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Introduction

Deliberative democracy is now a flourishing field. Deliberative democratic thinking characterizes ever more areas of theory and empirical study. Practical democratic innovations explicitly grounded in deliberative principles are proliferating, there is now a large academic and practical literature on deliberation, political figures increasingly appeal to deliberative democratic principles, and criticism has been robust and productive.

But all is not rosy on other fronts. As we bring this *Handbook* to fruition, the world at large appears to be moving in some disconcerting anti-deliberative and anti-democratic directions. Post-truth politics is the antithesis of deliberative democracy. Resurgent authoritarian and populist leaders in many countries have little interest in deliberation – except to suppress it. Where opposition is not repressed, we see in some quarters levels of political polarization that signal inabilities to listen to the other side and reflect upon what they may have to say.

We hope that these sorts of trends can and will be reversed, and that the ideas and practices of deliberative democracy can play a key role in their reversal. In the meantime, however, these trends feed the cynicism of those who believe that deliberative democracy is a pipe dream. A long tradition in political science deploys empirical evidence and analysis to show that ordinary people are not up to the task of competent participation in democracy. Recently Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels, in *Democracy for Realists,* argue that identities and partisan attachments rather than issue opinions or interests drive voting behavior. Achen and Bartels dismiss deliberative democracy in a footnote as irrelevant when it comes to "understanding democratic politics on a national scale" (Achen and Bartels 2016, 2 note 2). In contrast, we believe that deliberative democracy provides the best hope for countering the

democratic deficiencies described by Achen and Bartels, and also constitutes the best response to authoritarian populism and post-truth politics. Normative thinking about deliberative democracy and deliberative experiments is aimed not at duplicating democratic politics today but instead at providing ideals toward which to work and showing empirically how political systems can work better. Deliberative democracy puts meaningful communication at the heart of democracy, not as a naïve hope, but in full recognition of the real capacities and limitations of citizens, politicians, and political processes. We hope this *Handbook* will demonstrate the possibilities and limitations of deliberative democracy, the opportunities for and the obstructions to thoughtful deliberation, the accomplishments of both the theory and the practice, and the challenges that remain.

Concepts

Deliberative democracy is grounded in an ideal in which people come together, on the basis of equal status and mutual respect, to discuss the political issues they face and, on the basis of those discussions, decide on the policies that will then affect their lives.

In this volume, we define *deliberation* itself minimally to mean *mutual communication that involves weighing and reflecting on preferences, values and interests regarding matters of common concern*. Defining it this way minimizes the positive valence that attaches to the word "deliberation" itself, so that we can then speak of "good" and "bad" deliberation without "bad deliberation" being a contradiction in terms. We define *deliberative democracy* as any practice of democracy that gives deliberation a central place.

We conceptually contrast *deliberative* democracy to *aggregative* democracy, which is normally based on the counting of votes. That deliberative and aggregative democracy contrast

conceptually does not make them antithetical in practice. At least in established liberal democratic states, both deliberation (talking) and aggregation (voting) are usually important for democratic decision-making at different stages. Citizens and representatives discuss the issues before them, then sometimes come to agreement or, when conflict remains after discussion, make the decision by a vote. The role of the deliberation before the vote is to help the citizens to understand better the issues, their own interests, and the interests and perceptions of others; forge agreement where possible; and, in the instances in which agreement is not possible, both structure and clarify the questions behind the conflict and the eventual vote.

Like many human ideals and almost all democratic ideals, the ideals that animate deliberative democracy are aspirational – ideals that cannot be achieved fully in practice but that provide standards toward which to aim, all other things equal.[1] Many common criticisms of deliberative democracy fail to recognize the aspirational quality of deliberative ideals. That deliberative democracy in its ideal form cannot be achieved perfectly in the world of practice does not undermine its use as a standard toward which to strive. The central ideal in aggregative democracy, equal power, is also impossible to achieve perfectly in practice. Even referenda, in which each citizen may have an equally weighted and aggregated vote, are worded and placed before the citizenry by individuals whose power over that wording and placement is greater than that of the typical citizen. It is impossible to achieve either deliberative or aggregative ideals in all their fullness.

Despite the impossibility of fully achieving these ideals, however, in some circumstances we may want to try hard and incur significant costs to come closer to an ideal. In other circumstances, trying too hard to achieve one ideal may create impediments to achieving other ideals and values – for example, when the time and resources required for extensive deliberation

undermine decisive action on a matter of urgent public concern. When the costs in other values of promoting the deliberative ideal seem on reflection too high, we appropriately settle for institutions and practices that come less close to the deliberative ideal. This contingent approach, attending to the greater or lesser importance and the greater and lesser costs of different ideals in different contexts, applies to all the aspirational democratic ideals, including deliberative ones.

Over the past half century, thinking on the content of the deliberative ideals has evolved. In what we call the "first generation" of thinkers on the subject[2], philosophers in several different and sometimes competing traditions introduced a series of related concepts to contemporary democratic theory: Jürgen Habermas developed one tradition, John Rawls and Joshua Cohen another, and writers in the civic republican tradition a third. Thinkers in other traditions and fields, including those rearticulating the ideals of participatory democracy, analyzing successful policy processes, and studying the internal workings of legislatures and courts, all contributed ideas to the field (see Floridia, this volume). At the same time, scholars and practitioners interested in improving the practice of democracy on the ground introduced different kinds of deliberative experiments whose outcomes also influenced the evolving and contested theory. These first generation thinkers all viewed deliberation fairly generically, as the offering and receiving of reasons for positions or policies. They often also combined this generic idea with the ideals of high quality argumentation or rational-critical debate, a focus on the common good, mutual respect, and the concept of a rationally motivated consensus to which all could agree (see Chambers, this volume). Almost as soon as thinkers from these different strands of theory and practice introduced their conceptions of deliberation into contemporary democratic theory, those conceptions met opposition. To that opposition others responded in defense, and as the debate continued, the ideals began to evolve. What we call "second generation" ideals do not reflect a

consensus of either theorists or practitioners, but are nevertheless, we believe, more sensitive to the nuances of the pluralist aspirations and dimensions of modern democracies. The first-generation ideal that arguments ought to give and respond to "reasons," for example, has evolved into the criterion that arguments ought to give and respond to appropriate "considerations" and contexts—for example, more emotionally rooted expressions, and differing styles of communication such as narrative and rhetoric.

