be best. (Plato, 1935:§607)

Later rationalists, such as Descartes, did not eschew the imagination as did Plato, but still held that our senses could deceive us (Cottingham, 1999:60-1).

³ Utilitarianism consists of the view that society must be structured to augur well for individuals' pursuit of pleasure and minimisation of pain, and this translates into the bigger picture a minimal interference from government in freely competitive markets (Milner, 1991:7).

Empiricists relegated the imagination to something less than reason, something that could get out of control and needed the guidance of reason to mould and form it (Skilleås, 2001:31). Taste and emotions, they argued, need to arise through habit and agreement (Höffe, 1994:217). Hobbes, for example, describes pleasure and pain as being simply the appearance of ‘endeavour’ – a voluntary motion of either moving towards something (expressed as appetite or desire), or moving away from something (expressed as aversion) (Hobbes, 1651/1968:42). Hume understood the imagination to be something left over in the mind after the senses had processed outside phenomena (Broackes, 1999:105). In itself, the imagination could not tell of the appearance of things because of its capacity for exaggeration and invention.

The cultural impact of creative work in pre-Enlightenment times had repercussions that continued to resonate after the Enlightenment, and the rationale surrounding it is still applicable today. There’s the ‘flight of imagination’ paradigm:

Tom: See, I did a creative Masters.
Angela: Did you? So you didn’t have any ideas?
Tom: None [laughs]
Angela: You just emoted ... all over the page?
Tom: Yeah, absolutely. (Focus Group, 2001:A,7)

And there is the idea of creativity as a form of imitation:

Craft is portraying something that I've learned, which I can't do just by thinking and writing; I'm going to actually have to practise it. So it's kind of a practitioner's qualification. (Simon, 2001:C,20)

As a form of mimesis, creative works can be produced in the everyday practices of crafts, or through the wild stirrings of the imagination that produce work that effects changes in the emotions of the onlooker. As an element of practical knowledge, creative work is something enigmatic in terms of explaining the world through what one directly perceives (Norman, 1971:24) because, again, it is beyond control of the workings of reason. As interest in understanding the imagination increased, around the time of the Enlightenment, there developed a theory of art, namely aesthetics, which

was to introduce further interpretations of creative work. Because of the general scientificising of knowledge at that period, there developed, through aesthetics, the desire to understand and thereby manage, the sensory and imaginative life of the individual that was otherwise not readily accessible.

The Aesthetic

Ideas on art and the imagination were a part of the burgeoning ideas on the relationship of humanity to the world that emerged around this time. And the ideas that took hold still resonate today. Creativity and the imagination are often separated from reason and rationality:

Michelle: I was told – at *** University where I was in charge of creative writing – by an academic colleague, “You’re lucky you’re not an acad ... you’re not an intellectual”.

Sharon: What's that thinking going on accidentally?

Michelle: We’re the wild beasts. (Focus Group, 2001:B,5)

The scholarship of academics and postgraduate students in the discipline of creative writing can be perceived as unstructured, perhaps even chaotic and irrational by those in other discipline areas (Freiman, 2001). Creative writers press to counteract these notions in a setting that, as I have shown, remains committed to the development of ‘civilised’ people. And there is also a hierarchy created within the art world between the imagination and imitation:

How do we understand craft? Is craft just the nuts and bolts, which is, in a way, purely generic? What relationship do we have to craft? And craft is often denigrated and put in a hierarchy with art; you know, there’s the art and the artistry, and then the craft. (Paul, 2001:E,19)

As stated above, imitation is learning the practicalities of a craft – learning to do as one is taught. Imitation is something that can be taught, and something that can be produced at will, unlike the imagination. Imitation is learning the craft of a skill. Craft is specifically labouring to produce something from within given guidelines.

At the time of the Enlightenment, during the early eighteenth century, the beginnings of philosophical reflections on the place of art and the imagination in Western culture emerged for the first time since the writings of the ancient Greeks, produced by writers such as Shaftesbury, Hume and Leibniz (Crawford, 2001:51). Alexander Baumgarten, a German rationalist and follower of Leibniz who taught philosophy in Frankfurt from 1740 to 1762, proposed a science of the senses (Gross, 2002:403). He introduced the term *aesthetics* and described it, in his text *Aesthetica*, as follows: ‘The aim of aesthetics as a discipline is the development and improvement of the sensitive knowledge’ (Baumgarten, 1750:§14, cited in Gross, 2002:410).

Baumgarten’s texts, written in Latin, have been criticised for their obscure style, and much of the current understanding of his work is derived from the interpretation by one of his disciples, George Freidrich Meier (Gross, 2002:403-4; Hammermeister, 2002:6). Meier’s notion of aesthetics centred around the philosophy of art, and this development of Baumgarten’s ideas in the area of art has meant his work is often interpreted as a description of an ‘inferior cognition’ (Hammermeister, 2002:7), where the mind is divided into two levels: an upper one that deals with rational thought, producing scientific knowledge, and a lower one dealing with the imagination, producing sensuous knowledge (Gilbert & Kuhn, 1939:292; Hoffe, 1994:217; Gross, 2002:407). This bifurcation of knowledge, for which Baumgarten is often credited, is not what his work particularly explicates. His idea was to give the senses a value equal to, but different from, the value of reason. Aesthetics was not only a component of rationalist thought, but an extension of it (Smith, 2001:472).

Baumgarten’s development of *felix aestheticus* was the idea of the whole person, containing within themselves many contrary discourses, influences and aims, who should not ‘be reduced to either a purely rational or a purely sensual being’ but ‘be interpreted as a sensible creator and developer of his [sic] own world, that is, human culture’ (Gross, 2002:404-5). This idea of life as a work of art echoes in contemporary philosophical thought, for example, in Foucault’s later work, where he questions: ‘But couldn’t everyone’s life become a work of art? Why should the lamp or the house be an

art object but not our life?’ (Foucault, 1997:261). Aesthetics, then, was rather more than a collection of unrelated feelings: it possessed an inner logic that could be worked out in the mind.

Immanuel Kant, who studied Baumgarten’s work, set up a critique of knowledge that attempted to find common ground between a rational and an empirical view of the world. He determined that:

The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise ... We therefore distinguish the science of the rules of sensibility in general, that is, aesthetic, from the science of the rules of the understanding in general, that is, logic. (Kant, 1787/1934:61-2)

Kant allowed that the senses were a part of knowledge, but reason was the guiding principle in determining what is known (Gilbert & Kuhn, 1939:327).

The Kantian philosophical argument posits that although cognition and feelings are interdependent, the ‘two powers or capacities cannot exchange their function’ (Kant, 1934:62). In his first *Critique*, he debunked Baumgarten’s ideas on aesthetic cognition:

The Germans are the only people who at present use this word [aesthetics] to indicate what others call the critique of taste. At the foundation of this term lies the disappointed hope, which the eminent analyst, Baumgarten, conceived, of subjecting the criticism of the beautiful to principles of reason, and so of elevating its rules into a science. But his endeavours were vain. For the said rules or criteria are, in respect to their chief sources, merely empirical, consequently never can serve as determinate laws *à priori*, by which our judgment in matters of taste is to be directed. (Kant, 1787/1893:22)⁴

But by the time he published his *Critique of Judgement* he had changed his mind somewhat. Although he still rejected Baumgarten’s notion of the aesthetic as a form of knowing, he qualified that the aesthetic does have *a priori* conditions (Höffe,

⁴ I have used both J.M.D. Meiklejohn’s and Norman Kemp Smith’s translations of Kant’s first *Critique* because Smith’s version does not contain the footnote concerning aesthetics. This may be due to Smith’s decision to omit some of Kant’s wordiness caused, in Smith’s view, by ‘collating different statements of the same argument, inserted clauses into sentences that were by no means suited for their reception’ (Smith in Kant, 1787/1934:vii).

1994:217). Kant had worked out, in the two previous *Critiques*, that there were *a priori* conditions necessary for understanding and reason to take place. Understanding could take place without prior experience because of the synthetic *a priori* conditions of space and time. Reasoning occurred without prior sensuous input because of the synthetic condition of the free will. In positing this, Kant ascribed to a universality of knowledge and desire. So, for example, in the faculty of knowledge, in order to understand something outside of one's experience, appearances must 'conform to the form given to them by the understanding' i.e. objects are how we see them, and not how they actually might be in themselves, because our experience of them must be through the senses we have. This universality is outside of subjective differences, so is given as objective (Shand, 1993:175). These 'objective' understandings, though, are only endowed with significance because they conform to how people set up and operate their world.

A priori conditions in the faculty of knowledge allow for empirical knowledge of phenomena (appearances, known through understanding). *A priori* conditions in the faculty of desire allow for moral judgements of *noumena* (things-in-themselves, known through reason) (Deleuze, 1984; Höffe, 1994; Palmquist, 2000):

The gap between the noumenal and the phenomenal is bridged by the aesthetic because in the aesthetic experience, though tied to the appearance of things, we also sense a design in them that alludes to the superior world of *noumena*. (Cavallaro, 2001:161 – emphasis in original)

Aesthetics 'cannot be derived from objective understanding or morality or both' but is a subjective experience that contains 'a universal feeling for the world and for life in general' (Höffe, 1994:216). In the faculty of feeling pleasure and pain, *a priori* conditions allow for this universality, named, by Kant, as common sense (Kant, 1790/1952:§40). Common sense is the judgement given to taste. The difference with judgement's *a priori* condition is that it needs to be subjective – emanating from the individual. If it were an objective condition, then beauty, art, and taste would have to conform to principles that would either be so general as to be found in anything, or be so confining as to be 'inflexible, parochial, and insensitive to the genuine varieties of

art' (Eldridge, 2003:3). In Kant's aesthetic, the principle of taste is subjective because it is not possible to dictate what art is for everyone. 'The judgement of taste does not subsume under a concept at all – for, if it did, necessary and universal approval would be capable of being enforced by proofs' (Kant, 1952:§34).

In Kant's aesthetic, art needs to be subjective because it is not possible to dictate what art is for everyone. Creative practice in universities is as influenced by this notion as is creative work in the field of cultural production:

Paul: Well, every new product changes the boundaries in some way.

Peter: Every story is a new one.

Nick: I don't think we ever should develop a formula. I think we should keep that open and that will be a way of making sure that one kind of writing becoming privileged won't happen. (Focus Group, 2001:E,12)⁵

This notion still holds today, and is evident in the difficulties confronting those trying to fit creative writing into the research field without 'stifling' its creative impetus:

The other thing is, how can you have a set of criteria to apply to the creative work that you put over the top? (Dianne, 2001:C,17)

Dianne is referring to the idea of having a formula for presenting creative research work, similar to that which is found in the sciences, and how it would restrict the genres in which the research work could be presented. The subjectivity of the aesthetic cannot be accorded pre-existing guidelines from which art, beauty and taste is then created:

A principle of taste would mean a fundamental premise under the condition of which one might subsume the concept of an object, and then, by a syllogism, draw the inference that it is beautiful. That, however, is absolutely impossible. For I must feel the pleasure immediately in the representation of the object, and I cannot be talked into it by any grounds of proof. (Kant, 1952:§34)

Kant states that everyone has judgements of taste, so these subjective experiences are universal. Aesthetic taste, though, is not tied to knowledge that is built upon in progressive steps. It is not made up of exhaustive categories as can be applied in areas

⁵ Nick's statement is made with no recognition of the privileging of the narrative that forms accepted research writing, as opposed to creative writing. I will discuss this in Chapter Four.

of understanding. This gives aesthetics its subjectivity. But this subjectivity often gets misinterpreted as having no abiding, rational form at all:

Peter: But I've heard people say there's too many problems in terms of the examination process.

Paul: So you think it's more of a scholarly problem do you ...

Peter: Yes, it's too subjective ...

Paul: than an intellectual problem?

Peter: than the template you've put on for a traditional PhD, which has got logic to that, hasn't it? (Focus Group, 2001:E,3)

Because the aesthetic is considered subjective, it loses its logic, its rationality.

According to Höffe (1994:216), in his analysis of Kant's ideas, the *universal subjective* is a contradiction in terms, but looked at from the perspective of Bourdieu's work, it is possible to accept the universal in the subjective. Problematising the *universal subjective* fails to consider the significance of universality as a conforming influence on how the world is viewed. Bourdieu equates Kant's use of the term *common sense* with *doxa*, placing it as part of culture that can never have 'autonomy from external determinants' (Bourdieu, 1993:2). Kant, in the emerging principles of the Enlightenment, gave aesthetics (and therefore, creativity and the imagination) an impoverished role in explaining 'reality' because subjective experiences could not be elevated to 'a general principle' – that of objectivity (Hammermeister, 2002:4). Objectivity, linked to a strengthening scientific paradigm, was increasingly accepted as the path to truth.

Copernican Fallout

From the period of the Enlightenment, people in the Western world began to apostatise the guidance of God and develop instead the idea of the infallibility of the process of one's rational mind. Enlightenment thinking celebrated the human ability to reason, objectify, and apply logic. This epistemological shift, from faith in God as the producer of meaning, to human-centred reason, meant that whereas in pre-Enlightenment times religion could explain and quantify the world (reasonably) satisfactorily, the

Enlightenment allowed knowledge to assume the mantle of explanation and set itself up specifically in opposition to faith.

Up to this point, the rule by the church had been sufficiently strong to curtail the publication and circulation of secular ideas. In the seventeenth century, for instance, Galileo was condemned by Rome, and Descartes withdrew his publication *Le Monde* because of the dominant ecclesiasticism (Cottingham, 1999:60). Over a century later, Hume kept his *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* unpublished during his lifetime for the same reason (Broackes, 1999:104). Religion was a part of learning in the pre-Enlightenment university. The church protected the field of knowledge because, in effect, this protected itself.

Study of the written word was understood to be an interpretation of a higher authority – God. Authors were ‘mere purveyors’ of logic, grammar and morality and their texts were used as examples of God’s word (Paulson, 1988:8). The study of writing incorporated:

the techniques permitting the sixteenth-century grammar-school boy to comb the classical canon for wise sayings, elegant turns of phrase, and ethical maxims, to store these as the commonplaces of his memory and copy book, and to retrieve them in times of oratorical and ethical need. (Hunter, 1992:350)

From the Renaissance on, texts began to be studied for themselves, rather than as replicas of God’s word. The advent of the printing press certainly increased accessibility to texts, but the post-Enlightenment centring of humanity in explanations of the world meant that the whole text was identified as the site for formation and development of ideas, and needed to be treated accordingly. Literature, for example, as a whole text in creative form, had the ‘capacity to improve the reader by bringing him into contact with serious, universal culture’ (Paulson, 1988:8). Here, Paulson’s ‘reader’, as collective humanity, is the realisation of the social moulding of the individual.

The Enlightenment was the culmination of an intellectual movement that drove a change from feudal rule (the divine right of kings) and ecclesiastical power. Knowledge, as a process of reason, was freed from the constraints of a private function and placed in the public domain, which ‘realizes man as a collective subject in the play between the ideal and the real’ (Hunter, 1992:361). This new form of knowledge allowed people to strive for self-fulfilment and change their circumstances for themselves. In the process of the Enlightenment an ethics was created as that which ‘defines a distance between what is and what ought to be. This distance designates a space where we have something to do’ (Certeau, 1986:199). This ethics took knowledge along a path that led away from interpretation and application to discovery and creativity. Aspects of humanity were brought to light that were valid for everyone, not just the privileged – ‘serious, universal culture’ became the collective condition of society. The emancipation of art and the imagination in the Enlightenment process was to have a similar effect.

People have always been able to create. From the earliest anthropological diggings, implements and artefacts have been found. But the ability to create was not caught up in the shaping of the self. Even the creation of decorative work such as painting, mosaics, architecture and sculpture in the Middle Ages in the West was *never* made with the intent to delight. The ‘artist’ individual would *never* consider taking credit for invoking wonder in the onlooker. The artist, as individual, did not even socially exist, as artists were part of a professional practice that exhorted a religious-based life. ‘Art’ was solely a representation of divine beauty and was produced because it was considered rightful to ‘illuminate the sacred text’ (Minor, 1994:8):

Pictures are used in churches so that those who are ignorant of letters may at least read by seeing on the walls what they cannot read in books. What writing does for the literate, a picture does for the illiterate looking at it. (Pope Gregory the Great, reigned 590-604, cited in Minor, 1994:8)

Art, as text, did not speak for and of itself. It was either part of the context, whether that was religion, entertainment, or useful artefact, or it was part of the content it was

portraying (Dissanayake, 1992:196). In the Middle Ages, to paint, sculpt, write music or poetry was only significant if it was part of church ceremony, for example, or village festival. Its content, also, played an integral part in its acceptance as part of these contexts. So, an image of God would be appreciated, whereas a likeness of the painter's mother would not.

The creation of 'art' was a social expression. Social organizations evolved in order to elicit and endorse this social expression. These organizations were known as guilds. Each guild specialised in a particular craft, which was taught to the younger members, or apprentices, by the older members, or masters. The guild was held together by a common bond that 'established standards' and 'defined the limits of each guild's activity' (Janson & Janson, 1997:276). They were usually commercially orientated, with each member being supported by their guild in exchange for allegiance to the guild (Minor, 1994:9). Those no longer under an apprenticeship were known as journeymen, so called because they were able to go out and work without direction, though only on small projects. The larger work was given to the masters to design and the apprentices to carry out (Janson & Janson, 1997:276).

Guilds were places of work, of manual labour. At the time of the Renaissance, there was a shift in status of art because a skilful use of hand that 'reveal[ed] and uncover[ed] the invisible' (Minor, 1994:12) – something that previously did not exist – came to be considered worthy of a degree of reverence because this revealing was invoked through the process of thought as well as the hand. Thought related to the workings of the mind and Renaissance belief privileged the mind because it was seen by scholars of the time as 'one's most spiritual and humanizing faculty' (Minor, 1994:12). This privileging of thought and the raising up of art alongside thought gave rise to the 'academy'⁶, a school of art where the role of theory played a part alongside practice.

⁶ The academy originated in Florence (Minor, 1994:13; Pevsner, 1973:2), and the idea emerged, in Greek mythology, from the story of Academus' exchange with Castor and Pollux in their search for their sister, Helen (of Troy), and hence, from Plato's Academy, being originally a place, then the community of people (Pevsner, 1973:1).

The academy was supposed to be a place for contemplation of artistic ideas freer than that found within guilds (Minor, 1994:13). If artists were exposed to the theory of art, the logic went, then they could endeavour to create from ideas that came from the learned establishment (including the ruling class and the church). This elevated art above the restricted practice as a craft in the guilds because it privileged the mind above the workings of the hand. 'By imposing control, through artistic ideology, from above, the academy attempts to establish for itself a secure position as defender and perpetuator of the status quo' (Minor, 1994:16).

Many academies were not only attended by artists, but drew attendance and great patronage from those who had an interest in art and those wealthy enough to commission art. Artists who could attract these commissions were able to gain even greater freedom. Especially in fifteenth century Italy, there was rivalry between kings and courts to commission works of art that would 'raise them to the firmament of immortality', including painting, sculpture and architecture, and this affected the status of the artists themselves (Graham-Dixon, 1999:112). The successful artist (and here, the artist is nearly always the painter) could command the right to work on whatever they chose instead of creating commissioned works (Graham-Dixon, 1999:151).

Later again, during the shift to human-centred reason that constitutes the Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant instigated another great metaphysical turnaround that affected human understanding. It was his Copernican revolution. Copernicus conceived the heliocentric view of the universe: rather than the earth being flat, and the universe revolving around us, the sun was the centre and the earth moved around it. In relation to metaphysics, Kant conceived a similar idea. He said that instead of our knowledge conforming to an object, what happens is that objects are conformed to the knowledge of the subject. This transcendental perspective points to knowledge coming from our minds and not from the object itself (Palmquist, 2000).

This 'Copernican turn' revolutionised notions of the self. If all one's perceptions came from within, and not from how things were 'out there', or how God wrote them, then

this had a great impact on the capacity to believe in self. It became *necessary* to do so, in fact, if knowledge now came from nowhere else. ‘The abandonment of authority as the source of truth leads to a profound search as to the origins and justification of our beliefs’ (Shand, 1993:157). Kant’s Copernican revolution had a profound effect on science and art. It also influenced the ideation of social conscience – how could cultures develop if they were a conglomerate of subjective wants and needs? Was individual or social improvement more important? It also had a profound effect on science and art. The idea of the universal subjective in art paved the way for romanticism and a distancing of doing from knowing. As this effect is very important to an understanding of the conditions of creative writing as elucidated in the focus groups, I will discuss it in greater depth further into this chapter.

Its effect on science meant that humanity, in perceiving itself as the centre of its own destiny, constructed a set of tools for this process that could be universalised in order to speak to the collective state of people. Observation and analysis, as they were now used in the interpretation of the physical world, were different from the interpretative practices in pre-Enlightenment times:

A process can be reproduced exactly within given conditions, with an industrial rationality which postulates a universal system of equivalences [whereas] (classical representation is not equivalence but transcription, interpretation and commentary). (Baudrillard, 1993:73)

There was a commonality to Enlightenment scientific processes, in that the expected outcome would consolidate knowledge into clear and concise concepts, thereby demonstrating objectivity and predictability (Gross, 2002:407).

Isaac Newton was one scientist who developed these concepts. Newton’s theory of physics proposed a mechanical cause and effect in the laws of nature (Shand, 1993: 157-163; Höffe, 1994:91). His theory encompassed such a vast range of phenomena that it was recognised by Kant as a ‘paradigm of exact science’ (Höffe, 1994:63). ‘Newton’s laws were not simply perceived as better accounts of phenomena; they were

explanations of an entirely new kind, unprecedented in their objectivity, generality, and predictive power' (Paulson, 1988:10). Work – such as that undertaken by Newton – led to statements of fact that could be more broadly applied, giving rise to objective truths and predictable laws.

The paradigmatic status of the new experimental sciences meant a change in the importance of the written word. The writing of whole treatises in science in order to explain one's position and argument to others was now unnecessary, as there was general agreement on the approach and procedure to problems in scientific experimentation. The sciences became 'representations of a reality in which everyone must believe' (Certeau, 1986:200). 'A valid scientific experiment can be, in principle, duplicated by anyone, and the writing of its results is a matter of impersonal transcription' (Paulson, 1988:6). Knowledge was relayed through the procedure of the experiment, not through the written word. The most important function of the scientific paradigm is its ability to be replicated. It is not validated through lengthy and eruditely written text.

Useful and Useless Knowledge

Kant's Copernican revolution influenced the forming of social conscience, as mentioned earlier. Knowledge, now recognised as being arrived at through individual effort, was championed by two opposing approaches as to its benefit for society. These two ideas on knowledge and education form the backdrop of opposing ideologies today:

There's a tendency to see proper university work in kind of Scottish Enlightenment terms, I think; 'the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake' is one way of putting it. But there's also an economic system that that kind of pursuit was embedded in, which was, you know, independently wealthy people who had the time and the ability to pursue knowledge in that kind of way, which was obviously a model that doesn't hold up terribly well these days but it's still kind of pined for. (Tom, 2001:A,2-3)

This notion of knowledge acquisition:

operates on the idea of education to be a better person. Whereas what I think we're seeing now is a really utilitarian approach, you know – education to make you more professional and saleable. (Angela, 2001:A,3)

These two approaches were based on the old paradigms of empiricism and rationalism, and came to be known respectively as utilitarianism and idealism.

Utilitarianism used the universalising principles of the Enlightenment to show that self-improvement stemmed from improved social and material conditions. According to Bentham, who promoted the idea of utility:

The principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever according to the tendency it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say of every action whatsoever, and therefore not only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government. (Bentham, 1781/2000:14)

Government, according to Bentham, should be guided to produce laws based on reason, which, in turn, produces the greatest utility – utility being anything that is of 'benefit, advantage, pleasure, good or happiness' (Bentham, 2000:14). Bentham's argument effectively linked the pleasure of the individual to the development of free markets and just government by advocating 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' (Milner, 1991:7).

With regards to knowledge, utilitarianism 'conceived education as the training of men to carry out particular tasks in a particular kind of civilization' (Williams, 1958:111). Education was the instigator of change in society, and this change could only be for the better in relation to political and economic standards for all individuals. The utilitarians therefore saw knowledge as benefiting society as a whole, rather than for individual advancement. 'Attention is turned perpetually outward to the mundane sources of pleasure and pain, rather than inward' (Rosenblum, 1987:31). Outward stimuli are how one gains knowledge of the world. Knowledge could, therefore, be put to use for the benefit of all.

Idealism's principles were based on rationalism, with the idea that each individual was capable of bettering themselves through the operations of their own minds, and that *individual* growth would lead to greater social maturity. The absenting power of God over the moral and righteous guidance of individuals left a gap to be filled. If it was not God who provided a model for a moral, upstanding life, then it must be humanity itself that was drawn to do so. Idealism meant that people became moral and good through learning. One could become a moral citizen through the ability to use the faculties of one's own mind. Individual value and meaning rise above egocentric individualism to evolve into a social conscience. Here, society is 'distinct from both the political state and the aggregate of individuals' (Otter, 1996:9). The social is analogous to the moral state of community, which arises through the development of the self (Otter, 1996:7).

Idealism revealed its politics by advocating a continuation of knowledge that was the privilege of the aristocratic classes:

Assured enough of its political and economic stability, this governing bloc is able to disseminate some of its power in the forms of a general culture and 'civility', founded less on the potentially divisive realities of social rank and economic interest than on common styles of sensibility and a homogeneous reason. 'Civilized' conduct takes its cue from traditional aristocratism: its index is the fluent, spontaneous, taken-for-granted virtue of the gentleman, rather than the earnest conformity to some external law of the petty bourgeois. (Eagleton, 1990:32)

If the right kind of knowledge were cultivated then one had the ability to enter a privileged world that revealed the right way things should be. With regard to creative work, this meant the *study* of it, but not the *doing* of it, an argument borne out in practice by twentieth century critical approaches to literature such as Leavisism and New Criticism (Docker, 1984). The study of literature, as advocated by Leavis for example – and being confined to only certain types of literature – gave one the ability to see the true nature of the world. It did not mean that literature gave *an* understanding,

but *the* understanding. Reason, through literature⁷, became the pivotal force that could overcome difference and disagreement, just as religion used to function before the Enlightenment (Young, 1996:203).

The Leavises perceived literature as a medium allowing for more fulfilling discoveries than could possibly be gained within the strictures of scientific discourse. Literary criticism, from a Leavisite perspective, was not something one could contort into an abstract methodology. It was an approach requiring the ‘moral imperatives’ of “maturity” and an “open reverence before life” His [Leavis’] ideal critic works within a discipline defined by qualities of responsiveness and intuitive tact, rather than subtlety of philosophic grasp’ (Norris, 1982:19-20). Because the Leavises’ romanticising of literature placed it as *the* creative practice par excellence and insisted upon the immanent and spiritual nature of literary genius, they believed that writing was not something that could be taught. Rather, it was something to be studied in order to understand it in all its complexity so that one’s otherwise impoverished, utilitarian life might be enriched. The study of literature became, for the Leavises (and others), something which could counter the insidious effects of industrial society.

This had the effect of separating creative writing from other creative practices incorporated in universities at the time, such as music. For such disciplines, study was not set in opposition to creative production, but seen as integral to its learning. However, because writing was accommodated within the humanities, it came under the orthodoxy that a liberal education would ensure the cultivation of a better person (emerging from study in the liberal arts), and a correlating divorce of liberal knowledge from any kind of applied knowledge. This orthodoxy did:

divide a text (and a writer’s imagination) into a hierarchy of levels: deep, profound metaphysical layers (the truly literary), as against superficial social or political or ideological or utopian layers (not really literary at all). The latter layers are but surface features, like gelatine on top of a pâté, tasted if you like, but not to

⁷ Idealism was not confined to literature alone. As stated in the previous chapter, it manifested itself in the sciences through the determination to hold up discovery as having no ‘practical use’ (Snow, 1964:32).

be confused with the strong, rich, subtle, European-style tastes below. (Docker, 1984:89)

This was upheld by the Leavisite approach to literature, and helped to increase the idealist view of knowledge.

The English-based model of a university that has predominated in Australia, as mentioned in the previous chapter, is set up in such a way as to dichotomise knowledge as idealist or utilitarian:

Tom: You can get a PhD in music and it's quite legitimate, so it's interesting to think why music has that status but writing doesn't. And I think it's partly because everyone thinks they can write but not everyone thinks they can be a musician. There seems something easy about writing that isn't quite as apparent to people about music.

Sarah: But doesn't that go back to elitism, high culture, low culture, kind of thing? Writing is seen as having to fulfil a utilitarian role in terms of basic communication, basic recording of things, whereas music goes back to that knowledge for its own sake. It's purified, it's exalted, and therefore, it's differently recognised. (Focus Group, 2001:A,14)

This bifurcation presents as 'knowledge for its own sake', and knowledge of a pragmatic nature. To this dichotomy of knowledge Young gives the terms 'useless' and 'useful' knowledge (1996:184-217), which correlates, respectively, with Bourdieu's autonomous and heteronomous poles.

Useful knowledge, demonstrated through its pragmatics, correlates to the vocational attributes of a university – producing doctors, teachers, and social scientists for example; and in its approach to research – producing discoveries that have immediate application. Its pragmatics lends it the status of utility in society:

I think having creative writing in the university helps with discipline, it helps with self-reflection and in particular it probably helps with publishing, with learning the ropes you have to have these days to actually make it in the publishing stream. (Hannah, 2001:F,2)

Useless knowledge, demonstrated through (often metaphysical) contemplation and analysis, is associated with an individual's interpretation of processes, activities and issues which, through research, can lead to discoveries that have no immediate application. Its tenets are set to give benefit to the individual mind before this can be conferred on society.

I went into the MA absolutely enthused. Part of that was the need to tell a particular story, which I think was probably one of the biggest motivations for me. But also it was to tell a story about particular things in particular ways ... I think part of it was having a deadline; having other people's opinions who I valued to actually assess what I was doing. Publication wasn't actually the goal. It was more a matter of whether or not I could test myself and feel satisfied that I had achieved it. (Sarah, 2001:A,7)

Useless knowledge is often referred to as liberal knowledge. This can be a little confusing because of two conflicting meanings applied to the term *liberal*. In relation to the tenets of *useless* knowledge, 'liberal' is associated with an ideology that espouses a cultivated intellect and an education that imbues idealist principles. It stems from a pre-modern university that espoused a liberal education, concentrating on the mediæval trivium (grammar, rhetoric and logic) and quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music). These subjects were considered to fulfil the area of 'higher' learning, which meant extending the student to full greatness as a scholar, inducing thought and improvement of mind. The conflicting, and more contemporary, meaning ties 'liberal' to a utilitarian ideology, where liberalism is waved as the flag of rights of the individual and is associated with democracy, the freedom of the individual and the state's duty of non-interference except in the case of bettering the collective individual experience (Kymlicka, 1995:483). In Chapter One, I made use of the term *in the first sense*. Its limited use, from now on (unless stated), will relate to the *contemporary* meaning of liberal democracy.

Useless knowledge is open to the 'unknown' that goes beyond what is already known. Useful, or pragmatic, knowledge requires closure, by assimilating knowledge 'to what is already known' (Weber, 1996:49). There is an internal conflict in the university that is expressed through this 'bifurcation': openness and closure, the individual and society, pragmatic knowledge and useless knowledge (Young, 1996:214-16).

Those operating under idealist principles appropriated useless knowledge for the purpose of inciting moral purpose and obligations. It was meant to impart the right way to think, be and act – for example, the 'morality' of English literature – where its motives hid the promotion of the hegemonic culture of the privileged. The overall

(perhaps naïve) aim was to produce a better world. It also appears as a kind of working model of universities, as expressed by members of the focus groups I conducted. Those within academe have held up this model, based on the idea of a university as it operated in early industrial times, as the ideal, even if its structure is not congruent with the current broader field:

There is a tendency in universities generally to look back nostalgically to some supposed ideal, epoch or place where there was this thing called knowledge for its own sake ... and that model permitted within it gentrification of clever people. (Mary, 2001:A,2-3)

Its appeal is still apparent, even in a political and economic climate that is very different from its idealist beginnings.

This model of education, espoused through knowledge for its own sake, was one that promoted a culture of privilege. In this respect, it is worth reflecting on the extent to which the cultural studies' (leftist) motives of teaching and knowledge to produce a better world draws on the same logic. The difference is that the latter's concerns and interests revolve around the proletariat, or marginalised, rather than the bourgeois, or dominant, elements of society (Young, 1996:204). Both approaches depend on, or emerged from, association with the study of literature in the university. Both these approaches to knowledge have their ideological bases in the same thing – to instil a way of thinking about the world. Whether this influence stems from the right or left of the political divide, it has its roots in the idealist approach to knowledge that emerged from the Enlightenment.

Criticism of the materialist, pragmatic approach to knowledge in the university has relied on this same argument that has traditionally been placed in an elitist vein (and from where much literary criticism is seen to come). Those with a leftist, egalitarian view of the function of literature have nowhere left to stand if they eschew this elitism as well as materialism. The problem stems from 'the oppositional literary or theoretical mode [that] was not the oppositional institutional one – a situation that in itself illustrates the limitation of oppositional politics' (Young, 1996:205). Those opposed to

elitist positions find themselves cast in the position of supporting materialist claims, without any alternative available to them.

Idealism is also evident in contemporary academia in the flailing arguments for the primacy of basic research over applied research. Invited submissions from the West review (DEETYA, 1997) on financing and policy in higher education, commenting on government policy in higher education, highlighted setbacks to the research sector of universities if a more idealist approach to knowledge was not taken:

The legislated control over what was to be knowledge in Australian society ... would attempt to reduce the international and intergenerational disciplines, the outcome of humanity's desires to know, to the parameters of the ideology of the government-of-the-day and its Minister. It is totalitarian as well as hubristic. (Finlay, 1997)

Comments such as these seemed to have little effect on the direction of government policy in the area of higher education. As one university commented on the present government's release of its green paper (Kemp, 1999a) into research policy in universities:

What is ... explicit in the Green Paper is the sense that the balance of research done in universities will and should shift from researcher-driven basic research with outputs in academic journals, to industry-driven research that has the potential both to solve immediate problems and to develop commercial solutions or processes that can be applied to a broader client base. The Green Paper's preferred model is Silicon Valley, not the Nobel Prize Committee, and innovation, not understanding, is the key objective. (Aitkin & Kennedy, 1999:1)

Useful, or 'skills oriented', knowledge, which originated from the empiricist position, is linked to utilitarian knowledge through its ability to profit society as a whole (Young, 1996:205-7). Knowledge based on societal improvement lent itself to political and economic interventions through a liberal approach to knowledge. Appropriate knowledge, in this paradigm, was that which could be put to good use, either for providing the skills needed by a profession, or for promoting social change. The practicality of knowledge was paramount in this utilitarian approach; but it was fairly

broadly interpreted. The study of literature, for instance, because it was associated with philology, could be seen as fitting the criteria because it was useful for understanding the workings of language, and for providing historical criticism (Young, 1996:218). But the study of creative writing practice was not seen as fitting the criteria, even though its products were supposed to be so uplifting.

Adam Smith, the well-known Scottish economist and philosopher of the eighteenth century, championed the utilitarian approach to knowledge. Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* distinguished the value of a pragmatic education:

When any expensive machine is erected, the extraordinary work to be performed by it before it is worn out, it must be expected, will replace the capital laid out upon it, with at least the ordinary profits. A man educated at the expense of much labour and time to any of those employments which require extraordinary dexterity and skill, may be compared to one of those expensive machines. The work which he learns to perform, it must be expected, over and above the usual wages of common labour, will replace to him the whole expense of his education, with at least the ordinary profits of an equally valuable capital. (Smith, 1880/1976:106)

Smith stated the benefits of knowledge for the individual in terms of its financial return. Just as a machine can increase financial profits for its owner, knowledge would increase financial profits for the educated worker. Knowledge was, in Smith's analysis, coextensive with capital.

The argument for the utility of knowledge is that knowledge needs to keep pace with social developments in order to have value. It cannot have value unless it remains tied to market forces, otherwise it tends to 'sophistry' and systems of thought that are 'outmoded and useless' (Young, 1996:208-9). Adam Smith noted of knowledge that it could be 'purchased, in the same manner as his shoes or stockings, from those whose business it is to make up and prepare for the market that particular species of goods' (Smith, cited in Scott, 1965:345).

If market forces determine what counts as knowledge, at any one time only certain kinds of knowledge are determined as useful. Young asks, 'Can it be assumed that the market is always right?' (1996:209). Knowledge championed by market forces will always be of benefit to the market first. If the utility of knowledge is all that is heeded, this further reinforces the link between empiricism and utilitarianism. This is evident in current political doctrine on what counts as knowledge, as evidenced by the Minister for Education, who wrote that Australia's 'research priorities, a way of aligning broad research efforts with the community's economic, social, and environmental needs, were developed after close consultation with science, engineering and technological research communities' (Nelson, 2003d).

But the move to appropriate knowledge for the benefit of the community has not wholly been advanced for economic benefit. The utility of knowledge for the benefit of society has played an important role in the promotion of knowledge, and still remains an important factor, as evidenced through dialogue emerging from my focus groups. Discussions of knowledge centred around the issue of useless and useful, even though those exact terms were not used. Useless knowledge:

was training an elite, you know; that's what it was for. And mass education, the kind of paradigm that we've grown up with, is less about that really. In fact it's about breaking down categories like elite, isn't it? Isn't that what it's meant to be? (Tom, 2001:A,3)

The universalising of mass education has not only helped eliminate problems of access to knowledge, but, according to some commentators, has also conquered the useful/useless dichotomy. The following excerpt from one discussion was in relation to the fact that the relevant faculty had not had to set up any special guidelines for the presentation of a creative writing PhD:

Nick: I think the generic PhD – what's now known as the generic PhD – is so varied anyway. You know, you get a PhD in science, you get a PhD in IT, you get a PhD in any discipline. All requirements for that generic PhD are all totally different everywhere you look. And that's been the secret for success.

Paul: There's no two cultures any more. (Focus Group, 2001:E,12)

On the surface, this presents as highly pragmatic. Having a broad scope for presentation of a PhD acknowledges the fact that PhDs are marked by experts in each discipline who are equipped to determine whether a particular thesis works. It also presents as idealist, opening the PhD field to all kinds of players and their imperatives, rather than restricting it to a specialist form. What this simultaneous pragmatism and idealism disguises is that the generic PhD, taken as a template, can inadvertently deny some forms of work access to the research area, as the template is not broad enough. Creative writing, under this template, is regarded as artistic expression (with the need for an attached exegesis or critical essay), but not as intellectual practice (which is able to stand on its own as a researched thesis). From this emerges two cultures that Paul (above) considers the generic PhD has overcome: the dominant one determines what is research; the dominated one must try to emulate the first in order to belong. As one focus group member recalls:

A student who began her PhD in the traditional stream decided to write a creative thesis some way down the track. Her supervisor O.K.ed it, but she ended up finishing before the necessary addendums could be made to the standard PhD form, and at one stage, she was in danger of not being able to submit her work for a PhD degree. (Tracy, 2001: H,1)

Marginalisation can occur when the dominant, central ideas and relations become hegemonic. Under the generic framework for the PhD, there are two cultures, which relegates creative writing (as opposed to other forms of writing in the academy) to that of artistic expression only:

I think one of the reasons why this university has been quite happy to support the creative PhD in the writing area is because we have insisted on having a pretty substantial exegesis there. And they can see – even from the humanities people where you're likely to get the most opposition – that these dudes aren't trying to say, 'I'll do 100% creative product and give me a PhD for it'. (Nick, 2001:E,10)

Instead of incorporating marginalised groups, hegemony helps to maintain dominance over them.

Academic Habitus

Another form of relations that helps structure the academic climate, but at an individual level, is an academic's, or student's, habitus. Habitus is a person's (flexible and changeable) disposition that is simultaneously observant of social mores and values while freely operating within them:

objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them and, being all this, collectively orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor. (Bourdieu, 1977:72)

Habitus, in effect, defines what someone can do within the confines or strictures of society, taking their personal history into account. According to Bourdieu, it is neither fully part of the consciousness of the subject, nor rigidly or permanently fixed:

In short, "it is because subjects do not know, strictly speaking, what they are doing, that what they do has more meaning than they realize." "Docta ignorantia," therefore, a cleverness that does not recognize itself as such. (Certeau, 1984:56)

An academic's habitus is formed from 'structured structures' (Bourdieu, 1977:72), which predispose one to approach research in a certain way. One such structure is the scholastic point of view. The scholastic point of view presents an approach to research that is privileged in the academic environment. It forms part of the academic habitus and is, therefore, part of what forms the researcher as they are. The notion of a scholastic point of view is:

a very peculiar point of view on the social world, on language, on any possible object of thought that is made possible by the situation of ... leisure ... Adoption of this scholastic point of view is the admission fee tacitly demanded by all scholarly fields: the neutralizing disposition (in Husserl's sense), implying the bracketing of all theses of existence and all practical intentions. (Bourdieu, 1998b:127-8)

It is, in short, the objectifying and universalising perspective offered by a position within the academy: universalising because members of the academy (apparently) have

the freedom, and the capacity, to see the world from a larger and wider perspective than that available to those who are preoccupied with acting within it according to immediate demands and necessities; objectifying because it is predicated on empirical, measurable, replicable research and/or on substantiated argument (Bourdieu, 1998b:127-140).

Participants in the focus groups unwittingly reinforced what is often taken for a scholastic point of view, but in effect, is something akin to what Frow describes as a position that enables those:

who are in principle willing to grant the sheer difference between frameworks of value, their irreducibility to a single perspective, nevertheless seek to reserve some ultimate criterion which, 'in the last instance', allows for an absolute discrimination between more and less valuable texts. (Frow, 1995:133)

The doxa in the approach to research dictates that academics will undertake the process in a certain kind of mode, with a certain kind of attitude: not the scholastic point of view, but the overlaying of a scientific (and to some extent, a marketable) model of university-based research, which can be presented as if it were the scholastic point of view but is a way of privileging a certain type of intellectual practice. This position was sometimes adopted by members in the focus groups to the detriment of support for creativity in universities, which they otherwise advocated:

I didn't write one [a dissertation] in visual arts, I wrote one in cultural studies, because there was no such thing as visual arts then. Mine wasn't studio-based. It was me looking at people and talking to people. Yeah, well, there wasn't an alternative in those days, and I'm really glad there wasn't, because if there had been, I don't think I'd be doing what I'm doing now, and taking that and applying that to what I do, which is bridge theory and practice in my own life and therefore in my own theorising. (Ruth, 2001:G,3)

There are two main assumptions here: one is that a thesis in the arts does not deal with theory sufficiently to enable one to see the connections between practice and theory; the other is that theory is how one comes to an understanding of something. This diminishes the part practice plays in gaining an understanding of the world. These assumptions also undermine any alternative approaches to research, which this person was otherwise trying to promote and facilitate.

In order to gain recognition for research, academics must tailor their work to fit with positions of consecration in the academy that are determined by ‘principles of legitimation’. This also plays a part in determining academic habitus. As described in Chapter One, heteronomous positions are dependent on economic capital for their power, whereas autonomous positions are dependent on freedom from economic imperatives. In academia, heteronomous positions determine a hierarchy dependent on ‘economic and political capital’, whereas autonomous positions operate under a ‘cultural hierarchy’ that correlates with academic (or ‘intellectual’) distinction.

If one operates under the logic of an heteronomous position, then one’s disposition (or habitus) will be determined by the ‘principles operative in the field of power’ i.e. economics and politics. If one’s habitus is shaped from a position of autonomy in the academy, then cultural, rather than economic, imperatives will be the guiding principle, e.g. recognition by one’s peers (Bourdieu, 1988:48). In relation to the contemporary situation in Australian universities, legitimation linked to the field of power has more validity in the areas of applied science and technology; legitimation linked to qualities valued in a university, such as intellectual ability, are still linked to sciences, but not popular sciences, rather branches of science such as physics; mathematics, too, and philosophy.

Hierarchies in the academy revolve around autonomy and consecration, and to an increasing degree in contemporary universities, heteronomy. The area of creative writing often oscillates between autonomy and heteronomy, but is consistently placed at the low end of consecration:

Roger: So, you do get international fee-paying students in creative writing, yeah?
Michelle: Well ... none of the graduate diplomas are fee paying, but there’s one from Malaysia at the moment paying \$17 000 for just one year of her Masters.
Roger: Really.
Michelle: Yes, that’s ...
Keith: In creative writing?
Michelle: Yeah.
Unidentified voice: Why do people ...?
Sharon: Why do they do it?
Unidentified voice: Yeah.

Roger: Because you think most people would only do a fee-paying thing if it was going to lead to a solid job, or something like that. Doing creative writing's not going to lead to that. (Focus Group, 2001:B,8)

Here, creative writing's usefulness is questioned because the participant was comparing it to other disciplines in the academy that engender greater cultural and economic capital.

This questioning of the usefulness of creative writing was a recurring theme in my focus group sessions. Creative writing in the university does not necessarily add to gross domestic product (GDP), nor does it have the prestige of receiving accolades from others in the field. It falls short of attaining heteronomous and consecrated positions, and even though it can sometimes boast a degree of autonomy, where is the capital gained through autonomy when speaking, or writing, into a vacuum?

If someone does creative work and they're happy with that (compared to someone else who does some critical work because they've got an eye on teaching and that's an indicator that they've got conceptual abilities and they can actually impart them to other people) is there a counter-part in science that says, I'm going to play with some concepts and maybe come up with something and maybe that'll be fine, but afterwards I'm just going to go back to being a service-station attendant? There isn't really. It seems to be if you do the sciences you're going to be a teacher, or a practitioner, add to knowledge or whatever. We don't make any distinction on that. Is there a Masters, for instance in science that says come and do an interesting experiment and go away, without any view to where you go further in science? (Simon, 2001:C,15)

The assumption is that creative writing is not a useful pursuit, but the idea here of *useful* is a limited one. There is no acknowledgement that creative work augments our culture and facilitates our interpretations of it. Where this line of argument also falls down is in the assumption that one discipline leads to teaching or practice in that area of specialisation and the other doesn't. What it does highlight is that science can be done with financial support through undertaking other scientific work, whereas creativity needs to be financially supported from work outside the *creating* domain (but not necessarily outside the field of cultural production).

Basic ('useless') research wins approval from those already established in the academic field, and so draws the researcher into a consecrated position which is endowed with

cultural capital. The appeal of applied research, in contrast, rests on its capacity to contribute to the heteronomous area in the field. It will attract an audience who see it as advancing society for economic purposes:

Jackie: In all sorts of sciences there is an attempt to appear to make it look scientific which is often a bit bodgie-dodge.

Tom: What? Social science, you mean?

Jackie: Yes.

Tom: I couldn't agree with you more. Social sciences have completely internalised the norms of hard science, haven't they?

Mary: Without gaining ... without gaining their respect.

Tom: No, it's just complete contempt.

Sarah: Or their money.

Mary: Which is all such a sign of respect, isn't it? (Focus Group, 2001:A,8-9)

A creative writer in the university has a greater potential to occupy a consecrated position than a writer outside of the confines of any institution because they vie for this position under the 'principles of legitimation' in two fields rather than one – art and education:

I just think that people do it 'cos you get a bit of paper at the end of it. It does feel like it's a tradable commodity ... It's more legitimate. It's better to tell your Mum that you're at university doing a degree, you're getting a BA rather than sitting at home on the dole being a writer. You know, it just sounds better. Plus it taps you into some sources of money. It's just support. (Tom, 2001:A,4)

But as part of postgraduate and academic work, creative writers struggle to position themselves positively in relation to highly consecrated or autonomous positions. In the university, creative writing does not generate substantial economic or cultural capital:

Roger: So, it's just interesting to consider how creative writing wants to position itself in terms of fitting in to research paradigms or finding the right areas for funding.

Sharon: And insisting on its validity, which still seems to be made an issue at every level. (Focus Group, 2001:B,10)

There is also an epistemological problem positioning creative writing as a discipline in the university. Its whole content revolves around mastering language, which is something that everyone uses everyday. There is a doxic attitude to writing that ties it to speaking, the voice, and the basis of our communication. From this, there is an assumption that we can all do it:

So there's a status thing about it which belittles the creative effort. Anyone can write poetry. Uncle Jim did when there was a wedding last week, and it had everyone's name in it. (Simon, 2001:C,6)

And if we can all do it, then it does not follow that someone who is doing what everyone else can do, should, or could, be bestowed with more cultural capital than the rest of us:

So, for the majority of people, because they all considered themselves the centre of their story, to think of doing something, of writing up at a level where you could get a PhD for it, it's just kind of dismissed. I think, we all think we can all do it because we're all the centre of our own story. (Sally, 2001:C,6-7)

When learning in the university is in a discipline other than creative writing, the extra skills one needs to acquire its mastery are more obvious and cultural capital is more readily bestowed:

Simon: There's this idea that everyone can write and everyone – not everyone, but a number of people out in that broad community – are capable of writing, if only they can sit down, because they've got a story in them. There's something of that ilk, which diminishes the discipline that's required to actually do it, especially a large-scale work. But people don't think in those terms about inventing the wheel, or, you know, inventing a more efficient fuel injection system for cars so that they're twice as economical as they are now. If you said that to people they'd go, wow, that's huge.

Julie: Or writing a sonata. How many people think that they can write a sonata? Doesn't mean because they hum a tune ...

Simon: There's a kind of technological barrier that doesn't seem to be there in the perception of a number of people because they think that writing comes out of personal experience, and hey, I've had personal experience. I think when it comes to actually doing it they often think they're capable, whereas they might not think they're capable of being a forensic chemist, or something like that, without a lot more work. (Focus Group, 2001:C,6)

Creative writing is devalued in the academy because it requires one to have a skill in something that everyone supposedly already possesses. But the devaluation is not as simple as that:

Tom: I guess music's much more rigorous, in a sense, and there are testable things ... you know, you can test people's ability ...

Mary: Like whether you hit the note.

Tom: Yeah, that's right. No, I'm sorry, that's not an F. You fail. I'll give you an F [laughs]. I mean, there's kind of objective standards so it lends itself to that kind of university measurement structure. (Focus Group, 2001:A,14)

But music, as we name it, only sounds like music because of the doxa surrounding it. For example, those who are brought up listening to classical music (even without any music apprenticeship) will be trained to expect to hear the dominant chord following the fifth (even if they are incapable of naming what they have heard). Those brought up on rock music will not expect to hear this music played in three/quarter time.

In the constant interaction of structures and agency that helps construct the habitus, the principle of legitimation that generates cultural capital holds sway over all other functions of the university, because it is its (apparent) autonomy, its freedom from economic and political demands, that gives academia its authority:

I think I would say to that, that research was a prime function in the university. The two things that universities are for is research and teaching, and on the research side, it's absolutely important to the life of any university that there's a conservation of knowledge and a critique of knowledge. It's both in teaching, but also primarily in research that you get the conservation of that knowledge and you get the critique of it. Without that, I think university life crumbles and I think that's absolutely fundamental to teaching as well as research and, therefore, research is absolutely fundamental to teaching. I don't think there should be tertiary organisations where there's just teaching. Well, when I say I don't think there should be, of course there should be, but I don't think a full university actually operates without those two. You can certainly have institutions, as India does, for instance, between the school levels – junior colleges, as they're called – where staff aren't expected to do research and then you have the equivalent in Australia. And of course they serve a very good purpose, but an actual university, as I would define a university, would always be working with that connection between teaching and research. (Hannah, 2001:F,1)

Along with this capacity for legitimation that comes from the possession of cultural capital generated through the production of research, come certain dispositions that are also a part of the academic habitus. Dispositions are 'inculcated, structured, durable, generative and transposable', thereby generating certain actions in and responses to differing situations that are determinant on one's past (Bourdieu, 1991:12). Dispositions in academia will correlate to the scholastic point of view mentioned earlier, and not only contribute to an academic's attitude to research. The authority of a consecrated position (who holds power over who can also attain positions in this restricted field of production) produces a disposition of authority:

Nick: You know, the cult of the university lecturer, it's in every discipline area. I think it's a good thing. Good for students. I love the idea that students are absolutely enraptured

with this guy who knows everything about rocks, or something, or who knows everything about ...

Paul: People who say 'Professor, can you have a look at this please?'

Nick: Oh, yes, you know, but why not. I mean, universities should be full of people with such expertise and such knowledge that they are gurus. I think it's a bit sad for students if they actually do get into a class where ... if that expertise is not such that that person sort of radiates their knowledge in a charismatic way. I can remember when I went to university. You don't learn from the people who are so boring that you don't want to be part of the course.

Paul: That's right. I'm in general agreement with that. (Focus Group, 2001:E,21-2)

Those who already have the security of a consecrated position engender this disposition. Those in the university who undertake creative work and wish to aspire to these positions of high consecration have to work to change the language, structures, attitudes and dispositions of others, and often, even their own:

So, at least within our faculty we are having a profile which is seen to be powerful. And I was asked this year to run the faculty research forum every month, which is terrific, because it's the first time they've had a creative arts [sic] do that. Usually, you know, it's up in the other, more leg ... more recognised ... I was going to say legitimate, but I don't mean that. (Ruth, 2001:G,7-8)

The doxa of research in universities is so established, so confirmed, in our language that it is difficult to steer away from it. It is reinforced in many ways, through academic dispositions, and by the principles of legitimation operating at the autonomous and heteronomous poles in the field of research.

The Corollary of the Aesthetic

The doxa of research and what gets to be termed research is also affected by other disciplinary boundaries, such as what determines creativity. The effect of Kant's Copernican revolution on art still has ramifications today. The universals set up in areas of knowledge, such as mathematics and the sciences, before Kant's premises, did not sit well with creativity and the imagination. Many artists found the neo-Classical principles of art (which stipulated an underlying form for all art) too stifling (as had Kant), and adopted a more individualistic approach to their work (Heath & Boreham, 1999:14). Individualism meant that one had the opportunity to *be* divinely inspired, which was not possible before the Enlightenment. Kant's work on the imagination,

creativity and art paved the way for Romanticism because he did not agree with formulae for creative acts:

I wanted to be creative in using thinking, in using ideas and finding other things that are part of those ideas; not just the logical steps that are in front of you. I didn't want to be the one step after the other logical type; I'm not that kind of person. (Lisa, 2001:D,18)

The 'productive imagination became, as it were, *officially* recognized by mainstream Western thought' (Kearney, 1988:156 – emphasis in original).

At the time of the Enlightenment, the art academy's patronage expanded to include the general public in the eighteenth century due to the development of mercantilism and the art exhibition (Minor, 1994:18). Now the artist was released from the confines of church and patron altogether, but the destruction of these boundaries created other difficulties to overcome. For the most 'ambitious' artists:

Their work became, inevitably, more remote from the lives of most people. It was thanks to their learning and sophistication that they lost the central position in society which had been enjoyed by their predecessors almost by right. No matter how fascinating and original their work might be, it no longer spoke unambiguously to everyone. The rise of the artist could also be seen as a form of marginalisation. (Graham-Dixon, 1999:152)

Artists were now in control of their subject matter, and therefore the ideas that produced these works. This not only applied to artisans, but producers of other creative works, such as writing. Artists had a growing market of interest in their work, but this also meant it was in the artists' interest to maintain (social) relevance in order to preserve their capital, whether cultural, symbolic or economic. It was necessary for the artist, without the guidance or direction of a patron, to find the time to explore their consciousness and, from this, create. The artist:

is thrown back on himself, his status and nature. He places his own consciousness at the centre of his art, not because he is narcissistic or egocentric, but simply because there is nothing else, and because there are questions which need answering. (Thurley, 1983:112-3)

Art became more than just representation; it was possible for art to occupy ‘an autonomous realm, sufficient unto itself’ (Fisher, 1993:244). The artist is faced with coming to an understanding of their own function and place in order to write about the world outside them. Knowledge emerges from within with the loss of old verities and the new self-referentiality and self-reflexivity in art that is a further echo of Kant’s ‘Copernican turn’. Creative work was given the right to be appreciated for itself, without external measures, such as representation, morality, or utility. Where it fell down was the concomitant right of having ‘an internal subject matter that is sufficient unto itself’ (Fisher, 1993:245).

Artistic creation became something produced in isolation through a combination of inspiration and genius:

One of my students subscribes to romantic ideas which say, ‘If I see how I’m doing it, I won’t be able to go on doing it’, which is bullshit. But, if she thinks that, it has that effect. (Mary, 2001:A,9)

The Romantic movement pushed the idea that the artist, whether writer, painter, or musician, must not be disturbed or their creative genius may be denied them. From the Kantian premises developed the idea that the creativity of genius was stifled by reason. This romantic distinction between creativity and knowledge is something that survived into modernity:

The Romantics ... introduced the fable that the poet dreaming in his garret, who writes only as the spirit moves him, is an image of the true poet; ... we hold fast to the belief that they should work only as the spirit moves them, undisturbed by our requests and unemboldened by our indifference. (Wind, 1963:91)

The stories of genius are numerous on this score – Schumann, Byron, Van Gogh, to name but three. *Stravinsky’s Lunch* (Modjeska, 1999) is a fictional work that depicts the life of Stravinsky, who controlled his whole household because he could not be disturbed when he was composing. Coleridge bemoans how a ‘person on business from

Porlock' caused him to lose his whole inspired vision, and so to greatly abbreviate his 'Kubla Khan' (Coleridge, 1983:564)⁸.

The Romantics were reacting not only against the strictures of universalised criteria for art, but also to a whole host of conditions that a belief in the constructedness of the world through self had brought to light. The main ideological standpoint in opposition to which Romanticism emerged was utilitarianism. A considerable part of Romanticism's reaction to utilitarian ideology was distaste for an increasingly industrialised, segmented society that represented this new industrial age. Romantics regarded utilitarianism as destroying 'organic society' (Eagleton, 1983:36). Many of the Romantic poets were active politically and pushed for what they felt was culturally valuable rather than materially profitable. Lord Byron, for example, spoke up for the Luddites in his address to the House of Lords. Like the idealists, the Romantics saw knowledge emerging from within – the difference was in the degree of autonomy of self. The Romantics:

propose alternative notions (really, alternative metaphors) of mental activity in which imagination or another inner resource – energy, emotion, or some unnamed power – informs the world. Where utilitarians diminish the self to empirical pleasures and pains, romantics give the self a deep generative center. One notion of self is inert and reactive, the other expressive. (Rosenblum, 1987:31)

Where romanticism drew on – or intersected with – utilitarianism, though, was through its pursuit of pleasure. Without 'Jeremy Bentham's devastating attack on asceticism and his emancipation of desires', the image of the creative romantic, at the mercy of their passion would not be possible (Rosenblum, 1987:29-30).

Another ideological standpoint from which Romanticism differentiated itself was idealism. What Romanticism reacted against was idealism's mimetic quality – mimetic in the Platonic sense, of being a copy of the 'ideal', which entailed the idea that if one

⁸ Stevie Smith's response to Coleridge's plight, in verse, is to the effect that Coleridge would not have let himself be interrupted if in fact he had something to say (Smith, 1983:1074).

could only think correctly, one could find the right way. After the Enlightenment, art was no longer communicating the word of God (as an imitation of His grand plan), but Romanticism gave art the right to the subjective expression of its author. Art was, for the Romantics, an active, rather than a reactionary, force.

The Romantic legacy has political implications for creativity that can best be described as a backlash against the indoctrination of formulaic principles that emerge from both utilitarianism and idealism. A reaction to the power of discourses based on Enlightenment rationality manifests itself through the politics of Romanticism, which rejects the discursive power of Enlightenment thinking as limiting. Romanticism evolves as a reverse discourse, asserting that moral good can only be achieved by eschewing the dominance of reason. ‘Suddenly, what had made power strong becomes used to attack it. Power, after investing itself in the body, finds itself exposed to a counter-attack in the same body’ (Foucault, 1980: 56). Romanticism ties creative work to its higher ideals of intuition and feeling rather than to the more base desires of capitalism and the less intuitive, moralistic values of reason.

The way art was caught up in the Romantic discourse divorced it from knowledge and presented it as divine inspiration. It eluded the confines of society because, in its identity as part of the restricted field of production, it was specifically *not* seen as something that contributed to material gain. It was also seen as a classless pursuit, *not* taken up to imbue others with its doctrine, and not created with specific political intent (although this may be the case in some instances).

These Romantic notions of art have evolved out of the practice of aesthetics since the Enlightenment, with Kant’s views on aesthetics being the catalyst for much reflection and rumination. It seems rather extreme to lay the blame for the understanding of art all at the feet of one person, but it is through Kant’s critiques that creativity comes to be perceived as something more than the productive impulse that leads to an imitation or a presentation. Many interpreters of Kant suggest that art becomes divorced from knowledge altogether and set up instead in its own domain of judgement, that of feeling:

You absolutely can't just be a product of your own imagination, but they had this little thing that said you can't have works that are a product of your own imagination. As if your imagination isn't influenced by every course you've ever taken, every book you've ever read. (Julie, 2001:C,8)

And feeling, operating on a different plane or trajectory from knowing, is something that knowing can never have under its control and so is considered dangerous to knowledge.

Kant writes of art being different from science because it is a practice rather than a theory, an 'ability' rather than a 'knowledge' (Kant, 1952:§43):

From a student's point of view, my difficulty with creative work is getting it recognised. I'd produced copious amounts, published short works in literary magazines – Westerly and Southerly – won awards, got the Varuna Fellowship, got first class honours, all that kind of thing, and I still missed out on a scholarship. (Kathy, 2001:B,4)

And:

For years that's been thrown back at us by the sciences, that we don't do research because we don't make any really original contributions. (Julie, 2001:C,3)

Although Kant goes on to say that 'the possession of the most complete knowledge does not involve one's having then and there the skill to do it' (1952:§43), thereby giving to art a skill that knowledge does not have, he sets up practice as being something that can be done without the necessity of knowing.

This is further exemplified by Kant in his explanation of genius (1952:§47). He does say here that in science one 'can never do more than merely learn and follow a lead' – so, in effect, Newton's physics could be stumbled upon by anyone willing to learn – but in art 'we cannot learn to write in the true poetic vein, no matter how complete all the precepts of the poetic art may be, or however excellent its models', and one who can write in this way, earns the right to the title genius (Kant, 1952:§47):

We don't claim to be able to teach people how to write. We claim we can develop them, but there's got to be something there to begin with. (Sandra, 2001:D,23)

This, again, differentiates art from knowing, and he extends this difference by stating that science is superior to art in its ability to strive for ‘greater perfection in knowledge’, whereas with art ‘ideas, so rich at once in fancy and in thought, enter and assemble themselves in his⁹ brain, for the good reason that he does not himself know, and so cannot teach others’; and, therefore, art has ‘a limit imposed upon it which it cannot transcend’ (Kant, 1952:§47).

Art’s turn from knowledge is further exemplified when Kant distinguishes art from craft (1952:§43). Craft’s success, he writes, is measured by its output and labour, while art, although it necessarily contains some form of ‘compulsory’ mechanism, is successful only if it is ‘play’: that is, ‘an occupation which is agreeable on its own account’ (1952:§43). Given that Kant insists that learning is the labour of striving for more knowledge, the notion that creativity and art are specifically *not* labour draws an even clearer distinction between the two discursive, and practical fields.

The Wildness of the ‘Doing’ Subject

Kant’s analysis turned the act of creativity into something that was *doing*, but not knowing; a kind of native or instinctive capacity removed from analysis – aesthetics is for the artist as ornithology is for the birds (Newman, 1990:247). Certainly, works on aesthetics tend to be written from the perspective of understanding art through the eyes of the observer, not through the artist her/himself (John, 2001; Lamarque, 2001). So, aesthetics becomes a study, a theory, of how to recognise and analyse art, but not a study or theory of how creativity comes into being. Nietzsche refers to Kant’s understanding of aesthetics coming from a similar perspective:

All I wish to underline is that, like all philosophers, instead of visualizing the aesthetic problem from the point of view of the experiences of the artist (the creator) Kant reflected on art and the beautiful only from the point of view of the “spectator”.
(Nietzsche, 1977:134-5)

⁹ The ‘he’ referred to here by Kant is the artist.

Kant's main concern with art was how it is viewed. When spectators view art, they often make some sort of judgement according to taste. This judgement occurs when art is held in the eyes and the ears of the spectator (even if this is the artist her/himself), not when the work of art is being created. Kant's critique encompasses art as knowing because judging is a part of knowing. His work does not elucidate on the *doing* of art, only on the *viewing* of art. The *doing* of art is not part of judging art, and therefore, gets left out of knowing.

This legacy from Kant distanced art and artists from the domain of learning in the late eighteenth century at the same time that learning, through Enlightenment reason, was gaining ground as the dominant discourse for arriving at the truth. This set creativity and learning on opposing trajectories and created the basis of the philosophical differences between creativity and research that have become so deeply embedded in our social system:

They are opposed as the objectivity of knowledge is opposed to the subjectivity of feeling; as the unity of scientific truth, ideally constructing a single, coherent system, is opposed to the irreducible plurality of objects of beauty, each strictly individual and irreplaceable; as the unambiguous and univocal meaning of concepts is opposed to the plurivocal and inexhaustible meaning of the aesthetic ideal ...; as the strict, universal and exactly reproducible rules of scientific method are opposed to a free creativity which no determinate rule can encompass and the unity of which is manifested only in an inimitable 'manner' as the expression of a unique personality. (Markus, 1994:21)

These aspects are reflected in creative writing in the academy, and also resonate with the Kantian idea of art being play as something that is a *doing* without the necessity of *knowing*:

It was only yesterday when it was thought that people ... any old man and his dog could teach creative writing, you know. It's usually someone who's published a book, as long as they could suck on a straw and stand up straight. You know what I'm getting at. It's just so new. And now we've got the contradiction, that with the teaching of literature being such a powerless state ... where [do] the people with PhDs go? Do they go and teach writing? If there's an epistemological problem in there ... You know, there's some real issues there. (Peter, 2001:E,17-8)

One issue is whether someone can successfully teach something they have never *done*. There are different guidelines for those who teach ways of thinking and those who teach ways of doing. As Kant says, how to think in logical steps can be imparted to anyone willing to understand (1952:§47). But in Kant's terms the *doing* of something, creative writing, for example, has two different aspects – one *doing* being craft, the other being 'genius'. Kant says of the first that it is mere labour without the agreeableness of free play (1952:§43), so has a greater semblance with aspects of knowing rather than doing. And of the second, he says it cannot be taught because its limit is internally dependent (1952:§47).

If creative writing is taught as a craft, then one is expected to learn the different elements of the practice (for example, in writing: plot, characters, point of view) and how all these elements can be pieced together in practice. Also, if craft is labour, though it may contain elements of beauty for its observers, originality is not paramount, which contributes to its denigration within the academy, with its overarching search for original contributions to knowledge.

Undertaking the practice of the craft of creative writing is not seen as contributing to knowledge:

because a discipline that doesn't engage in some sort of meta-discourse doesn't produce knowledge. (Michelle, 2001:B,10)

Embedded in universities is an attitude to creative writing which bears this mark in areas such as its inclusion into universities' higher degrees curriculum. The institution of English departments has been one effect of idealism. The idea of studying literature was formed under an idealist paradigm, where creative writing could be studied for all its beauty, but was something specifically not able to be taught. It is the opposing ideology of utilitarianism that accepts the 'craft' of writing rather than the study of it. In doing so, academics complain it reduces creative writing to a process:

We're not bricklayers. I mean that's the other kind of school of creative writing that I take exception to. (Sharon, 2001:B,6)

The bifurcation of useful and useless knowledge plays out in the area of creative writing as well as in research.

On one level creative writing is acknowledged by its practitioners as a craft, because it does have elements specific to its practice that good practitioners need to learn. But on another level, writers strive to subvert this because a focus on craft tends to simplify the practice to the extent that it is alienated from theory. This is very different from the study of science (especially medicine or laboratory work), or engineering, or business management. The value of 'craft', or skills, changes depending on the value of the discipline/faculty in which it is being taught. Acknowledging creative writing as only a practice has other implications for its place in the field of research because of the sociological differences between the practical and thought.

The second aspect of *doing* is the free form of *play*, as Kant referred to it when differentiating it from craft (1952:§43). Although the idealist approach to the study of literature placed creative writing as the creative practice 'par excellence' and insisted upon the immanent and spiritual nature of literary genius, creative writing was not considered something that could be undertaken in the pursuit of knowledge. Rather, it was something to be studied in order to understand it in all its complexity so that one's otherwise impoverished, utilitarian life might be enriched. Writing that is worthy of studying, the argument went, can only be realised by a rare few:

I actually find that people [those outside the creative writing discipline] value the creative element of it and are very interested in that process. So I don't think they are belittling the creative. And people who can't do it, those people who know they can't do it, really do value it. It's just one of those things that has a mystique attached to it. (Barbara, 2001: C,6)

This mystique arises from the idea of art as play, as something that arises from within: the genius, the 'wild subject', unheeded by thought. Consequently, this idea of genius undermines art's ability for 'greater perfection in knowledge' because it does arise from within, and not from contemplation of other knowledge already formed (Kant, 1952:§47):

Amanda: Maybe in part that big difference comes out of the idea that somehow creative writing just somehow flows out of their head. That's a dreadful notion but it is what's out there.

Emily: It's still current.

Amanda: If you're a creative writer, you somehow ...

Emily: You have a muse.

Amanda: Yeah, and you just write ... It's very strong, that idea. (Focus Group, 2001:D,6)

Historically, from this perspective emerged many interpretations of the creative that encompass the dark, mysterious, the irrational, and the inexplicable. Creativity is seen as a force that inheres in bodies – something mysterious and inexplicable – and, so, connected to nature rather than the mind.

Nietzsche looked upon art as a positive force, with two aspects, the Dionysian and the Apollonian. The Dionysian aspect, for Nietzsche, associated with the god of intoxication who presides over 'formless flux, mysticism, and excess', was homologous to this 'barbaric' creativity (Nietzsche, 1886/2000: xvi). A Dionysian drive in the artist is the pain of 'self-oblivion' in order to reach the greatest pleasures (Nietzsche, 2000:22-25). It is, in other words, an intuition – 'the phenomenon that pain arouses pleasure, that exultation tears cries of agony from the breast' (Nietzsche, 2000:25). The artist, charged with a Dionysian pessimism, could come to a greater understanding of the world and how it should be, thereby having the ability to transform it into a product of their own perfection (Furst, 1979:65):

The artist was more than a hero; he was virtually a divinity, endowed like God himself with the power of creation, for all art is ... a direct reflection of the absolute act of creation and consequently an absolute self-affirmation. (Furst, 1979:67)

This wayward element of creativity is countered, in Nietzsche's interpretation of art, by an Apollonian aspect which bestows on the artist 'rational knowledge and moderation' (Nietzsche, 2000:xvi). But it has achieved great notoriety through theories on repression and the unconscious espoused, initially, by Freud.

Freud expressed the dark, unruly image of creativity in his explanation of the psychoanalytic session – the analysand (the patient) created stories from the dark,

normally unspoken, unconscious (Brophy, 1998:61). His work was based around his thesis of the development of the individual as one who had to repress these dark thoughts in order to reach maturity. But this wild, unspeakable part of the human psyche always finds a way to be heard, whether through dreams, fantasies, or slips of the tongue. As Freud says of creative writers:

But creative writers are valuable allies and their evidence is to be prized highly, for they are apt to know a whole host of things between heaven and earth of which our philosophy has not yet let us dream. In their knowledge of the mind they are far in advance of us everyday people, for they draw upon sources which we have not yet opened up for science. (Freud, 1907/1959:8)

The ‘whole host of things’ a creative writer knows is drawn from the unexplored unconscious. It is the repressed part of an individual that Freud wishes to uncover.

Surrealism, an art and literature movement in the 1920s, was a celebration of the unruliness of creativity that arose out of the Dadaist movement at the end of WWI. Dadaism was an expression of its time against the terror and anguish of the war and the nationalist feeling to which an older generation still adhered. The Dadaists ‘refused to take anybody or anything seriously. According to them, even to criticize a fact in earnest would confer upon it an importance which nothing on earth can possibly deserve’ (Lemaitre, 1969:596). The position they took meant that their own ideas could not stand any type of critique, so the movement was, in a way, self-defeating and did not last long.

But from its demise, Surrealism arose, a central figure being the Dadaist, Andre Breton. Surrealism, as defined by Breton, was:

pure psychic automatism, by which an attempt is made to express, either verbally, in writing or in any manner, the true functioning of thought[;t]he dictation of thought, in the absence of all control by the reason, excluding any esthetic or moral preoccupation ... Surrealism rests on the belief in the higher reality of certain hitherto neglected forms of association, in the omnipotence of the dream, in the disinterested play of thought. (Breton, cited in Nadeau, 1964:89)

Clearly this is very close to Freud's psychoanalytic model. But this rampant individualism that was so outrageous at the time could not abrogate the subject from the confines of society.

The Doxa of Creativity

Artistic product is necessarily constrained by political and economic determinants because the artist as agent is a part of the social structure. Consequently, art can never be autonomous with respect to politics. Even if the doing of art has not been a part of the knowing of art, doing is still delimited by the kinds of judgements it is possible to make in the socio-cultural era where the doing takes place. Kant's accent on judgement provides this outlook too in his acceptance of an empirical view:

The empirical interest in the beautiful exists only in *society*. And if we admit that the impulse to society is natural to mankind, and that the suitability for and the propensity towards it, i.e. *sociability*, is a property essential to the requirements of man as a creature intended for society, and one, therefore, that belongs to *humanity*, it is inevitable that we should also look upon taste in the light of a faculty for estimating whatever enables us to communicate even our *feeling* to every one else, and hence as a means of promoting that upon which the natural inclination of every one is set. With no one to take into account but himself a man abandoned on a desert island would not adorn either himself or his hut, nor would he look for flowers, and still less plant them, with the object of providing himself with personal adornments. Only in society does it occur to him to be not merely a man, but a man refined after the manner of his kind (the beginning of civilization) – for that is the estimate formed of one who has the bent and turn for communicating his pleasure to others, and who is not quite satisfied with an Object unless his feelings of delight in it can be shared in communion with others. (Kant, 1952:§41 – emphasis in original)

So the doing of art, for Kant, as it is at an historical moment, is a way of connecting socially with others. The way these connections are made is governed by how the art is judged by the audience it is aimed at – this could be the culture as a whole, or specific groups or sub-cultures within it (Ferguson, 1999:2). And this is delivered in Kant's

work through his elucidation of a 'common sense' (Kant, 1952:§40). As mentioned earlier, common sense can never be free of external determinants. It becomes *common* because it is formed from social interaction. A person in isolation, as Kant states, will not have a common sense of the beautiful because they have no one else with whom to interact. The kind of society also determines the type of aesthetic judgement. Small feet in China were once considered beautiful; the size of a woman's bottom lip determines the size of her dowry payment in Surmaland:

Unless one holds to the strictly formalist position that all things somehow inherently contain or lack 'beauty,' 'power,' etc., the question of how is it that people come to make these kinds of judgments about things is an inherently political one. (Ferguson, 1999:2)

But Kant dismisses this 'empirical interest' by saying:

This interest, indirectly attached to the beautiful by the inclination towards society, and, consequently, empirical, is, however, of no importance for us here. For that to which we have alone to look is what can have a bearing *a priori*, even though indirect, upon the judgement of taste. (Kant, 1952:§41)

Kant comes up with the subjective universal as the *a priori* conditions for aesthetic judgement, but eschews political influence in his dismissal of the 'empirical interest', and attributes common sense with *a priori* status. Contemporary social theorists (such as Bourdieu) have demonstrated that common sense evolves in a person through social interaction. Common sense, from this perspective, is analogous to a person's habitus. There may be parts of a person's habitus that are so fixed they are unchangeable, but because one's social demeanour does not stay the same (through aging, role taking and the status of these roles), their habitus will also be in a state of flux.

According to Kant, the subjective has limitations because it is a universal experience. What Kant's analysis assumes is that all subjective judgements of taste are formed from within, 'only on the presupposition' of a common sense. But this common sense is not 'some external sense, but the effect arising from the free play of our powers of cognition' (Kant, 1952:§20). Kant misconstrues the universal by apportioning common

sense to an individual ‘power of cognition’. Subjectivity always operates under the constraints of the objectivities surrounding it, from whence it is formed. A belief in total subjectivity makes no allowance for any recognisable form to art. The power of common sense is evident because there are acknowledgements of art. Common sense does not arise from within, as Kant states. This would only add to a formless state of flux. Common sense is something that helps define and form art for everyone because of its objectivity.

If aesthetics is socially constructed, then art is defined in its particular sphere by collective judgements, and artists play their role by providing instances of, or challenges to, the known differences set up by these judgements (Ferguson, 1999:3). What Kant’s *a priori* subjectiveness of aesthetics points to is how judgements of taste are linked to social constructs rather than to claims of validity and universality (Ferguson, 1999:3-4).

Taste in art is not something that can be rule-driven – no one can be talked into liking something – but there are underlying constraints as to what is possible *as* art:

Jackie: But there are still acceptable, unacceptable creative products. Well, I mean, you know, if you start writing a novel in a complete sort of ...

Tom: Yeah, it still has to be rational.

Jackie: way that’s never been done, I mean it would still be considered as unacceptable so I think there are criteria ...

Angela: Well, imagine if James Joyce wrote Ulysses for a creative writing degree.

Jackie: Well, maybe if you did it at some moment it would have been. It wouldn’t have passed ...

Angela: It wouldn’t have, I don’t think at the time that he wrote it, you know.

Tom: Yes, that’s true.

Sarah: So it’s fitting in with existing traditions, isn’t it? (Focus Group, 2001:A,10)

These ‘traditions’ form doxa about what can and cannot be labelled creative. Doxa is our common sense, like a circulating language of which we are all aware but which is left unspoken.

Kant’s *universal* concept in aesthetics is a very important one. The difficulty is with its *a priori* status. Common sense, or doxa, can only arise from social interaction and

social experience. Seeing art devoid of common sense is how ideas have formed about creativity as being dangerous:

Paul: In the creative writing discipline, if you do want to use that word, there's a tension between the generic and the non-generic, you know, the generic and the original, or the unique, which you don't get to such an extent, or which isn't so obvious (which is perhaps more to the point), in other disciplines.

Nick: Yes, all right. So the idea of the original ... the idea of the unique ... I mean originality does drive us a lot, doesn't it? Or the term does, and what we interpret it to be. It's a dangerous thing, but that's what we do. (Focus Group, 2001:E,19)

The idea is that it can send the writer, the artist, the creator, off into areas with no boundaries, where thoughts are unable to be contained. The danger is in never knowing what will appear. In striving for originality, there is a notion that one must let go of prior thought, for holding on to it risks keeping the work generic. This aspect of creativity has a strong affinity with the unconscious described by Freud. It also correlates to the Dionysian artist ideal of abandoning the self in order to come to the greatest heights of creative endeavour. In order to have a successful outcome, the writer (or the analysand) must abandon thought and let arise whatever comes.

The realisation of creativity is a successful balance of subjectivity and the universal (commonsense, or doxa) of aesthetics. It is the conjoining of Dionysus with Apollo – darkness with light, mysticism with rationality, intoxication and excess with moderation (Nietzsche, 2000:xvi). It is most easily recognised and accepted in the university in disciplines other than creative ones:

I would see creativity to be expressed in research. And if it's not, research is without what it takes to actually produce that conservation and critique. Particularly the critique and the conserving balance as you pass into your own time with that, requires a degree of creativity, which is not the same as creative arts, of creative writing, which in the popular use of that is a different point of practice. (Hannah, 2001:F,1)

To someone outside creative disciplines in the university, often the idea of the Dionysian artist is foremost. One reason is that the objectivity of the aesthetic cannot be apportioned and ordered like the objectivity of understanding. There are not mutually exclusive, exhaustive categories in which to compartmentalise thought. But

the interplay of subjectivity and objectivity is still very important in the production of art.

Without recognising, or realising, the necessity of this conjoining, art can only ever be seen as play. It becomes something that is not knowledge:

Yeah, they're certainly both narratives but I mean you don't need to ... like you couldn't write ... you could write the story off the top of your head, you wouldn't need to read another solitary book, would you? (Tom, 2001:A,7)

The idea that creative production is not knowledge sets up a division between what one knows about the world through experience and what one knows about the world through books. In the 'knowledge industry' of the university it is seemingly more important to think using secondary sources:

Tom: You can write a novel without doing a skerrick of specific reading. You're obviously drawing on what you know about the world, you know, etcetera, etcetera, but that's quite different ...

Mary: I think you're also drawing a lot on other things that you've ...

Tom: But I couldn't have sat down and written my PhD off the top of my head. (Focus Group, 2001:A,8)

This idea figures strongly in the academy, at all levels. Students undertaking creative writing degrees can find it hard to get their work accepted on the same level as other degrees because they are often unable to point to sources of their ideas:

I was the top student in my honours equivalent year and given the prize for the outstanding student but at the eleventh hour the faculty decided to award it jointly to a man who had lower marks but who was not in the creative area but in the communications area. So, there's this perception that creative writing somehow either doesn't count or isn't quite ... or rigour in creative writing isn't quite as rigorous as other disciplines. (Sharon, 2001:B,4)

It correlates to the skills aspect of art put forward by Kant.

This juxtaposition of play and thought manifests in attitudes to creative writers in the academy. Creative writers who have attained an award or degree from the academy (which bestows on them the right to be recognised as part of the institution) still have to

negotiate their position with all the other positions in the hierarchies relating to capital accretion in the university.

Conclusion

As I have shown from my focus group discussions, many current views and values as to why creative writing should not be part of higher degrees or academic work in the university are extensions of philosophical arguments concerning the place of creativity in society that have long been argued. Creativity can be seen as a dangerous, formless, intoxication of the spirit; as play, rather than labour *or* thought; and through the writings of Kant, something that is unable to be given guidelines, and that emanates from within.

The doxa of creative work and the doxa of research arise from different epistemological underpinnings – creativity from the unexplainable force of the imagination, and research from the logical force of understanding. Where they both draw on similar frameworks is through their sociological application in a heteronomous framework. The utility of both has found a common ground in the operation of the university. The effect of this heteronomous influence on the value of creativity will be explored in the next chapter.

3

In Terms of Value

There was a time, as in the Middle Ages, when only the superfluous, the excess of production over consumption, was exchanged.

There was again a time, when not only the superfluous, but all products, all industrial existence, had passed into commerce, when the whole of production depended upon exchange ...

Finally, there came a time when everything that men had considered as inalienable became an object of exchange, of traffic and could be alienated. This is the time when the very things which till then had been communicated, but never exchanged; given, but never sold; acquired, but never bought – virtue, love, conviction, knowledge, conscience, etc. – when everything finally passed into commerce. It is the time of general corruption, of universal venality, or, to speak in terms of political economy, the time when everything, moral or physical, having become a marketable value, is brought to the market to be assessed at its truest value. (Marx, 1847/1976: 113)

Marx's summary of the economic stages of the Western world charts a transformation from exchanging only what was excess to needs, to deliberate production of an excess for exchange, to the 'selling of one's soul'. The latter, as it applies to research and tertiary education, is the focus of this chapter. The emphasis on economic capital means the market has now alienated the one-time inalienability of knowledge 'for its own sake'.

Australia's current social formation is oriented around production for the economy, with economic capital the primary goal and the reward for success in virtually any endeavour. This dependence on market success is a consequence of a global turn to

neoliberalism, the idea that free trade benefits all participants and the economy is the basis for the formation, and success, of a society. Consequently, knowledge that is valued is that which is tied to answers that can be bought and sold (that is, knowledge that has value in the economic sense), hence is deemed important for the development of society. Not only is there a requirement to increase production on an economic level. As I will discuss in this chapter, knowledge gains legitimacy and power if it can be connected to our priority of needs, and these needs are dependent on our particular social formation, which is currently structured around neoliberal principles.

Education becomes an important field because it produces recognisable cultural capital and this can be exchanged for economic capital. In the case of the contemporary university, the push to vocationalise training and produce commodities that can be sold (i.e. students and knowledge) changes the emphasis within a university from the vocation of investigating knowledge for its own, or society's sake, to the pursuit of knowledge as a marketable commodity. Cultural capital is valued only insofar as it can be linked in some way to economic capital. As Bourdieu states, 'In the name of the scientific programme of knowledge, converted into a political programme of action, an immense *political operation* is being pursued' (1998a:95 – emphasis in original). Valuing knowledge only for its economic contribution is a political operation in that it benefits some groups in society to the exclusion of others.