These second generation ideals are not more "realistic" in the sense of being practical accommodations to the reality of not being able to reach the first generation ideals fully. Rather, they embody expansions of first generation ideals, often driven by ideals of democratic inclusion and plurality. The theorists who have advanced the second generation views of deliberation have advanced them as better *ideals* – more inclusive and better thought-through – than the ideals of the first generation. The choice between first and second generation ideals is contested, as is the meaning of each of the ideals in either generation. What any democratic ideal ought to imply in practice is always contested. An important job of political theory is to make clear the strands in any such contest so that both practitioners and theorists may understand better what they want in the realm of democratic ideals.

Table 1 presents our summary of the first and second generation ideals

[Table 1 about here].

The ideals are not only contested but also evolving, so that what we present here is a snapshot that will undoubtedly change further as deliberative theorists continue to place the ideals under scrutiny, examining their implications and suggesting alternatives.[3]

The ideal of mutual respect is central to all theories of deliberation (Gutmann and Thompson 1996). Although theorists have explored what respect might mean in any interaction, no one has suggested revising the underlying ideal significantly. For Larmore, for example, "to respect another person as an end is to require that coercive or political principles be as justifiable to that person as they presumably are to us" (Larmore 1999, 608; see also Forst 2012). That justifiability may be tested in deliberation. In practice, respect in deliberation includes listening actively and trying to understand the meaning to the speaker of any statement rather than taking that statement as an object to be dismissed, demeaned, manipulated, or destroyed. It means, without sacrificing realism, trying to see the motives of the speaker as the speaker experiences them. It means, as Bernard Williams put it, that each speaker "is owed an effort at identification; that he [or she] should not be regarded as the surface to which a certain label can be applied, but one should try to see the world (including the label) from his [or her] point of view" (Williams 1962, 41).

In response to early formulations of the ideal of mutual respect as requiring an "effort at identification," subsequent thinkers, particularly Black feminist theorists, have pointed out that this effort should include a consciousness that one cannot ever fully understand or identify with the experiences of another, particularly if one's interlocutor comes from a background very different from one's own (Collins 1990). Thus, one must give highly respectful attention to, and ask questions designed to elicit, each person's own understanding of their experiences and their own interpretations of their words (for an early formulation, see Barber 1984, 173-174). Even when difficult, members of dominant groups interacting with members of historically subordinate groups should work to understand the expressions, narratives, problems, and

positions of subordinate groups. In practice, regardless of the background of any of the individuals involved, mutual respect in deliberation enhances the frank and free flow of ideas. Respect in interaction is, in short, an unchallenged standard of good deliberation.

The ideal of absence of coercive power in deliberation has also remained unchallenged since Habermas first targeted its importance in his 1962 *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* ([1962] 1986, 202) and later portrayed it as possibly the central presupposition of argumentation based on the quest for understanding (Habermas [1981] 1984, 25 and 1982, 235, 255). Reconceived from a pragmatic presupposition to an ideal, the aim is that in deliberation, coercive power, defined as the threat of sanction or the use of force (moving others against their will), should not play a role. It requires no subtlety to realize that such conditions never exist in reality. Since Foucault (e.g., Foucault [1975] 1977), however, our understanding of the subtlety of the effects of power has expanded greatly. We now see how even the words we have available to us to speak, including the language we must speak (von Parijs 2011), carry with them a host of forced choices emanating from the context of social, political, and economic power -- for example giving us, before the recent feminist movement, "mankind" as the most accessible word to describe humanity (see, e.g., Lupia and Norton 2017). Despite the impossibility of removing coercive power from any deliberative situation, however, that aspiration remains central to the deliberative enterprise. We rightly judge particular deliberative institutions by how closely they approach this ideal.

Although mutual respect and the absence of power stand unchallenged as deliberative ideals throughout the evolution of deliberative thought, other earlier ideals embedded in the concept of

good deliberation have undergone some evolution, ranging from minor to significant. The ideal of equality, for example, has undergone a slight modification from certain earlier formulations. It still encompasses the component ideals of mutual respect (as discussed above), inclusion (the ideal that those with interests at stake in collective concern should have a voice in deliberations), and communicative freedom (the ideal that each should be free to give his or her opinion; see, e.g., Habermas [2005] 2008, Cohen 1989). But early formulations of the ideal using phrases such as "equal voice" or "equal influence," which seemed to require that each participant have an equal effect on the deliberative outcome, have come under critical scrutiny and revision. Knight and Johnson argue, for example, that democratic deliberation requires not equal influence (i.e., equal persuasive effects), but "equal opportunity of access to political influence" or simply "equal opportunity of political influence" (1997, 280, 292). An ideal of equal influence would give equal weight to both good and bad arguments, but in good deliberation one should change one's mind under the influence of a good argument, not a bad one. Knight and Johnson point out that in practice, a fully achieved ideal of equal opportunity to influence would require "equality of resources," including "material wealth and educational treatment," in order to "ensure that an individual's assent to arguments advanced by others is indeed uncoerced." The full goal of the "equal capacity to advance persuasive claims," would require remedying "the asymmetrical distribution in any political constituency of relevant deficiencies and faculties" (1997, 281). In a significant critique of Habermas, Fraser ([1990] 1992) had earlier made a similar point, writing that "societal equality is…a necessary condition for political democracy" – although this point cannot, of course, mean waiting for equality before pursuing democracy, since democracy is often the means through which social equality is advanced (Young 2000, chap. 1). Because both the equal capacity to advance persuasive claims and social equality are aspirational ideals, it

should be clear that the shift from equal influence to the equal opportunity to influence as an ideal is not a concession to "reality" but an attempt to specify the ideal more carefully.