In our current society, the values espoused by neoliberal discourse dominate many fields: our politics (the field of power); our universities (the field of research); and art (the field of cultural production). This is evident in the way in which the media's attention to freedom, democracy, and even 'the family' is measured in economic terms first, and then in other terms of value, such as health, education, or human rights. For example, having more children (one for the mother, one for the father and one for the country) is portrayed as important by government in economic terms, rather than detrimental in ecological terms.

This chapter explores the effect of neoliberalism in rendering knowledge ‘alienable’. I will describe, firstly, what values are, then address the basis of Australia’s current society as neoliberal, and the values this engenders. I will look at who and what these values empower, with particular regard to neoliberalism’s effects on government policy in the area of university research, the misrecognition of power, how university research policies respond to this, and what forms of knowledge benefit most from the values held by neoliberal discourses. These values are also evident in the discourse surrounding creative writing as research that emerged from the focus group discussions. However, writing is not alone; virtually all forms of basic research have been placed under similar strictures by recent government policy initiatives.

Value and Capital

Recently creative writing has gained a place among undergraduate disciplines in the university because of the contemporary turn to a utilitarian approach to education and research. This was a significant point emerging from my focus group discussions:

I’m in favour of teaching creative writing at undergraduate level for universities purely to make money for English departments; to make money in a situation where access to other sources of money is, you know, precluded in so many cases now, and where just about every second member of the general public regards themselves as potentially a creative writer. (Hannah, 2001:F,3-4)

The utilitarian function posits knowledge and creativity as things to be utilised. They are products, and both they and the subject who labours well at them can be put to good use (Taylor, 1999:5). Their scope and value are restricted by the ‘social context in which these processes occur’ (Throsby, 2001:22). They are not necessarily acquired for their use-value but for the value they stimulate as a sign in a capitalist economy.

Value arises from social meaning-making engendered by political, cultural and religious systems (Stunkel & Sarsar, 1994:48). There is ongoing tension among philosophers who attempt to explain how social values arise. Universalist philosophers deem some values to be important to all peoples in all cultures, such as bodily health and safety, and an ability to use our senses, imagination and thought in individual and social situations

(Nussbaum, 1999:41-42). Relativist philosophers state that value systems differ according to cultural, social and political ideologies and contexts. What is common to value systems in both these interpretations is that they see values in prescriptive, not descriptive terms. They are concerned with ‘what ought to be rather than what is’ (Stunkel & Sarsar, 1994:50) – like the principle of ethics.

Descriptive values, in contrast, are often statements of measurement, such as ‘numerical temperature values in an experiment’, or statements of non-moral choice such as a preference for ice cream rather than cream (Stunkel & Sarsar, 1994:51). The decision to measure something, though, and the selection of the tool with which to measure, *is* prescriptive – so arguably there is no way out of prescription, no simple or neutral description. Prescriptive values are tied to someone’s habitus, and so are influenced by different lifestyles. To voice a preference for reading Charles Dickens over Jeffrey Archer is very different from stating a preference for ice cream. It involves situating oneself within an hierarchical (albeit arbitrary) system that reads personal choices as statements of one’s worth.

Value systems influence habitus, and vice versa. A person’s habitus is generated by his/her history and contexts, and by the collective habitus of which he/she is part. This will influence her/his value system. New experiences, objects, actions and accomplishments will be accepted as valuable or rejected depending on how well they fit with already existing thoughts and processes incorporated into an individual’s habitus:

We know in general terms, that the effects that a new experience can have on the habitus depend on the relation of practical ‘compatibility’ between this experience and the experiences that have already been assimilated by the habitus, in the form of schemes of production and evaluation, and that, in the process of selective re-interpretation which results from this dialectic, the informative efficacy of all new experiences tends to diminish continuously. (Bourdieu, 1991:82)

If one is comfortable with the acceptance of a value because it has a ‘sense of place’ within one’s habitus, then there will be a greater level of ease and competence when operating in fields that also uphold this value with a sense of worth.

In order to inculcate oneself into a field, a person may have to incorporate a value into their habitus they may not have previously held. ‘Hyper-control’ and ‘hyper-correction’ can result, meaning that one is constantly readjusting one’s thoughts and actions to fit with the value espoused by that field (Bourdieu, 1991:82-3). Imagine a work environment that values employees who partake in ‘cultural’ activities in their leisure time. A new recruit, whose normal leisure pursuits revolve around football matches and going to the movies, desires to increase his/her acceptability in the work group by going to the opera. Her/his sense of comfort in enjoying the performance will correlate with her/his level of understanding of the opera, and therefore, her/his ability to interpret and talk about the performance. He/she may wish to value the opera but the competence needed to incorporate this value into his/her habitus is not present. Competence:

is acquired in a social context and through practice, [and] is inseparable from the practical mastery of a usage of language and the practical mastery of situations in which this usage of language is *socially acceptable*. (Bourdieu, 1991:82 – emphasis in original)

What this person values is not the opera, but the practice of complying with what is valued in this new environment. By *performing* as part of the group, this person is demonstrating a kind of conscious affiliation of her/himself with this value and the collective habitus of the workplace. This is likely – given time – to reshape his/her own habitus.

The ‘what ought to be’, prescriptive, function of values operates as a system that enacts relations of power (Frow, 1986:60). Competing values do not have a necessary hierarchy, because there is not a necessary right or better way; so the only way of determining the prescriptive value is the power game. There are no values more inherently right or good than others, only values authenticated through the power of

supporting an order, ‘which is a dressed-up version of how we want things to be, or how we want them to be forced to be’ (Nietzsche, 1886/1990:14).

The value system in universities operates on the principle of capital and its exchangeability, and revolves around knowledge – the teaching of knowledge, the production of knowledge and the acquisition of knowledge. The value of knowledge in the university, and society in general, is implicated in the amount of capital it generates – that is, capital in any of its forms: economic, cultural, or symbolic. Knowledge contributes to the production of these various kinds of capital, and can help to generate particular ways of navigating institutions and the everyday world. It is valued economically for its use and exchange value: knowledge produced in a university, for instance, can be applied to fields outside academia, therefore having a use value beyond the field of academe. Graduates have a greater exchange value than, say, school leavers, because of their acquired knowledge and demonstrated skills. Knowledge also helps a person gain cultural capital. The knowledge produced in universities is considered prestigious, in part because it is only available to those who have successfully incorporated formal learning into their habitus. This cultural capital can then be exchanged for prestigious work and social position. Symbolic capital is usually not recognised as capital as such, but is ‘misrecognized’ capital, seen as someone’s natural ability or talent. It is invested in someone through forms of honour and prestige.

Academic capital – of which demonstrated knowledge is a part, and which includes publication record, research profile and recognition as an expert – can translate as economic, cultural and symbolic capital depending on the circumstance, but it is never in a stable relationship with these forms of exchange. Changes in other fields operating in a culture and changes in values outside universities will affect the value of academic capital. Changes that have occurred over the past century have also affected the very nature of universities:

First, the shift of emphasis to research over teaching promoted greater specialisation in areas of knowledge and a weakening of universities as coherent institutions. The growth of applied research ... has opened universities to strong external influences,

particularly from governments. Second, there has been a dramatic increase, over recent decades, in the proportion of the population attending universities ... Third, as a consequence, the number of 'relevant' subjects has grown vastly and the range of occupations for which degrees are offered has expanded substantially. (Crittenden, 1997:92)

These changes have affected the value of academic capital. A greater emphasis on research coupled with the importance of knowledge for a growing economy has meant universities are no longer wholly autonomous institutions – government has a vested interest in the development going on within their walls. This has also adversely affected the value of academic capital in terms of its translation into cultural and symbolic capital, because a large increase in the student population and the variety of courses taught in universities works on the principle of diminishing marginal utility – the more there is of something, the less valuable it will be. Positions previously counted as prestigious because they required academic capital in order to perform them, become more commonplace, and so decrease in cultural capital. A broader range of occupations requiring those who undertake them to have acquired academic capital also means a decrease in symbolic capital. No longer will the 'academic' speaking publicly on sustainable environments be given the status of the public intellectual when a good proportion of the adult population are university graduates, and hence consider themselves intellectuals as well.

The only increase in value for academic capital in the current climate is in its exchange as economic capital. This has had a marked effect on the production of research in universities, as it is research – particularly in applied areas – that attracts funds, produces profits (both for the university and for fields outside who have a vested interest in the research), and therefore increases the economic value of academic capital. The drive by government to increase research's market appeal (and thereby decrease dependence on public funding) makes the division between autonomous and heteronomous positions in the field more pronounced. Research interests become bifurcated, based upon opposing principles: one form – applied research – interests government and industry (in economic terms) and is, therefore, coextensive with the

economic power of the dominating fraction of the dominant field; the other – pure, or basic, research – attracts the attention of research peers (and acquires cultural value), but loses out in the market economy and is part of the dominated fraction. The contemporary focus on the economic value of research is a symptom of society's increasing dependence on the circulation of knowledge to generate growth. The discourse of neoliberalism helps to sustain and maintain this valuing of growth.

Neoliberalism and the Inalienability of Creative Writing

Neoliberalism, the dominant discourse of the Western world today, operates under the guiding principle of capitalist logic, and its practices include free market access, a global economic and communication network, and accompanying technological changes. Neoliberal values and practices are so embedded into the current system, one could be excused for thinking of its co-extensivity with democracy as necessary, whereas, as Milner states, liberalism is 'much more properly normal to capitalist society' than to democracy (1991:125f).

Neoliberalism arises from the politics of liberalism and the philosophy of utilitarianism that was founded by Hobbes and Locke in the seventeenth century, and its subsequent developments through to Bentham and Mill in the nineteenth century (Milner, 1991:7). Its basis is the individual, and it advocates the maximum utility for individuals through their freedom to operate in markets that are unfettered by government intervention. Its tenets have become so entrenched in the Western way of life that neoliberalism has become part of the doxa. Bourdieu states that neoliberal discourse in the current climate is 'like psychiatric discourse in the asylum' (1998a:95) – so inevitable it is impossible to envisage the world being explained in any other way. Government and big business legitimate the practices of neoliberalism to the extent that there is misrecognition of its arbitrariness. This misrecognition, expressed through the unquestioning public acceptance of neoliberal principles, shows a public 'unaware of the very question of legitimacy' (Bourdieu, 1977:168).

The neoliberal principle positions the world as a vast supermarket, where democracy is simply economic choice. Under this umbrella, research output is defined and measured primarily in terms of utilitarian principles. A paper published in *Meanjin* over ten years ago addresses this issue, which has become even more pertinent today:

What is research then ...? Well, it is finding things – things you can sell. It is quite clear that a new and resolute materialism is swamping the evaluative and heuristic concept of research. You now do not look for things of interest, human value, critical power. You look for things for which there is a market. (Knight, 1989:459)

The neoliberal principle of economic utility affects the value, and therefore, the status, of all forms of research in the university. In my introductory letter inviting academics and postgraduate students to participate in focus group discussions on creative writing in universities, one area of interest to me was the status of creative writing as research (see Appendix A). I asked the focus groups how creative writing stood in relation to other research disciplines in universities in terms of status (see Appendix B). What was evident from the answers I received was that the status of creative writing was low in universities at postgraduate and academic research levels:

Creative writing's not the category that you can apply for an ARC grant in, unless you ally it with some theoretical project, or something. (Michelle, 2001:B,9)

In a neoliberal climate, creative writing's status as inalienable, because of its position as knowledge for its own sake, or 'useless' knowledge, precludes it from being considered 'tangible' research:

Barbara: Perhaps research is seen as more tangible in areas other than creative writing.
Simon: It's more quantifiable. And this is important too, more easily demonstrated – they can say, "Look, here it is, working", rather than, "Here, engage with that and see what you make of it". (Focus Group, 2001:C,3)

Creative writing is not presented in the field of research as a form of knowledge easily transferable to economic capital; this is more easily accomplished in a heteronomous position in the field of cultural production.

The main focus of the discussions leaned towards funding, or to guidelines that might establish creative writing as a research discipline, and only briefly touched on value. Creative writing's value as intellectual practice was recognised and acknowledged in many of the discussions, but with an accompanying general lament for its lack of acceptance outside the boundaries of the creative field:

Keith: Within a creative arts school, I think one of the things is that creative writing has a feeling of relevance and sort of a contemporary feel because the students can write things and then produce them and put them on; they can write things and then film them and show them; they can write things and publish them. There is this feeling that it's part of contemporary art expression and that it has a kind of vital relevance, perhaps in a way that things don't have when they're more marginalised.

Sharon: But that doesn't change the position of marginalisation within the wider university or within the tertiary sector. (Focus Group, 2001:B,6)

Value was not the main area of discussion, perhaps because it was not seen as being as open to change as are funding categories or university guidelines for research output:

I think it's sad there is this competitive aspect and it's largely over funding, but it's partly a sort of traditional suspicion about the value of creative work. I don't think it's helpful to anyone. Someone in science says, "That's not true research or true discovery", but what have they got to lose in the way things are structured, with science part of a fixed pie of research? I think it's that non-dollar side that is the problem and won't change quickly. It's about the perception of how we actually uncover things that are useful to us individually and as a community and provide it to others – that may not change. (Simon, 2001:C,22)

This perception of research was demonstrated in the focus groups as something generally accepted, even to the extent that those in the area of creative writing had to accept the low status of their work in order to be accepted into the field of research. Several students owned to being accepted into a PhD degree on the strength of applications (falsely) targeting a more traditional approach to research:

I've got an Australian Postgraduate Award, but the way in which I ended up doing what is largely a creative PhD is sort of in a roundabout way. My proposal looked innocently academic to start with, but this [academic work] is only part of the process. This is fine now, but when I started it wasn't. I've always known what I was doing, but I've strategised the whole process. (Barbara, 2001:C,1)

At the time of these discussions, in 2001, there were at least two out of the eight universities in which I conducted focus groups where the PhD degree in creative writing was in its first year. The students undertaking this degree did not have any point of

reference from which to base their work, or their position within the field of research. The fact that creative writers did not already hold positions of consecration in the field had ramifications for the students' position in relation to other research positions.

As creative writing generates less value in the field of research than other disciplines, creative writers who wish to be accepted in the field need to be more aware (and perhaps accepting) of the disposition of disinterestedness that is usually associated with research work in the academy:

Simon: But we have a sales problem in DETYA, or the broader community, where creative writing as a product of research has to be articulated.

Julie: I think it's purely a funding thing, which is what really annoys me because we spend a lot of time arguing this ... It's because people don't value just the creative work and because the money flows in certain directions and that's really why we're jumping through hoops doing this. That's why the justification has to be there because the funding bodies don't think it's the product of serious intellectual effort, which we all know it is. (Focus Group, 2001:C,8)

These creative writers as researchers are forced, through their position, to make what Bourdieu refers to as a 'virtue of necessity' (1988:220). This is where one accommodates to, and even values, one's position in the field because one cannot escape from, or change, the relationship of that position with other positions in the field's hierarchy:

It is the same system of classification which continues to function throughout an academic *career*, which is a strange obstacle race where everyone classifies and everyone is classified, the best classified becoming the best classifiers of those who enter the race. (Bourdieu, 1988:217 – emphasis in original)

Those who are higher up control entry into their classification, and so on, down the line. With respect to creative writing in the field of research, this was evident in the focus group members' acceptance of the need for an exegesis or critical essay in order for their work to be accepted as 'scholarly' (even though they *knew* their creative work was 'the product of serious intellectual effort'), and then, in turn, their gatekeeping of the field. This was expressed through comments made to some of my questions. For example, when I asked one group's opinion about continuing creative writing at the

PhD level but not calling it a PhD, calling it something different, the response was, 'Like therapy or something?' (Sally, 2001:C,18). Everyone laughed, and I felt my question had overstepped some unspoken boundary that was very tenuous but well defended, and had been enunciated earlier in the discussion:

Julie: I think that just because you've written a novel, you shouldn't get a PhD.

Barbara: You'd also get people coming in who've already written the novel and they just want to sit around on funding for a couple of years. (Focus Group, 2001:C,14)

What they are protecting here, in effect, is not creative writing, but its position alongside (or near) more traditional knowledges in the field of research.

This control over classification, though, derived from a 'virtue of necessity', still does not make the work of creative writing an alienable object in the field of research. The exegesis, or critical essay, means it can be counted, and exchanged, as knowledge, but this is knowledge with an appeal to the autonomous sector of the field. Creative writing functions as an inalienable object in the field of research for two reasons. One is because of its epistemological underpinnings discussed in the previous chapter; secondly, as a form of knowledge that does not have immediate economic applicability, it is relegated to a position of 'useless' knowledge by dominating positions within the field whose dominance is dependent on the current social structure of neoliberalism.

Research in a Neoliberal Climate

The legitimation of research in the university came about from 'the relation between science, the nation, and the State' (Lyotard, 1984:32). The 'state', whose contemporary focus is increasingly linked to the global economic market, once comprised only the nation-state, whose *raison d'être* was concern for the population's welfare (Bobbitt, 2002:208). This included:

maintenance of civil order by means of bargaining among constituencies, the administration of juridical norms that embodied a single national tradition, and above all the management of the economic growth of the society in order to provide a continuous

improvement in the material conditions of life for all classes.
(Bobbitt, 2002:208)

Research, relatively new in historical terms in universities – having been introduced in the German model of the university only in the late nineteenth century – was carried out with a certain degree of autonomy when the nation-state followed their principles of guidance. Although universities were never really autonomous, when different values obtained, such as those legitimated by the central discourses of the field of power, they could perform as such because their position of authority depended not on economic but on cultural capital.

Now that the neoliberal principle dominates, cultural capital loses its value to economic capital. With this change in the value of different capitals comes the universities' increasing lack of autonomy that leads to their being politicised. The new state, the market-state, represents a new constitutional order. Institutions can forge ahead economically, but at the expense of subjugating all their capital under the rubric of the market economy (Bobbitt, 2002:208-11). Research becomes a rationale for government, business and industry because it performs a function conducive to the aims of the state – research is pursued not only for its own ends, but also as a means of contributing to power and wealth (Mourad, 1997:31):

The definition of research is a political matter: its borders are policed, with sanctions falling on those whose knowledge products fall outside the formal definitions. What counts as research, accordingly, is elastic, contested and policed. (Barnett, 1999:148)

The government's block funding guidelines for university research are a good case in point. Block funding, allocated through DEST, is calculated on the competitive grants that researchers receive from the ARC (Research Infrastructure Block Grants Scheme – which will be discussed later in the chapter) and on a performance-based level in the areas of research and research training. One element of this block funding, currently (2004) known as the Institutional Grants Scheme (IGS), is comprised, on a performance-based formula, of three components. Sixty per cent of this grant is

allocated for research income the university attracts, 30% for attracting higher degrees research student places, and 10% consists of research publications generated by academic staff (DEST, 2004a). The publications component is ‘a competitive source of discretionary income in which research is the chosen indicator because it is “measurable”’ (Bourke, 1997:25). The government’s shifting around of *what* is measured in the publications component is an indication of how contingent measurement is, no matter how strongly it claims empirical validity.

In the *Data Collection Specifications*, DEST rewards a ‘research’ book but not a textbook; a critical text but not a novel; a research report but not a collection of short stories; a review article but not a poem (DEST, 2003b). In 1998, the categories in the publications component were significantly reduced, from ten to four. The Australian Vice-Chancellor’s Committee (AVCC) recommended one year later that within the formula of funding in the IGS there be:

a new measure [to] ensure that those in the arts, humanities and social science fields will receive equal recognition as those areas that can more readily attract research income from external sources. (Kemp, 1999b:sect 3.2)

This recommendation resulted in the increase of research publication categories in 2001 that only lasted for one year (see DEST, 2002b & DEST, 2002d). In this year, DEST increased the number of categories to seven. This included books, book chapters, journal articles, conference publications, refereed designs, patents and major original creative works (DEST, 2002b:6). Then, for the collection of 2002 data, the categories were again reduced to four, omitting refereed designs, patents and major original creative works. The auditors found it too difficult to verify the authenticity of publications that came under the ‘creative’ categories (DEST, 2002e:section 5.4.7.1).

DEST restricts what is counted as research by narrowing their guidelines for research activities. Research and scholarship carried out in universities in areas such as creative writing are left in limbo – academics and postgraduates in creative writing *do* want to extend their knowledge and practice in their area of expertise or specialisation, but their

work is forced in a different direction by the limitations of legitimation placed on research by such categories as set by DEST:

There is this kind of general drive to make everything applied and if it can be applied then it can attract more funding. One of my students was talking about this same kind of problem in mathematics, because what he likes doing is pure mathematics. And I really lament the passing of working in philosophy and theory because I am interested in creative writing as a pure form of working with ideas, rather than having to be driven to show, well, this is the way it can be applied. But I also see that as a general trend within universities. (Kathy, 2001:B,10)

Thinking and writing about ideas is an integral part of research production within the humanities but a lack of resources and funds does not enable academics to take the time to write:

Research publications are a lot of research points for the department, so there's an implicit pressure if you are an academic and a creative writer, your academic work gets you credibility as a researcher, whereas your creative work has to somehow fit in. So I was very relieved this year, for example, to be commissioned to write an academic article and spend the time doing that because I thought, "Well, that gets my credibility a little bit more settled, and frees me up to go and do more of the stuff I want to do", because the credibility is not in that. (Emily, 2001:D,15)

The university, through its production of academic capital, is a contributing factor in the increasing economic competitiveness in the global market. When it comes to value in terms of what a university produces, there are specific areas within the university whose academic capital is more readily taken up outside the university than others. Some types of academic capital can be exchanged for economic capital and others cannot, because of the values that arise out of the broader social context.

Economic Value

At a public level, value is tied to capital creation, whether it is the cultural capital of a university degree, the symbolic capital of expertise, or the economic capital for which these other forms of capital can (sometimes) be exchanged. Value in the marketplace is typically associated with money, with objects and subjects measured principally against an economic rule. The principle of supply and demand, which is at the heart of contemporary economics, is organised as a representation of everyday interactions

where value arises from the desire for something to ‘satisfy human wants’: the use value, and ‘opportunity cost’, of the thing desired – what would need to be given up ‘in order to acquire’ it – which entails a value of exchange (Throsby, 2001:20).

One formula (and there are several) used to calculate economic value is based on the abundance or scarcity of a good. If there is high demand, and supply cannot keep up, then the monetary value of the good will increase because people will be prepared to pay more for it. If demand slumps and there is an excess of supply, then the value will decrease: hence the practice of mark-down sales or remaindered books. Another economic theory for determining value is utility theory, based on the satisfaction a consumer receives from a commodity (Hunt & Sherman, 1990:236). Utility attaches value to a good based on its ability to ‘produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good or happiness’ (Throsby, 2001:21). Utility is calculated on individual preferences and works on the principle of ‘diminishing marginal utility’ (Hunt & Sherman, 1990:237): i.e. that the more someone has of something, the less they will desire it. The opening lines of Shakespeare’s *Twelfth Night* states this quite succinctly:

If music be the food of love, play on,
Give me excess of it, that surfeiting,
The appetite may sicken and so die.
(Shakespeare, 1623/2001:sect 1.1)

It can be applied to the acquisition of a cold drink on a hot day, possibly also to the number of children born into one’s family, but not to the earning of a wage.¹

The labour theory of value is another theory for determining value and is based upon the time and effort put into producing a commodity. It has been developed in a number of ways from its beginnings with Adam Smith, to David Ricardo, to Karl Marx and others (Hunt & Sherman, 1990:267). I will take Marx’s development of value further because

¹ Although, one could argue, the principle of diminishing marginal returns applies to wages as well – the more you’re being paid, the less satisfaction (utility) you get from the last increase relative to the free time you’ve had to give up to get that increase.

his work is widely available and has been applied in many ways in cultural as well as economic situations.

Value is derived, in Marxian terms, from a commodity's use (its utility) and exchange (its price). Marx introduces a fairly unproblematic view of the utility of objects. All commodities or objects of consumption (being for whatever need or want) have a function or use. The conditions of an object's material production, and its ability to meet a human need create its use value, which is inherent in that product and cannot exist separately from it. 'Use-values become a reality only by use or consumption: they also constitute the substance of all wealth, whatever may be the social form of that wealth' (Marx, 1867/1983:438). That is to say, use value does not depend on the laws of the field of economic exchange, but guarantees itself in terms of 'actual' need, a need which acts as a guarantee of its worth.

In Marx's analysis of exchange value, though, he poses a puzzle. It seems exchange value can only be a contingent, socially dependent, changing thing: a portion of this may be given in exchange for a portion of that. But exchange values are consistent between commodities at a given space and time. For example, one paperback bestseller can be exchanged for thirty dollars. Thirty dollars can also be exchanged for a tank of petrol. The book and the petrol have no correlative use value, but they exist in a relational capacity because they contain equal amounts of something. This 'something' is not physically present in the objects as commodities, but is only distinguishable in the phenomena of exchange (Marx, 1983:439). What the exchange value is presenting is the *value* of the commodity:

We have seen that when commodities are exchanged, their exchange value manifests itself as something totally independent of their use-value. But if we abstract from their use-value, there remains their Value ... Therefore, the common substance that manifests itself in the exchange value of commodities, whenever they are exchanged, is their value. (Marx, 1983:441)

Marx determined that the level of exchange of a commodity is dependent on its value. If something is in great abundance, it is still possible for it to have a high exchange

value if it is something that is valued or in demand: beer in a public bar; higher degrees in universities. Conversely, something in scarce supply may have a low exchange value because it is something with low demand (Marx, 1847/1976:115). The demand for a commodity is the guide to its exchange value.

In terms of creating alienability of the otherwise inalienable, when everything can be reduced to the law of economics, the use value of products changes. Use value is no longer an inherent, independent value, but one tied up in the logic of the exchange value. Knowledge, for example, is no longer a value in itself – it only becomes valuable if it can be exchanged.

The code under which the present society operates – the ‘structural law of value’ – has done away with the ‘commodity law of value’ based on use value. Use value, or ‘the relation of every term to what it designates’, no longer dominates the value system operating in society. No longer does the ‘referential value’ have the ‘upper hand’. The ‘structural law of value’ allows exchange value to take precedence, where ‘every term can be related to every other’ (Baudrillard, 1993:6). All signs are given value in relation to other signs, and there ceases to be any reference to the ‘real’ of use value. The structural law of value is:

entirely reabsorbed without any trace of bloodshed into the signs which surround us, operative everywhere in the code in which capital finally holds its purest discourses ... – a symbolic violence inscribed everywhere in signs. (Baudrillard, 1993:10)

We cannot destroy the system through violence. The system continues because of its *symbolic violence* – ‘it thrives on symbolic violence – not in the degraded sense in which this formula has found fortune, as a violence “of signs”’ (Baudrillard, 1993:36), but through the dominance of economic imperatives to the general well-being of a society. This is demonstrated in the current setting by such trends as the mass migration from country areas to cities, not only in Australia but all over the world, for the opportunity of paid employment i.e. economic reward. This need for economic reward is a form of symbolic violence because the receiver views it as vital to their survival,

and there is always an accompanying threat that it may be taken away. Baudrillard calls this form of symbolic violence ‘the seizing of power by the unilateral exercise of the gift’ (Baudrillard, 1993:36).

A gift is an unequal exchange that, as Bourdieu (1977) argues, gives power to the giver. Its meaning as a form of reciprocal appreciation, as detailed by anthropologists (Levi-Strauss, 1969; Mauss, 1974), is overridden by issues of power which are hidden in the gratitude of gift-giving and receiving. The gift and counter-gift ‘implies an intention to develop or maintain a social relationship between parties to the exchange’ (Bell, 1991:156), but for Bourdieu this is more a commodity exchange than a gift. The gift is a misrecognised form of exchange because it is also a form of symbolic violence, representing, for the receiver, an obligation to the giver, especially when the gift is given without an immediate counter-gift.

This has implications for a system based on neoliberalism and economics because of their focus on ‘improvement’ as a gift, refusal of which is tantamount to refusing life. Improvement manifests itself in many forms, one being that of education. As Western society developed scientifically and technologically, the whole arena and structure of the marketplace as a place of work changed and, consequently, the importance of education changed too. Acquiring knowledge was the acceptance of a gift, exercised as a right of passage to the acquisition of forms of capital, be they economic, cultural or symbolic.

The Circulation of Knowledge

In Marxian terms, the use value of a product is only arbitrarily commensurable with another product’s use value because of the commonality afforded them through their exchange value as commodities (Baudrillard, 1981:16). An object’s use value is commensurate with its own concreteness and particularity: ‘Being limited by the physical properties of the commodity, it has no existence apart from that commodity’ (Marx, 1983:438). Thus, unlike exchange value, it is not dependent on external aspects

but is a product that satisfies a social need. This is the basis of its use value. But use value remains outside of Marx's equation for creating value – it does not have equivalence to other commodities, as exchange value does (Baudrillard, 1981:130). Marx does state that use value changes with changes in society and culture – 'To discover the various uses of things is the work of history' (Marx, 1983:437) – but there the analysis of use value stops.

Baudrillard, though, develops these concepts, and states that just as exchange value is calculated as abstract labour, use value can be calculated as abstract need (1981:132). Abstract labour is pertinent to capitalist societies. Labour is of a social nature, in that it transforms resources into products that people need. In a capitalist system, this social nature of labour is indirect because products are made for general exchange on the market rather than for specific exchange. This indirect social nature gives labour its abstractness, 'and we care about it only as it is represented by, or embodied in, the commodity' (Hunt & Sherman, 1990:268). Abstract need is also part of capitalist societies, because when products are being made, there is not a particular consumer present, only the 'abstract social need' that engenders the idea of the usefulness of the product.

Use value, like exchange value, is determined by the cultural play of signs within a system. Because commodities can be exchanged, they have a use. If they cannot be exchanged, their use cannot be circulated because they cannot be identified through the signifier, money. When this logic is applied to knowledge, there are two effects. If knowledge cannot be circulated in an economic market, it becomes difficult to maintain the relevance of that knowledge. Just as myths and folk-tales were no longer needed to explain culture after the invention of writing, just as mediæval alchemy was no longer relevant in an increasingly scientific world, there is the possibility of the end of some forms of knowledge (Fuller, 1993; Barnett & Griffin, 1997). In a neoliberal world, even in academia, the economic applicability of some knowledges is difficult to establish. Creative writing, when assessed in terms of its research value, is a case in point. It can survive at the undergraduate level because it attracts students, but not at the

postgraduate and academic level because it does not meet the funding criteria established by the government research-funding bodies (DEST and the ARC). If the relevance of knowledge continues to be measured in economic terms, and research (that produces knowledge) is treated accordingly, then unless other factors play a part, creative writing at this level will become an uncirculated knowledge:

Kathy: I've seen a subtle shift in this department over the last five years. Has there been more of a change in attitude ... is it acceptance or a monetary thing?

Roger: I reckon it's to bring in students.

Michelle: Yes, I think it's because of money. As long as they can keep running a program with about 700 students – there are 700 places that are occupied in a given year by students in creative writing and they can run that on one and a half full-time lecturers. (Focus Group, 2001:B,7)

Where knowledge *can* be circulated in an economic market, there is an opposite effect: it gains in relevance. As I have argued, knowledge that can be exchanged in economic terms becomes a commodity and therefore has a *broader* appeal. It becomes a practice not confined to an elite but one available to the mass public. This results in stronger links between society and knowledge, which means a better informed public, and also a public that can demand that knowledge be accountable to its needs (Delanty, 2001:104). From this aspect, creative writing has a greater chance of surviving at the research level because of its popularity at the undergraduate level and the subsequent demand by those who wish to continue studying it as a higher degree. The popularity of 'relevant' knowledge though, has mostly occurred with knowledges of economic value, which is influenced from outside the confines of the university.

Universities are no longer the main sites for the use of knowledge. Their relationship with the broader community is one in which the public holds them to increasing accountability. Research produced in the university needs to be fed into the 'knowledge-based' economy in order to keep it going. The public, John Hood writes, demands a 'level playing field' so that 'national benefits [are] maximised':

Research sparks the innovation cycle as well as feeding it. Innovation is important for economic growth and social advancement. Intellectual property developed within once hallowed halls constantly begs to be capitalised. (Hood, 2001:24)

Hood, as vice-chancellor of the University of Auckland, offers views that fall within the parameters of a redefined role for vice-chancellors, who increasingly have to be accountants first and knowledge generators second. 'Vice-chancellors and their colleagues straddle an institutional pluralism that requires the delicate balancing of the organic and the deliberate, the collegial and the managerial, the pure and the commercial' (Hood, 2001:24).

Politics has effected, in universities, a change from the 'academic autonomy' of knowledge to a situation in which knowledge is 'promarket', tied to 'the needs of business' and commodified (McChesney, 1996:118-9). Although McChesney is referring here to the situation in the US, his argument also applies to Australia. Business wants research that can produce answers suitable for commodification. Universities need to compete with business in the production of applied or applicable knowledge, and hence applied research is valued as more vital than basic research in the current social context. Universities have consequently had to restructure their focus, approach, output, and accountability when it comes to knowledge production. The AVCC recommends a 'plurality' in the 'principles of research funding', which would allow for 'multiple research funding streams' (AVCC, 2003). What this means is that universities need to be able to direct their research efforts towards attracting funding from private sources, as well as depending on the public purse. The power of the global market economy has its correlative effect on universities and research. The intersection of the market place and the university means that knowledge becomes dominated by capitalist values rather than cultural influence.

The debate over the direction along which the government is steering research has become more of a polemic than a discussion. Government policy has created a 'reality' that is purely tied to the economic. Institutions now need to be economically driven, to be market aware, as that is how their 'performance' is judged. Research needs to attract funds from private sources rather than remain dependent on government funding. Government policy fits a neoliberal ideal that posits decentralisation and privatisation as

the way that society will maintain buoyancy in the global market. If economic imperatives are not met by leading institutions, then they are seen as failing a *cultural* agenda. Research undertaken in universities, as set by government policy, must follow a neoliberal polemic. The government's white paper on research, *Knowledge and Innovation*, talks about the 'culture of entrepreneurship' (Kemp, 1999b:sect 1.5), and is strewn with words and phrases that tie knowledge and research to economic imperatives, such as 'responsive to business needs', 'investment', 'venture capital', 'commercialisation', 'knowledge breakthroughs', 'ideas powerhouses' and 'competitive allocation'. Dr Kemp, then the Minister of the Department of Education, Youth and Training Affairs (now DEST), stated universities should be free to choose their own areas from which they want to conduct research, but he also made statements such as, 'Institutions should be able to increase their responsiveness to global market opportunities' (Kemp1999b:sect 1.6), which ties research to economic considerations.

The framework for higher education that has emerged from this white paper relies upon 'performance-based funding for research student places and research infrastructure' (Kemp, 1999b:sect 6). Dr Kemp again stated, 'Research – as a key source of knowledge and new ideas – is central to success in the global knowledge economy' (Kemp, 1999b:sect 1.2). Knowledge and research are measured in terms of economic capital in this white paper. Knowledge is not recognised for its ability to contribute to understanding, for its cultural value, but for its ability to be economically successful. 'The producers of knowledge are critical players in our national innovation system, providing the ideas and techniques which can be transformed into economic advancement' (Kemp, 1999b:sect 1.4).

The University of Melbourne attracts the largest amount of funding of all universities in Australia (DEST, 2003a). Melbourne's Vice-Chancellor from 1996 to 2003 spoke on a number of occasions in support of ideas that underlie the government's steering towards commercialisation of research in the higher education field (Gilbert, 2001; Gilbert, 2003):

The New Testament warns against storing new wine in old wineskins. With wineskins, as with human institutions, the ferment of the new can prove too much for the inelastic fabric of the old. The metaphor is ancient, the idea contemporary. What works for one vintage may be dysfunctional for the next. Wine remains highly prized, but old wineskins outlive their usefulness. (Gilbert, 2001)

Gilbert states that not all universities need to be research institutions. This negates the idea that good teaching at the tertiary level is dependent on good research. His argument rests on the commercial aspect of research: he states funds should be channelled to universities (like Melbourne) that have a comparatively high research output and that attract commercial interest. He also states that it is heretical for university boards to consider that 'public funding is uniquely legitimate' (Gilbert, 2003). His views seem designed to exclude any autonomous research/creative work: certainly there is a large shortfall in what governments provide in funds and what universities need, but buying into private funding runs the risk of only undertaking commercially directed research.

The Australian economy has changed over the last fifty years from depending on *primary* industry to the surge in the 1960s and 1970s of *secondary* services. Now the emphasis has shifted to the *tertiary* sector, and the product it provides – knowledge. Although universities are not the only *users* of knowledge, they still hold the status as being the main *producers* of knowledge. But there is increasing incentive for business to become involved in the production of knowledge when knowledge 'feeds' the 'innovation cycle'.

Research in the twenty-first century is not only conducted within the boundaries of the university. In an increasingly globalised market, knowledge production has 'escaped' the confines of higher education and is being corporatised. Private research institutions, where it is easier to connect discoveries to economic turnaround, are receiving increasing support from government. In the 2003 federal budget, the government introduced a new scheme to fund pharmaceutical companies to develop 'medicines for global markets', with 'support for research and development [that will] "unlock" \$500

million of new investment in the sector' (Colebatch, 2003:5). Research, in this context, is not pursued for its social consequence, but more as a straight-out short-term balance sheet decision. "Research" evaporates. All that is left are inquisitive inquiries searching for an audience or a patron or both' (Barnett, 1999:149).

Neoliberal imperatives drive the economy and increasingly permeate all other social structures. There is no judgement of outcomes, just an assessment of how situations are handled. Economics becomes the way everything in the world is judged. Creativity, in Australia, is commodified and commercialised. It is valued for its economic worth. Creativity and the arts are not looked upon as being valued unless they can stimulate economic growth – so box-office hits are good. In Australia, writing is prized largely for its entertainment value. The Australia Council's report, *Australians and the Arts* (2000), found that 42% of people valued the arts for their pleasure, entertainment and relaxation, compared to 22% for arts' intellectual benefits (Costantoura, 2000:table 37). Entertainment stimulates economic turnover.

This is not to deny the potential for economic value that may exist in a piece of creative work. Although creative works generate ideas, they necessarily also generate economic capital in the exchange of these ideas just because of the nature of a capitalist system. Creative works increasingly need to 'play the game' of economics in order to be included in the system. 'The physical market determines the work's economic value, the market for ideas determines its cultural value' (Throsby, 2001:104). But in order to have cultural value, there needs to be economic value given to cultural pursuits.

For example, a new Council for Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences (CHASS) was set up in 2003 by the Federal government to strengthen the role of this sector in Australia. The appointed head of the Council, Toss Gascoigne, is the former director of the Federation of Australian Scientific And Technological Societies (Australian Academy of the Humanities [AAH], 2003), which indicates one way the game is being played: in order to run a council for the arts successfully, it needs to be headed by someone with experience in the sciences. According to the AAH, Gascoigne has 'exactly the

background CHASS needs in its foundation director', which is someone who can link research and practice to politics (AAH, 2003). DEST is encouraging the commercialisation of research in the humanities, arts and social sciences sector by awarding CHASS funding to undertake a study, the outcome of which will be:

a description of the commercial activities of the sector, an understanding of the incentives and impediments to commercial engagement and recommendations for changes to Government policy or new programmes likely to encourage commercial activity. (Nelson, 2004)

This contradicts Dr Nelson's comments, made earlier in 2003, about establishing CHASS. Then he said, in regards to public interest (rather than commercial) research:

It is ... that 'research in universities passes the soul from one generation to the next' ... I think one of the funding models that we, as a country need to look at, is the extent to which we can divert some of the revenues which come into commercialised research into those areas which serve public interest. (Nelson, 2003c)

The most recent developments in CHASS, outlined above, show that this notion of 'public interest research' has not been forthcoming. It gets spoken about, circulated in discourses on research, but then ignored because it falls short of economic imperatives. What is valued in the arts, too, seems to be linked to economic imperatives.

Social structures are interdependent and their importance, in economic terms, is consonant with their ability to contribute to the bottom line. This means that even knowledges that have been excluded from research guidelines, such as creative writing, have been included in other capacities (eg. at undergraduate level) when they fit an economic model:

We were talking about the role of creative writing, and not naming any names or anything, his attitude was, "Well, isn't this weird. Who would have thought that something like creative writing would take off". And there was some discussion about whether it was acceptable or not within the academy. And he was talking about how that old liberal arts degree is the one that's always been favoured, particularly at this sandstone university. And then suddenly we've got a winner which is what people want, [but it] doesn't really fit. But they're prepared to run with it. And it was a bizarre kind of situation, where you think, "Well, here it is being endorsed by the academy but for the wrong reason". So where it

fits is a really interesting question. From our perspective it would be very different from out there. (Sandra, 2001:D,1-2)

Creative writing's inclusion at the research level, though, has been a difficult and slow process, and it certainly has not achieved the impact that has been seen at the undergraduate level. There, creative writing is often the degree that keeps English departments and schools of media and communication financially viable²:

Michelle: Whenever there's a question of, "Oh, we're going broke", "Oh, creative writing, perhaps you can approach the industry," and what-not. But it's hard enough doing the teaching without being ... "Contact all the publishers and say endorse a few scholarships for us, thanks very much," you know?

Sharon: "Because you're doing so wonderfully well."

Michelle: It's always creative writing that's looked to as a saviour and yet never given any staff.

Sharon: And I think that's the pressure that we're feeling as well in universities. This business about, "OK, you've got to produce research, you've got to produce," you know, "let's make money, we're running a fee-paying postgrad dip course," and so on. It's ever increasing. "Do something else to make it better for the institution."

Michelle: Yes, they like the dollars. They don't necessarily send them back to the departments that are producing the dollars. (Focus Group, 2001:B,8)

To be viable in any terms, higher education has to be economically viable. The importance of economic growth stimulates an increase in the welfare of those institutions contributing to the growth of this value.