The ideal of giving "reasons," a central part of the early deliberative theories of Jürgen Habermas and the Rawlsian theorist Joshua Cohen, has also come under criticism, sometimes unfairly, for being too focused on the kind of rational argumentation one might find in an academic seminar. It is true that Habermas's early archetypical "public sphere" was characterized by the "people's public use of their reason" ([1962] 1989, 26) in "rational-critical debate," which in turn rested only on "the standards of 'reason'" (28) and "the authority of the better argument" (36; see also 54 and *passim*). In later work, however, Habermas argued forcefully that "[f]eelings have a similar function for the moral justification of action as sense perceptions have for the theoretical justification of facts" (1990, 50; see Neblo 2003). Joshua Cohen in early work (1989) portrayed the relevant ideal as requiring that deliberative outcomes should be settled only by reference to the "reasons" participants offer, but he meant to include in that concept a set of fuller considerations. Cohen's early formulation followed John Rawls' emphasis on "public reasons" (as eventually expressed in Rawls 1996) as well as the emphasis on reason of Joseph Bessette, who coined the term "deliberative democracy" (1979, 1982, 1994).

Amelie Rorty (1985), Martha Nussbaum (2001) and many others have pointed out the flaws in dichotomizing "reason" and "emotion." The emotions always include some form of appraisal and evaluation, and reason itself requires an underlying emotional commitment to the process of reasoning. Nussbaum's positive account of the role of emotions in deliberation particularly singles out the emotion of compassion as an essential element of good reasoning in matters of

public concern. Neblo (2017), Krause (2008) and Morrell (2010) have argued that empathy is both a precursor to good deliberation and plays important roles within deliberation. Others have focused on the importance to deliberation of many important kinds of human communication other than reason-giving, including "testimony" (stating one's own perspective and experience in one's own words) (Sanders [1991] 1997, 351, 371), "greeting" (explicit mutual recognition and conciliatory caring), "rhetoric" (persuasive speaking that can involve humor or arresting figures of speech), and "storytelling" (which can back prescriptions or communicate understandings based on personal experience rather than abstract argument) (Young 1996, 129; 2000, chap. 2). These additions to the ideal are particularly important when the less purely "reason"-oriented forms of communication are more cognitively and emotionally available to members of relatively marginalized groups, such as women, people with less formal education, and members of non-dominant ethnicities. Contemporary deliberative theorists have, by and large, accepted these criticisms by modifying the deliberative ideal of eliciting and presenting "reasons" to an ideal of eliciting and presenting "relevant considerations," which may have a more emotional than purely rational base (Mansbridge 1999; 2015).

The ideal of consensus has undergone greater revision. Jürgen Habermas was the preeminent first generation theorist to stress consensus as the goal of deliberation. In his early *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, he described that aim as "the consensus developed in rational-critical public debate" and the "final unanimity wrought by a time-consuming process of mutual enlightenment, for the 'general interest' on the basis of which alone a rational agreement between publicly competing opinions could freely be reached" ([1962] 1989, 179, 195). In Elster's later stylized rendition of Habermas's thought, the goal of political action "should be

rational agreement rather than compromise, and the decisive political act is that of engaging in public debate with a view to the emergence of a consensus" (1986, 103). In his *Theory of Communicative Action* (1984, 1987 [1981]), however, Habermas presented consensus not as a political ideal but as part of a speech-act theory of deliberative influence: when speakers aim at mutual understanding by making "validity claims," they are, in effect, seeking consensus with other speakers (Floridia 2017). Still later, Habermas pointed out that a deliberative democracy should underwrite and protect deliberative influence in the sense of aiming at mutual understanding, and will also have processes that enable fair compromises and bargains when interests or values genuinely conflict, as they will in pluralistic societies (Habermas 1996 [1992], esp. 164-9). Within the Rawlsian tradition, Joshua Cohen early on wrote that "ideal deliberation aims to arrive at a rationally motivated consensus – to find reasons that are persuasive to all who are committed to acting on the results of a free and reasoned assessment of alternatives by equals." He immediately pointed out, however, that even "under ideal conditions there is no promise that consensual reasons will be forthcoming. If they are not, then deliberation concludes with voting, subject to some form of majority rule" (1989, 23). Later theorists were to investigate further the conditions in which consensual reasons were not forthcoming, arguing that a goal of deliberative communication more attentive to pluralist contexts and ideals would be consensus in matters of compatible values and common interests, but conflict clarification and fair compromise when those conditions did not hold (Habermas 1996, Mansbridge et al. 2010).

Relatedly, early deliberative theorists stressed the centrality to good deliberation of an orientation to the common good. Habermas made such an orientation central to his early concept of a "rational-critical" public sphere ([1962] 1986; see Elster 1983, 103). Sunstein (1988) and

Cohen (1989) also made the common good central to their discussions of deliberation. More recently, however, some theorists have suggested that in some circumstances self-interest is an appropriate motivation in deliberation, as long as that motivation is constrained by considerations of fairness and others' rights (Fraser ([1990] 1992), Mansbridge et al. 2010).

In addition to these centrally constitutive elements of ideal deliberation, other characteristics of the traditional ideal, such as publicity, accountability, and sincerity, have also come under critical scrutiny and suggestions for revision. One recent group of theorists, for example, has suggested that the ideal of "publicity," which many theorists, including Kant, thought required by the deliberative ideal (see overview in Habermas [1962] 1986, 100, 116, 165ff), is not appropriate for all deliberations, particularly those that occur within highly strategic contexts like legislatures. These theorists have enumerated some of the conditions under which privacy rather than publicity is likely to promote better deliberation (Chambers 2004; Warren and Mansbridge et al. 2016, 174-85); such conditions include guards against corruption and requirements for public justification following a closed forum. The ideal of accountability appears in Gutmann and Thompson's (2004) analysis as a requirement for good deliberation in the context of elected representation. Deliberation in other forums would require other forms of accountability that still remain to some degree untheorized. Finally, traditional views of good deliberation may have emphasized the importance of authenticity and sincerity among the speakers, but more recent theorists have pointed out that some insincerity is allowable and even preferable in the non-substantive matters of greeting, compliments, and other communications aimed at generating the mutual respect necessary for deliberation (Warren 2006).

On the non-ideal but pragmatic and prudential front, a major goal of deliberation has always been the epistemic goal of improving knowledge (see Estlund 1993, 2009, Landemore 2013, Martí 2006, Nino 1996), but the tensions within that goal and how it is to be achieved are constantly contested (Bohman 1998).

In short, there is no Platonic ideal of good deliberation. The ideals of which good deliberation is composed are rightly constantly subjected to critical scrutiny, examined for unintended implications, opened to revision, revised, and subjected again to contest and further scrutiny. The ideals evolve as those who have placed them under scrutiny suggest revisions and others accept those revisions. Deliberative democracy is an excellent example of what Gallie (1956) calls an "essentially contested concept," but it has the additional quality that contestation and reflection are integral to the concept itself (Gutmann and Thompson 2004, chap. 4).

The Sites of Deliberative Democracy

Where can and should the ideal of deliberative democracy be pursued? The short answer is almost everywhere. A number of different locations can be joined in productive combinations.

We may begin with the formal institutions of government, notably legislatures, courts, and executives (see Quirk et al., this volume). Legislatures in practice often do not adhere closely to deliberative standards. Elected representatives often use public speech strategically, as their motivations are usually shaped in the first instance by the imperatives of winning elections within adversarial contexts. Parliamentary debates can be ritualized performances, conceived in the service of strategizing for electoral victory and aimed primarily at scoring points in the public eye. Reflection and being amenable to changing one's mind, central deliberative ideals, are often

in short supply in public legislative debate, especially in the adversarial systems of Anglo-American countries. Westminster style parliamentary systems in particular have the virtue of sharpening the accountability of governments, but do so at some cost to deliberative learning within political institutions.

Yet not all legislatures are as deliberatively problematic as the Anglo-American adversarial versions. Using measures derived from Habermas's work on deliberation, Steiner et al (2004) show that deliberative quality is higher in more consensual systems with no strict party discipline (such as Switzerland), where the divide between "government" and "opposition" is less clear. They have also shown that deliberative quality is higher in committees that are not open to the public, where legislators are more likely to show respect for the others' perspectives. Even in the American system, informal meetings among legislators can produce significant deliberation, while legislative staff may deliberate privately with other legislative staff (Mansbridge 1988, Bessette 1994). Because a mutually trusting environment in which participants can speak freely is often crucial to good deliberation, the quality of deliberation may be inversely proportional to the degree of attention that deliberation will get from the public. Thus transparency may not always be a deliberative good and may do deliberative harm. (For evidence on the anti-deliberative effects of transparency and an accompanying normative argument, see Warren and Mansbridge et al. 2016.) The future is open to work comparing the quality of deliberation in state and provincial legislatures in federated systems, as well as in direct face-to-face democracies of different sizes and compositions, as in New England town meetings or participatory budgeting assemblies.

For Rawls (1993, 231) the exemplary deliberative institution is not a legislature, but rather the US Supreme Court, which is populated by specialists in a certain kind of public reason. Such

enthusiasm for the deliberative centrality of constitutional courts is hard to find outside the United States. Moreover, although constitutional courts may be deliberative, they are not very democratic, given that their members are only appointed by democratically elected representatives and often appointed for life. In the United States today, the Supreme Court today increasingly fails to approach deliberative standards because its members divide along predictable partisan lines and are thus at times tempted not to take seriously the arguments of members with contrary partisan leanings. This said, judges and justices must still justify their decisions with reasoning, and they are constrained by institutional rules, norms of impartiality, and the particulars of cases to respond to the positions they oppose, especially when overturning precedents (Rosanvallon 2011, part 3). Constitutional court systems are thus an important, if limited, site of deliberation.

Juries also provide important sites of citizen deliberation within the judicial system. Although in many countries the actual deliberations of juries cannot be observed, mock juries and retrospective accounts give a largely positive account of the quality and effects of deliberation, with the egalitarian qualification that class, race, and gender (to a declining extent) tend significantly to affect participation (see York and Cornwall 2006 and Gastil, Burkhalter, and Black 2007, summarizing an extensive literature).

In the executive branch of government, the appointed members of government agencies often deliberate extensively over which policies are to the public good (see Sunstein 2017 on the US Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs and Weaver & Jones 1989 on the "deliberative process privilege"). This deliberation may be especially inclusive in the context of coalition government, where the consent of coalition partners is needed in order to pass legislation (see Steiner et al. Political requirements for consent can lead to "deliberative negotiations" (Warren

and Mansbridge et al. 2016) not only in legislatures but also in administration, where high levels of justification rationality and mutual respect may be necessary to cope successfully with factual disagreements and issues of fairness and justice, as well as to spark a constructive spirit during policy negotiations. Administrations in many countries have adopted practices of 'governance-driven democratization' (Warren 2009), in which they consult stakeholders or broader publics in order to craft better policies. This kind of consultation can involve only simple "notice and comment" procedures in which regulators are required by law to post possible regulations publicly, so that members of relevant publics can register their disagreements and suggestions for change. But the consultation can also involve far more thorough deliberations, including iterative processes that incorporate elements of negotiation as well as deliberation (for the EU, see, e.g., Sabel and Zeitlin 2008).