National Research Priorities

In terms of government policy on funding university research, it is not always the arts and humanities that miss out. Creativity is funded if it can generate business and industry interest and produce monetary gains. For example, the Creative Industries Faculty at the Queensland University of Technology receives government funding for its research into commercially applicable creative work in the arts and humanities. The ARC's three Centres of Excellence (the Australian Centre for Plant Functional Genomics, the National ICT Australia, and the National Stem Cell Centre) all receive

² Krauth (2000) found that creative arts enrolments increased by 45% from 1989 to 2000. From 2001-2002, there was a 9.5% increase in creative arts enrolments, the largest increase over all areas of study aimed at gaining a university award (DEST, 2002a).

government funding for creative commercial work in technology and the sciences (ARC, 2003a).

Current government policy sets up an alignment between science and technology in such a way that they are seen as pushing each other forward – they become inextricably entwined. This discounts a great many aspects of science and undervalues much of the work that scientific investigation carries out, as funding for science, too, rests on economic performance. In the 2003 federal budget, the CSIRO, a public research institution, was not guaranteed funding beyond a year, and, it was stated, their long term funding would ‘be subject to a “science and innovation mapping exercise”’ (Cauchi, 2003:3). With a push for skills and the utility of knowledge, the creative aspect of science is dismissed, along with other knowledges that are underpinned by creative effort, as government policies demonstrate.

In August 2000, a Federal government summit, *Innovation: Unlocking the Future*, where the Chief Scientist presented a discussion paper, *The Chance to Change* (Batterham, 2000a), initiated the government response, *Backing Australia’s Ability* (DEST, 2001), which led to the government’s development and setting up of national research priorities. In itself this chain of response highlights the strong link given by government to science and the direction of research, which the government, itself, acknowledges: ‘The framework for choosing national priorities ... builds on work by the Chief Scientist in his report *Chance to Change*’ (DEST, 2002c).

In *The Chance to Change* discussion paper, Batterham refers to the ‘knowledge economy’ and links advancements in science to the economic growth of the nation. ‘Investment in research is the fundamental building block for creating the new ideas that, through commercialisation, can become marketable products and processes and the basis for new businesses’ (2000a:27). In *The Chance to Change* final report, Batterham states:

We need to introduce incentives for researchers in universities and government research agencies to make the most of the knowledge

they create, and build upon this to elevate their role in the economy. The challenge for them is to stimulate and facilitate the increased transfer of knowledge to business and society. (2000b:12)

Knowledge is business, according to Batterham's line. Its use is to stimulate business and economic growth.

Batterham's ideas are echoed in the subsequent government papers and policies. This reaffirms the government's initiative to expand the 'knowledge economy' through scientific and technological growth. Batterham states:

Where knowledge is an essential ingredient, innovation is the activity that utilises that resource. As sunlight is to photosynthesis, knowledge is to innovation. Innovation is the process that translates knowledge into economic growth. (2000b:15)

The terms 'knowledge' and 'innovation' used in this context almost make it impossible to argue for research to be directed to any means other than economic. It has become an established association that is gaining increasing power, like the disciplinary procedures that arose in the eighteenth century. As Certeau describes, these procedures 'colonized' and 'vampirized' the social justice ideology of the Enlightenment with a grid of techniques and practices capable of controlling the whole population (Certeau, 1984:45-6). The Chief Scientist advocates scientific discovery in terms of application and commercialisation. There is no room here for funding research that requires exploratory work and more abstruse contemplation.

The government's national research priorities were an initiative of *Backing Australia's Ability*, and were developed from the government issue paper, *Developing National Research Priorities* (DEST, 2002c). Four areas of research priority have subsequently been identified and they include:

1. An Environmentally Sustainable Australia;
2. Promoting and Maintaining Good Health;
3. Frontier Technologies for Building and

Transforming Australian Industries; and
4. Safeguarding Australia. (Howard, 2002)

In the paper, *Developing National Research Priorities*, research priorities were divided into two sections. One covered science, engineering and technology (SET) and the other, social science and humanities (SS&H). The taskforce wished to focus on SET priorities initially, with SS&H priorities to be evolved in 2003/4:

The government's intention is to identify and commence implementation of national research priorities for SET research this year ... This focus reflects the emphasis given to these areas of research in *Backing Australia's Ability*. Around 75% of Commonwealth-funded research currently goes to SET. (DEST, 2002c:12)

An early response to the government's issue paper, submitted by the ARC – a body responsible for allocating contestable research funding for universities – questioned the process of implementing a 'two-phased approach', and stated that the 'areas of national priority ... would benefit from significant research input from the social sciences and humanities' (ARC, 2002b:11). But the above priorities indicate a much easier incorporation for scientific and technological research; not so for social science and humanities research.

The ARC's submission on nominations for priorities, though, did not benefit the SS&H area. The ARC identified eight areas of national research strength, which included:

nano- and bio- materials; genome and phenome research; complex and intelligent systems; photon science and technology; the development and wellbeing of young Australians; deep earth exploration for minerals and energy; long distance infrastructure – connecting Australia; and ICT new media. (ARC, 2002a:4)

The 'development and wellbeing of young Australians' buried in the middle of all that hard science indicates, in the framework of my critique on values, two things. One is the 'rites of institution' pertaining to research. The second indication, in the ARC's lack of SS&H directed research, which only reinforces the first, is the dominance of neoliberal discourses.

The rites of institution create arbitrary boundaries that exclude some and not others through their power (Bourdieu, 1991:117-126). This form of symbolic power, which can function as a form of violence, legitimates arbitrary practices as a way of dividing a population. The position of some groups will be consecrated and that of others will not, and this occurs when the arbitrary limit is misrecognised as a legitimate limit (Bourdieu, 1991:118). It separates those who have (and will have) from those to whom these rites will never be applicable. Receiving a doctoral degree is one example of the rites of institution. It places an arbitrary boundary on all knowledge, allowing those who practise some forms of knowledge to receive the accolades, the title of respect and the consecration that those who practise in other forms of knowledge do not receive. As Bourdieu states, 'degrees are just as much a part of magic as are amulets' (1991:119). They are also a part of keeping those within the rites separate and seeing themselves as separate, just as 'the Great Wall of China was meant not only to stop foreigners entering China but also to stop Chinese leaving it' (Bourdieu, 1991:122). In the ARC's eight areas of research strength, an arbitrary circle is drawn around the areas of research (among all the *possible* areas of research) that will be identified as *areas of research strength, areas that attract funding, areas that can contribute to the knowledge economy*.

A number of submissions to the *Developing National Research Priorities* issue paper recorded concern at the exclusion of SS&H elements in the setting of research priorities (University of Melbourne, Australian Academy of Humanities, Australian Academy of the Social Sciences and Group of Eight, to name a few), but DEST stated that SS&H would not be a factor in contributing to SET priorities until further priority development in 2003/2004 (DEST, 2002c:12). I made note at the time that as the Federal government had established research priority setting and this had already affected funding bodies such as the ARC, there seemed little chance of a more expansive agenda when it came to research. As the Prime Minister, John Howard, stated in a press conference on the national research priorities:

I think they ought to be priorities for many years into the future. You do need a lot of stability and constancy in areas like this and one of these things that we have endeavoured to do is to bring as much predictability and constancy and stability as you can to this area. So I would see them, self evidently, continuing for a long time into the future. I don't put any time limit on [them]. They're not related to a term of government or any particular period of years. (Howard, 2002)

The development of SET priorities precludes such a development of priorities relevant to SS&H areas because the government has determined the area covered by SET will determine what the priorities will be.

The subsequent development of SS&H priorities has not been to establish overtly social science or humanities priorities at all. As Dr Brendan Nelson stated:

The nation's best scientists and representatives from our university sector gave the Prime Minister, myself, my colleagues and my senior officials advice on what we should be doing in science. We have set, through a detailed process of community and scientific consultation, four broad research priorities ... And I make no apology for it but we have enmeshed in that humanities, arts and social sciences. (Nelson, 2003c)

SS&H goals have had to fit with the already existing SET priorities:

Responding to climate change and variability (*Environmentally Sustainable Australia*);
Strengthening Australia's social and economic fabric (*Good Health*);
Promoting an innovation culture and economy (*Frontier Technologies*); and
Understanding our region and the world (*Safeguarding Australia*)
(Nelson, 2003b)

The AAH's submission to the *Developing National Research Priorities* paper, written in support of SS&H priorities, also unwittingly adds to the doxa of the 'knowledge economy', and therefore, of science and technology. In the current setting, creativity in research is looked to for its capacity to add to an economic agenda. The AAH views creative research as innovative and something that is 'essential for the economic and social health of Australia' (AAH, 2002:1). The references to 'growth' and 'profit areas'

made by the AAH fit with a 'knowledge economy' agenda, but detract from a broader understanding of culture that the AAH is trying to advance.

The AAH pointed out, 'a growing body of research indicates that a society's economy will thrive only if its creative capacities are sustained and nurtured' and 'big questions of human and social identity must at least rival in importance the revolutions in biotechnology and in information and communications technology' (2002:1). But they also stated that culture is, 'the study, preservation and creative interpretation of the accumulating residue of our society's cultural practices' (2002:2). The term 'accumulating residue' gives a metaphoric impression of something that lies at the bottom of a bucket, not something that is imperative in the further understanding of cultures and society. The AAH state that 'the cultural industries are little supported by research' (2002:2), but if culture is looked upon only as an 'industry', how can it be anything other than something to be marketed and sold?

The whole research agenda, in the context of the national research priorities, revolves around a doxa so ingrained that even an institution ostensibly *for* promoting cultural ideas cannot point out ways of extending research other than from an economic perspective. If everything points to making a dollar, then dollars will certainly be made, but at what cost in other respects? This phenomenon is not peculiar to Australia. For example, in the UK:

even the claims for the new Humanities and Arts Research Council had to be couched in the discourse of performativity: the ideas could be taken seriously only if the links between humanities and arts on the one hand and economic regeneration on the other were made explicit and given overriding attention. And its proposed home was none other than the Office for Science and Technology, a bizarre juxtaposition but one that even its most ardent supporters might be prepared to tolerate for the greater status that that home was likely to bring. (Barnett, 1999:23)

The government's goal in producing the *Developing National Research Priorities* paper is to 'integrate Australia's science and research effort even more closely with the

community's economic, social, and environmental aspirations for the future' (DEST, 2002c:4). The objective of the priorities is to:

identify areas where a whole-of-government approach can deliver benefits additional to those captured by our existing research funding system. Government will play a role by examining proposed priorities against its overall policy objectives. (DEST, 2002c:13)

Research, through these priorities, is being directed from the government level, not at the level where creative thought and discovery takes place. The government's criteria for these priorities is for them to have a positive impact on 'Australian needs and challenges arising from geography, climate, bioresources, economy, way of life and/or culture' (DEST, 2002c:14). Positive impact can be linked with change in any number of areas, such as social behaviour, cultural attitudes, individual and group rights and responsibilities, but again, the easiest to justify in a neoliberal climate is economic liquidity.

Although the four research priorities stated in the *Developing National Research Priorities* paper are not specific to universities, the government paper, *Higher Education at the Crossroads*, does identify that the focus of research encompasses these priorities, not only through performance-based funding distributed through the ARC, but also through block-funding allocated to universities through DEST, although 'priority setting would not apply to university block funds "at this stage"' (DEST, 2002f:56). The current emphasis on science and technology in the broader community is reflected in the narrowing of research approaches universities can undertake if their research is to be funded from the public purse. It also means forcing SS&H researchers into a 'science' model of collaboration and research concentrations. Narrowing government funding discourages research by universities in areas that fall outside of the 'national priorities' agenda.

National priority setting fixes the areas government sees as worthy of investigation and research. This takes away autonomy from universities. If these priorities are not

challenged (and they have already been embraced by the ARC, the main contestable funding body for universities), then there is the potential for government to increase intervention in university research paths with serious consequences in terms of narrowing research outlook. There is now the possibility of research that falls outside scientific/technological parameters being dismissed as unworthy of investigation.

Humanities research has already experienced changes from the effects of these directives. New areas, such as tourism, can channel research that is a better fit with economic strictures. But creative writing, previously shunned as research for not being rigorous enough (see Dawson, 2001), now has the added burden of trying to define itself within economic terms in order to be useful as knowledge. How is it ever going to sustain a position in relation to knowledge production, let alone grow in this respect, in the bigger picture of research defined by government departments and the ARC bent on measuring research outcomes against technological and economic improvement?

Universities must be accountable in the way they spend allocated funds, granted, but in order to function as universities, they need to be recognised as more than just businesses that produce knowledge for economic profit. Universities engender social benefits through critique, ideas, diversity, acceptance and celebration of differences that contribute to the overall improvement of societies in which they dwell. The role of the university in society is one of making an ethical contribution that stimulates debate and change for the social benefit of the broader community.

If university research funding is allocated only for research that generates economic potential, then research becomes a narrow framework developed within the confines of scientific and technological areas. This only acknowledges a very restricted idea of what is considered socially beneficial to society. The Ministerial Discussion Paper, *Higher Education at the Crossroads*, points to this problem when it states, 'Universities need to be involved in more than serving labour market requirements and undertaking applied research' (Nelson, 2002:13). But subsequent government initiatives and policies – from the issue paper, *Setting Firm Foundations* (DEST, 2002f), about

research funding generated from the government review *Higher Education at the Crossroads*, to the ‘forgotten frontier’ of commercialisation in CHASS (Nelson, 2004) – make no further reference to broadening the framework of research. Knowledge remains, and gains in importance as, part of economic directives.

Power

The agenda for the value of different forms of academic capital is set within a political arena:

Scientists still have that valued position, in that they produce stuff that people – the broader community – may benefit from: better irons, better stoves. It was a Liberal member who wrote to the Age recently and said GST on books is fine because it’s only the privileged who buy books anyway; if GST is lifted off books, it’s only going to benefit a minority, and a privileged minority at that. (Simon, 2001:C,15-16)

The members of this focus group stated how depressing it was to hear comments like this and how unrealistic these ideas were. But they also noted that these ideas about the kinds of thinking considered important are very entrenched and hard to shift:

The larger things we’re battling with are things like DETYA funding and community standards. We’ve drifted from a creative nation to a knowledge nation now, according to the Labor line, and the great new university is on a hard disk somewhere. It’s a synthesis of existing programs that are already offered. It’s nothing new. In that context – it’s not taking away from the theoretical possibilities – it’s just *practically* difficult to get people to say, “Yes, of course thinking is important and creative thought is important; we should be putting money away”. (Simon, 2001:C,15)

Some knowledges advance those people engaged in them through links to powerful institutions, while other knowledges are pursued at the expense of this social standing and recognition. All knowledge is epistemologically grounded in social hierarchies:

The powerful have far more interests in obscuring the unjust conditions that produce their unearned privileges and authority than do the dominated groups in hiding the conditions that produce their situation. (Harding, 1991:59)

The knowledge that is dominant in society at one point in time occupies that position because it provides the questions and answers that the dominant fields need circulated in

order to remain in their positions of power. As Bourdieu says, all positions that can be taken already exist, and in taking a position one is making a choice between groups (Bourdieu, 1979:128). The choice is always a political one, because some groups (and their choices) have greater legitimacy than others: ‘any exercise of power is accompanied by a discourse aimed at legitimating the power of those who exercise it’ (Bourdieu, 1979:125).

During the 1980s and 1990s, the dominant field increasingly drew in the university as part of the economy by evaluating its students and knowledge as assets – whether the university sector liked it or not. The knowledge economy – a constitutive metaphor introduced in the late 1960s – was born (see Lane 1966; Drucker, 1969). The Australian Labor Party used this terminology in their *Agenda for the Knowledge Nation* (ALP Knowledge Nation Taskforce, 2001). The Coalition federal government’s white paper (Kemp, 1999b) on research in higher education was entitled *Knowledge and Innovation*. Knowledge, increasingly used in terminology as a commodity, correlates with neoliberal economic rationality.

Knowledge is limited by its use. If something does not have any utility then it cannot have use value. But when use value is inextricable from exchange value, then the boundaries of useful knowledge are greatly diminished. One of the central effects of contemporary neoliberalism is an economic orientation that entails everything be seen and understood in a relationship of its usefulness, explained by the Heideggerian notion of ‘standing reserve’ (Heidegger, 1977).

Standing reserve is the term Heidegger uses to explain how everything in the world is viewed according to its relation to humanity:

Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing. We call it the standing-reserve. The word expresses here something more, and something more essential than mere “stock”. The name “standing-reserve” assumes the rank of an inclusive rubric. It designates nothing less than the way in

which everything presences that is wrought upon by the challenging revealing. (Heidegger, 1977:17)

In the power structure of society, nothing has value in and of itself (an independent value), but can only have value in relation to its usefulness to society, and is therefore categorised ('enframed') as a form of stock, or standing-reserve.

The biggest problem with Heidegger's explanation is his metaphysics, which points to 'Truths' from which humanity is exiled, or excluded, through the 'revealing' caused by a technological society. This transcendent notion of foundations, origins, truths and essences is problematic. I find his ideas useful, though, where he points to things being revealed in a myriad of ways in the sense that all views of the world are culturally determined. He states that the one way they *are* seen covers over all the other possible ways of seeing them. It is possible to accept this without having to accept his notion of transcendence. Heidegger's idea of a dominant revealing has similarities to doxa, and to the poststructuralist truism that arbitrary meanings gain legitimacy through the field of power. It is also useful for understanding the dominant field's dependence on the institutions it has created.

Knowledges are ways of revealing, especially through the process of research. A knowledge (or epistemological framework) that gains precedence over others will be pertinent to the social, cultural and political thoughts at the time, and will be used by those in power:

The language of authority never governs without the collaboration of those it governs, without the help of the social mechanisms capable of producing this complicity, based on misrecognition, which is the basis of all authority. (Bourdieu, 1991:113)

Knowledges of authority – languages of power – can only continue to hold authority by legitimation and consecration in fields in which they are circulated. The structure of these fields becomes part of how habitus is (unconsciously) determined. There is a cycle of acceptance and reinforcement of languages of power, giving them a legitimacy that comes across as natural but is in fact arbitrary. Neoliberal discourse is a good

example, where its influence on university research drives forward the need for research to produce knowledge that can be readily exchanged for economic capital.

Knowledge becomes a driver of the new economy, which gives 'rise to a focus on intellectual capital' (Neumann, 2002:168). This explains the seemingly illogical connection between decreasing government funds for universities, with a simultaneous increase in university accountability to government. As the University of Melbourne's 2002 *Strategic Plan* states, 'a logical connection between reduced funding responsibility and greater deregulation collides with an administrative logic that inclines Government and Government bureaucrats to greater intervention' (University of Melbourne, 2002:13). The connection is not illogical at all when the relationship of knowledge to power is exposed. The knowledge economy:

replaces an epistemological with an economic definition of knowledge. Knowledge becomes a factor of production, more critical in the production process as economic performance comes to rely more and more heavily on knowledge inputs. At the same time, the knowledge economy is one where knowledge is not only a key input but also an increasingly significant output that can be grown in an unlimited way. The implication of this is that knowledge must be effectively and efficiently managed and locked into systems and processes that enhance innovation. (Usher, 2002:144)

The changes affecting what constitutes knowledge are not particular to Australia. New Labour in Britain speaks of a knowledge economy, where Blair equates 'entrepreneurial universities' with 'entrepreneurial businesses', and sees universities as being 'at the heart of the UK's productive capacity' because 'knowledge is the intangible asset of wealth creation in today's globalised economy' (Rutherford, 2001). Some liken the changes in universities to a streamlining that is part of the monocultural trend in the globalisation of big business (Mattelart, 2000; Delanty, 2001; Giroux & Myrziades, 2001; Hayes & Wynyard, 2002). If knowledge outputs can be controlled then it is easier to impose formulaic guidelines on its production. This system, with the potential to control knowledge, is what is referred to as the McDonaldization of knowledge:

A consensus of meaning comes from the stability of social forms and patterns of thought. Hence much of McDonald's success rests on its recognizable appearance, its iconic golden arches, and its promise (not necessarily realized) to deliver formulaic products. (Finkelstein, 2002:183)

Mattelart states that McDonald-type monoculture is the 'price that is paid' for extending economics beyond the boundaries of a nation to encompass free trade and big business (Mattelart, 2000:103). Here, even Mattelart's critique of a monocultural world falls under the parameters of this world – in his *price that is paid* – because economic discourse is the one most used and best understood.

University education in Australia had been known as tertiary education. From the late 1980s the word 'tertiary' was replaced by 'higher', giving the university its place in a broader social structure as one of superiority, and therefore one where contributions to the broader social structure would be of paramount importance. The power of the neoliberal principle of economics ties knowledge acquisition to economic capital:

Every power to exert symbolic violence, i.e. every power which manages to impose meanings and to impose them as legitimate by concealing the power relations which are the basis of its force, adds its own specifically symbolic force to those power relations. (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990:4)

'Higher' became a constitutive metaphor used to conceptualise education within the 'bigger picture' of society (Bessant, 2002:89). This metaphor, as part of the big picture, sets up the university as valuable in terms of its relationship to other institutions:

This metaphor or, more broadly, this discourse draws heavily on thousand-year-old narratives and icons of heaven and hell, those primal vertical divisions of space and hierarchy. It draws on the Classical, Islamic, and Judaeo-Christian cosmologies and their visions of universal architecture. The lower, inferior, the subterranean regions is [sic] the terrain of the less civilised, the darker and closer to Hades and hell. Heaven on the other hand has always been superior real estate, not only because "God" lives there; it was also an imaginary extremely rich in allusion to victory over death, the region of reason, enlightenment, nirvana, the triumph of light, intellect and spirit. (Bessant, 2002:95)

With the change to the use of the term ‘higher’ when discussing university education, came other changes in terminology instigated by government through education policy. If higher education was metaphorically linked to ‘God’s garden’ and could therefore be a place of greatness, then a capitalist democracy needed to harness this greatness in a way that would be of most benefit – as economic capital. Knowledge and economics became inextricably linked. As Bourdieu states, neoliberal discourse presents itself as ‘self-evident’, with no alternative (1998a:29). The metaphors used in neoliberal discourse contribute to its symbolic violence. This form of violence is insidious because it is misrecognised as violence – neoliberal tenets espouse that economic wealth in a capitalist society is obtainable by anyone: ‘it is taken for granted that maximum growth, and therefore productivity and competitiveness, are the ultimate and sole goal of human actions’ (Bourdieu, 1998a:30-1). The metaphors that evolve in our language support neoliberal tenets – employers become ‘the vital forces of the nation’; putting off workers is ‘downsizing’ (‘an energetic body has to be thin’) (Bourdieu, 1998a:31).

The symbolic violence that is legitimate knowledge imposes itself on the university, which itself becomes merely a knowledge factory or a knowledge machine that contributes to the knowledge economy, resulting in the capitalist ideal of producing a marketable/saleable product. Even before ‘knowledge economy’ was being used as government rhetoric, there was an awareness of this approaching change. Taylor (1999) talks about ‘The Machine’, a metaphor for the influence of capitalist society wanting to produce a marketable, saleable product relating to the academic system. ‘The Machine’ is:

an intensification of that unitary mindset which has served Western society quite well for so many centuries but which has had to be defeated, subverted, overthrown or seduced into complicity whenever a significant advance has taken place. (Taylor, 1999:5).

It is unitary in its goal and outlook – making the human subject into a commodity; and positioning the subject’s striving for knowledge as something that can be used.

Knowledge is a product and the subject who labours well at it should be put to good use. Taylor's metaphor of 'The Machine' describes an element of capitalist culture that is also expressed by Jean Baudrillard:

The alleged autonomy of political economy (or rather its value as a determining agency) enables it to reproduce, just as efficiently, capital's symbolic function, its real domination over life and death established by the code, and which is continually stirring up political economy as a medium, an alibi and a fig-leaf. A machine has to function if it is to reproduce relations of production. (Baudrillard, 1993:31)

Knowledge reproduces the code, the symbolic exchange of value, and 'circulates like a sign', giving credence to a truth that establishes economic value.

Power, even when primarily symbolic, does have material effects (Frow, 1986:60). If everyone in society is under the protection of the state, then it is in the state's interest to provide protection as efficiently and economically as possible. The more economic profit the state can generate, the more can be injected back into the community for its and the community's benefit. Governments' achievements in this regard over the past two hundred years, materialized through making use of the relationship between science (to gain a greater understanding of the population) and technology (to put this understanding most efficiently into practice), has been an effective one; an educated population is better able to self-regulate and self-motivate themselves in terms of what areas the government deem important to society, and the gradual development of the university system in Australia is a case in point:

Given that all discourse is informed by power, is constituted *as discourse* in relation to unequal patterns of power, then political judgements can be made in terms of particular historically specific appropriations of discourse by dominant social forces. Note that this involves two distinct theses: first, that of the productivity of power; second, that of the inequality of powers. (Frow, 1986:61)

The productivity of power can be demonstrated in the turn from sovereign rule to the technology of 'institutions of power', which ensured the continuation and improvement of people's lives rather than their submission to life or death (Foucault, 1984:263).

This, Foucault termed biopower. Biopower is ‘the growing inclusion of man’s natural life in the mechanisms and calculations of power’ (Agamben, 1998:119). It gives rise to rights of institutions to the scientific exploration of the general population in order that their welfare may be better cared for and is a coalescence of knowledge and power that forms ‘disciplinary technologies’ (Foucault, 1984: 17). Agamben, in his reading and exposition of biopower, identifies the point that it imposes not on *bios*, the Greek term for political life, but on *zoē*, life itself (Agamben, 1998:1). The ‘entry of *zoē* into the sphere of the *polis* – the politicisation of bare life as such – constitutes the decisive event of modernity’ (Agamben, 1998:4). Biopower is not only state apparatus operating to control and care for the individual, but the delimiting discourses about the self that regulates an individual’s own behaviour and way of operating (Agamben, 1998:5):

Populations are managed not only through the provision of state services but also, and more importantly, through governmental techniques aimed at the formation of personalities which have desirable attributes and characteristics. ... this relation is not understandable through the concept of coercion; rather, liberal techniques of government are productive in the sense that they provide, via the construction of new social norms, new ways of being and knowing. (Gibson, 2001:7)

The inequality of powers (Frow’s second thesis stated above) is demonstrated in the wake of the Enlightenment when scientific advances that improved the human condition required an injection of economic capital. A realisation that technological development was not only task efficient, but also produced what would be desirable to an increasingly industrialised society, forced science to become inextricably linked to technology and wealth:

The games of scientific language become the games of the rich, in which whoever is wealthiest has the best chance of being right. An equation between wealth, efficiency, and truth is thus established. (Lyotard, 1984:45)

In order to grow, the economy, structured as it is, requires a narrowing definition of knowledge in order to focus on this growth – in order to be utilised as standing-reserve. For example, in the university system, research that does not produce knowledge that

can be easily revealed as part of the standing-reserve – such as creative writing – has to incorporate ‘legitimate’ knowledge in order to be accepted. As so many of the focus group members pointed out, research produced through creative writing only becomes accepted as research by having an extra body of (traditional research) work attached to the creative work. It has to adapt its processes in order to be sanctioned as part of the research culture:

Thus, to say that certain agents recognize the legitimacy of a pedagogic agency is simply to say that the complete definition of the power relationship within which they are objectively placed implies that these agents are unable to realize the basis of that relationship although their practices, even when contradicted by the rationalizations of discourse or the certainties of experience, objectively take account of the necessity of the relations of force. (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990:14)

Every action requires authority behind it in order to have any powerful effect. And every action undertaken with the confidence of having this authority or power behind it takes place without an understanding or recognition of the relations of power that legitimise that authority (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990: 14).

Action exercised without authority ‘is a logical contradiction and a sociological impossibility’ and if it ‘aimed to unveil, in its exercise, its objective reality of violence’ it ‘would be self-destructive’ (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990:12). For legitimate knowledge in the research culture to be ascribed as framing the world through economic determinations would destroy the authority that gives this knowledge legitimacy.

University Research Policies

From this framing, evinced for example in the government’s national research priorities, the impetus is there for individual university research policies to direct research into specific areas. Knowledge, as a saleable commodity, comes to be valued and desired by those outside the university system. It becomes something that can be produced by business if it can be traded for economic gain. If universities are but one place where

knowledge is produced, as opposed to the only place, then there will be a need to increase their knowledge production in order to remain competitive in the knowledge market place. In the light of decreased funding support from government, they have had to form new alliances with industry and business. A new triangular relationship is formed between universities, government and business. An example that highlights this capitalist influence in higher education is from the USA, the University of Phoenix, with its 'FlexNet' delivery of courses: all learning, bar the first tutorial, takes place via the internet; there are few, if any, tenured staff; and they advertise quick turn-around and industrial-specific qualifications (University of Phoenix, n.d.).

I have looked in depth at three universities' policies for the purpose of discovering the impact on them of an ever-increasing economic framework for research outcomes. The three – the University of Melbourne, University of Technology Sydney (UTS), and the University of Canberra – were chosen specifically because they include creative writing as part of their higher degrees and because they generate symbolic and cultural capital in differing measures due to their place as *institutions* in the field of academe. The three have developed creative writing from different schools or departments: Melbourne out of the School of English; UTS out of Humanities and Social Sciences; and Canberra out of Media and Communication. Melbourne is a long-established university; UTS and Canberra both attained university status through the government higher education reforms in the late 1980s.

From 1999 until 2003, universities had to submit a yearly Research and Research Training Management Report (RRTMR) to DEST in order to be eligible for research funding. (This may again be a requirement in 2005 – see DEST, 2004b). These Reports, which were to follow guidelines stipulated by DEST were 'designed to encourage universities to use business oriented strategic plans to determine their research direction' (Neumann, 2002:172). Part A was to consist of stated objectives for research and the direction in which research was undertaken; Part B was to be a report of what research had been completed.

Both these parts included two areas of accountability: the ‘active researcher’ and ‘areas of research excellence’. Accountability in these two areas forces the chain of government control down to the level of the individual (Neumann, 2002:172). Calculations on what constituted an ‘active researcher’ were taken from indicators such as producing peer-reviewed publications, or receiving a grant. Areas of ‘research excellence’ were calculated from data such as successful grant applications.

In the area of research excellence in the three universities I looked at, both Melbourne and UTS had geared their research to the government’s National Research Priorities (NRP). Melbourne identified nine areas of research strength (University of Melbourne, 2003b:sect 1.4), some of which were outside the NRP boundaries, but Section 5.3 specifically addressed the NRP and described the ways in which research at Melbourne covered all four areas. UTS stated it had a three-tier structure of research, with the top tier consisting of five institutes, which correlated exactly to the areas covered in the NRP (UTS, 2003: sect 2.3). Both Melbourne and UTS were covering similar areas of research in an effort to address the NRP. This doubling up of research is another area of government concern, as stated by Dr Brendan Nelson:

Sometimes when I go to a university I’ll find a very small number of researchers working in a field in under resourced facilities, and then I will go to another university working in the same field where there’ll be an enormous amount of infrastructure and personnel, and one wonders how long, as a country, that we can sustain funding all kinds of research in all institutions who choose to do that. (Nelson, 2003c)

In the above case, it seems it is the government that has instigated the problem of a doubling up of research by their insistence on the narrow focus of their NRP. Both Melbourne and UTS have water management and conservation research on their agendas as well as other research crossovers. The government does not want to waste money by having research duplicated throughout Australia, but by implementing their four NRPs and requiring RRTMR that is exactly what they are effecting.

Perhaps the government's decision to cease the requirements of research reports for 2004 is an indication of their having perceived this duplication of research. It could also be in response to a plea by the 'Group of Eight' universities, of which Melbourne is a part, to cease sector-wide quality assurance structures. As Melbourne explained in its 2002 *Strategic Plan*:

The result [of DEST's regulatory framework] is an almost automatic emphasis on sectoral conformity at the expense of institutional autonomy and sectoral differentiation. ... An incorrigible tension always governs the relationship between, on the one hand, public accountability and Government control and, on the other, the value good universities place on academic freedom and institutional autonomy. (University of Melbourne, 2002:12)

Part of Melbourne's plea for more academic freedom was for greater flexibility in obtaining income from sources other than government, such as opening up more fee-paying places, and securing private investment. In the current *Strategic Plan*, Melbourne has accomplished the former, and states it would welcome government consideration of taxation incentives for industry investment in research and design (University of Melbourne, 2004b:17) – an indication that their concern for flexibility is being met.

Melbourne also emphasised that as they are the leading university research institute in Australia, more funds should be allocated to their research resources in order for them to continue to be front-runners in Australia and be competitive world-wide (University of Melbourne, 2002:sect 1.6.3; 2004b:16-17). This seems somewhat self-serving, and also short-sighted as far as the expressed concern about 'sectoral conformity' is concerned: funds concentrated in a small number of institutions could correlate with a corresponding decrease in areas receiving research attention. Australia would be less ready or able to adapt to changes needed in the direction of research eventuating from the pace of change in all knowledge generation and uptake (Neumann, 2002:168).

An emphasis on economic capital was evident in all three universities. Canberra stated, 'The commercialisation of outcomes is a high priority and will benefit not only the University, but also individuals, the community and society' (University of Canberra, 2003:sect 6). UTS stated, 'The University prides itself on outcomes-oriented research and its relationships with business, industry, the professions and the community' (University of Technology, Sydney, 2003:sect 2.1). In order to generate this capital, universities need to nurture and promote research in disciplines that can attract the most economic interest i.e. in scientific and technological areas. Melbourne goes as far as to state:

Success in commercializing research (where relevant to an academic discipline) is one component of the criteria used in assessing that total research performance and academic standing for promotion or appointment. (University of Melbourne, 2003b:sect 6.3)

For all three universities, there was a lack of definition or explanation of, or guidelines for, creative writing within the postgraduate research area. At Canberra, the only Masters or PhD degree listed in this area in the Division's courses and programs is the Master of Creative Writing by coursework (University of Canberra, 2004b). A PhD is available in Communication, but there is no detail as to what areas are incorporated under 'Communication'. In the Master of Arts in Communication, there is a reference to the type of research preferred: 'The School encourages research on communication topics relevant to industry and government and research that leads to the production of a creative thesis' (University of Canberra, 2004a). Creativity, coupled with 'relevance to industry and government' invokes links to innovation, applied research and economic capital rather than creative, basic research and cultural capital.

UTS does advocate research in creative areas. On the faculty homepage, there is a link to research, where it specifically states:

The Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences has gained a reputation for its research in professional practice and creative production as much as for its work in the more traditional intellectual areas. (University of Technology, Sydney, 2004a)

The site for postgraduate research study, which is linked through the faculty homepage and the university handbook, describes two higher degrees at the doctoral level, one the Doctor of Philosophy, the other the Doctor of Creative Arts (University of Technology, Sydney, 2004b). It is not clear, from the description of either degree where creative writing would fit. There is a Masters research course that asks for ‘a thesis component in the form of a book-length piece of creative writing in any literary genre and an accompanying essay’ (University of Technology, Sydney, 2004b).

Melbourne’s Faculty of Arts web page states it is possible to undertake a PhD research degree in creative writing but on the Creative Writing page, there is no description for a PhD course, only a Masters (University of Melbourne, 2004a). The thesis component of the Masters programme can be wholly a creative work or have up to 50% consisting of critical work. This reduces the length of the creative piece of work accordingly (University of Melbourne, 2003a).

In a climate where government is increasing university accountability and tightening guidelines for research practices, omitting descriptions of research degrees in creative writing may mean it becomes more difficult for the universities to maintain these degrees on their books. There may be increasing limitations on valid (and funded) research areas that fit government priorities. A greater dependence on private investment also has implications for the constitutional make-up of research.

For all universities to get government funding they need to undertake research that is pertinent to government priorities, particularly with application-based funding administered by the ARC. All public funding for universities is performance-based. The IGS (as mentioned earlier in the chapter), along with the Research Training Scheme (RTS), is administered by DEST. The ARC runs the National Competitive Grants Program, an application-based scheme that funds research projects under the ‘Discovery and Linkage Programs’, and Centres of Research (ARC, 2003b). The three Centres of

Excellence run by the ARC were initially promoted as ‘a resource for all Australian researchers’ (Kemp, 2000), but are purely scientifically or technologically orientated.

Science and Technology: Alienated Forms of Knowledge

The Higher Education Funding Act 1988 states its objectives, in part, are ‘to support a higher education system that is characterised by quality, *diversity and equity* of access; and contributes to the development of *cultural and intellectual life* in Australia’ (Attorney-General’s Department, 1988 – my emphasis). A lack of diversity and equity is evident with both performance and application based funding, through DEST and the ARC, in the way the funding schedules are structured. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the IGS does not count research publications that come under a ‘creative’ category. The ARC steers its funding away from arts and humanities areas too, with the emphasis on science and technology. As stated in the latest *Strategic Plan*:

On 4 December, the Minister for Education, Science and Training, the Hon Dr Brendan Nelson MP, directed the ARC to take account of the national research priorities in performing its functions under the *Australian Research Council Act 2001*, including the National Competitive Grants Program, commencing with the 2004 new funding round. (ARC, 2003c)

Basing research funding on a performance-based system curtails research undertaken in the arts and humanities. It is comparatively difficult for humanities research to gain grants for work, especially investigative and explorative creatively written work, before it has been produced. Although it may attract a ‘market’ after it has been produced, there is the factor of time needed for its production, and if no funding is provided, this means unpaid time. Academics in this area either need to produce research work outside their teaching and administrative hours, or not produce at all. The current emphasis on gaining grants that fit the national research priorities as a factor in calculating allocated government funds is detrimental to research in the arts and humanities:

In focusing more on publication and creative outputs (which need to be treated with equality), these [funding] mechanisms could enhance humanities research as well as scientific research, whereas presently they are biased towards the latter. (Dean, 2002b: 3-4)

Even science experiences the problem of being economically driven. With such an emphasis placed on applied research, any undertakings involving basic research are seen as being of little or no value. This has affected research to such an extent that some universities have changed their internal funding categories to be more inclusive of a broader range of research:

This university has been very strong in supporting this idea of creative performance being recognised as RQ [research quantum]. Now, I've been away for a year and I'm not sure whether you can still use the term RQ, but this university has a process where certain kinds of creative product are not recognised for RQ at the other [government] level. When the money comes back, though, it gets divided up – I think another couple of universities do this – it gets divided up inside of the university as if creative products have been recognised. (Nick, 2001:E,6)

But this has not always been a successful move. The dominance of science and technology can still hold sway over what sort of research product in the creative areas can be accepted. Creative practitioners in universities have sometimes had to change the focus or direction of their work in order to receive any funding handouts:

What I'm saying is that just some elements within the creative arts here haven't wanted to compromise in any way. I sort of saw it as we have to. It seemed to me that with the goal of having creative product recognised, along the way there would probably have to be some compromises, like science and IT and so on. They were supporting us, so I thought we'd have to. In other words because our products were not going to attract real RQ from Canberra, we should do something about it. (Nick, 2001:E,7)

Knowledge becomes accountable to the concepts of measurement, verification and quantification – those that fit the scientific/technological mode. In the context of the university system, these concepts more easily justify and accommodate certain knowledges over others. The push for technological advancement is tied to a neoliberal global influence that generates the need for up-skilling, up-grading, and constant realignments in order to continue to have a stock of components upon which to call – a standing-reserve. If science and technology are privileged as a result of neoliberal policies, this will only allow for uni-directional development – a continuing and

increasing uptake of world resources (whether they be natural or human resources) that are useful, in a technological sense only, to society.

Society tends to treat technology as an organic thing: cars have ‘bodies’; computers have ‘memories’ and ‘viruses’. We give ourselves machine-like qualities as well: ‘burnout’; ‘putting on the brakes’, even being ‘well-oiled’. This indistinctness between people and technology is formed because technology is an extension of the human body, a creation or invention in order to accomplish something (Schirato & Webb, 2003:47). But technology does not reside in technology itself. It is not a thing, but an activity, ‘always a means to an end’ (Rybczynski, 1983:76). It is a performative function made to act by what is brought to bear by people (Polanyi & Prosch, 1975:61). Polanyi gives an example of the use of a stick to tell one’s way in the dark – not very technological by today’s standards, but it demonstrates the performativity of technology. The stick is used to give a tactile explanation of the surroundings. What is important is what the stick allows us to do:

While we rely on a tool or a probe, these instruments are not handles or scrutinised as external objects. Instead, we pour ourselves into them and assimilate them as part of ourselves. (Polanyi & Prosch, 1975:36)

This performative function can never be detached from its place in a social, cultural and historical context: ‘since technology is a human activity, it is thus a part of human culture and hence reflects the human preoccupation of its time’ (Rybczynski, 1983:223). Technology is embedded in relations of power, serving the interests of individuals or institutions, whether for economic or cultural means (Schirato & Webb, 2003:146). For example, the development of the computer has gone from its initial instigation as a form of communication, to giving those who are conversant with it the potential to transfer their cultural capital (literacy in the IT realm) to economic capital, to providing the individual the opportunity of discovering other ‘like-minded’ individuals and the space for public expression. The global networks that technology now enables are also a part of the neoliberal climate:

Globalisation can be seen as a process in which science and technology have provided the means, and economic orthodoxy has set the framework within which those means are put to use. (Throsby, 2001:155)

Here, Throsby highlights the fact that technology has been an effect *on* neoliberalism as well as an effect *of* neoliberalism. The other cause contributing to the means for a neoliberal orthodoxy, according to Throsby, is science. Science is an expression of the cultural split between the subject and the object that resulted from Descartes' *cogito ergo sum*.

Pre-Enlightenment Western culture, based on the Judeo-Christian ethic, held the ten commandments to be the basis for civilisation – to sin against fellow humans was to sin against God. Lying was (tantamount to) sinning, while seeking truth brought one closer to God. It was thus religion that paved the way for the ascendancy of science and its principles of verifiability. The discourse of science extended this notion of resolving problems by producing truths. These truths, ironically, helped bring about the demise of religion and religious authority and instigated scientific authority in its stead. The religious search for truth that drove the scientific mindset was eaten up by its own efforts because of the discovery that the thinking person, and not God, was the centre of the universe. And this newly created thinking person had great confidence in their ability to explain the inexplicable. What has increasingly been taken for knowledge in nature is only that which can be qualified and controlled. This measurement of nature has influenced the measurement of humanity – an acceptance of the objective at the expense of the subjective.

Institutions that generate technology become useful to government and hence are seen as generating outcomes that serve an end beyond them. Within technology there is always an end to be attained, and whatever is at hand to achieve that end is put to use; therefore, the attention is on usefulness (Lovitt & Lovitt, 1995:228). For example, on a radio discussion entitled *The Dawn of McScience*, a scientist stated that the only reason there is any dispute over cloning is not because of ethical reasons but because science has not advanced far enough yet to guarantee no mistakes (Adams, 11/03/04).