As societies become politically more complex, administrators have turned to formal and informal networks of mutual consultation and decision in the service of effective governance. In many polities, particularly in the "consensual" democracies of Northern Europe, these networks are increasingly outweighing, and some think displacing, the formal institutions of government in the production of collective decisions (Rhodes 1997), Although such networks sometimes include important civil society actors such as NGOs, they are often democratically and deliberatively problematic because they fail to approach sufficiently the standards of inclusion and equality required for democratic deliberation. The NGOs involved in the consultations and negotiations are often self-selected or selected on a non-democratic basis and the networks can be dominated by powerful actors such as corporations, with little or no citizen involvement (Hendriks 2008; see also Hendriks and Boswell, this volume). Although such networks have the potential to multiply dramatically the sites of deliberation, they should always be scrutinized and

evaluated in the light of deliberative and democratic standards. As a general democratic rule, the closer any NGO or voluntary association comes to being a constitutive part of the consultation and negotiation that results in formal state coercion, the more internally democratic and open to citizen choice and input that association should be -- although when such consultation and negotiation are not significant, there are good reasons to allow each association to govern itself adaptively in response to its own self-concept and constituency (Smith and Teasdale 2012).

Moving further outside the institutions of government, civil society and the public sphere have loomed large in deliberative democratic thinking, especially in strands inspired by Jürgen Habermas. Following the connotations of the word "public," the public sphere could be thought of in the most encompassing terms as the totality of deliberation in public life in a society, including the institutions of government. Deliberative democratic theorists who follow Habermas, however, conceive the public sphere as public life outside the formal institutions of government that form the public opinion to which the institutions should respond. Following Fraser's elaborations of the concept ([1990] 1992), we will speak of such public spheres as plural, differentiated, and overlapping, encompassing political activists, social movements, old and new media. They may also encompass informal political conversations, or conversations on issues the public ought to discuss, among friends, acquaintances, and online interlocutors. Public spheres flourish when political speech and association are protected and people have robust capacities to associate for shared purposes. The deliberative qualities of public spheres should not be idealized; much that goes on in the speaking public is vicious, manipulative, exclusive, and deceptive. But deliberative thinking can evaluate what is going on in these spheres and generate ideas for improvement. Public spheres are a site for the generation of influence over formal institutions of government, for deliberative social learning across ideological, ethnic, or

religious differences, and a source of change that can be consequential even in the absence of governmental decisions. Public spheres enable issues to be identified, formulated, and advocated in innovative ways. Barriers to entry tend to be lower and topics more diverse than within the institutions of government. In Habermas's terms, public spheres function as deliberative "sensors" of new issues and problems, which may eventually find deliberative uptake within more formally institutionalized contexts ([1992]1996, chap. 8). The rise of feminism, environmentalism, and gay rights all provide examples.

As this focus on public spheres suggests, the theory of deliberative democracy is not, unlike some of its more established competitors, tied to the sovereign state. The traditional "town hall" meetings that legislators sometimes hold on particular issues and the public hearings held by legislators and administrators are intermediary between state and public. Many of these are attended primarily by activists and come up wanting on many deliberative criteria. Elections also play an intermediate role between state and public, offering opportunities for citizen deliberation. In a deliberative innovation in Benin, experimental town hall meetings in the electoral context provided information, candidates' proposed solutions, open policy-based public debate, and no cash distributions to the audience. These forums increased participants' information and subsequent discussion with others when compared to standard clientelist rallies that made localized promises and distributed cash (Fujiwara and Wantchekon 2013). A "Deliberation Day" in the week before a presidential election has been suggested in the US (Ackerman and Fishkin 2004). Political forums with deliberative elements are being instituted across the globe (e.g., Heller and Rao 2015, and in this volume, *inter alia,* Fischer and Boosabong, Hendriks and Boswell, Forester, Parkinson, and chapters in the section on "Practical Applications"). Deliberative theories and practices may also be applied to the internal

mechanisms and external influences of private entities such as firms and private universities (Felicetti 2016, Smith and Teasdale 2012).

With its focus on deliberative influence that works through publics, deliberative democracy travels relatively well into the international system. As Risse (this volume) points out, international politics and negotiations feature a great deal of persuasion, which may approach deliberative ideals more or less closely. Indeed, deliberative influence is often more important in the international domain because state-like institutions are weak or absent. Transnational public spheres and global civil society can function as components of a global deliberative democracy—and even serve as sites of inclusion where the state-like features of democracy do not exist (Bohman 2007; Dryzek 2012). Such public spheres meet deliberative ideals best when they involve the representation of categories of people or ideas that would otherwise not emerge or be heard within existing structures.

Existing formal institutions and informal practices can, then, be analyzed and evaluated according to deliberative standards, and ideas can be generated for improvement based on those standards.

Alongside existing institutions, we are now seeing a proliferation of institutions designed to reflect the ideals and purposes of deliberative democracy. Some intentionally designed forums address existing policy or partisan divides, bringing together people with a history of conflict on a policy issue. In such cases, deliberative principles work synergistically with long-established dispute resolution principles and practices (see Susskind et al., this volume). In forums like these, partisans are taken out of their normal strategic interactions (whether in judicial or legislative politics or in the larger public sphere) and join a process involving more or less deliberative

principles, under the auspices of a facilitator or mediator. The practices include mediation, stakeholder dialogues, and consensus-building. They may involve the pursuit of substantive consensus on particular policies, but often the participants expect to reach mutual understanding of the kind that enables a negotiated settlement that all parties view as fair and mutually advantageous. Deliberation thus does not need to result in consensus to be successful; it is often sufficient that it clarifies conflicts or generates warranted legitimacy for negotiated settlements. Restorative justice processes and truth commissions draw on some similar dynamics, but involve criminal justice cases rather than public policy disputes, and are usually focused on establishing the voice and public standing of victims of violence (Gutmann and Thompson 2004, chap. 6). In all of these cases the goal is to get participants to craft positions and solutions that respond to the key interests and values of conflicting parties through reflective reciprocal understanding. These kinds of partisan and conflict-focused forums date back to the early 1970s.