Scientific rationalism can still promote the idea ‘that everything is rational and explicable through empirical observation and the consequent deduction of laws’ (Birchall, 2003:14) – despite the increasing acceptance of discourses developed in the twentieth century on the decentred subject and human fallibility.

This usefulness is not an end in itself. It is not content with explaining or creating one thing, but must use this creation or explanation continually to feed into an ever-expanding arena of uses (Heidegger, 1977:16). As reliance on science and technology increases, this generates a need for fields involved with scientific and technological advancement to become increasingly necessary to government:

And if technology is political, it is because technology always carries with it a certain “telos” of operations, a certain directive capacity. In other words, technology – both in terms of the human side of technology and of the technology of what it is to be human – is integral to those relations of authority and subjectivity that insert our selves into the space of the present, giving us the status of living beings capable of having “experience” of the present. In short, technology neither is, nor could be either, “outside” politics or corrosive of politics; it is tied irrevocably to our political self-understanding and our understanding of the political. (Barry, Osborne & Rose: 1996:15)

In the context of research, applying this notion of technology, research can only be revealed through its character as standing reserve in its role as applied research. Research, as an autonomous activity, is not caught up in this notion of technology, which Heidegger refers to as the ‘essence of technology’ (1977:28). This very transcendental perspective is not something with which I agree, but I would call Heidegger’s ‘essence’ a relevant *aspect* of technology in the current climate. It is this ‘essence’ that is necessary for the university to enter into relationships with other institutions in society. In a technological society, nothing has value of and in itself, but only in relation to its usefulness to society and how it is categorised as a form of standing reserve. This categorisation Heidegger calls enframing:

Enframing does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is. As a destining, it banishes man into that kind of revealing which is an ordering. Where this

ordering holds sway, it drives out every other possibility of revealing. ... Where Enframing holds sway, regulating and securing of the standing-reserve mark all revealing. (Heidegger, 1977:27)

The danger lies not in technology itself, but in the 'essence' of technology, in the way that a technological orientation or ethos restricts how the world can be viewed. This notion of technology, revealed through enframing, denies humanity other ways of revealing truths about the world (Heidegger, 1977:28).

Enframing reinforces the dominance of particular values and this allows the dominant values to extend their authority over more and more fields. Everything becomes drawn into the standing reserve of technology and science. This standing reserve calls everything into a revealing that is enframed through technological determinations. Enframing places things in relationship to humanity, and this is the only way their value is determined.

Enframing is more than just a relationship to economic worth, but in the case of creative writing in the field of research, it seems it is only 'enframed' this way – economically. If economic value is taken as the main justification of authority, then this misrecognises the symbolic violence of technology, for example, where refusing technology is tantamount to refusing life. In withholding justification of values in any way other than economic, a research area does not need to be technologically and/or scientifically oriented in order to contribute to this economic value. The arts, for example, contribute \$25 billion a year to GDP, a large proportion of economic growth (Nelson, 2003a). But science and technology are the areas most favoured in research funding.

This has ramifications for creative writing in the field of research. If creative work received an increase in funding, that would not necessarily change its position in relation to authority in the field of research. It would not give creative work the ability to enframe because technology enframes society and those areas that are seen as useful to technology are brought into the circuit and those that are not, such as creative work, lose worth and power. A technological perspective treats everything as standing-

reserve and by doing this, any other form of value is denied. For technology, the significance of language is its function of providing ‘technologically useful information’ (Lovitt & Lovitt, 1995:235-6). This notion is expounded in the criticism that humanities disciplines receive for their use of ‘academic jargon’, which is a criticism thrown humanities’ way far more often than science or technology (Garber, 2000:37). ‘The word jargon, when used to dismiss the language of critical theory in the humanities, is in fact describing what for practitioners of these disciplines are terms of art’ (Garber, 2000:37). The use of these words is vital to the functioning of the discipline, just as technological and scientific words are vital to the practitioners of their disciplines. Specialised words allow one engaged in ideas to express them in terms of the ‘art’ they are performing. They are also a gateway that regulates the entry of newcomers to the discipline (Garber, 2000:37), which, in Bourdieu’s terms, is part of gaining consecration and autonomy in a field.

Technology enframes and guides research, giving it the power of explanation and interpretation, at the same time delimiting the ways it is able to do this. The system dominates through the doxic acceptance of legitimate knowledge, such as the focus of DEST and ARC funding on science and technology. There are no natural, necessary cultural needs, but things are set up to be viewed this way because of the cultural system that has been set in operation and the sum of its parts which, individually, do not create an availability of culture to all:

The dominating and dominated “agents” of the system reach their social destiny under the illusion of having exercised their individual liberty. The system can therefore reproduce itself precisely because it gives the appearance of not reproducing, thereby masking the real contradictions on reproduction. (Raynaud, 1994:64)

Technology becomes a way of being, a way of interpreting the world. It is not just a process, but an ideology of sorts. Technology is ‘a medium rather than a “productive force”, ... as the form and principle of an entirely new generation of meaning’ (Baudrillard, 1993:56).

Is there a possibility that the over-concentration of knowledge development in one direction will result in a turn to what Ulrich Beck terms a 'risk society': one where the distribution of bad effects outweighs the distribution of good; where the social prescription of science turns to a social critique; and that positive goals of equality become defensive goals of safety? (Beck, 1992). Since September 11, this notion of a risk society is becoming more prevalent. But in order to balance scientific developments with human developments, there needs to be support from the government.

Conclusion

What comes to be valued in terms of the place of universities in society is their contribution to capital, whether it is cultural or economic:

We need to ask how the dominant ideology of society becomes expressed in patterns of funding and in political decision-making and ... [by doing so, show that this] permeates at all levels the research questions and the explanations which flow from the research activity. (Brew, 2001:86)

Because of government policy and societal changes, the breadth of research is being narrowed. 'The implication of this is that knowledge must be effectively and efficiently managed and locked into systems and processes that enhance innovation' (Usher, 2002:144). The attention that knowledge is now receiving through government priorities and through literature written on this area (see Gibbons et al, 1994; Barnett & Griffin 1997; university policies) means the idea that knowledge should be valued primarily for its economic applicability has become part of the doxa.

What is of vital importance to the continuation of a healthy society and a healthy environment is recognition of the diversity of interests that need to be developed. If sole emphasis is placed on scientific and technological discoveries and applications then this works to the detriment of social connectedness and interaction. Research is not only a way of knowing that can be evaluated in economic terms. It is not a practice

undertaken only for technological gain. Research is also a way of knowing that specifies particular forms of practice that have nothing to do with economic imperatives or the enframing of science and technology.

The broader community has compromised the autonomy of academic capital with increasing government control of higher education and society's increasing dependence on knowledge. What counts as capital narrows the framework of the role of the university. It is obligated to fulfil only those narrow strictures of knowledge production placed on it by the doxa produced in a social structure garnered from neoliberal principles. Yet a university could equally be a vibrant public space that invites continuous discovery and acceptance of differences.

There needs to be the opportunity for problems and aspects of everyday living to be approached from a variety of perspectives. If not, there is a risk that a kind of colonial imperialism will emerge that prevails over all human endeavours. Unlike the imperialism of old, which was driven from a cultural perspective (although there were many other factors present), the current risk of imperialism would stem from a scientific/technological perspective; the effect, however, could very well be the same. Alternative research approaches for the discipline of creative writing will be explored in the next chapter.

4

The Dumb Beast on the Couch

Let me summarise the threads of the discussion from the previous two chapters. In Chapter Two I argue that the field of academe problematises certain kinds of knowledge – such as that demonstrated by creative writing – and privileges others. The culture of a university works in such a way that some forms of research are deemed useful and others useless. As academia is the dominated of the dominant fields, the ‘useful’ and ‘useless’ research it provides is categorised as such by the field of power in reference to its creation of capital, which is necessarily limited.

In Chapter Three I extended the notions of useful and useless knowledge to the economic domain, and argued that under the current doxa of neoliberalism, the universal privileging of economic aspects in any decisions, reforms or outcomes for research overdetermines any cultural aspects basic (non-applied) knowledge may have. This has ramifications for the possible direction of, and coverage by, research undertaken in the academic field. Under this model, cultural aspects of a society are underplayed, or are channelled to fit economic imperatives.

Society depends upon cultural practice and formations, and hence cultural capital cannot be neglected, but the current trend within universities points to the privileging of research that can be most easily adapted to capitalist doxa. In short, I am upholding culture on the one hand, while reproving cultural institutions on the other. If my argument seems contradictory – defending culture (of which the academy is a part), against the structure of the academy (which plays a part in constituting culture) – then it

parallels a dilemma discussed by Bourdieu in his posthumously published book, *Firing Back* (2003).

In this book, Bourdieu urges a collective force from the cultural field to counterpoise the hegemony of capitalist doxa. But he finds himself, in doing this, countenancing institutions of which his work has been very critical in the past, for example, education, and the nation state (Bourdieu, 2003:23). As does Bourdieu, I find myself defending an institution (the university, as part of the broader cultural picture) while at the same time, advocating change for it. This change, in terms of cultural practice, directly affects how creative writing's relationship to knowledge is perceived in the university:

I think it's accepted that creative writers doing Masters and PhD programs do a lot of reading, a lot of conceptual exploration, that it is an epistemological project. But the wider university – because we're not all kind of meta-fictional and self-reflexive – think that a discipline that doesn't engage in some sort of meta-discourse doesn't produce knowledge, and I think that's one of the big problems. And I think we're in a relatively privileged position vis-à-vis the other practices because we can discursively frame the other practices, and it's a bit like psychoanalysis. Creative writing is the dumb beast on the couch and it's cultural theory that makes it confess. (Michelle, 2001:B,10)

Michelle's analogy ties the practice of creative writing to the 'thinking' space of the university. But many others in disciplines outside creative writing and those not involved with it in broader society have an image of creative writing as a dumb beast that is just a form of entertainment 'on the couch'.

In this chapter, I will argue creative writing is not the dumb beast on the couch. And here I have two images of the dumb beast in mind. The image of creative writing I wish to contest, firstly, is the dumb beast such as might be found in a psychoanalytic session, where the analysand spills forth words that can only make sense if the analyst interprets them. The creative process here is likened to the workings of the unconscious, as described in psychoanalytic discourse, drawn as part of the imagined, the unspoken and repressed. This links creativity to the 'dark' side of the human psyche: dark, in the sense that what is formed stems from human interaction or culturally determined forces, but is not necessarily 'within our individual control' (Sarup, 1992:12). This constitution

of creativity sets up a problem for creative practice as a way of knowing, and effects the necessity for the exegesis if it is to take up a valid place within the field of research.

In the second section of the chapter, I will refute creative writing's position 'on the couch', this time in the sense of it being mere ornamentation, more a dumb beauty than a beast: a decoration, an appendage. Against this image of creative writing as a mere decoration on the couch, I will argue that creative writing is a worthy companion to other discourses in academe because it makes a *cultural* contribution, and cultural capital is necessary to sustaining the way of life valued in the twenty-first century.

Creative writing practitioners in the academy need to demand a space for creative writing as research so it is no longer seen as 'the dumb beast on the couch'. This demand would fall in with other demands from a broad range of movements that question capitalist doxa. The purpose is also to validate creative writing as part of knowledge produced in the field of research, which contributes to cultural creation. To do this, it is necessary to engage with the cultural and structural battle as to creative writing's ontology and its function in the broader social field: what are the underlying values of creativity in the general community that might affect the success of creative writing's value as research? It is through elaborating on this that I will continue my discussion.

Creative Writing and Value

Traditionally, the university has operated as an autonomous institution, sometimes to the extent that researchers could boast that their work had no use outside the institution. The bifurcation of research and knowledge into 'useless' and 'useful' meant that creative writing could never be part of 'useless', or disinterested knowledge. This was due to creative writing's placement, in early Australia, in mechanics institutes and schools of art, and later in primary and secondary schools, which, although fitting the autonomous end of the spectrum in regards to educating a person to improve their personal development, was applicable only at compulsory schooling levels or in

vocational institutions – never in universities, where allegiance to British tradition meant creative writing carried ‘the stigma of being an American (or anti-British) idea’ (Krauth & Brady, 1997:47):

Tom: But interestingly, within that kind of “knowledge for knowledge’s sake” sort of thing, creative writing wouldn’t have been considered legitimate within that framework.

Mary: No.

Tom: So it’s funny that it finds it’s legitimate in a more commercial environment.

Angela: Well, I don’t think that it’s really considered legitimate in this framework ...

Tom: No, I don’t either.

Angela: Unless you ally it to something like film writing or script writing.

Tom: Yeah, but it’s in, but it’s in. It would never have been accepted before, you know.

Oxford and Cambridge would never have taught it. (Focus Group, 2001:A,3)

Within the field of research, as I argued in Chapter Two, there are two main oppositionally defined positions that determine what is classified as research. One is associated with what Bourdieu terms heteronomy, where research is valued for its ability to contribute to the principal asset of the dominant field – economics – and its doxa – political belief. The other is aligned with autonomy, free from outside influences and demands, with no requirement for immediate application, and so is termed useless by those with a more heteronomous disposition.

Research bifurcated in this way is part of the division of positions (and dispositions) in a field which are often irreconcilable. One could argue that all research has to deploy similar methodologies in order to produce an outcome, but this only addresses the practice of research and not the product:

There’s a difference between saying that the processes of producing different forms of research are the same, and what those forms of research actually do and how they’re used. (Roger, 2001:B,12)

The skills of negotiation and navigation in language are pertinent to both creative and traditional forms of writing in the university system, but this does not equalise the ways in which they are valued.

One participant in the focus groups decried the notion of creative writing in the academy as just aesthetic production when she said:

It's not as if we're just sort of wanky artists. (Michelle, 2001:B,6)

Others in that discussion agreed with her, and I found similar views throughout all the discussions. The point here is that creative writing considered as academic work is not just the result of a writer's imagination, refined and redrafted to produce a 'work of art' and nothing else. This image of the writer as artist is caught up in the specifics of creative work as a 'pure aesthetic', as the work of art 'stressing the properties of gratuity, the absence of function, the primacy of form over function, [and] disinterestedness' (Bourdieu, 1996:285). Creative writing, understood in these terms, is relegated to the status of something capable of contributing to knowledge only when the critical reader comes into play and considers its form – style, characterisation, and genre are of main concern. The historical and social context, the political or social meaning, and the purpose of the writing are ignored (Witcombe, 2000). This aesthetic notion of creative writing is difficult to circumvent because it is part of writing's appeal. Its appeal is portrayed as a transcendental condition in relation to creative practices and art works, but under analysis is revealed to be a product of social conditions under reflexive investigation (Bourdieu, 1996:288).

The reason for this has to do with the autonomous pole in the field of cultural production. Because of the nature of fields, it is most often at the autonomous pole where definitions of fields are formed. This is because those operating under autonomous principles depend solely on the product relevant to that field to legitimate their position in the field. Those operating under heteronomous principles can make use of external influences to legitimate their position, such as monetary reward or status in another field (eg athletes or actors). Therefore, it is from the autonomous pole where legitimate positions are defined, where the boundaries of the field are determined, who earns membership in the field and who is granted status (Bourdieu, 1996:223).

The space of the creative (literary) writer, within the field of cultural production, is at the consecrated autonomous end of the continuum. This position defines the writer in terms of the internal restrictions of the field, part of which requires that writers distance

themselves from external determinants such as economic success. A writer's standing is gauged by recognition from her/his peers, not by the price they can demand for their work, and not (initially) by the recognition they receive from a general audience. The hierarchy that is developed in the field through this autonomy creates a 'subfield of restricted production', where the writers' only aspiration is to achieve the recognition of their peers. Overall, their work is not produced for profit and they eschew economic and 'worldly' success (Bourdieu, 1996:217-8). The main stated interest of writers in this position, or those who aspire to this position, is not in reinforcing doxic, or setting up heterodoxic, attitudes or beliefs. Their aim is their work, and 'works must make their own public' (Bourdieu, 1996:218). Therefore, if their work is not well received by the public, this can create an ambiguous situation, because failure to be popular can be ascribed to two causes: one is that the writer is part of the autonomous subfield in the field of cultural production and their work holds cultural but not popular value; the other indicates the writer holds no position of consecration in the field, and their work can acquire neither cultural nor economic value (Bourdieu, 1996:219).

Creative writing in Australia generally is not as valued as other creative pursuits by the Australian public, according to a study, *Australians and the Arts* (Costantoura, 2000:tables 24 & 3).

Table 3, which looks at what people considered to be part of the arts, is tabulated from the results of the question: 'When I say the term "the arts", could you please tell me the things that come to mind as part of "the arts"' (Costantoura, 2000:table 3).

Definition of 'the arts'	Population %
Painting	51%
Theatre	40%
Music	36%
Art galleries	25%
Drama/Plays	19%
Dance	16%
Opera	16%
Movies/Film	16%
Ballet	14%
Visual arts	13%
Acting	10%
Crafts	8%
Classical music	6%
Orchestras/Orchestral music	6%
Singing	5%
Books/Novels	5%
Sculpture	5%
Writing	4%
Design	3%
Architecture	3%
Photography	3%
Museums	3%
Reading	3%
Sport events	1%
Literature	1%
Fashion	1%
Poetry/Poetry readings	1%
Drawings	1%
TV, Media	1%
Gardens/Gardening	1%
Live entertainment (NFI)	1%
Aboriginal art	1%
Ceramics/Pottery	-
Creativity	-
Musicals	-
Other	11%
None/No interest	1%
Don't know	1%
TOTAL	332%
Average number mentioned	3.3

Table 3: Spontaneous Definitions of the Arts

Table 24 looks at how people participate in the arts, and is tabulated from answers given to pre-given categories, one of the categories being ‘read books/stories’: ‘And thinking specifically about the sorts of things that you said you would be happy to see as part of the arts in future, I would like you to think about which of these things you personally have done at some time, if at all, over the past two weeks’ (Costantoura, 2000:table 24).

Activities	Population %
Watched/listened to arts	67%
Read books/stories	58%
Read about the arts	54%
Supporting family/friends participating in arts	45%
Been part of an audience	44%
Participation in arts for own enjoyment	39%
Participation in arts for others to enjoy	25%
None	6%

Table 24: How Australians Have Recently Participated in the Arts

What this indicates about Australians’ attitude to the arts is that in terms of autonomous art and its associated status, creative writing is more readily placed among activities that are part of the everyday: reading books and stories is the second most common artistic activity stated by participants in the survey, even by those in the survey who identified themselves as disengaged from the arts (Costantoura, 2000:table 24). One participant in the focus groups stated that having creative writing research degrees is:

...certifying people already certified by their practice. (Jenny, 2001:1,2)

How does this affect creative writing’s position as part of the field of research? What the Costantoura report shows is that members of the general public do not view creative writing as having the same level of consecration as painting, theatre or music. In terms of a consecrated position in the cultural field, the survey shows that other disciplines in

the arts hold greater amounts of autonomy and consecration. These disciplines may be easier to redefine in the research field because they already occupy a consecrated position in another field. It is not necessarily the creative aspect that gives creative writing its low consecration. Creative ideas in other disciplines in the field of research, such as science, are praised. Autonomous, or restricted, production is determined by values on which the autonomous position of any field depends. The correlation of autonomous principles in the field of cultural production – ‘art for art’s sake’ – and in the field of research – ‘knowledge for knowledge’s sake’ – is easier to see in terms of the similar positions these practices hold in their two fields. Practitioners of creative writing, whose work seems to be considered part of the everyday in Australia (as the Costantoura survey shows), have less capital to bargain with in their aspiration to acquire some form of consecration in the field of research.

The results of the Costantoura survey, that shows a lack of autonomous consecration, conflict with the comments from my focus group discussions on creative writing in the field of research. The participants in the discussion were concerned to expound an aesthetic view of creative writing, which the survey showed is a view the broader society does not hold. This is perhaps due to different cultural values that pertain to class differences, and is a study of some magnitude in its own right (see Frow, 1995). My concern here is to highlight how both views limit creative writing’s capacity to function as research.

An aesthetic view gives creative writing an identity as decoration, a ‘useless’ product: ‘the pleasure and pastime of an intimacy which is reduced to itself alone ... Art, useless to the world where only effectiveness counts, is also useless to itself’ (Blanchot, 1982:215). Taken too far the other way, though, any attempt to reposition creative writing as ‘useful’ in the university is likely to take it to the other extreme, of being simply a craft. Some of those participating on the focus groups also feared their work being viewed from this perspective:

Brick layers: that’s the other kind of school of creative writing that I take exception to.
(Sharon, 2001:B,6)

This view mechanises creative work, eschewing the imagination or relegating it to a transitory function in the process, rather than practice, of creative expression.

In the field of research, if knowledge is reduced to a pragmatic function, this then limits all creative capacities connected with it. Creative writing becomes a craft, something to be mastered in order to produce an end product. The empirical aspect of this emerges in the knowledge of techniques of writing, such as voice, characterisation and plot. These aspects certainly are important to the creative writing process, but do not constitute the whole gamut of creativity. When the utility of creativity is brought to the fore, it emulates as a sign of use value through its exchange value: the heteronomous principle dominates the value of the practice.

Of the possible positions in the field of cultural production, the consecrated heteronomous position has the greatest degree of external influence because it has the backing of an audience with greater ‘social quality’ (Bourdieu, 1996:220). This ‘social quality’, of economic, political and cultural significance, is a part of the disposition of those who can impose their values on the field because they are part of the consecrated dominant fraction of the dominant class. What those in the consecrated heteronomous position try to legitimise is the subjugation of art to the demands of the dominant field, which imposes an economic ‘Trojan horse’ on the field’s cultural pursuits (Bourdieu, 1996:220-1). An example of creative output in writing that holds a position of heteronomy is that of mainstream filmic writing (be it for big screen or TV), as it appeals to the everyday and, therefore, has greater potential to engender economic capital. It imparts messages and stories with which a large audience can identify, and this is done through the writer perfecting her/his craft, which may contain an appeal to aesthetic semblances as well, but is not the primary aim.

There were some participants of the focus groups who considered craft as a component of the ‘theory’ of creative writing in universities:

Creative writing in different universities is set in quite different theory contexts, you know. We have a particular propensity towards doing certain sorts of theory around here and others are not present. In the last few years I've tried to introduce just a tiny little bit more of the American thing of craft – this whole idea that there is a creative writing theory, but it's called craft. (Nick, 2001:E,17)

There are problems if craft becomes the dominant determination of creative writing as it then becomes creative writing's only condition, as well as its mode of production.

My argument that creative writing is not just a craft goes back to Kant's ideas I discussed in Chapter Two that art is more than a craft, more than just a way of doing something. Craft is aligned with learning the appropriate steps i.e. a method, a 'science':

“There is no art in that, it is only science”: i.e. you *can* do it if you know *how*; and he says just the same of all the would-be jugglers. To that of the tightrope dancer, on the other hand, he has not the least compunction in giving the name of art. (Kant, 1952:163-4f – emphasis in original)

This notion of craft is referred to by Certeau as a 'mere "trick" (what one has only *to know* in order to perform it)' in relation to what narrative is and does (1984:79).

Creativity cannot be reduced to 'brick-laying', where just by putting one thing in front of another, a process can be spelt out:

Being creative is using thinking, in using ideas and finding the other things that are part of those ideas, not just, you know, the logical steps that are in front of you. (Lisa, 2001:D,18)

Lisa saw creative writing as a process that comes about through one's ability to concentrate, to be the core from which ideas emanate, an attitude Maurice Blanchot also holds:

To write is to let fascination rule language. It is to stay in touch, through language, in language, with the absolute milieu where the theory becomes image again, where the image, instead of alluding to some particular feature, becomes an allusion to the featureless, and instead of a form drawn upon absence, becomes the formless presence of this absence, the opaque, empty opening onto that

which is when there is not more world, where there is no world yet. (Blanchot, 1982:33)

Through writing, an image is projected to the reader that brings them into greater awareness of the social space around them, rather than taking them away from it.

The problem posed by the findings of the Costantoura survey, on defining what is part of the arts, is a problem stemming from the internal structure of the arts and how different artistic dispositions furnish different boundaries as to what can be defined as art (Bourdieu, 1996:223). The contradictory and contrasting positions of aesthetics and craft vie for the generic position of creative writing in the field of academic research, as is often the case with conflicting positions in the internal structure of many cultural fields, whether artistic or educational:

The internal positions must first of all be understood as so many specifications of the generic position of writers (or the literary field) in the field of power, or, if you like, as so many particular forms of the relationship objectively established between writers as a whole and temporal power. (Bourdieu, 1996:71)

If creative writing cannot be of value in a heteronomous or autonomous position in the university, it is not possible for it to be placed within the field of research in the first place. Feedback in the focus group discussions shows that creative writing in the field of cultural production is viewed as connected to both autonomous and heteronomous principles, through its aesthetic value or as its value as a craft. But the creative writing practitioners, in general, disparaged both these forms of definition for creative writing as research. For creative writing to be accepted as research, a process of broadening or changing the definition of research must take place. 'The struggles over definition (or classification) have *boundaries* at stake (between genres and disciplines, or between modes of production inside the same genre) and, therefore, hierarchies' (Bourdieu, 1996:225). Boundaries can only be changed by the power of consecration, and those with greater power in the field, who hold the most (appropriate) capital, have the ability to do this (Bourdieu, 1996:224).

Knowledge that holds the greatest value within the academy is that which perpetuates the functioning of the academy, which is research. Research appeals to a broader audience as well, but in the restricted field of the academy, a researcher who gains the approval of their peers (others in the academy) has a greater chance of acceptance and a more secure position within the field. The degree of consecration a researcher receives inside the field of research is synonymous with the ‘principle of internal hierarchization’ (Bourdieu, 1996:217) and, therefore, one which gives researchers greater power the further they are removed from external determinants such as generation of economic capital and the ‘demands of the “general public”’ (Bourdieu, 1996:218). In this respect, creative writing needs to define itself as part of the autonomous realm of research in the academy in order to be valued.

The Dumb Beast

The Idea of Tactics and Strategies

Creativity and research exist because of the social structures which produce a belief in them, and because of material conditions that allow for the production of creative work (Bourdieu, 1993:35-7; 1996:285-312). But these are not the only factors in determining a piece of research or creative practice. No matter how extensive someone’s efforts are to learn to drive a car, we do not label it research, nor is mastering a Beethoven sonata considered creative. In the field of cultural production, Bourdieu states that for something to be confirmed as art requires:

the historical and sociological analysis of the genesis and structure of the institution (the artistic field) which is capable of accomplishing such an act of institution, that is, of imposing the *recognition* of the work of art as such among all those (*and only those*) who (like the philosopher visiting a museum) have been constituted (through the effort of socialization, which also has to be analysed in terms of its social conditions and logic) in such a fashion that (as their entry into a museum attests) they are disposed to recognize as artistic and to apprehend as such the works socially designated as artistic (notably by their exhibition in a museum). (Bourdieu, 1996:287)

These social conditions constitute art only in certain kinds of ways; so too, with creativity and research. Creative writing, along with other artistic forms accepted in all sorts of mediums in our current episteme, is often aligned with spontaneity but not the meticulously planned, the freedom of emotional expression rather than calculated control, the formally trained but not the amateur, the imaginative rather the real, and, in ‘understanding the work in its reality as a fetish’ – whether producing an aesthetically pleasing creative piece or not – *the need for critique* in order to explain what the writer (or painter, musician, choreographer) really meant (Bourdieu, 1993:35). Therefore, creativity is not only determined by the social condition of its producers, i.e. their background and qualifications, but also by the social conditions that determine the value of creative work i.e. the institutions that support creative work such as arts councils, museums, theatres, conservatories, and universities.

Creative writers, over the last ten or so years, have been increasingly successful in having their work accepted in the academy on the basis of defeating some of the above assumptions about artistic practice:

I know there is some justice to the argument that the critical essay or the exegesis is there to satisfy the universities’ more traditionalist view. But many writers engaged in creative writing PhDs now take on the exegesis as a challenge in a way that they did not in the first few years that there were PhDs offered in Australia. And so that notion that it was there simply to satisfy the requirements of the university, I think, is really outdated. (Emily, 2001:D,11)

But creative writing, in order to have the value of other forms of knowledge in the field of research, needs to show it has social relevance as well as being spontaneous and free, that it allows for variance within its formal training, that it does elucidate the everyday, albeit sometimes through the workings of the imagination, and that it can speak for itself. Creative writing, as it stands, is not fitted to operate in this capacity.

According to Certeau, social relations, or the constant jostling for positions in a field, determine what terms each position is given (Certeau, 1984:xi). For example, the position of writer may change over time or in different social spaces, from one who makes social comment, to one who entertains. If someone belongs in more than one

field simultaneously (and everyone does), then there are many conflicting, some exclusive, some combining, dispositions at work on one's habitus. Often, conflicting dispositions are covered over by the dominant mode of operation, and everyone's positions and dispositions is gauged in relation to this way of operating. For example, intellectual culture makes one form of knowledge dominate all others. Creative writers are 'concealed' (Certeau, 1984:xii) in this culture as people who are just the users of this intellectual culture, and it is forgotten (or denied) that they contribute to it.

A system uses strategies in order to privilege its practices. Strategies are a form of operating that expresses power relations grounded in making use of space by delimiting one's place, and thereby showing up other places as *other* (Certeau, 1984:36). They 'conceal beneath objective calculations their connection with the power that sustains them from within the stronghold of its own "proper" place or institution' (Certeau, 1984:xx):

I think that we've got the Masters courses sitting out there that very much allow for just the creative process and at a PhD level the exegesis gives that extra dimension. It becomes a scholarly work. (Barbara, 2001:C,10)

Masters is shown up as *other*, and the PhD with exegesis holds its connection with legitimate 'scholarly work'.

The *other* is on the outside, anywhere outside that is not in *this* place. Strategies operate from a place. The notion of location is very important in the understanding of strategies. It implies that there is a proper place (Certeau, 1984:36). For example, in regards to what gets termed knowledge, a strategy will define knowledge in terms of how it is institutionalised. Knowledge taught in schools and universities will have greater legitimacy than knowledge outside the designated curriculum.

Certeau states that strategies come into being through their ability to 'provide oneself with one's own place' (Certeau, 1984:36). In symbiotic relationship to strategies, and not depending on place for their determinations, are tactics. Tactics are a form of operation used by those in and outside the system in order to make or do something for

themselves. Tactics have to penetrate the system which is permeated by techniques of control – the strategies used by the dominant in the structure of the field:

Michelle: There's fairly violent opposition to ficto-critical practice¹.

Kathy: I wonder if it comes back to some traditional hierarchy of the sandstone university that has tradition and ideals of what rigorous intellectual analysis constitutes? (Focus Group, 2001:B,7)

Tactics do not occupy a place, but operate by taking advantage of opportunities that arise from moving through the space occupied by strategies and seizing the moment to act – they depend on the use of time for their success. A tactic:

is devious, it is dispersed, but it insinuates itself everywhere, silently and almost invisibly, because it does not manifest itself through its own products, but rather through its ways of using the products imposed by a dominant economic order. (Certeau, 1984:xii-xiii)

In the field of research, one could apply these terms of strategy and tactics to the task of holding a consecrated position within the field. Strategies are used by practitioners already occupying a position in the field who wish the delimitations of the field to remain as they are. Those who do not occupy a position in the field, but wish to, need to use tactics: they need to incorporate into their practice something that will make their practice acceptable within the structure of the field.

Certeau states on several occasions that strategies, being aligned with place, hold greater power than tactics, which need to make use of time for their advantage. Tactics do not hold a place, but only occupy a space: the 'art of the weak' (Certeau, 1984:37). Certeau's concern, in describing strategies and tactics, is to elucidate 'battles or games between the strong and the weak' (Certeau, 1984:34). A strategy is the calculus of force-relationships which becomes possible when a subject with will and power (a proprietor, an enterprise, a city, a scientific institution) can be isolated from an

¹ As one participant commented in another discussion: 'I think it's a loathsome activity. I like genre in general but that's one genre crossing I do not like at all. Some people have made it possible ...but in general I find it a self-indulgent practice for people who are neither good creative writers nor specially good critics ... In general, I think it's an easy intellectual practice for people who don't really have the time for creative writing and want to be self-indulgent about research' (Hannah, 2001:F, 4-5).

environment (Certeau, 1984:35-6). Strategies are spoken of and discussed, as they are afforded legitimacy within the culture. Academics with an interest in university research in Australia would know of the CSIRO; many would have heard of the ARC's three Centres of Excellence; few outside the humanities would have heard of the Council for Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences (CHASS). When Dr Brendan Nelson, Minister for Education, Science and Training, was asked about funding for research in the humanities at his 2003 National Press Club Address, he stated that CHASS was, 'one of the measures ... about which you wouldn't have read, because a lot of this stuff doesn't get reported' (Nelson, 2003c). The power of research still resides in the strategies of science. 'The space of the tactic is the space of the other' (Certeau, 1984:37).

Both Frow (1995) and Buchanan (1995) describe and analyse, to varying degrees, Certeau's metaphors of strategies and tactics in relation to dominant and dominated positions, which I will use to help describe the power relation of research and creative writing. Frow states that Certeau's understanding of power only allows for a top-down analysis of power relations. His concern is with 'a polar model of domination' that he sees elucidated in the examples Certeau puts forward to demonstrate the workings of strategies and tactics: e.g. the imposition of Spanish culture on the South American Indians (Certeau, 1984:xiii). Frow says this only shows power coming from the one direction, making tactics 'a single pathos of resistance' rather than a complex and diverse struggle (Frow, 1995:55).

My reading of Certeau does give tactics a more nuanced view than just resistance. Certeau describes tactics in the act of a renter transforming an apartment (1984:xxi), and a driver's skill in manoeuvring the streets of Rome (1984:18). A sense of power resides here, not in the authority of a strategy, but in the adaptability and manoeuvrability of tactics, which I think, risk going unnoticed because of their lack of visibility. Certeau states:

Power is bound by its very visibility. In contrast, trickery is possible for the weak, and often it is his only possibility, as a 'last

resort': 'The weaker the forces at the disposition of the strategist, the more the strategist will be able to use deception.' I translate: the more the strategy is transformed into tactics. (Certeau, 1984:37)

Trickery and deception, the power tools of the weak, are part of an armoury of operations (among them cunning, simulations, discoveries and laughter) that have the ability to insinuate themselves into the space of strategies. Creative writers' adoption of the exegesis is certainly not a 'simple pathos of resistance', but a manoeuvre to gain a position, possibly eventually a strategic one.

I have concerns too with Buchanan's notion of the strategy/tactic metaphor, firstly because he argues that tacticians have no agency, and following from this, there can be no top-down dialectics of power:

Strictly speaking, it is only possible to *operate* tactically or strategically; one cannot *be* tactical or strategic. It is this feature of his apparatus, the fact that it does not require any process of identification, that enables Certeau to operate outside of the imperatives of dialectics. Because of it, he no longer has to identify 'top' or 'down', and can therefore show without contradiction that the manifestly powerful are vulnerable to the manifestly weak. So, far from top-down, Certeau's conceptualisation of power is pluralist. (Buchanan, 1995:110 – emphasis in original)

In reference to the first point, Certeau clearly refers to 'strategists', as mentioned in his quote above, who have forces at their disposal, and in so doing, certainly demonstrate agency. And by basing his disagreement of top-down power on this, Buchanan fails to make a valid claim against the dialectic. I agree, though, that strategies and tactics are more pluralist than Frow's analysis allows. The fact that resistance by universities around Australia to including creative writing as part of higher degrees has been worn down over the past ten years demonstrates the shifting, merging and restructuring of the strategy of legitimate knowledge.

Comments from the focus groups reinforce the idea that strategies not only emanate from the top down, but are reinforced by others outside the 'proper place' occupied by

strategies (Certeau, 1984:xix). One participant stated there was a need for the an exegesis when undertaking creative writing projects because the nature of the university requires one to think at a different level about what one is doing (Tracy, 2001:H,1). Another said:

A creative PhD with a big theoretical component is the bar up as high as it can go. (Sally, 2001:C,19)

That the majority of creative writers in the university accept the exegesis in the creative writing area shows that strategies have the power to influence all those wishing to be included in the field as well as those already in it. This resonates with Bourdieu's notion of the 'illusion of the absolute' (1996:286), where he explains that aesthetic dispositions in the field of cultural production are self-inventive moves by practitioners of aesthetics to adjust themselves in accord with the social space of the field. What this means is that someone's habitus, adjusted in accord with a field, can only be so because of the long history of influences in the field that constituted it as it is, and also the person's own exposure to instruments and views particular to that field (Bourdieu, 1996:289).

The Illusion of the Absolute

I will exemplify this concept through some responses from the focus group discussions. A part of these discussions was to gauge participants' acceptance of the exegetical component of postgraduate higher degrees. My expectation, prior to my fieldwork, was that creative writers in universities would be somewhat resistant to, or resentful of, the added 'burden' of an exegesis. While I found academics and postgraduates certainly resented DEST's limited categories in its data collection of academic publications (which exclude creative writing), the reaction to the exegesis was somewhat ambiguous, demonstrated by comments such as these:

People don't value the creative work ... It is the product of serious intellectual effort, which we all know it is. (Julie, 2001:C,8)

Then, a few minutes later, she went on to say:

I think that people here who are doing these PhDs [creative writing with exegesis] are interested in that intellectual side as well. (Julie, 2001:C,9)

And then later still:

If you're interested in that intellectual side, your PhD degree [creative writing with exegesis] also says to the outside world, 'I know how to do research'. It has to do with the skills side of it, and what it says about your intellectual capabilities (Julie, 2001:C,14)

What I need to note here, for the benefit of the reader, is that these changes of opinion as to the knowledge status of creative writing were not prompted from my running of the group discussions. In the discussions, I did not direct their course, apart from starting dialogue with a planned question if a topic was exhausted (see Appendix B). I did not give any personal point of view, and kept interjection to a minimum, usually just to ask for clarification of a point. Most participants, in the discussion quoted from above, voiced their opinions with more conviction as the dialogue progressed (which tended to happen in the majority of the focus groups as participants relaxed into the discussion). Their comments tended, increasingly, to favour assumptions made in the field of research that followed the underlying doxa of what research was – an intellectual pursuit, of which creative writing was not an accepted part – even though this conflicted with their desired outcome for creative writing.

With this in mind, in my analysis of comments from the focus groups there is often a difference between how the participants see their actions and how I interpret them (Bourdieu, 1996:223). They are operating from a position where they are striving to be accepted in the field of research and can acknowledge this struggle. I am operating from a position where I can recognise and articulate how the narrow definition of the creative writer at the autonomous pole of the field of cultural production impacts on the narrow definition of the researcher at the autonomous pole of the field of research.

Bourdieu's analysis of the field of cultural production is particularly useful here. Conditions that constitute dispositions, combined with a field's social history, comprise the meanings, values and judgements particular to that field (1996:290). Where I feel

Bourdieu's argument is limited in his reference to an aesthetic, which is always a privileged one, be it the nineteenth century art lover (1996:288), or the museum visitor (1996:289). Surely, through use of this analysis there is as much aesthetic relevance on the work of graffiti artists, or a visit to the local pinball parlour?

To get back to research: positions in the academy that eschew creative work as a form of academic work reinforce the doxa of research that keeps the academy functioning *as it is*, and reinforcement of these assumptions, especially by those who have a wish to change them, only makes the doxa stronger:

I was quite keen from the outset, talking about designing the PhD and getting it up, to have it perceived as a writing research degree, and so people graduated having demonstrated excellence in two writing disciplines rather than just one ... the notion was that it be something that was more rather than less in any sense. (Emily, 2001:D,3)

Writing and research are held to be two distinct activities. (One wonders how research is ever communicated.) There was no acknowledgement, or even indication, that people thought that writing in the academy may produce a different text to that written outside the field – that it may be more grounded in social, cultural and philosophical insights:

We need the exegesis because I don't think we can forget that people are coming to do creative writing PhDs within an academy. You don't have to have something that says PhD creative writing in order to be a writer. (Sandra, 2001:D,12)

Creative writers in the focus groups supported the status quo and saw the exegesis as a necessary part of the 'creative' academic process. This reinforcing of the doxa is propounded by Zizek as 'non-knowledge of the reality'. He states:

we have finally reached the dimension of the symptom, because one of its possible definitions would also be 'a formation whose very consistency implies a certain non-knowledge on the part of the subject': the subject can 'enjoy his symptom' only in so far as its logic escapes him – the measure of the success of its interpretation is precisely its dissolution. (Zizek, 1994:305)

A frequent question addressed in the focus groups was why writers don't just go out and write a book rather than come to university if they do not want to work within further constraints:

We have always stuck with the idea that the exegesis is required ... I, personally, don't think that there is anything wrong at all with the idea of the exegesis being a part of university practice. If you just want to write a novel, fine, go write a novel and get it published. But, you know, the thing about writing a novel *and* getting a PhD for it – it seems to me that the exegesis is an important part of that. (Nick, 2001:E,4)

What this notion fails to gauge is an important distinction of the different functions of writing. As outlined in Chapter One, there are various positions a writer as researcher can occupy within the field of research. In Bourdieu's analysis of the field of cultural production, he talks about the writer of social critique (someone who speaks to the people), the writer intent on aesthetic form ('art for art's sake'), or the writer whose work is directed at a large public to gain them economic reward (Bourdieu, 1993:165-8). In the university, and more specifically the field of research, these positions apply too. But also, a different view prevails depending on one's position, whether it is from outside or inside the field. What the focus group discussions revealed was a lack of understanding of the sociological factors that influence institutions and individuals and the complex way these two (the thing and the disposition) interact and play out. This was evident in the unidirectional focus of the position of the creative writer: as a producer of heteronomous art in the field of cultural production, and hence, the necessity for the exegesis in order to bring the writer into an autonomous consecrated position once they entered the academy. In the discussions, creative writers in the academy always placed their counterparts outside the academy in the heteronomous position.

The relationship of the narrative of creative writing to other narratives has, in part, been determined by what Certeau describes as a 'double displacement'. This double displacement is possible in numerous situations, for example, in the interaction between hierarchally placed groups. Those outside the alpha group know they do not belong there but wish to, and if they are invited to join this group, they will often eagerly join in, hoping to be accepted. The double displacement occurs when they are told by the alpha group that they really do not fit in.

In the academy, one form of discourse, for example, medical science, portrays itself as legitimate by highlighting another discourse, such as literary studies, as not. This deduction is fallacious but is successful because of its appeal to the underlying doxa of research, reinforced by those who hold positions of greater legitimacy and consecration in the field. In terms of creative writing:

fiction is deported to the land of the unreal, but the discourse that is armed with the technical “know-how” to discern errors is given the supplementary privilege of representing something “real”.
(Certeau, 1986:201)

Literary studies, in relation to creative writing (rather than medicine), is a legitimate research practice, which shows legitimacy changes with different standards and objects of measurement.

Creative writing is set up as a practice outside legitimate research practices by other practices that establish what is valid by delimiting their own discourses. To enable this, it is necessary for the consecrated discourses to reinforce the legitimating practices of the ‘institutional structure’ at the site of contestation, but in a covert way (Ward, 2000:43). This happens when practitioners, who hold legitimate positions, allow enough space for contestation to take place. But this ‘play of social forces’ is always defeated by the dominant dispositions because they uphold the principles of the legitimating structure.

The postgraduate creative writer is involved in another double: they are doubly enveloped by autonomous principles in pursuing a place in the field of research. In choosing to enter the field of research rather than be a creative writer who ‘writes a novel and gets it published’, one eschews heteronomy. The postgraduate creative writer is bound to an autonomous position by the fact they choose to operate their practice within the confines of a university. In analysing the reason for an exegesis, if it is caught up in a sociological confirmation of a writer’s acceptance to uphold a disposition required in an autonomous position, then this is an erroneous and tautological task.

One could argue that creative writers in the university do not necessarily have to turn their backs on heteronomy – they can still obtain economic success in the broader social field by producing work of publishable quality. But publishable quality in the academy does not have such heteronomous connotations. The publishable quality of creative writing, undertaken within the boundaries of the university, means ‘it can sustain the same sort of critical scrutiny deployed in the study of exemplary texts, that it can contribute to knowledge in the same fashion’ (Dawson, 2001:267).

All writing programs in universities in Australia have the opportunity to belong to a national body of writers, known as the Australian Association of Writing Programs (AAWP). The AAWP produces a biannual on-line journal called *Text*, containing among other things papers, commentary and editorial concerning the issue of the exegesis in creative writing higher degrees. Why the continuous debate in *Text*? Why do writers in the university keep discussing (and worrying over) the subject if they have accepted the doxic position of research?

In 2004 the AAWP produced a special issue of *Text*, solely related to the topic of the exegesis. Some articles looked at the ways in which an exegesis can be written. Some looked at the reasons *for* writing an exegesis:

The creative component of the work can frequently be cast as art practice or professional development, and “research” as conventional scholarly – book based or library based – theoretical, analytical, or critical research. (Fletcher & Mann, 2004)

Some looked at the difficulties *of* writing an exegesis:

The actual composing of this type of hybrid thesis produces a creative product that could not have been the same in a non-academic context. In other words, the exegesis is the critical factor. (Kroll, 2004)

Very few argued against the exegesis.

An assumption that came out in one article, and was echoed by others, was that if there is going to be a creative higher degree with no exegetic requirement, then the conditions for awarding that degree would mean the student did not need to demonstrate proficiency in creative *and* academic work, only creative work (Bourke & Neilsen, 2004:table 5). The ‘illusion of the absolute’ stops a creative writing thesis being one of creative and academic ability.

One paper uses Bourdieu’s notion of the logic of practice to argue that the exegesis can counteract the dominant logic and promote the creative thesis:

The social philosopher Pierre Bourdieu, contends that social and institutional systems that make up society or the *habitus*, operate according to two forms of logic: rational logic and an alternative logic, which may be understood as the logic of practice. Bourdieu explains that rationality achieves privileged status by a process of appropriating and subsuming, into its own logic, knowledge and cultural capital generated through practices that employ the alternative logic of practice. The exegesis can counteract this cultural “forgetting” by tracing and highlighting the logic of specific experiential inquiry. (Barrett, 2004 – emphasis in original)

Using Barrett’s terms, the exegesis does not ‘counteract’ the logic of ‘rational’ structures, but employs it. The requirement of an exegesis interpellates the ‘logic of practice’ into the research structure. Supporting the exegesis, by promoting its form of practice – used by the dominant practices in the university to maintain their own form of logic and exclude other practices – does not help to support a practice that is having difficulty in gaining entry into the academic sphere.

Creative Writing is Practice and Theory

This attack on one form of narrative, the creative narrative, is a consequence of the privileging of method:

Tom: You could write a novel without doing a skerrick of specific reading. You’re obviously drawing on what you know about the world, but ... I couldn’t have sat down and written my PhD off the top of my head.

Mary: But you’re drawing a lot on other things that you’ve read.

Tom: Yes, but in terms of the methodology of the research, it's quite different. (Focus Group, 2001:A,8)

The topic of methodology was introduced in discussions several times throughout the focus groups, and was of concern in relation to creative writing:

What is research in the creative writing discipline? (Nick, 2001:E,24)

The general understanding of this predicament was measured by this response:

There is a need for the exegesis because the university requires you to think at a different level about what you are doing. (Tracy, 2001:H,1)

This indicates the respondent believes that use of the creative writing narrative does not enable the writer to 'think' at the appropriate level. In being unable to articulate a methodology, creative writing is ostracised from the other narrative practices in the field of research.

Certeau argues that if there is too much methodologising, then one runs the risk of setting practices against each other based on whether they have a methodology or not, which has been evident in the broader field of education between the sciences and the 'rest' for the past two hundred years:

The idea of method has progressively overturned the relation between knowing and doing: on the base of legal and rhetorical practices, changed little by little into discursive 'actions' executed on diversified terrains and thus into techniques for the transformation of a milieu, is imposed the fundamental schema of a *discourse* organizing the way of *thinking* as a way of operating, as a rational management of production and as a regulated operation on appropriate fields. That is "method," the seed of modern science. (Certeau, 1984:65 – emphasis in original)

A hierarchy emerges between those practices that can be articulated by another discourse and those that cannot. Those that can, can be 'known'. It separates 'knowing' from 'doing', relegating those practices without an explanatory discourse to be incapable of thought:

Instituting the criteria of an exegesis assumes that theoretical narrative is critical and that creative writing is not. (Kathy, 2001:B,14)

In relation to creative practices, and creative writing specifically, this hierarchy reduces the function of research to what it shows, but not what it can tell or know, because it is not able. It becomes an aesthetic expression, which privileges its 'doing' without taking into account its 'knowing'. Where this sets up an additional dichotomy for creative writers is in the form of their practice. Their form of expression is narrative, not paint, or music or dance. Narrative is also the form used by practices specifically *not* labelled creative. To put it another way, creative practices other than creative writing can assume a 'properly artistic language' (Bourdieu, 1996:292) specific unto themselves, whereas creative writing's language cannot. People producing narrative in other practices may argue they eschew creativity, for example, in the retelling of an historical event or the writing up of the procedure of an experiment. These forms of narrative are generally a way of describing the process of a practice: e.g. science, music, maths. The form of presentation for creative writing (narrative) is different from other expressions of creativity because it can also be expressed in a non-creative way. This further adds to the difficulty of accepting creative writing as 'know-how' because those undertaking other writing practices do dismiss it as false – or at least as fantasy, confabulation. This can reduce creative writing to a 'doing', whereas other forms of narrative are ways of 'knowing'.

The divesting creative writing of its ability to know sets up this form of practice as only a 'doing', an uncontrollable wildness:

We're the wild beasts. (Michelle, 2001:B,5)

This aspect of creativity, mentioned in my description of Nietzsche's duality of art in Chapter Two, is only one side of a two-sided aspect to creativity that has been written about and spoken of as far back as the tales of the gods in ancient Greece. Nietzsche described art's duality using the analogy of Apollo and Dionysus. These two gods represent the competing sides, and compelling pull, of creative aspiration. The Apollonian outlook is rational, calm, and operates within established boundaries.

Dionysian traits, on the other hand, are irrational, passionate, and are realised by breaking out of the mould.

Apollo is the god of light and is associated with 'visible form, rational knowledge, and moderation'. Dionysus is the god of intoxication and presides over 'formless flux, mysticism, and excess' (Nietzsche, 2000:xvi). Nietzsche goes on to say that art does not evolve from a 'single principle', but is created from the tension, or 'tremendous opposition' between the 'transfiguring' power of the individual and the 'exultation' of discovering the core of humanity (Nietzsche, 2000:86):

We will have achieved much for the discipline of aesthetics when we have arrived not only at the logical insight but also at the immediate certainty of the view that the continuing development of art is tied to the duality of the Apollonian and the Dionysian: just as procreation depends on the duality of the sexes, which are engaged in a continual struggle interrupted only by temporary periods of reconciliation. (Nietzsche, 2000:19)

Apollo, the measured aspect to creativity and art, embodies the confidence of humanity in the individual to 'secure the future in the present by the agency of its own' creativity (Buchanan, 1995:51). Dionysus allows humanity redemption from past actions and a return to a 'golden age' by letting go of the restrictions of the present and looking to the future (Buchanan, 1995:53).

Another metaphor for the conflicting elements of creativity is that of the figure of Prometheus carrying the fire in the fennel stalk (Mason, 2003:236). Mason highlights the dangers of an uncontained creativity (a Dionysian approach to art) without the restraining powers of the constrained creativity (the Apollonian aspect of art). Without having contained the fire in the fennel stalk, Prometheus would not have been able to bring fire back to the earth from the gods. The analogy here is a powerful one, and pertinent to many present-day dilemmas, for example in the social ramifications of the battle between economic versus environmental practices:

To envisage a future which is no more than an extrapolation of the currently dominant trends is to see a prospect of gradual collective

suicide. And it may be that that will be our fate. We will only avoid it by either some wholesale reversion to pre-modern attitudes (which is hard to imagine taking place) or by making the notions of limits and interdependence central to our perceptions and decisions. The first (pre-modern) solution would mean rejecting creativity as a value; the second change would mean that creativity would cease to have the exemplary status which it has come to possess over the last hundred and fifty years. (Mason, 2003:235)

It is also pertinent to the notion of creativity, and how its value is always changing, from the purely ‘useless’, highly esteemed, reverence of the Romantic era, to today where creativity is increasingly viewed as part of practices capable of helping society to realise its potential, which is an ability to work with, and alongside, other practices for a greater understanding of our social existence. For creativity to be expressed in this capacity, it must be that the contained creative act is acknowledged as worthwhile – as a mixture of Apollonian constraint and Dionysian expression.

Buchanan, in analysing the Apollonian and Dionysian aspects of art, aligns these aspects to Certeau’s practices of strategies and tactics, and in doing so argues that art is a practice that incorporates both. ‘Insofar as thought can have an image, Apollo ... is the image of strategy’ and ‘Dionysos [sic], on the other hand, is the image of tactics’ (Buchanan, 1995:52). In terms of understanding art’s duality through the analogy of Apollo and Dionysus, this would mean that art is both strategy and tactic.

Buchanan’s argument about art contradicts Certeau’s ideas about one form of artistic practice, the narrative of telling stories. Certeau says narrative is a form of *mētis*, a practice encompassing three elements that combine to form something ‘close to everyday tactics’ (Certeau, 1984:81), and argues that *mētis* is a temporal practice, just like tactics, that increases its chances of success by judging the timing of its operations. It has the capacity for multifariousness not possible for those practices – strategies – already incorporated in structure; ‘it is an undoing of the proper place’ (Certeau, 1984:82). Thirdly, it articulates a space without possessing it, like a memory, and ‘like those birds that lay their eggs only in the other species’ nests, memory produces in a

place that does not belong to it' (Certeau, 1984:86). For Certeau, narrative, the telling of stories, is clearly a form of practice that uses tactics in order to operate. I would argue that the temporal, multifarious, and dispossessing traits of narrative consist of Dionysian and Apollonian aspects, but their operation and function is tactical. Creative writing needs both aspects to function, but creative writing's function (in the field of research) is tactical.

Writers, and especially creative writers, are using a tool not generally considered specialised – language. This is something every person uses every day, very unlike other creative forms such as art, dance, or music; and it is used in a way very different from other forms of research narrative. However, the analytical and conceptual use of everyday language to construct creative and/or theoretical language requires the acquisition of skills of negotiation and navigation. Universities have not appreciated how this is pertinent to creative as well as research writing:

What differs between academic and creative writing is the discipline, and the style and prose. You learn what is appropriate to each, but that's true of every genre. If you are writing in any given genre, you are learning a discipline of writing and its restrictions and constraints, formulas and expectations. I just have never had this sense that one of these disciplines is the poor cousin of the other, and I've never agreed with that notion that one is creative and the other is not. (Emily, 2001:D,5)

The reticence in universities to include creative writing as an area of stand-alone postgraduate research runs parallel to the ambivalent response of the education system as a whole to the study of creative writing. Both theory and creativity contribute to knowledge, and the concrete apparatus of the university needs to position them in balance:

Tom: Why did you feel the need to do creative writing at a university?

Sarah: I think it's a matter of partly being tested in a way where you can actually use both theory and creativity, or use theory in a creative way. (Focus Group, 2001:A,7)

Creative writing can contribute to knowledge, but without losing its aesthetic qualities.

Creative writing in the field of academic research would still have aesthetic qualities, but this would not be its only merit. It has the possibility of opening up areas of

knowledge rather than just be an aesthetically pleasing work to write or read, but only if ‘doing’, or *poiein*, and ‘knowing’, or *tekhne*, are kept together:

A number of good, solid European philosophers ... have pretty much forgotten the fundamental relationship that exists between *tekhne* (know-how) and *poiein* (doing). They have forgotten that the gaze of the West was once also the gaze of the ancient mariner fleeing the non-refractive and non-directional surface of geometry for the open sea, in quest of unknown optical surfaces, of the sight-vane of environments in uneven transparency, sea and sky apparently without limits, the idea of an essentially different, essentially singular world, as the initial foundation of the formation of meaning. The ship, being fast, was in fact the great technical and scientific carrier of the West. At the same time, it was a mix in which two absolute forms of human power, *poiein* and *tekhne*, found themselves working together ... the ship defines another power, in the face of what might arise: the power of the unexplored side of the failure of technical knowledge, as poetics of wandering, of the unexpected, the shipwreck which did not exist before the ship did; and beside this, very much alongside it, that stowaway, madness: the internal shipwreck of reason of which water, the fluid, remains a utopian symbol through the centuries. (Virilio, 1994:27-8 – emphasis in original)

What Virilio points to is that linking *tekhne* and *poiein* will lead to far greater experiences than those only using ‘knowing’ or ‘doing’. People who demonstrate creativity do not separate knowing from doing. Without the other, both knowing and doing lead to harm: people do not realise their potential, or their place, in the world; they go mad. The relationship between the concrete and the abstract is one of complementarity, and this needs to be appreciated and accepted in the field of research for creative writing to gain a place as a valid form of research practice:

The whole thing of the theory and practice working together, I mean, that’s been my bag for years and years. In other areas as well, you know, you can find a way to make the theory fit the practice or the practice fit the theory. It seems to me that that’s one area where this whole thing is valuable in terms of academic work. So much academic work, whatever field it’s in, is towards practice. You know, the geology department, for example, where you do mining. It’s all towards practice. And when they find a problem, they come back and they research it and they find it and it seems to me that one of those crossed boundaries (and this is exactly that) is that the practice is actually people’s perception of how life works. And that’s what fiction does. That’s what creative writing does. It’s that practice of living that lots of people actually get a lot out of by reading. They think, “Ooh, you know, this is how it works. Is *that* this person’s experience”, or “Hell, I’ve had that”. And it seems to me that that’s one way the whole practice of language works with the theory of language. You come away and you write about what

are people's experiences, in much the same way the geology department goes out, sends the people out, and works out how it works under the ground or wherever, whatever department it happens to be. To me that's one way it does the practice and theory in a way that perhaps academic English writing doesn't. (Sandra, 2001:D,9)

For creative writing to be separated from theory would mean creative writing would only be recognised as a concrete task, a 'doing'. An example of the consequences of separating practice from theory with respect to creative writing in the academy occurred in the US. Creative writing was initially moved into universities in the US because its practical aspects were a good juxtaposition to the theory of literary studies, the other aspect of English departments (that were increasingly moving away from grammar and rhetoric). But the bifurcation of English into creative writing and literary studies created a situation where:

“even the best of the writing programs are not integrated with other facets of literary studies. ‘Creative writing’ is a (usually) suspect alternative to ‘criticism’ or ‘scholarship’”... On one side there is “an immense elaboration of the techniques of composition” accompanied by “a fatal ignorance of the past”; on the other side an “elaborate sophistication regarding poetic theory” that goes with “a fatal ignorance of composition.” ... Technique has been divorced from theory – composition from the past – as each section of the English department sought to perfect its own speciality. (Myers, 1996:168)

The US academy pushed the principle of creativity being attainable through teaching, and eschewed the (essentialist) notion that creativity was inherent in a person. But over-reliance on this principle meant creative writing became separated from all other disciplines in order to manifest itself as a university discipline.

Australian creative writing programs, having got off to a start nearly a century later than in the US, have evolved in a very different way, but give creative writing a similar ontological understanding in relation to the concrete/abstract divide. Barriers block creative writing at the research level based on similar ideas about creativity that resulted in creative writing being divorced from theory in the US. Again, it is unacknowledged that creative writing is a 'doing' *and* a 'knowing'. From the American example, one can see the consequences of separating creative writing from English departments, or

from literary or cultural studies areas in Media departments. An acceptance of the separateness of doing from knowing permeates the university, and the positions and dispositions in the field of research. Even applicants for creative writing higher degrees in universities can have very craft-based ideas towards writing training: they see a clear separation of their 'craft' from forms of abstract thought in which they see little or no value:

Sandra: That kind of discrimination also comes from the student body. In the graduate diploma and the MA that we have as course work, I'd say – maybe not so much now, but in the first stages – there were a number of people who came to do the creative writing graduate diploma who were quite resentful about the fact that they had to read other people's work.

Emily: They were resistant to the notion of learning to read?

Sandra: That utterly reinforced my belief that theory and practice *must* work together. And it works the other way too. I honestly think you can teach such a great deal about literary appreciation or literary theory or whatever through practice. And the links seem to me to be very, very strong. To separate them is the worst possible thing that you could do, regardless of whether people come to us wanting to be creative writers or they want to know more about literature. (Focus Group, 2001:D,8)

The practice of immersing oneself in other's writing demonstrates the importance of the connectedness of concrete and abstract in creative writing. If creative writers only approach their writing as a craft, then they disregard the nuances necessary in their work for it to be socially connected.

Creative writing is a valuable form of expressing social ideas and opinions while making use of the imagination as well. It is not just 'the dumb beast on the couch', open to a myriad of interpretation. It is a tool of communication that reinforces, or upsets and disturbs the status quo. Creative writing is a way of knowing that has validity outside its own field because it does not try to tell the 'real', but in moving away from the 'real' into 'fictional space', it does more than describe. It is a way 'of knowing how to manipulate, dispose, and "place" words that constitutes a way of acting in the world (through becoming a tactic) that pries open the strategies set up by operating doxa (Certeau, 1984:79). Creative writing can add to new knowledge because:

presumably your whole idea would be that you're creating a new cultural artefact that can tell people something about our histories or who we are or how we perceive ourselves, which I think is a really valuable contribution to make. (Barbara, 2001:C,4)

Literature takes the reader away from the physical world into the world of the story. It also brings the reader back into everyday life because stories elucidate the everyday through their very social function. By way of making a detour – that is, through moving away from the ‘real’ – literature can ‘make a hit’, as Certeau says; it ‘produces effects, not objects’, it has a way of telling the real without ever having to resort to description (Certeau, 1984:79). No other form of words can do this. Literary works ‘send us back endlessly to a truth outside of literature, while we begin to betray that truth as soon as it draws us away from literature, with which, however, it cannot be confused’ (Blanchot, 1995:2). A creative piece of fiction is not solely written to be admired or enjoyed. In the act of contemplating it the reader can be taken past this to a realisation of action which the reading has invoked. The writer is:

the creator of a new reality, which opens in the world a wider perspective, a possibility by no means closed but such, on the contrary, that reality in all its forms is enlarged because of it. (Blanchot, 1982:212)

The writing presents for the reader a picture of some human concern, ‘often in the form of a complex picture embracing the conditions out of which these arise’ (Farrell, 1952:18-19). Storytelling helps mould our social context:

The value of studying literature lies not where our organization as a discipline would imply it does – in the knowledge we thereby acquire about literature – but rather in the transformations we and our students and readers undergo in the process. We need literary knowledge not so as to know literature, but so as to know the world and ourselves. (Paulson, 1988:155)

Within the realm of creative narrative, it is possible to explore the depth and breadth of human experience that may not actually eventuate in one’s life but because of the narrative experience can produce new knowledge about something. Writers can ‘trace possibilities of fuller freedom than are generally available in culture’ (Eldridge, 2001:83):

I mean, look at some poetry, and meditations by poets on their work, like Mallarmé. There was a lag of probably 70 years before people like Derrida were taking up those ideas, but there is a direct lineage of contribution to philosophy of language, Blanchot, Derrida and so on, from the kind of experimentation Mallarmé was engaged in. Just as with pure mathematics, it's not known whether the square root of minus one will contribute to anything but eventually it turns up, apparently in the end of a wing design of an aeroplane, you know. So, there's often an incredible lag and an unthinkable articulation between that kind of experimentation and official discourses that circulate. (Michelle, 2001:B,16)

Michelle's reference to Mallarmé has resonance here. Creative writers form and elucidate ideas that may not have instant relevance, but could possibly do so in future times. Writers, such as Mallarmé (and he was only one of many mentioned in the focus groups: other included Umberto Eco and John Coetzee) demonstrate, through their work, the effectiveness of knowing and doing and how their ideas, expressed creatively, have a greater chance of infiltrating the social milieu and resonating there:

But that's one reason people choose to write fiction. It's one reason scholars write fiction. I mean, you look at Umberto Eco. His fictions are quite entertaining but they're informed by a base level of his ideas. And the number of people who read his scholarly writings is minuscule compared with the number of people he can reach with his fiction writing. People will absorb ideas and think about them while they are enjoying the fiction without even being conscious that they are absorbing an idea and being influenced by it. That's a very powerful and seductive thing to offer a writer. If a writer has the capacity, or can see that they can train to have the capacity, to reach *that* readership rather than *that* readership, very many writers will do so because it's very enticing. If you've got something that you think is really important to say and you can say it in such a way that it reaches a larger group, that's a very attractive thing. (Emily, 2001:D,9-10).

Creative writing, along with other writing, provokes thought as its form of communication, and its medium can reach a wide audience. Writers may choose to undertake their writing in a university environment because they want their work to have the added authority of coming from the place of power, the academy. Writers out in the community, in the field of cultural production, practice from a place that has less economic and educational capital than the university, an '*indeterminate site* in the social structure' (Bourdieu, 1993:43 – emphasis in original). Writing from the university affords the writer a greater degree of legitimacy and consecration. It helps develop the link between thinker and writer, and show the importance of knowing and doing together.

If creative writers are to be equipped to write from a basis of knowledge, they need to be trained in an awareness of where they are situated in the social world and to understand how their ideas fit with surrounding ideas and discourses. They need to know why it is possible to say some things and not others, and the triggers for the motivation to speak of them. This ‘offer[s] ways of thinking through both the necessarily political act of creative writing, and the frameworks that delimit our creative possibilities’ (Webb, 2000:4). Knowledge of the physical and the social worlds comes about through the application of reason and creativity, two different but related modes of thought through which we come to understand and explain the world. This knowledge is not self-evident – we can only come to our understanding of it through human consciousness, within a framework of dominant knowledges and taxonomies (the current episteme).

In the academy, consecrated meanings are necessarily informed by and through research and creativity. In reference to creative writing, as with virtually any other form of knowledge and professional production, this does not entail enforced learning of a set of theoretical positions, nor rote learning of the building blocks of a craft, but rather the cultural entwining, through language, of theory and practice. If creative writers dismiss the importance of scholarship to writing – if there is no entwining of the practical with the theoretical – then this forces the focus onto the practicalities of the craft of writing and away from criticism and analysis which are necessary to inform creative writing. Realising the importance of both forms of writing – creative and critical – allows creative writing to stand in totality as a work of accepted scholarship containing ‘a dialogic engagement with theory, with language, with a range of social and cultural discursive formations’ (Dawson, 1997:72).

It is through the metaphor of the ‘fire and the fennel-stalk’ that the importance of creativity can be found. Creativity is something that must be contained: it necessarily needs limits and boundaries. But it is not something that should be offered only composed of the elements of craft, for that would mean that what the writer communicates is not informed by the limitations of the world in which he/she lives.

Writers must undertake their work as a crafting of words alongside writing's modality as a voice of cultural questioning.

Writing as the Zoo of Society

Creative writing is a way of knowing that has validity outside its own field:

Sharon: The honours coordinator really took exception to the creative writing students engaging with theorists in an adversarial sort of way. He wanted to reinstate their position as writers. But it's the creative writing students who really get it.

Keith: Yes, it's the creative writing students who challenge theoretical constructs, more than any other student. (Focus Group, 2001:B,7)

Creative writing is a way of identifying what is going on, and what social problems are absorbing people and demanding official attention. There are many different forms of narrative, but creative writing is a narrative that explicates practices, all the practices that form human lives, so that *'a theory of narration is indissociable from a theory of practices, as its condition as well as its production'* (Certeau, 1984:78 – emphasis in original).

Without narration, there would be no way of understanding practices or carrying them out. Narration is part of practice. Popular writing, as Certeau says, is the 'zoo of everyday practices' (1984:78). Creative narrative is a particular form of practice, a way of 'doing', that is at the same time a particular form of understanding, a way of 'knowing'. It is, though, different from other forms of narrative, not only in an obvious way, such as from scientific narratives, but from other narratives that also describe social and cultural relations, for example, narratives produced by the media. These narratives of social practices depend for their verification on the establishment of visible 'proofs', which relates to the 'proper place' used by strategies in order to verify and justify their position. Proof is demanded in politics, in sport, even war, and produced by journalists, opinion polls and other media, who 'present themselves as messengers from a "reality"' (Certeau, 1984:185). In a long succession of 'proof' production, humanity has gone from believing in the unseen, through a struggle that 'based itself on

a contract between the seen and the real', to believing only what can be seen (Certeau, 1984:186).

This emphasis on proof privileges certain narratives only, but there are other ways of narrating social meaning and cultural interpretations. Not all social knowledge can be 'camouflaged as facts, data, and events' (Certeau, 1984:185), able to be neatly parcelled up and served with the evening meal as part of one's 'infotainment' package. For a narrative of social practices to be accepted in an 'official' capacity (e.g. in the field of research) only if it demonstrates a set methodology shows the increasing intrusion of this logic of proof in social and cultural areas of human lives (Bourdieu, 2003:67). Much of what goes on in a social and cultural context is not explicable through proof but still needs to be understood for the successful functioning of society. From out of human lives:

Things appear. Many of these "things" are human deeds (action) or the products of human efforts (work). Action and work would seem futile if they left no on-going impress on the world. Work's legacy is very often the things it creates which now furnish our world. But action that does not create a material object depends on stories for preservation – and for an impact on future deeds. (McGowan, 2002:162)

Creative writing produces narrative that often cannot point to a physicality or fact because of the nature of society itself, with its composition of attitudes, beliefs, values and mores that have no physical representation. If human meaning is what narrative in general seeks to produce, then creative writing is the specific narrative form that achieves this end.

Creative narrative has the capacity to unfold an understanding of our social and cultural space:

Creative writing is a critical engagement, a deconstructive engagement, with contemporary culture, at least from modernity on, in terms of writing practices. (Michelle, 2001:B,6)

It is not a narrative only concerned with fictionalising the world and making the inanimate animate, for example:

Why is it sane to find meaning in a doodle and insane to find meaning in a puddle of rain? Why is it sane to count the incidence of the word 'murder' in Shakespeare and insane to count frost cracks in the sidewalk? Why is mathematics sane and numerology insane? Why is astronomy sane and astrology insane? Why is it sane to perform an autopsy and insane to read entrails? Why can we sanely inspect the clouds to learn tomorrow's weather, but not the sex of an unborn child? Why is it sane to assign meaning to the elements of a Nepalese altar and insane to assign meaning to the elements in a chemical compound? Doodles, Shakespeare, and Nepalese altars are human; we can interpret their human significance. Puddles, frost cracks, clouds, and chemical compounds are not human and have no human significance. (Dillard, 1982:138)

The doxa of how meanings are formed gives free reign to the interpretative process when it is applied to the human world – society – but limits what counts as valid interpretation as applied to the given world – nature (Dillard, 1982:139). Creative writing, as part of the field of research, is a narrative that generally follows this doxa. Creative writers may direct their stories through interpretations of puddles and frost cracks, but their main concern is to engage their stories with culture.

The current trend in accepted approaches to research is to try to extract a limited interpretation of the social world as well as the physical world, evidenced by an increasing government focus on promoting social research for economic benefits. For example, the directives to SS&H research in terms of National Research Priorities have an economic slant on social research's ability to solve issues. Even in areas such as higher education, that have operated with a high degree of autonomy in the past, there is increasing subordination of independent practices to economic logic, for example, class sizes, and areas of research strengths. Though there has not yet been much intrusion into what is taught and discussed in individual subjects, there is certainly growing external influence on what subjects are able to be offered to students. Within this environment, creative writing is easily framed as an unprivileged social discourse, decoration rather than substance, because it cannot be extricated from its social situation

and studied in isolation. It cannot be measured, graphed, quantified, generalised, abstracted, nor understood in terms of causal relations; although structuralists did just this in their analysis of literature. They scientificised the study of creative writing, endlessly charting phonemes and morphemes across novels and folktales. English, or literary studies, while sidelined in the great technologising of higher education, has options to present itself as more ‘rigorous’, while the practice of creative writing is always going to seem personal and subjective. Narratives that have meaning only by understanding the whole text cannot be examined out of context and therefore, cannot be constituted into this scientific space (Certeau, 1984:20).

Because the principle of multiple verification of research findings – the scientific experiment approach to research – is still dominant in evaluating rigour of process and credibility of findings, a discourse that cannot be extracted from its social context is unable to manifest its validity. Its ‘unscientific’ core leaves it without a way to maintain research relevance. What can be extracted from it – its grammar, syntax, genre, pragmatic and semiotic analysis – are those understandings arrived at by scientificising language, but what ‘cannot be uprooted remains by definition outside the field of research’ (Certeau, 1984:20). Certeau explains this as a contemporary turning to simulacra:

Citation thus appears to be the ultimate weapon for making people believe. Because it plays on what the other is assumed to believe, it is the means by which the “real” is instituted. To cite the other on their behalf is hence to make credible the simulacra produced in a particular place. (Certeau, 1984:188-9)

Any researcher, that is, will accept research findings which have been proven through reiteration and re-verification, to be valid, even if those findings conflict with their initial postulation. In the sciences this is typically achieved through multiple replications of the original experiment; in the social sciences and humanities it often comes about through multiple citations of a work of writing by peers in the field.

Creative writing is rarely cited as the substantiation for argument, in research writing; when it appears at all it is typically only as the raw material of study, or sometimes as a decorative epigram, for instance. Thus it is a narrative left out of 'knowing', unless it incorporates some form of simulacra. The requirement to produce an exegesis at the postgraduate research level is a way of making the 'knowing' of the creative practice more visible:

With the conventional PhD, the research is there to see in the footnotes, whereas in the creative PhD there's no signposting to say this came from here and this came from here. So you can pick up a research thesis and open it to any page and you can see the research as well as the interpretation, but with a creative PhD you can only see the interpretation. It might be there in equal amounts, but it's hidden. (Russell, 2001:D,20)

The production of the validity simulacrum through the process of citation perpetuates a 'fiction' that entails even those within the area of creative writing itself believing in the necessity for an exegesis. This gives force to the idea that creative writing itself is not a valid form of research. This simulacrum that operates in universities has the power to include and exclude, thereby reducing the creative writing practice to a 'deviant' practice. An insistence that all discourses within the academy use citation in a pre-established way in order for their work to receive validation allows for the opportunity of:

changing "belief" into "mistrust," into "suspicion," and indeed into denunciation, as well as into the opportunity for citizens to manipulate politically what serves as a circular and objectless credibility for political life itself. (Certeau, 1984:189)

There are various narrative systems, and fiction is one of them. The higher status of 'legitimate' narratives allows them to measure the world's 'truths' and be measured and verified by other (legitimate) narratives. In the construction of narratives that are pertinent within the academy (and especially for PhD research degrees), narrative is often created in a way that looks at something from an angle not thought of before:

But if you want to retain the integrity of creative writing why can't you argue that it should be 100% creative writing. Why say we should be allowed to have a 50/50 mix in the one piece which is ficto-critical. Aren't you then denigrating the critical work that the purely ostensibly creative work does? I'm just not sure that using ficto-criticism as a kind of way of saying, "Well, look, I've got bits of theory here and bits of theory stuff in it as well".

That seems to me a way of evading the question of why isn't the straightforward novel or book of poems critical in some way. (Roger, 2001:B,15)

Creative narrative is also about constructing meaning that will have some kind of transformative effect – the narrative it engages can be verified on a social level:

Storytelling is vitally important even though we are often quick to trivialize it as entertainment. When people are under psychologic stress or require answers to universal questions, a story comes to the rescue by sharing the experience of others. We want stories for succor, for assurance that we do not confront human problems alone and that someone has walked this path before us. Stories convey meaningful experiences and prompt us to action, allay our anxieties, or fulfil other psychic functions. We long to know the experience of other people. To satisfy our psychic anxieties, we ask for stories, not logical propositions, rational explanations, or laundry lists of facts. In many circumstances, only hearing the experience of those who have gone before us can satisfy our psychic need. The centrality of stories in every culture and the psychic satisfaction they unstill indicates how important it is for us to attempt to reach the quality of another's subjective experience. (Cytowic, 1993:216)

Written narrative is a part of every discourse (except perhaps maths and music composition), but in terms of creative writing, is often relegated to a 'lesser', story function. Other forms of narrative hold greater legitimation, even though they are often telling a story as well, and from only one perspective: if fiction and theory are compared, theory already, always approaches interpretation from a particular standpoint – 'the meaning precedes the interpretation' (Young 1996:102). Creative narrative can operate performatively from a myriad of perspectives: fiction is in among the social world, it arises from the social world, it is, 'the zoo of everyday practices' (Certeau, 1984:78). Theory exists outside of the thing it is judging but literature is a view of the thing from the inside – a view of the everyday. Certeau's analogy of the zoo is an important one: the narrative of theory is only one point of observation; the narrative of fiction is capable of illuminating multifarious viewpoints.

The Use of Tactics against Strategies

Sandra: Certainly *** would argue that having the exegesis as part of the creative writing PhD is a compromise. The committees that finally approved the creative writing PhD still had to have proof that creative writing has a research component, where most of us would take that for granted. It's just that the product is different. (Focus group, 2001:D,3)

The actions of creative writers in the field of research – in agreeing to produce an exegesis as part of their dissertation in order to find a way into the research arena in the university – could be seen as tactical. There is a difference between how they see their actions and how I see them. In short, I am circumscribing creative writers' actions to that of negotiating positions within a field, in a particular way. They may interpret their reasons for agreeing to an exegesis in other ways. To date, creative writers have not been successful in demonstrating that their work is equal to the practices of other narratives for arriving at new knowledge. Until this can be accomplished, creative writing will be considered to have failed as a form of knowledge in the field of research and will always require an added form of narrative to explain and justify itself.

Creative writing, in this instance, is conflated with other creative practices, such as painting, music and drama. Creativity is a:

knowledge ... already written in practices, but no yet enlightened.
Science will be the mirror that makes it readable, the discourse
"reflecting" an immediate and precise operativity lacking
language and consciousness, an operativity already knowledgeable
but unrefined. (Certeau, 1984:68)

Certeau discusses how, since the eighteenth century, art has been aligned with doing, and science with knowing, so that art needs science to explain it. In other words, art is 'ethnologized' because it is separated from the field of research, and in order to be properly understood, it needs to be explained (Certeau, 1984:64).

This points to the 'dumb beast on the couch' metaphor, and here I will highlight another accepted psychoanalytic analogy that strengthens the 'science reads art' idea. Trying to explain the process of art is like trying to explain what/how someone thinks before they reach the symbolic stage (an act of maturation), where the developing child realises

itself as a separate being. As Lacan (1977) explains, this development into the symbolic takes the child from the real, the 'real' being where everything is inexplicable, where there is no definition, no boundaries, no place or time. From there the child moves to the imaginary (the mirror stage), which is the beginning of the formation of the self through recognising one's own image or reflection. The qualities of the 'real' mean speech is impossible until the mirror stage is reached (Lacan, 1977:1-7). The analogy to art and creative practice is that these occur in a space not able to articulate itself, so until the practitioner 'leaves' that space and joins the rest of 'us', they cannot explain the creative work. This reinforces the idea that creative works cannot speak on their own. If the ethnologised form of narrative is held to be the only way to explain what is going on in creative narrative, then this relegates the creative narrator to being an observer of a 'know-how' they do not own. The work of the artist, or creative practitioner, can only be known by the interpreter, 'who illuminates it in his discursive mirror', but who, along with the artist, does not possess this work either (Certeau, 1984:71). It also sets creative narrative in a position of inferiority to 'scholarly' narrative:

It is a knowledge that subjects do not reflect. They bear witness to it without being able to appropriate it. They are in the end the renters and not the owners of their own know-how. Concerning them it occurs to no one to ask whether there is knowledge; it is assumed that there must be, but that it is known only by people other than its bearers. (Certeau, 1984:71).

From the focus groups emerged the notion that in all narrative there is an element of interpretation of the knowledge 'subjects do not reflect':

I think all scholarly writing is a form of self-expression. It's a performance of one's self in a certain arena. It's very personal. It just has a mask of impersonality. (Emily, 2001:D,10)

I would argue that the problem stems from this elevation of the critical position with its corollary, the apparent disinvestment of the scientific observer in the product. Writers, the logic goes, are too invested in their work, and the product of their work is too personal, so that only the outside interpreter of creative work can make it 'speak' in research terms. This of course means that the creative product cannot stand on its own

in the research environment; and suggests a problem with requiring the producer of the creative work to produce an exegesis of that same work. How does the creative writer, who like their work is in the position of ‘dumb beast on the couch’, find a way of knowing and articulating its meaning, or the distance necessary to objectify the writing? If the creative writer also has to perform in the role of critic of his or her own work in order for that work to be accepted as research then the critic must be in the role of metanarrator; which seems to go against the logic that required an exegesis in the first instance.

The problem is more pervasive than that, yet less recognisable. It is accepted standard practice that all work in the academic field has undergone a critical process. This is part of how academia is defined. And it is almost doxic that creative practices encounter the critic on their way to acceptance in the cultural field, and to expression in the world beyond. In the case of a creative writing product being accepted into the academy, the creative writer has to undergo both these processes – firstly, by being their own critic in terms of artistic product, and secondly, by producing their creative and critical product for examination – in order to pass the usual criteria, the academic critique. Stipulating an exegesis is tantamount to saying the creative product cannot speak for itself, and requires further interpretation:

Mary: It is not especially helpful [the exegesis], and it does seem a bit like tokenism. If you *do* believe that creative stuff ...

Tom: If narrative is legitimate knowledge ...

Mary: is of value ...

Tom: then let it stand.

Mary: then let the university help to produce it. If you don't ...

Mary & Tom: then kick it out. (Focus Group, 2001:A,9)

Further interpretation, through the exegesis, sets out precisely the doxa of research, because only a particular form of narrative is received as research. Those who undertake to produce this form of narrative are constituted with the power of interpreting other forms of narrative that can expose:

a secret of which they are the “true” interpreters. It interposes a frontier between the text and its readers that can be crossed only if

one has a passport delivered by these official interpreters.
(Certeau, 1984:171)

It is as if this form of narrative has greater rigour than other narratives:

Sarah: I also think, though, that I'm one of these people that is in favour of having an exegesis as well as the creative work, and I know that you weren't.

Tom: Yeah.

Sarah: And that you resented it a lot. I didn't feel that at all. I actually thought it was quite a useful thing to do. And part of that was to show that you do have both strands that are interweaving.

Tom: Why do you need to show that?

Sarah: I think there's a range of ...

Tom: It goes to the heart of Sue's topic.

Sarah: It does, it does.

Tom: I reckon it just seemed to me it was a way for the university to show that this was legitimate research; that the novel, as research, couldn't stand on its own.

Angela: Yes, we have rigour.

Mary: Called mortis. (Focus Group, 2001: A,8)

'Rigor resembles nothing so much as *rigor mortis*' (McGowan, 2002:95 – emphasis in original). Yet overall, the majority of people in the focus groups were in favour of the exegesis, which goes to show the power of the doxa to determine what is considered 'proper' knowledge. Even those who believe their practice has a legitimate place in the field of research, for whatever reason – perhaps because it falls within the OECD definition of research; perhaps because it allows the opportunity for postgraduate work in any discipline offered at the undergraduate level – unwittingly play the game when it comes to hegemonic rules.

But rather than suggesting writers are simply 'dupes' of the doxa, it could be argued that their actions, in accepting the exegesis, are tactical: they have used the exegesis to get creative writing into universities:

Originally, those who were considered worthy of providing commentary, of creating the exegeses, had authority. They were the elect intermediaries between Holy Scripture and the laity. As supposedly objective interpreters, not creators with a stake in the outcome – after all, only God was the true creator – they analysed layers of meaning in both written texts and sermons. Authors in a university community, who are used to lecturing rather than sermonising, are now in the position of taking back some authority to speak for their artform as well as for themselves. But it hasn't

been easy. Theory as much as a dubious administration in some quarters challenged that right. (Kroll, 2004)

I argue for the use of the exegesis as tactic, as a way for creative writing to penetrate the system, by way of ‘using the products imposed by a dominant economic order’ (Certeau, 1984:xiii). Buchanan, in his elucidation of Certeau’s tactics and strategies, argues that in the social sphere, there cannot be one form of practice that guides and restricts all other practices. He ‘contends that no one type of practice can be said to dominate, or more fundamentally, provide the condition of possibility for all others’ (Buchanan, 1995:65-6). However, in the case of the field of research and its requirement of an exegesis attachment for a creative writing thesis, it seems that ‘one type of practice’ has indeed ‘provided the conditions of possibility’ for others. Certeau’s tactics and strategies are specifically useful in highlighting what does happen in fields and sites under a dominant mode of operation, such as demonstrated by the production of research narrative in a university. Certeau specifically says that there are other ways of operating, but they are concealed by the dominant mode of operation (Certeau, 1984:xi-xii). This ‘monism’, which Buchanan denies (1995:65), has multitudinous and varying effects and is revealed in the elucidation of the position of creative writing in the field of research.