Recently deliberative democrats have paid particular attention to non-partisan forums, usually composed of lay citizens with no history of activism or even necessarily interest in the issue at hand – termed 'mini-publics.' Indeed, for some observers "deliberative democracy" means only such intentionally designed citizen forums. We consider such a restricted use of the term misleading.

Sometimes a mini-public is open to all who wish to attend (see Fung 2003 on AmericaSpeaks). This format has the advantage of advancing the participation of many citizens but the disadvantage of self-selection, which tends to over-represent some kinds of citizens, usually those of higher socio-economic status. More frequently, some kind of stratified random selection is used to create deliberative mini-publics that better represent an affected public (hence the term "mini-public").

Among these near-randomly selected mini-publics, "citizens' juries" and "consensus conferences" normally involve 15-20 participants who deliberate face-to-face and are charged with coming up with a recommendation and a report on a policy issue. Such forums have been deployed in thousands of cases worldwide, particularly addressing the risks and promises of new technologies (such as biotechnology or nanotechnology) and environmental issues (such as climate change). Sometimes they are used in conjunction with other decision-making processes. In the state of Oregon, the Citizens' Initiative Review involves mini-publics of 20-24 randomly-selected citizens deliberating and issuing recommendations to voters about ballot initiatives (issues placed on the ballot though a process of petition) that an independent commission determines to be especially important owing to their constitution status, fiscal implications, or other kinds of impacts. The mini-public's report on the arguments for and against a particular proposal is then distributed to all the voters in the state (Knobloch et. al., 2013). Although small mini-publics are attractive because they are relatively inexpensive and easy to organize, their size often compromises their representativeness and heterogeneity.

"Citizens' assemblies" and "Deliberative Polls" are larger, generally involving 150 or more participants, and so have a better claim to involve a statistically representative sample of the relevant public. Citizens' assemblies generally conclude with a recommendation and report, while Deliberative Polls focus on the shift in informed opinions, with questionnaires that reveal change or lack of change over the deliberative period (Fishkin 2009). The British Columbia Citizen Assembly, a large mini-public charged with producing a referendum question as to whether British Columbia should change its electoral system, is to date the most thorough, well-designed, and well-studied of the assemblies (Warren and Pearse 2008). Deliberative Polls,

with a standard format, have been organized in more than twenty countries, including with less literate populations (Fishkin et al. 2017).

One can think of mini-publics as generating a particular kind of reflective public opinion, as opposed to the unreflective opinions revealed by standard public opinion surveys. Internally, many deliberative mini-publics work as intended by their designers. They feature supportive institutional features - such as balanced information materials, experts on both sides available for questioning, facilitation, and sessions with different functions, as well as deliberative norms – which are conducive to surprisingly high levels of deliberative quality as well as to opinion change driven by argument rather than by undesired group dynamics (see, e.g., Gerber et al. 2016; Siu 2009; 2017; Warren and Pearse 2008).

Almost all deliberative mini-publics are advisory to other decision-makers, whether the citizens themselves in a referendum or ballot initiative, elected representatives, or appointed administrators, although (see later discussion) in some cases administrators commit themselves in advance to following the mini-public's recommendations. Some theorists (e.g., Dahl 1985; Leib 2004) advocate a second (or third) assembly in legislatures in which randomly selected citizens would deliberate together on key matters of policy, thus avoiding partisan dynamics such as the incentive to block the other party's attempts at solving public problems and providing venues in which citizens themselves can master some of the more complex features of, for example, military strategy and nuclear weapons. Minipublics of all kinds can also function as "trusted information proxies" (Mackenzie and Warren 2012) for other citizens.

Deliberation, then, can be sought, analyzed, and evaluated in many locations, each with its particular institutional locations and designs, issues, and constraints. Rather than look for the

essence of deliberative democracy in any one of them, it is now common to think in terms of deliberative systems that join many locations.

Thinking About Deliberative Democracy Systemically

The idea of a deliberative system, introduced by Mansbridge (1999), is now widely deployed (Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012). The basic idea is that we should attend to the deliberative qualities of the system as a whole as well as to its particular components. One of the most important and difficult challenges for deliberative democrats is to understand how the many sites and kinds of deliberation are enabled and constrained by their environments, how they interact with established institutions, how deliberation translates from face-to-face to large-scale deliberation, and how, more generally, deliberation contributes to democratic political systems.

From a systemic perspective, deliberative ideals can be realized in distributed ways, with some venues (and persons) providing high quality reasons, other venues (or persons) having greater capacities for active listening and finding common ground, and still others functioning to include the marginalized or catalyzing new ideas. Inclusion might be sought in the public sphere, the components of good justification in legislative argumentation, and reflection on the merits of those arguments in mini-publics (Dryzek 2017). Systemic distribution can promote equality, as when the public sphere or a deliberatively designed feature of a civic forum provides spaces in which otherwise deliberatively disadvantaged groups consult together in "enclave deliberation" (Karpowitz and Raphael 2014; for cautions on enclave deliberation see Sunstein 2002). Another division of deliberative labor emerges when we trust a jury in a court case to reflect on arguments made by the lawyers for the two sides. A systems perspective also alerts us to the

possibility that non-deliberative political activities may have positive deliberative consequences for the system as a whole, as when disruptive social movement activism gets an issue on the public agenda, where it can be deliberated.

Recent theorizing about deliberative systems is helping us to re-think deliberative capacities in democracies beyond particular deliberative institutions and outside individual deliberative abilities (Parkinson, this volume; Neblo and White, this volume). As Habermas (this volume) notes, and as he has suggested throughout his work, the deliberative character of democratic opinion- and will- formation can be realized only through the democratic system as a whole. Hence, a systemic view does not have to lament the fact that deliberative virtues such as reason-giving and listening are not simultaneously and continuously on display in all democratic institutions. Even deliberative deficiencies can be justified on deliberative grounds if the particular deficiency in one venue helps advance the deliberative quality of the system as a whole. More generally, a systemic approach can also help to uncover deliberative deficits as well as identify those sites in which more or better deliberation would strengthen democracy and political system performance.

Owen and Smith (2015) have challenged the deliberative systems approach, pointing out that a systemic or macro perspective makes it seem less urgent to create as close to optimal deliberative conditions as possible in any one forum or to encourage better citizen deliberation in general. If deliberative ideals can be understood as distributed and emergent properties realized through the interplay of various sites in a democratic system, then encouraging or even searching for high deliberative quality in a specific forum may seem less important both normatively and analytically.

Yet the macro and micro perspectives can be reconciled by arguing that from a deliberative perspective every democratic forum that affects the public should be as deliberative as possible unless there are good systemic reasons why it should or could deviate from deliberative norms. In short, the burden of justification should lie with those trying to justify departures from the deliberative ideal. A departure might be justified if it contributed to overall deliberation within a deliberative system. A departure might also be justified through reference to other values, such as freedom of speech.

From almost any macro perspective, empowered spaces such as legislatures play key roles in a deliberative system. The onus in these spaces to justify departures from deliberative values is thus the greatest. In general, the more empowered the venue, the greater the need to justify any departure from deliberative standards. Future students of deliberative democracy should investigate, and practitioners should (all else being equal) try to improve, the deliberative quality of discourse in highly empowered venues such as the meetings of presidents and their advisors, legislative committees, and the boards of central banks, all of which make decisions that greatly affect the entire polity. In judging the quality of deliberation in these spaces, we might be interested in whether the pool of competing perspectives was large or restricted (particularly in regard to perspectives from marginalized groups or classes of people), whether the positions advanced were well-justified and attentively listened to or based on shallow reasons and low engagement, and whether good arguments had some effect on the decisions or instead power and interests dominated in the decision-making process. (These variables are no less important for being hard to measure.) Indeed, such highly empowered spaces, especially legislatures, prompted some of the earliest work on deliberative democracy (Bessette 1994; Gutmann and Thompson 1996).

As the perceived legitimacy of many elected legislatures has declined, and as new representative entities such as the European Union have tried to build their legitimacy, considerable attention has focused on inserting deliberative mini-publics, particularly the version composed of randomly selected citizens, into deliberative systems (Curato and Böker 2016). Lafont (2015; 2017; see also Chambers 2009) has criticized such mini-publics on the grounds that when only a handful of (randomly selected) citizens has the opportunity to deliberate and make decisions that non-deliberating citizens are not likely to fully appreciate, there may be a fundamental challenge for both normative and perceived democratic legitimacy. From the perspective of *normative* legitimacy, the randomly selected "representatives" are neither selected by the other citizens nor accountable to them, either in the sense of having to explain the reasons for their decisions to the other citizens or in the sense of being punishable by those citizens for their actions. From the perspective of *perceived* legitimacy (an issue not covered by Lafont), citizens currently have so little experience with representation by near random selection that they have no experiential basis on which to decide whether this kind of selection method provides better or worse representation than elections. Having no experience with this form of representation, they may not perceive it as legitimate representation. A great deal, both normatively and perceptually, rests on whether a mini-public makes binding decisions for the polity. Few, if any, have done so. Although in a significant number of cases duly elected or appointed authorities have announced in advance that they would follow the decisions of the randomly selected mini-public (Fishkin 2009; Fishkin et al. 2017; He and Warren 2011, 277; Johnson 2015; Sintomer 2011; Warren and Pearse 2008), in all of these cases the authorities held from the beginning, and retained throughout, the legitimate power to make the decision, never legally relinquishing that authority. Far more frequently, deliberative mini-publics fit into the deliberative system in an advisory role,

either to elected or appointed bodies or to the citizenry as a whole. Although such groups have no formal power, administrators and elected officials may trust the process more and be more persuaded by the results and the reasoning than by the testimony and process in public hearings, which may be dominated by activists (Karpowitz and Raphael 2014). So too non-deliberating citizens may give more weight ("trust-based uptake") to the careful deliberations of fellow citizens than to the strategic rhetorics of interest groups and parties (Warren and Gastil 2015). Alternatively, one can think of mini-publics more as advancing and propagating arguments that influence deliberation in the larger deliberative system than as making specific decisions – in which case their recommendations are less relevant than their reasons (Niemeyer 2014)

Finally, mini-publics in both their randomly selected form and their open form can have an individually educative function both for participating and non-participating citizens. Many researchers have found increases in information and civic engagement among the participants in randomly selected groups (e.g., Neblo et al. 2017; Fishkin 2009). Because the participants in these forums tend to speak with others later about their experiences (Lazer et al. 2015), the effects on information and engagement may spread beyond -- and potentially far beyond -- the participants themselves. In the US context, Jacobs et al. (2009) and other researchers find, correlationally and perhaps causally, that those who regularly participate in structured discussions in open forums more frequently connect with elites, engage in civic voluntary activities, and participate in electoral politics. In short, deliberative experiences in a citizen forum can advance essential democratic capacities that are valuable for an entire democratic system.

Critics

If a measure of the success of any political theory is the number of critics it attracts, deliberative democracy is doing very well indeed. In this section, we identify and respond to several of the more prominent and persistent critiques.