On the Couch

A Pluralised Society

Neoliberal doxa is like the ‘invisible hand of the powerful’, where legitimation is phrased in terms of the universal determinant, economics (Bourdieu, 2003:26). It does not, however, necessarily have equal application to every social field: certainly economic capital may be the dominant discourse of society in general, but it need not drive universities to the same extent. Academic work is still undertaken with a degree of autonomy, and in the humanities and the arts, the *raison d’être* of work is not always the dollar. Although what dominates the current episteme is economic capital, cultural capital continues to inform discourse, practices, habitus, and structures of all fields. A

focus group comment on the value of creative writing, from which I quoted in Chapter Three, is also pertinent to this situation:

It's purely a funding thing, which is what really annoys me because we spend a lot of time arguing this ...We just wouldn't even be having this discussion. It's because people don't value the creative work and because the money only flows in certain directions, and that's really why we're jumping through hoops doing this. That's why the justification has to be there because the funding bodies don't think it is the product of serious intellectual effort, which we all know it is. (Julie, 2001:C,7-8)

Cultural capital plays a very important part in determining the 'structured and structuring structures' (Bourdieu, 1977:72). In the interplay of economic and cultural capital, one can be exchanged for the other (cultural into economic), but not the other way round. This poses a problem in Bourdieu's analysis of capital, according to Frow:

Within the dominant class "the structure of the distribution of economic capital is symmetrical and opposite to that of cultural capital", and this means both that the two forms of capital are mutually exclusive, and that – in so far as possession of either is a sufficient criterion for classification in the dominant class – they are in some way mutually convertible. Their structural difference is subordinated to their potential equivalence. But of course this argument is incomplete: in the first place because the conversion of capitals can take place only under certain conditions and at certain restricted levels of the market, and in the second place because conversion is not reciprocal (it is possible to convert cultural capital into economic capital, but not vice versa). In the last instance symbolic and real capital are not equivalent, and this means that there is a real question about the class location of intellectuals. (Frow, 1995:39-40)

What Frow overlooks here is the extent to which culture influences economics. It is part of our democratic structure, based on the utilitarian principle of the greatest good for the greatest number. This principle is not only applicable in economic terms and is why cultural political issues play such a major role in the public arena. To remain in power requires those who hold positions in the field of power to think outside the purely economic: they must be able to show the general public that humanitarian issues, or cultural values, are part of their leaders' agenda. As Schreuder states:

science and technology do not exist in a cultural vacuum, or outside a particularly social milieu. A fundamental concept of the "public good" is necessary, for example, to underpin the massive

state investment in the advancement of the laboratory and experimental sciences. Technology is, moreover, largely shaped by the social needs that are informed by the cultural values of a society. (1995:xi)

Culture maintains this power through the social contract. The social contract interpolates a person as much as it interpellates, taking away their right to do as they wish. It is not possible to extricate oneself from this contract. In order for people to live in a society, there is a necessity for 'Law', or obligation, otherwise individual 'Right' (which is the want of betterment for the self) will result in the inability of people to live safely together (Hobbes, 1651/1968:189).

Hobbes produced a model from which individuals could continue to live their 'Rights', while having their property protected, through mutual agreement to follow the 'Law'. This meant citizens had to give over some of their 'Rights' to a governing body in exchange for being protected by that body. It was a model that required an adherence to capitalist precepts, such as treating labour as a commodity (Hobbes, 1968:295), and the value of exchange being determined by the market – 'The value of all things contracted for, is measured by the Appetite of the Contractors: and therefore the just value, is that which they be contented to give' (Hobbes, 1968:208). What Hobbes did fail to take into account (and this is commensurate with my argument with Frow above) is the social influence of individuals drawn into this capitalist market, who form classes which stabilise the influence of government through perpetuating the value of cultural capital. Cultural capital maintains its power, and is posited in the dominant field. This relationship between cultural value and social rule-making highlights the importance of keeping cultural capital as an important factor in decision-making, structures and habitus, so that economic capital is *not* the only determining factor.

Culture is powerful enough for the dominant field to try to subsume it under its own rhetoric. Reification, the turning of practices and people into things, is 'the essential tendency of capitalism', according to Castoriadis (1987:16). Reification arises, in part, because of the prominence of the orthodoxy of neoliberalism. Reification can never be totally successful in all areas of practice. As shown earlier, some narratives of social

practices, such as those produced by the media, have been reified to a degree. Creative narratives risk being subsumed under similar determinations. Creative writing is a practice driven by many and varied ideas and values. Its total reification would destroy its creativity. As Castoriadis goes on to say:

The struggle of people against reification is, just as much as the tendency towards reification, the condition for the functioning of capitalism. A factory in which the workers were really and totally mere cogs in the machine, blindly executing the orders of management, would come to a stop in a quarter of an hour. (1987:16)

Contemporary discourse links creativity with innovation. Government policy, as shown in the previous chapter, has subverted creative endeavour to support its own economic agenda by using terms such as ‘knowledge economy’ and the ‘creative nation’. In order to move ahead economically, to keep up with the rest of the world in terms of gross national product, politicians tell us it is important that we advance creatively.

Creativity as Innovation

The use of the word ‘creative’ is expanding. It is no longer limited to practices that involve the arts. Creativity, as a term, can be used to describe processes in management, new innovations, discoveries and visions that link to the ‘progress’ of society or the social individual, anything out of the ordinary and more and more often, just anything. Being creative is almost a person’s right, (with the possible exception of ‘creative accounting’, where it is usually categorised as a wrong). ‘Creativity has come to be valued – and systems have evolved to encourage and harness it – because new technologies, new industries, new wealth and all other good economic things flow from it’ (Florida, 2002:21).

Universities have increasingly taken up the descriptor ‘creative’ in areas not traditionally aligned with creative practice. Science, technology, and communications have all been involved. Scientists are called upon to be creative rather than detached, dispassionate, and objective. Computer technology has required increasing creativity

because of its interface with the public through the World Wide Web and software programs. As I discussed in the previous chapter, there is an expectation that knowledge formed in the academy will be innovative and creative as this contributes to 'production' and 'investment' (Kemp, 1999b:1). Many disciplines generate genuine creativity – contributions to any economic imperatives notwithstanding. However, these creative practices are of a different order from those practised within the artistic field.

Creativity outside the artistic/cultural field has become part of the political agenda that strives to drive the economy further. It has been tied in with development, new ideas, innovation, and human progress and all these terms are becoming so entrenched as part of the doxa that creativity is hardly imaginable without 'drive' and 'determination'. This sets up a teleological framework for 'creativity', analogic with the USA's doctrine of manifest destiny, that we are being propelled, inevitably, into a better future, and that creativity is an important tool in the movement of society towards its good end. It also means that creativity is valued differently, tied to technological advances rather than artistic expression and hence it has stronger links to economic and political agendas. A material-based, and increasingly globalised, economy is annexing terms traditionally seen as pertaining to the autonomous end of the autonomy/heteronomy continuum: as eschewing monetary gain. A billboard over a Melbourne freeway states, 'Do you wish to imitate or innovate?' The implication is that innovation moves one ahead, and imitation leaves one behind because it is based on an outdated image of creativity:

Simon: What if we had a highly theoretical component that said, 'I wonder if I could paint like Picasso', for example. What if I tried to imitate or to work from this point out in my own area? I think that would have much more credibility than if we said, 'I'm going to start with the creative bit'.

Jasmine: I'm not sure about credibility. I think it would immediately lead to criticism about imitation, imitativeness, lack of originality.

Sally: That's just copying, isn't it? How is it different from copying? (Focus Group, 2001:C,19-20)

Artistic expression becomes relegated to its simple aesthetic appeal, with all the limitations that conveys – as discussed in my previous chapters – and creative

practitioners have no choice but to innovate if they want to be taken seriously in the current climate.

Once, creativity was a practice (and a question) that arose mainly in the field of cultural production, and politically the changes in the meaning of creativity can be traced to the end of the Cold War and the increased market for potential capitalisation. Creativity as innovation that drives the economy disregards the role of creativity as ideas, thought, and new knowledge that drive the field of research (which is not necessarily economic). Bill Readings' elucidation of this dichotomous influence on research practice entails an acceptance of economic imperatives on the one hand, whilst remaining separate from them on the other:

Nothing in the nature of the institution will enshrine Thought or protect it from economic imperatives ... But at the same time, thinking, if it is to remain open to the possibility of Thought, to take itself as a question, must not seek to be economic. (Readings, 1996:175)

The same can be said of creativity. If it is colonised by economic imperatives, it becomes a practice driven by external determinants rather than internal.

In Virilio's recent work on art and war which addresses current issues on Iraq and the 'war on terror', he looks at the human form in art and corresponds the move from resemblance (emanating from a pious Christian influence) through representation to annihilation of the human form to that of humanity's move to a state of pure war (Virilio, 2003). The human form destroyed in art is perhaps an expression of the artist, destroyed in the current colonisation of creativity. Mason echoes this notion in his text's concluding remarks on creativity, where he states that an unbounded reliance on creativity will result in the 'prospect of gradual collective suicide' (Mason, 2003:235). Creativity linked to innovation is no longer isolated from the everyday. Rather than being a concern of the artistic, or scientific, areas of a university (in their own different ways), creativity has now become a necessary, but 'generalisable' skill in the field of the academy (Dean, 2002a:2). Within the academy, one striking difference between the

creativity it professes to support and the creativity that has been a part of the cultural field since the time of the Enlightenment is this notion that creativity *can* be a ‘generalisable’ skill.

Postgraduate and academic research are now required to demonstrate the general skills of inquiry, knowledge acquisition, and creativity in their production. What these requirements do not take into account is the intrinsic quality of much creative work:

Harvard Business School psychologist Teresa Amabile observed, “Intrinsic motivation is conducive to creativity, but extrinsic motivation is detrimental. It appears that when people are primarily motivated to do some creative activity by their own interest and enjoyment of that activity, they may be more creative than when they are primarily motivated by some goal imposed upon them by others”. (Florida, 2002:34)

In the past, arts’ separation from the everyday was, in part, due to the use of the term ‘create’ and its derivatives. Creativity was never a necessary attribute of everyone – but it was necessary for anyone determined to produce significant work, and in terms of art and the aesthetic, that meant being distanced from the necessities of daily life: it could not just be ‘performed’ as an everyday function, like multiplication or writing a memo. The academy, and more generally, the society in which it functions, has divorced creativity from the aesthetic, taking it from the specific to the general. Creativity is no longer linked with genius and the romantic notion of the artist, but rather than accept it as a part of dispositions and positions that *understand* the everyday, the current episteme emphasises how it *expects* creativity to *be a part* of the everyday. The word ‘creative’ is being inserted into government and university policies. It is a new way of saying, ‘This will make us more financially efficient and effective’.

Nietzsche’s idea that in order to be creative, one must disregard all else but the self has been turned on its head. In an ‘aesthetic framework of value’ (a framework that existed in the past), a significant act is all the more difficult to achieve because of the need to create ‘a particularity which aspired to as great a degree of universality as might be attainable’ (Mason, 2003:232). In a market economy framework, creativity rides on a

wave of monetary reward and commercial recognition. If a significant act can attain these, then it can certainly pin down its success to any particular it wishes, and why not creativity?

Our society has now reached a point where aesthetic production has become integrated into commodity production generally. And one of the most serious consequences of such a merger is the new facility of the established commercial culture to recuperate or neutralize the “oppositional” power of art. (Kearney, 1988:375)

Part of this new fascination and increased usage of ‘creativity’ stems from the mystique and genius that the old use of the term held. Creativity in the cultural field is strongly linked with individual performance. In order for the creative writer and other creative practices to maintain a hold on the ‘creative’ act, they have had to emphasise the difference between their type of creativity and the expected creativity of the everyday that is tied to economic logic. What this emphasis on difference does is take creative writing away from its connection with the everyday (in terms of being able to speak for the everyday), and direct it back to an aesthetic position, a mere part of its potential, as only a decoration.

A Virtue of Necessity

The following comment, discussed in terms of economic imperatives in Chapter Three, is also relevant here as it highlights the singular function of the concept of creativity in the university:

We were talking about the role of creative writing, and not naming any names or anything, his attitude was “Well, isn’t this weird. Who would have thought that something like creative writing would take off”, and there was some discussion about whether it was acceptable or not within the academy. He was talking about how the old liberal arts degree is the one that’s always been favoured, particularly at this sandstone university, and then suddenly we’ve got a winner, which is what people want, that doesn’t really fit. But they’re prepared to run with it. It was a bizarre kind of situation where you think, “Well here it is being endorsed by the academy but for the wrong reasons”. (Sandra, 2001:D,1-2)

The ‘wrong reasons’, in terms of liberal arts, are vocational ones. The juxtaposition, highlighted in this extract of the focus group discussion, between liberal and vocational

education, between creative writing and more traditional literary studies, between economic and cultural capital, and between autonomous and heteronomous positions all affect how creative writing is received in the field of research. Creative writing, a practice introduced into universities on the back of economic imperatives, cannot be accepted at the postgraduate and academic level as research in its own right because the 'knowledge economy' drives creativity to be innovative, and that means economically advantageous. Creativity, on its own, has such strong links with the romantic ideal of 'art for art's sake' that often the value of creativity as being anything else is hidden:

Some people have the feeling for language that makes for very good writing ... I'm not sure that it can be taught. Great writers have this feeling for words. (Hannah, 2001:F,2)

In this perspective, creativity is reduced to a purely aesthetic quality. What many of us forget is that this privileging of aesthetics was a culturally political move when it first began. The current political move is to reduce creativity to an economic function. The concept of creativity has a plural nature. Reducing it to one function tends to exclude any others as valid options. Creativity is available as a concept to be put to work by various fields and forces for their own interest, without having any status or ontology.

The practice of creative writing in the university is extrapolated from the creative field. Its theoretical informants may vary from literary theory to cultural studies, but the process of creating fiction has a long history relating to the arts. Creativity, itself a practice, has a much shorter history, stemming from epistemic changes from the Enlightenment that gave 'creativity' human agency so its value has become of greater importance in the development of human societies over the past one to two hundred years than at any time before.

These new ideas on creativity were certainly helped along by philosophical musings at the time. When the idea of a 'creator' declined, people could usurp creativity for themselves, and this allowed for the theorising of centralised humanity. Matthew Arnold stated that 'a free, creative activity, is the highest function of man' (Arnold, 1962:260). Karl Marx saw human fulfilment as commensurate with positive, creative

ability (Marx, 1939/1973:488). Even Nietzsche, often touted by philosophers as providing principles for postmodernism, reinforced art as an aesthetic value, and a higher one than other values, which placed him in the romantic category alongside Arnold. ‘In Nietzsche, “we the artists” = “we the seekers after knowledge or truth” = “we the inventors of new possibilities of life”’ (Deleuze, 1983:103). In defining what is art, Bredin and Santoro-Brienza say that if a piece of work’s primary utility is to be attractive, ‘a work of art is an artefact whose aesthetic properties are essential properties’ (2000:11). These statements emanate from the most diverse of Western ideological epistemologies of their time, but they all had one thing in common – the inextricable *value* to humanity of our ability to create. Where this aesthetic value falls down is its inapplicability to anything outside itself. As stated in Chapter Two, where aesthetics failed in its development from the Enlightenment was having ‘an internal subject matter that is sufficient unto itself’ (Fisher, 1993:245).

As creative practitioners eschewed extrinsic motivations, creativity’s value necessarily lay in its intrinsic qualities, reduced by the Enlightenment, Romanticism and the separation of reason and emotion to an end in itself. Oscar Wilde, in his preface to *The Picture of Dorian Gray*, states that, ‘Books are well written or badly written. That is all ... The only excuse for making a useless thing is that one admires it intensely. All art is quite useless’ (1909:6). This entailed a rejection of values applicable outside the field of artistic practice (or the field of cultural production), these primarily being economic reward and personal renown, at the same time as revering its primary function. This made creativity a ‘virtue of necessity’, where the primary function, in this case to create, becomes the determining value of the field. The ‘theory of art for art’s sake ... is to the field of cultural production what the axiom “business is business” ... is to the economic field’ (Bourdieu, 1993:62):

Today we would characterize progressive modernism, the avant-garde, as left-leaning and liberal in its support of freedom of expression and demands of equality. Since the 18th century, the modernist belief in the freedom of expression has manifested itself in art through claims to freedom of choice in subject matter and to freedom of choice in style ... It was in the exercise of these rights that the artist constantly drew attention to the goals of progressive

modernism. As the 19th century progressed, the exercise of artistic freedom became fundamental to progressive modernism. Artists began to seek freedom not just from the rules of academic art, but from the demands of the public. Soon it was claimed that art should be produced not for the public's sake, but for art's sake. (Witcombe, 2000)

Creativity is what humanity correlates with art, and art is what makes humans different from all other living things on this planet. Imagine a world without art – no humming in the shower, no furniture design, no restaurants, no catwalks, no storytelling, no language other than to express concepts and demands (Bredin & Santoro-Brienza, 2000:1).

Bourdieu's theory of art in the field of cultural production stipulates that some things are considered works of art only because they have been had that status conferred on them by the art world, and that it is the structures in the broader social field that allow for the operation of the art world as it exists. Every form of creative endeavour is composed of its own network of relations and positions that define dispositions and practices acceptable within the field. The literary world is made up of 'writers and readers, booksellers, publishers' readers, editors and marketing managers, newspaper and radio reviewers, academics and students, agents and translators' (Bredin & Santoro-Brienza, 2000:7).

Creative practice in the current episteme has become increasingly disconnected from art for art's sake, and linked instead to innovation, economic growth and the everyday. The position of art for art's sake, in order to differentiate itself from innovation, is now geared to a leisure time that is separate from the everyday – it is part of a luxury that everyday industry, commerce and growth do not fit into their agenda. The creative industry is dismissive of traditional areas of creativity unless they contribute to the market economy. Consequently, if a form of creative practice fails to be economically useful, its only acknowledged alternative use is the aesthetic. This attitude is evidenced to an extent by the focus group participants, who however ruefully acknowledge the

economic value of creative writing as its main justification for being within the university system:

I'm in favour of teaching creative writing at undergraduate level for universities purely to make money, for English departments to make money in a situation where access to other sources of money is precluded in so many cases now, and where just about every second member of the general public regards themselves as potentially a creative writer. I think that's saying a cash cow that we should all be using. I think, however, that postgraduate degrees in creative writing should be taken infinitely more seriously than that, but not necessarily seriously as research degrees. They should be taken seriously as creative writing degrees. (Hannah, 2001:F,3-4)

In terms of the values in a university, setting up creative writing at postgraduate level to make a virtue of necessity from an aesthetic position separates creative writing from the primary purpose of the work in the field of research, which makes a virtue of necessity of knowledge, not beauty.

Creativity as a Tactic

Isn't it really ironic that with the other art forms, they've been allowing people to put on a concert or have an exhibition of paintings and give people higher degrees for that. But just because it's in writing, and because everyone writes ... It's like the Strand report. Why is writing – which was the most obvious creative practice because writing has always been in the academy – the last one to actually be seen as contributing to knowledge? It's like insisting that creative writing is entertainment rather than scholarship. (Julie, 2001:C,12)

To insist on the domination of the aesthetic in creative practice is simply an inversion of the current situation of economic dominance to one of cultural dominance:

Mill, Arnold, and Emerson represent this liberal tradition, which merges Romantic paradigms of self-actualization and Enlightenment commitments to universal rights. Here is a vision of individual and society that counters, even subsumes, a vision that sees the world as all market. A richer culture, one that attends to the “full humanity” of persons, is offered in place of the attenuated, partial, and thin culture of the market. Individuals are called to participate in, form their identities in relation to, this richer culture. (McGowan, 2002:121)

In accepting this perhaps utopian vision, there is again, as there is with economic dominance, a ‘monocracy’ of the social field. Even Bourdieu’s last, posthumously published text, *Firing Back* (2003), could be placed in this category, with its often-strong indictment of the doxa of the capitalist market.

A form of pluralism is important: one that encompasses an economic outlook in a cultural framework. Fields outside the dominant field of power are not (I will not say ever) likely to overthrow the economic determinations of the market, but there is a very important place for other forms of capital. But why is cultural/economic pluralism so hard to put into practice? Certainly cultural value is not always able to be exchanged for economic value (as Frow has argued – 1995:39-40), and is therefore overlooked in market logic, but it does have other applications. The function of discourses that gain someone cultural capital, as can be found in the humanities and the arts, is to point to functions and operations that deliberate on axiological, as well as moral and social justice aspects in society (aside from any aesthetic function), e.g. Arundhati Roy campaigning against the dams project in central India. This specialised, sometimes theorised knowledge must be transmitted into action, though, in order for it to be of use e.g. someone skilled in creative writing using a theatrical presentation to provide information for young teenagers on eating disorders:

We can know that capitalism is corrupt and exploitative, believe ... that capitalism’s practices are wrong, and yet not change our behaviour very much from the ways we acted prior to acquiring that knowledge and those convictions. (McGowan, 2002:78)

There is no longer the possibility of having a simple faith in the power of knowledge. Knowledge without practice means that theories grow dust on the shelf. Creative writing, as a practice, is performative:

I think it’s a different sort of practice from critical work. One’s not necessarily better than the other, except I would say that to be able to do creative writing, if you took John Coetzee as an example, I think his creative writing is probably the best in the world at the moment. I would say his criticism is one of the best in the world too, but the thing that’s making the impact is the creative writing. And so, if you can do that, you know, in a hierarchy, I would put that higher, but then, on the other hand, not everyone is John Coetzee. (Hannah, 2001: F,4)

This does not mean creative writing solves social dilemmas every time a piece of creative work is formed, but it does mean that what is created is a unique perspective, and a unique unfolding of events and personalities. 'It is not enough to lay bare the bones of our social reality. The writer must also, like Mr Venus in *Our Mutual Friend*, articulate the bones' (McGowan, 2002:78). That is, the creative writer can, through gathering the 'scattered facts and values' together, articulate ways of operating that give voice to values other than economic ones, other realities that are important. Here, I am drawn back to Certeau's use of tactics, as mentioned in the first part of this chapter, but used here in a broader social sense. In this section, I argue tactics can be used by those working in areas within the academy, such as in creative writing, to highlight the importance of cultural capital.

By making use of tactics, there is 'the pleasure of getting around the rules of a constraining space' (Certeau, 1984:18). This making use of tactics ameliorates the problem of what function creative writing can have within the academy, if, in order to be accepted by autonomous principles that dominate in the research field, it has to eschew a heteronomous position that might be available to it outside the boundaries of the academic world. The university has traditionally been a site for critique of the broader social field through the figure of the intellectual. Edward Said supports the role of the academic in the figure of the public intellectual. According to Said, a public intellectual is someone who takes her or his role to be one of social criticism. They remain isolated from attachment, but speak out and stand for values, ideas and activities that transcend the collective weight imposed by the nation-state and the national culture (Said, 1994:30-1). Said calls this group of critics 'amateurs', in the traditional sense of the word – having no ties. An amateur is never comfortable with the status quo, always questioning it and holding these questions up for public scrutiny, which connects with the position held by creative writers in the academy – the thinker/creator who holds an autonomous position.

Said contrasts this position with the ‘professional’ intellectual. The professional, he charges, is aligned with the dominant elements of society’s discourse and narratives because their expertise and knowledge are used by the establishment to maintain the status quo:

The particular threat to the intellectual today, whether in the West or the non-Western world, is not the academy, not the suburbs, nor the appalling commercialism of journalism and publishing houses, but rather an attitude that I will call professionalism. By professionalism I mean thinking of your work as an intellectual as something you do for a living, between the hours of nine and five with one eye on the clock, and another cocked at what is considered to be proper, professional behaviour – not rocking the boat, not straying outside the accepted paradigms or limits, making yourself marketable and above all presentable, hence uncontroversial and unpolitical and “objective”. (Said, 1994:55)

The role of the amateur intellectual has been advocated for the creative writer in Australia on a number of occasions (Baranay, 2002; Dawson, 2001), and as Dawson points out, is a role taken to be quite a natural progression for a writer in other countries, such as France, where ‘there is a tradition of accepting writers as intellectuals’, and in South Africa, where ‘many writers feel compelled to explore their social responsibilities’ (Dawson, 2001:352).

One such instance fell to Andre Brink, a South African novelist, who advocated a strong link between writing and social commentary (Brink, 1989:25). Brink’s paper, entitled *Writing in a State of Emergency: The Writer’s Responsibility*, talks about the state of emergency that exists at the heart of all societies, whether it resides in ‘economics, in the situation of women, in the attitude to gay sexuality, [or] the accommodation of foreigners’, and how the writer can open these situations up to the ‘conscious life of that society’ (Brink, 1989:27). Brink was not advocating that all writing must drag the political ‘by the hair’ into their writing, but ‘that any writer can only write anything of significance if it is drawn from his or her own most profound’ experience, and so the writing, of itself, would be political (Brink, 1989:26).

In relation to creative writers in the university, Dawson advocates for them a role ‘as public intellectuals, not in the nostalgic sense of independent freelance thinkers, but as participants in the intellectual work of the New Humanities’ (Dawson, 2003:177).

This idea of writer as social critic, I think, also leaves room for the writer as producer of ‘art for art’s sake’, as an aesthetic position is never only aesthetic but always also political. Patrick White is a writer who, as his career was developing, was pigeonholed by Australian public commentary as someone in an autonomous position in the cultural field because they said he had no concern for what the reader wanted to hear. He was criticised because of his apparent inability to portray a sense of Australianness in his novels. Although his work failed to meet the (stereotypical) accepted version of how Australian characters should be depicted, the literary world outside Australia recognised him as a literary genius, and later on in his career, Australians did too. As David Marr states in writing about White’s earlier exclusion from Australia’s accepted (narrow) definition of a writer of Australian fiction:

White believed it was not for critics and commentators – however sensitive and skilled – to tell artists what was and was not Australian. The character, the direction, the mood and texture of Australia’s arts is a matter for artists alone to decide – through their work. (Marr, 1999:112)

What White was doing was writing characters that were not stereotypical and stereotyped. In showing alternatives to an accepted stereotype, he was also creating for himself a position as a writer who challenged the status quo. This position in the field of cultural production is also one of autonomy, but its biggest determining factor is eschewing consecration, therefore eschewing established (arbitrary) norms and establishment practices. It works through stating and questioning actions that move from heterodox to orthodox positions (often confronting orthodoxy), and its most important form of capital is not economic; nor is cultural capital of great importance, but social and political commentary help define its boundaries. If creative practice is defined through these parameters, then creative writing will be accepted in the academy if it can maintain a tension between its work and the accepted establishment. This

position works in opposition to the position of consecrated heteronomy, where writing is accepted because it supports the status quo. Those in consecrated autonomous positions also oppose this position because writing's function, using autonomous principles, is not seen to have politics as its function. As David Marr states, 'it is not for politicians to link the arts this way with issues of profound political concern' (Marr, 1999:112-3). Here Marr is arguing that art should not be used by political power for its own ends, but this buys into the underlying doxa on creative practices that their main agenda is artistic and not political (Baranay, 2002:10).

Many examples proliferate of writers whose work has had social impact. In Australia, there have been writers like Sally Morgan and Drusilla Modjeska who have reached audiences with a political message through their art. The Czech writer, Vaclav Havel, said of writers:

We have always believed in the power of words to change history. Words can be said to be the very source of our being and in fact the very substance of the cosmic life force we call man. Spirit, the human soul, our self awareness, our ability to perceive the world as the world and not just as our locality, and lastly our capacity for knowing that we shall die, and living in spite of the knowledge, surely all these are created by words. (cited in Riddell, 1999: 102)

Writing, although part of the ensemble of creative pursuits capable of addressing social and political issues through their practice as social art, is the only art form that can directly speak the same language as that used by the dominant power:

So the creative writing PhD is about obtaining a scholarly PhD, not about managing to write a fantastic, publishable novel. (Sally, 2001:C,9)

Its aesthetic function, although of value, is not the determining value in the field of research.

Conclusion

Creative writing can eschew the ‘dumb beast on the couch’ tag in the field of research because it is a valuable contribution towards new knowledge in its practice that is both a ‘doing’ and a ‘knowing’. From the focus group discussions, there emerged a strong sense of creative writing’s dialogic engagement with theory and the imagination that can discursively frame other practices.

What was of interest was the amount of support for the exegesis in terms of distinguishing writers in the university from writers in the field of cultural production. To understand this attitude using Bourdieu’s theories, I conclude that creative writers in the field of research view their position as having greater cultural (and perhaps symbolic) capital than creative writers outside the academic institution. But it also indicates an insecurity about the position they hold within the field of research, and they do not want to be identified with practices outside the academy that are not consecrated as adding to new knowledge. This may prove to increase support for the exegesis within the creative writing area because it distances the writers in the field of research from those outside whilst increases their acceptance within the field. I see the exegesis as a form of tactic, useful for gaining acceptance into the field, and it has proved to be useful in this respect.

Where I do see a problem arising from the continued use of it is that this means there is an acceptance that creative writing cannot be sufficient knowledge on its own. Denying that creative writing is a practice informed by many theoretical positions continues to place creative writing in the field of cultural production, where it makes a virtue of necessity of its aesthetics qualities, rather than allowing it a position in the field of research with the possibility of demonstrating its knowledge.

Creative writing practitioners have used the tactic of the exegesis in order for their narrative to be accepted at the research level in academe. The next step is to strengthen this creative narrative to a strategy, which can become one, *equally accepted*, way in which research is produced. In defining a role for creative writers in the academy, I

have argued this must be similar to already accepted positions; therefore it requires a degree of autonomy. Creative writers, along with other academics whose research function is social critique, do not participate in this role as final arbiters on social issues, but as demonstrated thinkers who also have the skills to convey this thought through story.

Conclusion

This thesis has traced the sometimes conflicting, sometimes collaborating relationship between creative writing and the academy, particularly in terms of the interrelations of positions and position-takings within the field of research. Throughout the short history of creative writing's involvement in Australian universities, creative writers have struggled to claim a position for themselves that is equivalent with that of other research disciplines, and to ensure that their work is recognised as contributing knowledge relevant to the academic field.

Of course the academic field is itself structured in terms of complexities and conflict. Some of the many relations in the research field are bound by an internal movement contingent on establishing autonomy from what Bourdieu describes as the field of power, or the dominant sector within the broad field of social relations. Coextensively with this is another set of relations, this time directed at how the research field relates with fields external to it, and this brings to the fore its dependence on heteronomous principles to establish value and dominance. This conflict, or constant pull between autonomy and heteronomy, is demonstrated throughout the thesis in my discussion of how the research field juxtaposes cultural and economic capital, and how the determination to earn one or other form of capital plays out in both internal and external relations. Because of the changing nature of knowledge and the changing relationship to internal and external determinants by positions within the field, the relative privileging of autonomous and heteronomous poles is also in a continuing state of flux.

The focus group participants demonstrated how they are caught up in these conflicting imperatives, pulled between autonomous and heteronomous principles in seeking, and

being accorded, a position in the field of research. Central to this position-seeking and -taking is the extent to which creative writing is positioned as a discipline capable of making a contribution to knowledge. Its value as knowledge is not readily established in terms of what counts as autonomous principles in the academy – those which revolve around determinations of what it is to ‘know’. When evaluated according to heteronomous principles – those which are economically determined (and by which the categorisation of ‘useful’ and ‘useless’ knowledge is determined) – it also falls short of the requirements.

Principally, it is positioned as ‘lack’ because the knowledge it produces does not count as ‘useful’ knowledge in terms of either the autonomous or the heteronomous principles of the research field. The heteronomous principle, which is currently the dominant mode in the academy, evaluates as ‘useful’ those disciplines and forms of knowledge that attract monetary rewards. Institutions that affect the market in monetary terms, such as government, business and industry, exercise an influence on what knowledges are privileged within the research field. Knowledge that can be exchanged in monetary terms and that has economic value is more advantageous for the research field to pursue in terms of its standing in the broader social field. Creative writing, as the focus group participants pointed out, rarely attracts funding from private institutions, does not help drive the market economy and remains dependent on public funding, and hence is relegated to the position of a ‘uselessness’ in terms of knowledge.

It is ‘useless’ too when measured according to the autonomous principle, which expects, and values, knowledge that fits particular sets of methodological frames, epistemological orientations and practices; including issues such as logic, replicability, generalisability, transparency and so on. Which positions are authorised by an autonomous logic is determined by cultural rather than economic value, and the competition for positions is played out in consecrating some knowledge over others. This internal conflict over positions and their value is most often demonstrated by contrasting research from the scientific and artistic areas, and terming them as knowledges committed respectively to ‘knowing’ and ‘doing’. I recall here Strand’s

analysis of this bifurcation, which he expressed as research *about* (done by scholars) and research *in* (done by practitioners). In these terms, science is able to produce answers that can interpret the world by theorising and analysing – and hence is useful – whereas art, as a practice, is only a ‘doing’ that is instinctive and removed from analysis – and hence useless as knowledge.

Creative writing, as a form of artistic rather than scientific expression, was placed in this practical, ‘doing’ category by many participants in the focus groups. Many of these researchers, the majority of whom were also creative writers, did not consider creative work as adding to knowledge unless it was accompanied by a more traditionally written piece of research – the exegesis. This was perhaps the strongest, most contentious (and least helpful in terms of creative writing gaining a place as a form of research) argument to emerge from the focus group discussions. Analysing the requirement of the exegesis in terms of social relations, this thesis has argued that creative writers’ adoption and acceptance of the exegesis has been a (successful) tactic for having their work included in the field of research. But if creative writing is to gain a consecrated position in the field, its practitioners need to show that the creative narrative is a worthy contribution to the field in its own right, and this can best be done by interrogating further the requirement of an exegesis.

I have argued, here, that creative writing can be re-evaluated as useful knowledge in a number of ways, not least in terms of the importance of cultural value to the broad social field. Creative writing is an important component of cultural value and capital, and works produced in this area of the field open up a more pluralistic view of the world than can be expressed through economic determinations alone. Creativity is *more than* an outlet to express beauty. It is *more than* a generalisable skill. By *more than* I mean it has the capacity to impact on social understandings, rather than be ghettoised as beauty, entertainment or simply part of the everyday. Creative writing is *more than*. It is a part of society’s expression of interaction, change and development that is always something more than economic value alone can allow for.

This thesis has largely been directed by the themes and concerns that emerged from the focus group discussions, which consisted of academics and postgraduate students in the discipline of creative writing. Its strengths lie in the themes that emerged, which were those the participants found most compelling. The limitations of the study arise from two sources. One is the construction of the focus groups, five of which were a mixture of academic and postgraduate students. My initial aim was to conduct separate focus group discussions for these two groups but this proved not to be possible. The other limitation is purely that of timeliness. When the discussions were conducted, a few of the creative writing research degrees were in the first years of operation, and so both staff and students were having to come to terms with the production of exegeses, and with how their universities viewed creative work within the higher degrees and research area. This would necessarily have affected participants' attitudes.

These limitations offer areas for future research directions. It would be insightful, in terms of understanding power relations, to note any differences in discussion outcomes that emerged from homogeneous groups. It would also be interesting to conduct a fresh set of focus group discussions to see if attitudes have changed over the past three years.

In terms of the current episteme, power is increasingly held by the market state in a global economy. Research that is privileged in the field is that which can contribute to heteronomous principles, which forces universities to become more like businesses than institutions of education. Readings states in his conclusion:

In the University of Excellence, teachers and students can even go on believing in culture if they like, as long as their beliefs lead to excellent performance and thus help the aim of total quality. (Readings, 1996:191-2)

And quality is measured in a market economy in monetary terms – ‘such action is perfectly logical in the terms of capitalism’ (Readings, 1996:188).

This thesis argues for the necessity of a space for work interested, and believing, in culture that need not be driven by performance and quality that is measured in economic

terms. The product of knowledge, if it is to be able to grow and be created in all areas of society, must not be narrowed to that which can be exchanged in the monetary market. If all knowledge, and therefore all aspects of our social constitution, are allowed to continue, change, diversify and adapt to a continually changing world, then knowledge in its capacity in the university (as contributing to this) must be accepted under the autonomous principle, and it must be recognised that not all knowledge can be exchanged for economic capital.

Accepting the importance of this opens up the possibility for creative writing in the field of research to make a valuable contribution to the broad social field. Creative writing, if it is able to function from a secure position in the field of research, can articulate other ways of operating that give rise to cultural understandings, and produce cultural capital that may be afforded, once again, as much worth as economic capital currently receives.

Bibliography

- Adams, Phillip (2004) 'The Dawn of McScience' *Late Night Live*. Radio National 11 March.
- Agamben, Giorgio (1998) *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. D. Heller-Roazen. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
- Aitkin, Don and Kennedy, Kerry (1999) *New Directions for Research Policy in the Modern University*, (response to the government's green paper), 2 November. University of Canberra.
- Alexander, Fred (1963) *Campus at Crawley: A Narrative and Critical Appreciation of the First Fifty Years of the University of Western Australia*. Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire.
- Allen, Pamela, (1980) *Mr. Archimedes' Bath*. Sydney: Collins.
- ALP Knowledge Nation Taskforce (2001) *An Agenda for the Knowledge Nation* [online]. <http://www.alp.org.au/kn/kn_au_020701.html> (downloaded 3 July 2001).
- Anderson, Robert David (1992) *Universities and Elites in Britain since 1800*. Hampshire: The Macmillan Press.
- Aristotle (1925) *Ethica Nicomachea*, trans. W. D. Ross. London: Oxford University Press.
- Aristotle (1975) *The Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. H. G. Apostle. Dordrecht, Holland; Boston, USA: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
- Arnold, Matthew (1869/1932) *Culture and Anarchy*, ed. J. Dover Wilson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Arnold, Matthew (1962) 'The Function of Criticism at the Present Time' in R. H. Super (ed) *Complete Prose Works*, Vol 3 – Lectures and Essays in Criticism. Michigan: University of Michigan Press, pp. 258-285.

Attorney-General's Department (1988) *Higher Education Funding Act 1988* [statute].
<<http://www.scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/pasteact/0/108/0/PA000070.htm>>
(accessed 30 August 2004).

Australian Academy of the Humanities (1998) *Knowing Ourselves and Others: The Humanities in Australia into the 21st Century*. Canberra: Australian Research Council.

Australian Academy of the Humanities (2002) *National Research Priorities: Nominations of Priorities* [online].
<http://www.dest.gov.au/priorities/priorities_sub/pdf99p.pdf> (accessed 29 November 2002).

Australian Academy of the Humanities (2003) *CHASS Director Appointed* [media release].
<http://www.humanities.org.au/news/press%20releases/chassdirectorpr.htm>
(downloaded 28 August 2004).

Australian Research Council (2002a) *Nominations Submitted to the National Research Priorities Taskforce* [online].
<http://www.dest.gov.au/priorities_sub/pdf108p.pdf> (downloaded 29 November 2002).

Australian Research Council (2002b) *Submission to the National Research Priorities Taskforce* [online].
<http://www.arc.gov.au/pdf/ARC_priorities_submission.pdf> (downloaded 12 May 2003).

Australian Research Council (2003a) *Centres and Networks* [online].
<http://www.arc.gov.au/grant_programs/centres_networks/default.htm>
(accessed 28 August 2004).

Australian Research Council (2003b) *Designated Priority Areas of Research 2002* [online].
<http://www.arc.gov.au/pdf/CEO3_Designated_Priority_Areas_of_Research2002.pdf> (downloaded 15 January, 2004).

- Australian Research Council (2003c) *Grant Programs* [online].
<http://www.arc.gov.au/grant_programs/default.htm> (accessed 30 August 2004).
- Australian Research Council (2003d) *Strategic Action Plan 2003 - 2005* [online].
<http://www.arc.gov.au/pdf/ARC_Strategic_Plan_200305.pdf> (downloaded 15 January 2004).
- Australian Research Council (2004) *Descriptions of Designated National Research Priorities and associated Priority Goals* [online].
<http://www.arc.gov.au/pfd/2004_designated_national_research_priorities_&_associate.pdf> (downloaded 15 January 2004).
- Australian Universities Commission (1975) *Sixth Report of the Australian Universities Commission*, (Parliamentary Paper No. 271). Canberra: The Government Printer of Australia.
- Australian Universities Standing Advisory Committee (1921) *Meeting of the Standing Advisory Committee of the Universities of Australia*, 24 November. Melbourne: University of Melbourne.
- Australian Vice-Chancellors Committee (2003) *Evaluation of the Knowledge and Innovation Reforms: AVCC Submission* [online].
<http://www.avcc.edu.au/policies_activities/research/gov_reviews/AVCC_sub_final_sep03.pdf> (downloaded 24 March 2004).
- Baranay, Inez (2002) 'Acting Up' in *Australian Author*, 34 (1), pp. 10-16.
- Barff, Henry E. (1902) *A Short Historical Account of the University of Sydney*. Sydney: Angus & Robertson.
- Barnett, Ronald (1990) *The Idea of Higher Education*. Buckingham: The Society for Research into Higher Education & Open University Press.
- Barnett, Ronald (1999) *Realizing the University: in an Age of Supercomplexity*. Buckingham: Open University Press.

- Barnett, Ronald and Griffin, Anne, eds (1997) *The End of Knowledge in Higher Education*. London: Cassell.
- Barrett, Estelle (2004) 'What Does it Meme? The Exegesis as Valorisation and Validation of Creative Arts Research' in *Text Special Issue (3)* [online]. <<http://www.gu.edu.au/school/art/text/speciss/issue3/barrett.htm>> (accessed 16 May 2004).
- Barry, Andrew, Osborne, Thomas and Rose, Nikolas, eds (1996) *Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-liberalism and Rationalities of Government*. London: UCL Press.
- Batterham, Robin (2000a) *The Chance to Change: Discussion Paper by the Chief Scientist*, August 2000. Canberra: Department of Education, Science and Training.
- Batterham, Robin (2000b) *The Chance to Change: Final Report by the Chief Scientist* [online]. <http://www.dest.gov.au/ChiefScientist/Reports/Chance_to_Change/Documents/ChanceFinal.pdf> (accessed 15 May 2003).
- Baudrillard, Jean (1981) *For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign*, trans. C. Levin. St Louis, MO.: Telos Press.
- Baudrillard, Jean (1993) *Symbolic Exchange and Death*, trans. I. Hamilton Grant. London: Sage Publications.
- Beck, Ulrich (1992) *Risk Society*, trans. M. Ritter. London: Sage Publications.
- Bell, Duran (1991) 'Modes of Exchange: Gift and Commodity' in *The Journal of Socio-Economics*, 20 (2), pp. 155-67.
- Bentham, Jeremy (1781/2000) *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*. Kitchener: Batoche Books.
- Bessant, Judith (2002) 'Dawkins' Higher Education Reforms and How Metaphors Work in Policy Making' in *Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management*, 24 (1), pp. 87-99.

- Birchall, Claire (2003). 'What's in a name? Competing claims on knowledge' in *Mediactive*, 1 (1), pp. 8-24.
- Blackford, Russell (1999). 'Don't Panic: The Universities and Their Troubles' in *Quadrant*, No. 353, XLIII, (1-2), pp. 11-17.
- Blainey, Geoffrey (1957) *A Centenary History of the University of Melbourne*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
- Blainey, Geoffrey (1989) *Australian Universities: Some Fashions and Faults*. Bundoora, Victoria: LaTrobe University.
- Blanchot, Maurice (1982) *The Space of Literature*, trans. A. Smock. Lincoln NE; London: University of Nebraska Press.
- Blanchot, Maurice (1995) *The Work of Fire*, trans. C. Mandell. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Bobbitt, Philip (2002) *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History*. London: Penguin Books.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1977) *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. R. Nice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1979) 'Public Opinion Does Not Exist' in A. Mattelart and S. Siegelau (eds) *Communication and Class Struggle I. Capitalism, Imperialism An Anthology in 2 Volumes*. New York: International General, pp. 124-130.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1988) *Homo Academicus*, trans. P. Collier. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1991) *Language and Symbolic Power*, ed. J. B. Thompson, trans. G. Raymond and M. Adamson. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1993) *The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature*, ed. and introd. R. Johnson. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1996) *The Rules of Art: Genesis and Structure of the Literary Field*, trans. S. Emanuel. Cambridge: Polity Press.

- Bourdieu, Pierre (1998a) *Acts of Resistance: Against the New Myths of our Time*, trans. R. Nice. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (1998b) *Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre (2003) *Firing Back: Against the Tyranny of the Market 2*, trans. L. Wacquant. London; New York: Verso.
- Bourdieu, Pierre, with Boltanski, Luc, Castel, Robert, Chamboredon, Jean-Claude and Schnapper, Dominique (1990) *Photography: A Middle-brow Art*, trans. S. Whiteside. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. and Passeron, Jean-Claude (1990) *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*, 2nd ed, trans. R. Nice. London: Sage Publications.
- Bourke, Gov. Richard (1923) 'Governor Bourke to Right Hon. E.G. Stanley, Government House, 30th September, 1833' in *Historical Records of Australia Series 1, Vol 17 Governors' Dispatches to and From England, 1833-1835*. Sydney: The Library Committee of the Commonwealth Parliament, pp. 224-233.
- Bourke, Nike and Neilsen, Philip (2004) 'The Problem of the Exegesis in Creative Writing Higher Degrees' in *Text Special Issue (3)* [online]. <<http://www.gu.edu.au/school/art/text/speciss/issue3/bourke.htm>> (accessed 16 May 2004).
- Bourke, Paul (1997) *Evaluating University Research: The British Research Assessment Exercise and Australian Practice*. Canberra: National Board of Employment, Education and Training; Australian Research Council; Higher Education Council.
- Bredin, Hugh and Santoro-Brienza, Liberato (2000) *Philosophies of Art and Beauty: Introducing Aesthetics*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Brew, Angela (2001) *The Nature of Research: Inquiry in Academic Contexts*. London: Routledge Farmer.

- Brink, Andre (1989) 'Writing in a State of Emergency: The Writer's Responsibility' in *The Australian Author*, 21 (3), pp. 25-28.
- Broackes, Justin (1999) 'Hume' in T. Honderich (ed) *The Philosophers: Introducing Great Western Thinkers*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 103-112.
- Brophy, Kevin (1998) *Creativity: Psychoanalysis, Surrealism and Creative Writing*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
- Buchanan, Ian (1995) *Heterology: Towards a Transcendental Empiricist Approach to Cultural Studies*. PhD thesis. Perth: Murdoch University.
- Caro, David (1989) *Australian Universities: A Diagnosis*. Conversazione Series – Seminar on the Sociology of Culture. Bundoora, Victoria: La Trobe University.
- Carson, Rachael (1962) *Silent Spring*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Riverside Press.
- Castoriadis, Cornelius (1987) *The Imaginary Institution of Society*, trans. K. Blamey. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
- Cauchi, Stephen (2003) 'CSIRO Survives But Review on Money in the Wind', *The Age*, 14 May, p. 3.
- Cavallaro, Dani (2001) *Critical and Cultural Theory: Thematic Variations*. London; New Brunswick, NJ: The Athlone Press.
- Certeau, Michel de (1984) *The Practice of Everyday Life*, trans. S. Rendall. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Certeau, Michel de (1986) *Heterologies: Discourse on the Other*, trans. B. Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Colebatch, Tim (2003) 'New Scheme Aims to Boost Drugs R&D', *The Age*, 14 May, p. 5.
- Coleman, Peter (1962) 'The New Australian' in P. Coleman (ed) *Australian Civilization: A Symposium*. Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire, pp. 1-11.

- Coleridge, Samuel Taylor (1983) 'Kubla Khan' in A. Allison, H. Barrows, C. Blake, A. Carr, A Eastman and H. English, Jr.(eds) *The Norton Anthology of Poetry*, 3rd ed. New York; London: W. W. Norton & Company, pp. 564-565.
- Commonwealth Department of Education (1985) *Directory of Higher Education Courses 1986*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.
- Connell, W. F., Sherington, G.E., Fletcher, B.H., Turney, C. and Bygott, U. (1995) *Australia's First: A History of the University of Sydney Volume 2 1940-1990*. Sydney: Hale & Iremonger.
- Costantoura, Paul (2000) *Australians and the arts: What Do the Arts Mean to Australians?*. Sydney: Australia Council.
- Cottingham, John (1999) 'Descartes' in T. Honderich (ed) *The Philosophers: Introducing Great Western Thinkers*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 59-65.
- Crawford, Donald (2001) 'Kant' in B. Gaut and D. M. Lopes (eds) *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*. London; New York: Routledge, pp. 51-64.
- Crittenden, Brian (1997) 'The Proper Role of Universities' in J. Sharpham and G. Harman (eds) *Australia's Future Universities*. Armidale: University of New England Press, pp. 85-103.
- Cunningham, Stuart (1992) *Framing Culture: Criticism and Policy in Australia*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
- Cytowic, Richard (1993) *The Man Who Tasted Shapes: A Bizarre Medical Mystery Offers Revolutionary Insights into Emotions, Reasoning, and Consciousness*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.
- Davies, Susan (1989) *The Martin Committee and the Binary Policy of Higher Education in Australia*. Melbourne: Ashwood House.
- Dawkins, John (1987) *Higher Education: A Policy Discussion Paper*, (Green Paper). Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

- Dawkins, John. (1988) *Higher Education: A Policy Statement*, (White Paper). Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.
- Dawson, Paul (1997) 'The Function of Critical Theory in Tertiary Creative Writing Programmes' in *Southern Review* 30 (1), pp. 70-80.
- Dawson, Paul (1999) 'Writing Programmes in Australian Universities: Creative Art or Literary Research?' in *Text*, 3 (1) [online].
<<http://www.gu.edu.au/school/art/text/april99/dawson.htm>> (accessed 17 June 1999).
- Dawson, Paul (2001) *Building a Garret in the Ivory Tower: English Studies and the Discipline of Creative Writing*. PhD thesis. Melbourne: University of Melbourne.
- Dawson, Paul (2003) 'What is a Literary Intellectual? Creative Writing and the New Humanities' in *Cultural Studies Review*, 9 (1), pp. 161-179.
- Dean, Roger (2002a) 'Creative Arts, Creative Research and Learning', *University of Canberra Monitor*, 24 September, p. 2.
- Dean, Roger (2002b) *Submission from the University of Canberra to the Higher Education 'Crossroads' discussion* [online]. <http://www.canberra.edu.au/vc-forum/crossroads_sub.html> (accessed 12 December 2002).
- Delanty, Gerard (2001) *Challenging Knowledge: The University in the Knowledge Society*. Buckingham: The Society for Research into Higher Education & Open University Press.
- Deleuze, Gilles (1983) *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. H. Tomlinson. London: The Athlone Press.
- Deleuze, Gilles (1984) *Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties*, trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam. London: The Athlone Press.
- Department of Education and Science (1970) *Directory of Courses*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.

Department of Education, Science and Training (2001) *Backing Australia's Ability: the Commonwealth Government's Commitment to Innovation* [online].
<<http://backingaus.innovation.gov.au/>> (accessed 12 May 2003).

Department of Education, Science and Training (2002a) *Table 21: All students by Level of Course, Broad Field of Education and Gender, 2002* [online].
<http://www.dest.gov.au/highered/statistics/studnets/02/student_table/'2002Tb121'/A1> (accessed 21 January 2004).

Department of Education, Science and Training (2002b) *2002 Higher Education Research Data Collection: Specifications for Preparing Returns for the Collection of 2001 Data*. Canberra: Higher Education Division.

Department of Education, Science and Training (2002c) *Developing National Research Priorities: An Issue Paper* [online].
<http://www.dest.gov.au/priorities/pubs/issues_paper/issues_paper.pdf>
(downloaded 2 December 2002).

Department of Education, Science and Training (2002d) *Higher Education Research Data Collection: Specifications for the Collection of 2002 Data* [online].
<<http://www.dest.gov.au/highered/research/documents/specs2002.rtf>> (accessed 17 April 2003).

Department of Education, Science and Training (2002e) *Issues Regarding the Specifications of the Higher Education Research Data Collection Requiring Further Clarification* [online].
<<http://www.dest.gov.au/highered/research/documents/clarif2002.rtf>> (17 April 2003).

Department of Education, Science and Training (2002f) *Setting Firm Foundations: Financing Australian Higher Education*, (Issues Paper). Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.

Department of Education, Science and Training (2003a) *Finance 2002: Selected Higher Education Statistics* [online].

<<http://www.dest.gov.au/highered/statistics/finance/2002/finance2002.pdf>> (18 March 2004)

Department of Education, Science and Training (2003b) *Higher Education Research Data Collection: Final 2003 Data Specifications* [online].

<<http://www.dest.gov.au/highered/research/documents/specs2004.rtf>> (18 March 2004).

Department of Education, Science and Training (2004a) *Institutional Grants Scheme* [online]. <<http://www.dest.gov.au/highered/research/igs.htm>> (28 August 2004).

Department of Education, Science and Training (2004b) *Research and Research Training Management Reports* [online].

<<http://www.dest.gov.au/highered/research/rrtmr.htm>> (10 September 2004).

Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs (1997) *Learning for Life: Review of Higher Education Financing and Policy – A Policy Discussion Paper*, (The West Review). Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Dillard, Annie (1982) *Living By Fiction*. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers.

Dissanayake, Ellen (1992) *Homo Aestheticus: Where Art Comes From and Why*. New York: The Free Press.

Docker, John (1984) *In A Critical Condition: Reading Australian Literature*. Melbourne: Penguin Books.

Drucker, Peter (1969) *The Age of Discontinuity: Guidelines to our Changing Society*. New York: Harper & Row.

Eagleton, Terry (1983) *Literary Theory: An Introduction*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Eagleton, Terry (1990) *The Ideology of the Aesthetic*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Eldridge, Richard (2001) *The Persistence of Romanticism: Essays in Philosophy and Literature*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Eldridge, Richard (2003) *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Art*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Exegetical Debate (2004) *Text*, Special Issue (3) [online].
<<http://www.gu.edu.au/school/art/text/speciss/issue3/exegesis.htm>> (accessed 16 May 2004).
- Farrell, R. B. (1952) 'The Faculty of Arts in the University and in the Community' in *One Hundred Years of the Faculty of Arts: A Series of Commemorative Lectures Given in the Great Hall, University of Sydney during April and May 1952*. Sydney: Angus & Robertson, pp. 7-20.
- Ferguson, Kennan (1999) *The Politics of Judgment: Aesthetics, Identity, and Political Theory*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Finkelstein, J. (2002) 'Novelty and Crisis in the World of McKnowledge' in D. Hayes and R. Wynyard (eds) *The McDonaldization of Higher Education*. Westport, Conn.; London: Bergin & Garvey, pp. 180-189.
- Finlay, H. M. (1997) *The Historical Nexus Between Universities and Government 1957 - 1992: Submission to the Review of Higher Education Financing and Policy* [online].
<<http://www.dest.gov.au/archive/highered/hereview/submissions/submissions/F/finlay.htm>> (24 July 2002).
- Fisher, John (1993) *Reflecting on Art*. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Company.
- Fletcher, Julie and Mann, Allan (2004) 'Illuminating the Exegesis, an Introduction' in *Text* Special Issue (3) [online].
<<http://www.gu.edu.au/school/art/text/speciss/issue3/fletchermann.htm>> (accessed 16 May 2004).
- Florida, Richard (2002) *The Rise of the Creative Class: and how it's transforming work, leisure, community and everyday life*. New York: Basic Books.

- Foucault, Michel (1980) *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972 – 1977*, trans. C. Gordon, L. Marshall, J. Mepham and K. Soper. New York; Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Foucault, Michel (1984) *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books
- Foucault, Michel (1994) *Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, Vol 3*, trans. R. Hurley. London: Penguin Books.
- Foucault, Michel (1997) *Ethics: Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 Vol 1*, ed. P. Rabinow. London: Penguin.
- Freiman, Marcelle (2001) 'Crossing the Boundaries of the Discipline: A Post-colonial Approach to Teaching Creative Writing in the University' in *Text 5* (2) [online]. <<http://www.gu.edu.au/school/art/text/oct01/freiman.htm>> (downloaded 2 December 2001).
- Freud, Sigmund (1907/1959) *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol IX Jensen's 'Gravida' and Other Works*, trans J Strachey in colab. with A. Freud, assist A Strachey and A Tyson. The Hogarth Press: London.
- Frow, John (1986) *Marxism and Literary History*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Frow, John (1995) *Cultural Studies and Cultural Value*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Fuller, Steve (1993) *Philosophy, Rhetoric and the End of Knowledge: The Coming of Science and Technology Studies*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Furst, Lilian (1979) *Romanticism in Perspective: A Comparative Study of Aspects of the Romantic Movements in England, France and Germany*, 2nd ed. London; Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd.
- Garber, Marjorie (2000) 'Contradictions in Terminology' in *The Australian*, 2 August, p.37.

- Gardner, W. J. (1979) *Colonial Cap and Gown: Studies in the Mid-Victorian Universities of Australasia*. Christchurch: University of Canterbury.
- Gibbons, Michael, Limoges, Camille, Nowotny, Helga, Schwartzman, Simon, Scott, Peter and Trow, Martin (1994) *The New Production of Knowledge: The Dynamics of Science and Research in Contemporary Societies*. London: Sage.
- Gibson, Lianne (2001) *The Uses of Art*. St Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press.
- Gilbert, Alan D. (2001). *The Idea of a University: Enterprise or Academy?*, at The Manning Clark Symposium, 25 July, Canberra [online].
<<http://www.unimelb.edu.au/vc/present/manningclarksym.html>> (accessed 14 March 2003).
- Gilbert, Alan D. (2003) *Some Heretical Ideas about Universities*, at The Menzies Oration, University of Melbourne [online].
<<http://www.unimelb.edu.au/speeches/agilbert09oct03.html>> (accessed 23 February 2004).
- Gilbert, Katherine Everett and Kuhn, Helmut (1939) *A History of Esthetics*, 2nd ed. New York: Dover Publications, Inc.
- Gillies, Malcolm (1998) 'The Arts' in *Knowing Ourselves and Others: The Humanities in Australia into the 21st Century*, Vol 2. Canberra: Australian Research Council. pp. 261 - 270.
- Giroux, Henry A and Myrsiades, K. (ed) (2001) *Beyond the Corporate University: Culture and Pedagogy in the New Millennium*. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
- Gott, Robert and Linden, Richard (1994) *Cut It Out*. Melbourne: CIS Publishers.
- Graham-Dixon, Andrew (1999) *Renaissance*. London: BBC Worldwide Ltd.
- Greenwood, Gordon (1955) *Australia: A Social and Political History*. Sydney: Angus and Robertson Publishers.

- Gross, Steffen (2002) 'The Neglected Programme of Aesthetics' in *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 42 (4), pp. 403-414.
- Grosz, Elizabeth (1995) *Space, Time and Perversion*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin
- Guide for Prospective 1978 Students*. (1977) Melbourne: Victorian Universities Admissions Committee.
- Guide for Prospective 1983 Students*. (1982) Melbourne: Victorian Universities Admissions Committee.
- Hammermeister, Kai (2002) *The German Aesthetic Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Harding, Sandra (1991) *Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking from Women's Lives*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
- Hartwell, R. M. (1955) 'The Pastoral Ascendancy, 1820-50' in G. Greenwood (ed) *Australia: A Social and Political History*. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, pp. 46 - 97.
- Hayes, Dennis and Wynyard, Robin (eds) (2002) *The McDonaldization of Higher Education*. Westport, Conn; London: Bergin & Garvey.
- Heath, Duncan and Boreham, Judy (1999) *Introducing Romanticism*. Cambridge: Icon Books.
- Heidegger, Martin (1977) 'The Question Concerning Technology' in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, pp. 3-35.
- Hobbes, Thomas (1651/1968) *Leviathan*. London: Penguin Books.
- Höffe, Otfried (1994) *Immanuel Kant*, trans. M. Farrier. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Hood, John (2001) 'Taking a Commercial Shine to University', *The Australian*, 17 October, p. 24.

- Howard, John (2002) *National Research Priorities* [online].
 <http://www.dest.gov.au/ministers/msg/dec02/transcript_051202.htm> (12 December 2002).
- Hughes, Diane and DuMont, Kimberly (1993) 'Using Focus Groups to Facilitate Culturally Anchored Research' in *American Journal of Community Psychology*, 21 (6), pp. 775-807.
- Hunt, E. K. and Sherman, Howard (1990) *Economics: An Introduction to Traditional and Radical Views*, 6th ed. New York: Harper Collins Publishers.
- Hunter, Ian (1992) 'Aesthetics and Cultural Studies' in L. Grossberg, C. Nelson and P. A. Treichler (eds) *Cultural Studies*. New York; London: Routledge, pp. 347-72.
- Janson, H.W. and Janson, Anthony F. (1997) *History of Art*, 5th ed. revised. London: Thames & Hudson.
- John, Eileen (2001) 'Art and Knowledge' in B. Gaut and D. M. Lopes (eds) *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*. London; New York: Routledge, pp. 329-340.
- Kant, Immanuel (1787/1893) *Critique of Pure Reason*, from the 2nd ed, trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn. London; New York: George Bell & Sons.
- Kant, Immanuel (1787/1934) *Critique of Pure Reason*, abridged from the 2nd ed, trans. N. K. Smith. London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd.
- Kant, Immanuel (1790/1952) *The Critique of Judgement*, trans. J. Meredith. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.
- Kant, Immanuel (1798/1979) *The Conflict of the Faculties*, trans. M. Gregor. New York: Abaris Books.
- Kearney, Richard (1988) *The Wake of Imagination: Toward a postmodern culture*. London: Routledge.
- Kemp, David (1999a) *New Knowledge, New Opportunities: A Discussion Paper on Higher Education Research and Research Training*, (Green Paper) [online].

- <<http://www.detya.gov.au/highered/otherpub/greenpaper/contents.htm>>
(downloaded 20 July 2000).
- Kemp, David (1999b) *Knowledge and Innovation: A policy statement on research and research training*, (White Paper) [online].
<<http://www.detya.gov.au/highered/whitepaper/>> (downloaded 20 July 2000).
- Kemp, David (2000) *Australian Research Council Inaugural Strategic Plan Launched* [online]. <http://www.detya.gov.au/ministers/kemp/may00/k060_030500.htm>
(accessed 21 July 2000).
- Kingston, Beverley (1988) *The Oxford History of Australia Volume 3 1860-1900 Glad, Confident Morning*. Melbourne: Oxford University Press.
- Kitzinger, Jenny (1994) 'The Methodology of Focus Groups: The Importance of Interaction Between Research Participants' in *Sociology of Health and Illness*, 16 (1), pp. 103-121.
- Knight, Stephen (1989) 'Searching for Research' in *Meanjin*, 48 (3), pp. 456-462.
- Krauth, Nigel and Brady, Tess (1997) 'Writing Beyond the Reading List' in *Australian Book Review*, 191, p. 47.
- Krauth, Nigel (2000) 'Where is Writing Now?: Australian University Creative Writing Programs at the End of the Millennium' in *Text 4* (1) [online].
<<http://www.gu.edu.au/school/art/text/april00/krauth.htm#appendix>> (accessed 19 July 2000).
- Krauth, Nigel (2001) 'The Creative Writing Doctorate in Australia: An Initial Survey' in *Text 5* (1) [online].
<<http://www.gu.edu.au/school/art/text/april01/krauth.htm#taylret>> (accessed 3 April 2001).
- Kroll, Jeri (2002). 'Creative Writing as Research and the Dilemma of Accreditation: How Do We Prove the Value of What We Do?' in *Text 6* (1) [online].
<<http://www.gu.edu.au/school/art/text/april02/kroll.htm>> (accessed 2 October 2002).

- Kroll, Jeri (2004) 'The Exegesis and the Gentle Reader/Writer' in *Text Special Issue* (3) [online]. < <http://www.gu.edu.au/school/art/text/speciss/issue3/kroll.htm>> (accessed 16 May 2004).
- Kymlicka, Will (1995) 'Liberalism' in T. Honderich (ed) *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 483-485.
- Lacan, Jacques (1977) *Ecrits: A Selection*, trans. A. Sheridan. London: Tavistock.
- Lamarque, Peter (2001) 'Literature' in B. Gaut and D. M. Lopes (eds) *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*. London; New York: Routledge, pp. 449-461.
- Lane, Robert (1966) 'The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable Society' in *American Sociological Review*, 31 (5), pp. 649-662.
- Leavis, F.R. (1943/1961) *Education and the University: A Sketch of an 'English School'*, 2nd ed. London: Chatto & Windus.
- Lemaitre, Georges (1969) 'Dadaism' in J. Friguglietti and E. Kennedy (eds) *The Shaping of Modern France: Writings on French History Since 1715*. London: The Macmillan Company, pp. 594-598.
- Levi-Strauss, Claude (1969) *The Elementary Structures of Kinship*. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode.
- Lovitt, William and Lovitt, Harriet Brundage (1995) *Modern Technology in the Heideggerian Perspective*. Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press.
- Lyotard, Jean (1984) *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. G. Bennington and B. Massumi. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- MacCallum, Mungo (1903) 'Professor MacCallum's Address' in *Record of the Jubilee Celebrations of the University of Sydney 30th September, 1902*. Sydney: William Brooks & Co., pp. 38-56.
- MacLaurin, Normand (1902) "'University Commemoration" The Chancellor's Speech at the University of Sydney', *The Daily Telegraph*, 21 April, p. 7.

- Macmillan, David (1968) *Australia Universities: A Descriptive Sketch*. Sydney: Sydney University Press.
- Marginson, Simon and Considine, Mark (2000) *The Enterprise University: Power, Governance and Reinvention in Australia*. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
- Markus, Gyorgy (1994) 'A Society of Culture: The Constitution of Modernity' in G. Robinson and J. Rundell (eds) *Rethinking Imagination: Culture and Creativity*. London; New York: Routledge, pp. 15-29.
- Marr, David (1999) 'The Key to His Weakness' in N. James (ed) *Writers on Writing*. Sydney: Halstead Press, pp. 109-114.
- Martin, Leslie Harold (1964) *Tertiary Education in Australia: Report of the Committee on the Future of Tertiary Education in Australia to the Australian Universities Commission*, Vol. 1. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.
- Martin, Leslie Harold (1965) *Tertiary Education in Australia: Report of the Committee on the Future of Tertiary Education in Australia to the Australian Universities Commission*, Vol. 3. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.
- Marx, Karl (1847/1976) 'The Poverty of Philosophy. Answer to the Philosophy of Poverty by M. Proudhon' in K. Marx and F. Engels (eds) *Collected Works, Volume 6 Marx and Engels 1845 - 1848*. London: Lawrence & Wishart, pp. 105-212.
- Marx, Karl (1867/1983) 'Capital, Volume 1' in E. Kamenka (ed) *The Portable Marx*. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd, pp. 432-503.
- Marx, Karl (1939/1973) *Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft)*, trans. M. Nicolaus, from Marx's notes, 1857-8. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books.
- Maslen, Geoffrey and Slattery, Luke (1994) *Why Our Universities are Failing: Crisis in the Clever Country*. Melbourne: Wilkinson Books.

- Mason, John Hope (2003) *The Value of Creativity: The Origins and Emergence of a Modern Belief*. Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing.
- Mattelart, Armand (2000) *Networking the World, 1794–2000*, trans L. Carey-Libbrecht and J. Cohen. Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press.
- Maurice, Furnley (1944) *Poems*. Melbourne; Sydney: Lothian Publishing Co Pty Ltd.
- Mauss, Marcel (1974) *The Gift*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- McChesney, Robert (1996) 'The Internet and U.S. Communication Policy-Making in Historical and Critical Perspective' in *Journal of Communication*, 46 (1), pp. 98-124.
- McGowan, John (2002) *Democracy's Children: Intellectuals and the Rise of Cultural Politics*. Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press.
- Merton, Robert and Kendall, Patricia (1946) 'The Focussed Interview' in *American Journal of Sociology*, 51, pp. 541-557.
- Miller, Henry (1995) *The Management of Change in Universities: Universities, State and Economy in Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom*. Buckingham: The Society for Research into Higher Education and Open University Press.
- Milner, Andrew (1991) *Contemporary Cultural Theory: An Introduction*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
- Milner, Andrew (1996) *Literature, Culture and Society*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
- Minor, Vernon (1994) *Art History's History*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Modjeska, Drusilla (1999) *Stravinsky's Lunch*. Sydney: Picador.
- Morgan, David (1988) *Focus Groups as Qualitative Research*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.
- Morrison, David (1998) *The Search for a Method: Focus Groups and the Development of Mass Communication Research*. Luton: University of Luton Press.

- Mourad, Roger (1997) *Postmodern Philosophical Critique and the Pursuit of Knowledge in Higher Education*. Westport, Connecticut; London: Bergin & Garvey.
- Murray, Keith (1957) *Report of the Committee on Australian Universities*, (Murray Report). Canberra: Commonwealth Government.
- Myers, David (1996) *The Elephants Teach: Creative Writing Since 1880*. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Nadeau, Maurice (1964) *The History of Surrealism*, trans. R. Howard. London: Jonathan Cape.
- Nadel, George (1957) *Australia's Colonial Culture: Ideas, Men and Institutions in Mid-Nineteenth Century Eastern Australia*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Nelson, Brendan (2002) *Higher Education at the Crossroads: An Overview Paper*. Canberra: Commonwealth Department of Education, Science and Training.
- Nelson, Brendan (2003a) *Arts and Australian Research Council Partnership* [media release]. <http://www.dest.gov.au/ministers/nelson/jun_03/n368_050603.htm> (accessed 29 July 2003).
- Nelson, Brendan (2003b) *Enhancing National Research Priorities* [media release]. <<http://www.dest.gov.au/Ministers/Media/Nelson/2003/11/n539281103.asp>> (accessed 18 March 2004).
- Nelson, Brendan (2003c) *National Press Club Address* [transcript]. <<http://www.dest.gov.au/Ministers/Media/Nelson/2004/03/ntscript240304.asp>> (accessed 30 March 2004).
- Nelson, Brendan (2003d) *Social Sciences and Humanities Critically Important to Australia's Research Future* [media release]. <http://www.dest.gov.au/ministers/nelson/mar_03/n311_210303.htm> (accessed 24 March 2003).

- Nelson, Brendan (2004) *The Forgotten Frontier – Commercialisation in the Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences* [media release].
 <<http://www.dest.gov.au/Ministers/Media/Nelson/2004/06/n777290604.asp>>
 (accessed 28 August 2004).
- Neumann, Ruth (2002) 'Diversity, Doctoral Education and Policy' in *Higher Education Research & Development*, 21 (2), pp. 167-178.
- Newman, Barnett (1990) 'Remarks at the Fourth Annual Woodstock Art Conference' in J. P. O'Neill (ed) *Barnett Newman: Selected Writings and Interviews*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, pp. 242-247.
- Newman, John Henry (1889/1976) *The Idea of a University: Defined and Illustrated*, ed. I. T. Ker. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich (1977) *A Nietzsche Reader*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich (1886/1990) *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale. London: Penguin Books.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich (1886/2000) *The Birth of Tragedy*, trans. D. Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Norman, Richard (1971) *Reasons for Actions: A Critique of Utilitarian Rationality*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Norris, Christopher (1982) *Deconstruction: Theory and Practice*. London; New York: Methuen.
- Nussbaum, Martha (1999) *Sex and Social Justice*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Nussbaum, Martha (2001) *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy*, revised. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- O'Brien, Kerth (1993) 'Using Focus Groups to Develop Health Surveys: An Example from Research in Social Relationships and AIDS-Preventive Behaviour' in *Health Education Quarterly*, 20 (3), pp. 361-372.

- Otter, Sandra den (1996) *British Idealism and Social Explanation*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Palmquist, Steve (2000) *The Tree of Philosophy*, 4th ed. [online].
<<http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/tp4/>> (accessed 12 February 2004).
- Paulson, William (1988) *The Noise of Culture: Literary Texts in a World of Information*. Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press.
- Perry, Gaylene (1998) 'Writing in the Dark: Exorcising the Exegesis' in *Text 2* (2) [online]. <http://www.gu.edu.au/school/art/text/oct98/perry.htm> (accessed 6 May 1999).
- Pevsner, Nikolaus (1973) *Academies of Art, Past and Present*. New York: Da Capo Press.
- Philp, Hugh, Debus, R. L., Veidemanis, Vija and Connell, W. F. (1964) *The University and its Community*. Sydney: Ian Novak.
- Plato (1935) *Plato's Republic*, introd. A. D. Lindsay. London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd.
- 'Plea for Outlet. Lack of Publishing Facilities'. (1929) *The Argus*, 22 August, p. 8
- Polanyi, Michael and Prosch, Harry (1975) *Meaning*. Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press.
- Pollack, Michael (1990) *Sense and Censorship: Commentaries on Censorship Violence in Australia*. Sydney: Reed Books.
- Raynaud, Philippe (1994) 'Bourdieu' in M. Lilla (ed) *New French Thought: Political Philosophy*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, pp. 63-69.
- Readings, Bill (1996) *The University in Ruins*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Riddell, Elizabeth (1999) 'Insincerity and Other Enemies of the Word' in N. James (ed) *Writers on Writing*. Sydney: Halstead Press, pp. 101-104.
- Rosenblum, Nancy (1987) *Another Liberalism: Romanticism and the Reconstruction of Liberal Thought*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

- Rutherford, Jonathan (2001) 'The Knowledge Economy vs the Learning Society' in *Information for Social Change*, 14 [online].
<<http://www.libr.org/ISC/articles/14-Rutherford.html>> (accessed 12 June 2001)
- Rybczynski, Witold (1983) *Taming the Tiger: the Struggle to Control Technology*. New York: The Viking Press.
- Said, Edward (1994) *Representations of the Intellectual: The 1993 Reith Lectures*. London: Vintage.
- Sarup, Madan (1992) *Jacques Lacan*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Schaper, Eva (1968) *Prelude to Aesthetics*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.
- Schirato, Tony and Webb, Jen (2003) *Understanding Globalization*. London: Sage Publications.
- Schreuder, Deryck (1995) "'National needs" and the role of the Humanities' in D. Schreuder (ed) *The Humanities and a Creative Nation: Jubilee Essays*. Canberra: The Australian Academy of the Humanities, pp. ix-xvi.
- Scott, Ernest (1936) *A History of the University of Melbourne*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.
- Scott, William Robert (1965) *Adam Smith as Student and Professor*. New York: A.M. Kelly.
- Serle, Geoffrey (1973) *From Deserts the Prophets Come: The Creative Spirit in Australia 1788-1972*. Melbourne: Heinemann.
- Shakespeare, William (1623/2001) *Twelfth Night/Twelfth Night, Or What You Will*. London: Nick Hearn.
- Shand, John (1993) *Philosophy and Philosophers: An Introduction to Western Philosophy*. London: Penguin Books.
- Shaw, Alan George Lewers (1962) 'The Old Tradition' in P. Coleman (ed) *Australian Civilization*. Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire, pp. 12-25.

- Simon, Brian (1960) *Studies in the History of Education, 1780–1870*. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
- Skilleås, Ole (2001) *Philosophy and Literature: An Introduction*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Smith, Adam (1880/1976) *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, eds. R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner and W. B. Todd. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Smith, Murray (2001) 'Film' in B. Gaut and D. M. Lopes (eds) *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*. London; New York: Routledge, pp. 463-475.
- Smith, Stevie (1983) 'Thoughts about the Person from Porlock' in A. Allison, H. Barrows, C. Blake, A. Carr, A. Eastman and H. English, Jr (eds) *The Norton Anthology of Poetry*, 3rd ed. New York; London: W. W. Norton & Company, pp. 1074–1075.
- Snow, Charles Percy (1964) *The Two Cultures: And A Second Look. An Expanded Version of the Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Stewart, David and Shamdasani, Prem (1990) *Focus Groups: Theory and Practice*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.
- Strand, Dennis (1998) *Research in the Creative Arts*. Canberra: Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs.
- Stunkel, Kenneth and Sarsar, Saliba (1994) *Ideology, Values, and Technology in Political Life*. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America.
- Wentworth, William (1849) 'Foundation of a University' in Legislative Council, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 7 September, p. 2.
- Taylor, Andrew (1999) 'The Ghost and the Machine: Creative Writing and the Academic System' in *Text*, 3 (1) [online].
<<http://www.gu.edu.au/school/art/text/april99/taylor.htm>> (accessed 6 May 1999).

- Throsby, David (2001) *Economics and Culture*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Thurley, Geoffrey (1983) *The Romantic Predicament*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Truscott, Bruce (1945) *Redbrick and These Vital Days*. London: Faber & Faber.
- Turney, Clifford, Bygott, Ursula and Chippendale, Peter (1991) *Australia's First: A History of the University of Sydney Volume 1 1850 - 1939*. Sydney: Hale & Iremonger.
- University Guide of Australia*. (1979) Hong Kong: Hang Seng Bank Ltd.
- University of Canberra (2003) *Research and Research Training Management Report* [online]. <<http://dest.gov.au/highered/respubs/rrtm/2003/uc.pdf>> (downloaded 27 April 2004).
- University of Canberra (2004a) *Course: Master of Arts in Communication* [online]. <<http://www.canberra.edu.au/courses/index.cfm?action+detail&courseaid=230AA>> (accessed 12 June 2004).
- University of Canberra (2004b) *Division of Communication and Education Courses and Programs* [online]. <<http://www.ce.canberra.edu.au/courses.cfm>> (accessed 12 June 2004).
- University of Melbourne (2002) *The University of Melbourne Strategic Plan: Perspective 2002* [report]. <<http://www.unimelb.edu.au/vc/stratplan/StratPlan2002.pdf>> (downloaded 14 March 2003).
- University of Melbourne (2003a) *Masters of Creative Writing (coursework and minor thesis)* [online]. <<http://www.sca.unimelb.edu.au/cw/MCW.html>> (accessed 5 September 2004).
- University of Melbourne (2003b) *Research and Research Training Plan* [online]. <<http://www.unimelb.edu.au/publications/ResearchPlan04.pdf>> (downloaded 27 April 2004).

- University of Melbourne (2004a) *Creative Writing* [online].
<<http://www.sca.unimelb.edu.au/cw/index.html>> (accessed 5 September 2004).
- University of Melbourne (2004b). *The University of Melbourne Strategic Plan Perspective 2004* [report].
<<http://www.unimelb.edu.au/publications/strategicplan/StrategicPlan04.pdf>>
(downloaded 27 April 2004).
- University of Phoenix (n.d.) *FlexNet Internet Classes* [online].
<<http://info.universityofphoenixcampuses.com/online.jsp>> (accessed 24 March 2004).
- University of Technology, Sydney (2003) *Research and Research Training Management Report* [online].
<<http://www.research.uts.edu.au/docs/2003UTSRRTMR.pdf>> (downloaded 27 April 2004).
- University of Technology, Sydney (2004a) *Research* [online].
<<http://www.hss.uts.edu.au/research/index/html>> (accessed 12 August 2004).
- University of Technology, Sydney (2004b) *Research Degrees* [online].
<<http://www.hss.uts.edu.au/courses/research.html>> (accessed 12 August 2004).
- Usher, Robin (2002) 'A Diversity Of Doctorates: Fitness for the Knowledge Economy?' in *Higher Education Research & Development*, 21 (2), pp. 143-153.
- Virilio, Paul (2003) *Art and Fear*, trans. J. Rose. London; New York: Continuum.
- Virilio, Paul (1994) *The Vision Machine*, trans. J. Rose. Bloomington; Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- Ward, Graham, ed (2000) *The Certeau Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- Webb, Jenn (2000). 'Individual Enunciations and Social Frames' in *Text*, 4 (2) [online].
<<http://www.gu.edu.au/school/art/text/oct00/webb.htm>> (accessed 14 November 2000).

- Webb, Jenn (2001) 'Eating Dust: Electronic Media and Regional Arts' in B. Levy and F. Murphy (eds) *Story/telling*. St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, pp. 79-86.
- Webb, Jenn, Schirato, Tony and Danaher, Geoff (2002) *Understanding Bourdieu*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
- Weber, Samuel (1996) 'The Future of the University: The Cutting Edge' in T. Smith (ed) *Ideas of the University*. Sydney: Research Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences in association with Power Publications, pp. 43-75.
- White, Richard (1981) *Inventing Australia: Images and Identity 1788-1980*. Sydney: George Allen & Unwin.
- White, Robert (1998) 'The State of English Studies in the 1990s' in *Knowing Ourselves and Others: The Humanities in Australia into the 21st Century*, Vol 2. Canberra, Australian Research Council, pp. 95-105.
- Wilde, Oscar (1909) *The Picture of Dorian Gray*. Paris: Charles Carrington.
- Williams, Raymond (1958) *Culture and Society, 1780 – 1950*. London: The Hogarth Press.
- Wind, Edgar (1963) *Art and Anarchy: The Reith Lectures 1960*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Witcombe, Christopher (2000) *Modernism* [online].
<<http://witcombe.sbc.edu/modernism/artsake.html>> (accessed 20 May 2004).
- Woolley, John (1902) 'Woolley's Inaugural Address' in H. E. Barff (ed) *A Short Historical Account of the University of Sydney*. Sydney: Angus & Robertson, pp. 29-41.
- Young, Robert (1996) *Torn Halves: Political Conflict in Literary and Cultural Theory*. Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press.
- Zizek, Slavoj (1994) 'How Did Marx Invent the Symptom?' in S. Zizek (ed) *Mapping Ideology*. London; New York: Verso, pp. 296-331.

Appendix A – Letter of Introduction to Universities to Participate in Focus Groups

Dear _____

My name is Sue North and I am a PhD candidate in the School of Creative Communication and Cultural Studies at the University of Canberra.

I am writing to seek your permission to conduct a discussion seminar with a small number of academic staff and postgraduate research students within your department/school as part of my primary research.

My research entails looking at the practice of creative writing in universities in relation to research practices. This encompasses areas such as funding (both internal and external), guidelines for acceptable practice (for example, at postgraduate level), and status. In terms of postgraduate research alone, there is ongoing political debate concerning the worth of a creative PhD in relation to more traditional research.

The purpose of the discussion is primarily a chance to air views on the topic and exchange information and ideas about the opportunities and/or constraints on creative writing being incorporated into universities at the research level in terms of funding, status and scholarship.

I envisage carrying out two discussion groups, one with academic staff and the other with postgraduate research students. The reason for the split is to investigate any dichotomy of views in the creative/research divide without conflicting with supervisor/student roles.

This research project has been approved by the University of Canberra Committee for Ethics in Human Research.

The number in each discussion group would ideally be 5 – 8 people, to be conducted on your university campus. I hope to be in _____ the week beginning _____. Could you contact me to let me know if you wish to participate in this project? My contact details are set out below.

I hope you can contribute to this project, as the University of _____ is an important component in my investigation of the nature and structure of research within universities in Australia.

I look forward to hearing from you,

Regards,
Sue North

Appendix B – General Guidelines for Focus Group Discussion Questions

- What is the role of research in a university? (What is its function?)
- What is the role of creativity in a university?
- How do you see creative practices in relation to scientific practices?
- What do you see as the steps involved in writing a piece of traditional research?
- What do you see as the steps involved in writing a creative work?
- What are the differences in the social construction of research and creative work?
- How is this bureaucratized in universities?
- How does creative work stand in relation to other disciplines in universities in terms of status?
- Does including a creative writing element in your research project impact on its funding?
- Do you think a creative project is entitled to similar funding to projects involving traditional research?
- What opportunities, or obstacles, are there for creative writing to be incorporated into universities as research?
- How do creative writers get what they are doing recognized as research?
- Do you think creativity can be evaluated in similar ways to research?
- If a postgraduate research student wishes to conduct their research as a creative writing project, what additional requirements, if any, should be included as criteria?