Deliberative democracy is too idealistic and ignores power and politics. Speaking for what sounds like mainstream political science, Ian Shapiro (1999) holds: "Enough of deliberation: Politics is about interests and power." According to Shapiro, a deliberative account of politics is not sensitive enough to conflicting interests and powerful players who have no willingness to enter a deliberative process, but will strategize and if necessary use coercive means to realize their interests. In a more economistic vein and focusing on the link between politicians and citizens, Pincione and Teson (2006, see also Achen and Bartels 2016) diagnose what they call a "discourse failure" in politics. In their account, citizens face high costs in obtaining reliable knowledge about political issues. Politicians can then take advantage of the "rational ignorance" of the public. For political gain, they will posture and use vivid rhetoric rather than engage in rational discussion, because such posturing and rhetoric are more accessible to citizens and have greater emotional appeal. The philosopher Michael Walzer (1999, 71) further claims that most political debates generally do not produce anything like a deliberative exchange: "a debate is very often a contest between verbal athletes with the object to win the debate. The means are the exercise of rhetorical skill, the mustering of favorable evidence (and the suppression of unfavorable evidence), and the discrediting of the other debaters."

These "realist" criticisms correctly highlight the many strategic features of political speech. But they tend to deny that actors can and often do influence one another with reasons and arguments, and fail to identify the ideals embedded in these moments of speech. Indeed, by flattening speech

to its purely expressive and strategic elements, these criticisms overlook not only instances in which politics is conducted through deliberation (and there are many, once we look for them), but also strip democratic politics of deliberative ideals altogether, leaving us with an impoverished landscape of political possibility. The deliberative ideals themselves are not undermined as aspirational ideals by the empirical fact that political actors do not instantiate them fully in practice (Neblo 2015).

Some of these criticisms are contextually limited, focused on Anglo American politics. Different institutions in other systems may reveal greater potential for deliberative action. As noted earlier, comparative research on legislatures reveals that certain institutional contexts – such as consensus systems with less party discipline in combination with non-public committees – can spur better deliberation in legislatures.

Likewise, many of these criticisms are directed toward first-generation ideals of deliberative democracy. The first-generation perspective, stressing the ideals of common-good and consensus-oriented argumentation, a coercion-free environment, and complete openness to the better argument, could be criticized for devaluing political conflict (see.e.g., Honig 1993), although Habermas's later work is not subject to this criticism. The second-generation perspective, however, stresses plurality as an ideal. It thus embraces conflict. It also both broadens the range of deliberative acts and takes into account the deliberative functions of a wider range of communicative acts that are not themselves predominantly deliberative. This perspective makes it more likely that we can identify and assess the deliberative content of political interactions. For instance, the concept of deliberative negotiations (Naurin and Reh, this

volume) helps in analyzing mixed communications that qualify as neither pure deliberation nor pure bargaining. Risse (this volume) finds such mixed communications common in international negotiations.

Deliberative negotiations allow self-interest to be a necessary and productive component of political decision-making, yet simultaneously highlight the desirability of mutual justification, mutual respect, and equality among the participants. In mixed communications, to the extent that negotiation partners aspire even implicitly to the deliberative ideal, they should abstain from using force, threats, and strategic manipulation, relying instead on the influence of arguments. Depending on the context, some forms of domination (such as the inevitable-appearing requirement to speak a hegemonic language) and threat ("If you don't vote for my policy this time, I will not vote for yours next time"), may be compensated for or balanced so that they do not greatly threaten the deliberative process and therefore, from a deliberative perspective, may play a permissible part in mixed communication. But any manipulation that involves deception deeply undermines deliberation, present and future. It directly contradicts, *inter alia*, the core values of reciprocity, respect, and equality on which good deliberation is based (Gutmann and Thompson 2004, chaps 3-4).

Modified in the light of pluralist ideals, deliberative ideals become more applicable to situations of underlying conflict and also capable of further evolution. When we take pluralism seriously (as, for example, when underlying conflicting interests make negotiation more appropriate than substantive consensus), then it becomes clear that deliberative quality cannot be assessed well solely on the basis of the full list of first generation standards. Rather this quality should be assessed in ways relevant to specific contexts without losing its core in reason-giving and listening (Bächtiger and Parkinson 2018).

Deliberative democracy mistakenly aims at consensus. Empirical political scientists, difference democrats, pluralists, and agonists have criticized deliberative democrats for putting a misplaced stress on (rational) consensus as an ideal. From the viewpoint of difference democrats and agonists, rational consensus is not just undesirable, but also conceptually impossible. To Mouffe (1999), its pursuit means that deliberative democrats seek to repress plurality and the articulation of different perspectives through the conflict that defines politics. To Shapiro (2017), it means that deliberative democrats seek to repress the structured antagonism that makes clear choices and accountability possible.

This criticism misrepresents the role of consensus even among first-generation deliberative democrats. It is particularly misplaced for the second generation of theorists, who grapple with problems of inclusion with particular sensitivity to differences (e.g., Young 2000). Habermas, often the target of such criticisms, came to view substantive consensus in politics as less important than consensus with respect to the rules, rights, and procedures that protect differences and enable them to be deliberated, bargained, or subject to votes when sufficiently clarified (1996). In addition, recent years have seen a number of re-formulations of the consensus concept that are compatible with political struggle and conflict. Dryzek and Niemeyer (2006), for instance, develop the concept of meta-consensus. Rather than requiring unanimous agreement on substance, meta-consensus requires only agreement on the acceptable domain of preferences and range of competing options, the credibility of disputed beliefs, and the legitimacy of competing values. Meta-consensus so defined ought to be acceptable to pluralists and difference democrats, as well as conducive to tractable political outcomes. Miller (1992, see also List, this volume) argued that deliberation can play a significant role in structuring conflict to avoid indeterminate

voting cycles. Gutmann and Thompson note that respect for differences is part and parcel of mutual respect and reciprocity in deliberation (1996; 2004). They advocate a working rule of "economizing on disagreements," particularly with respect to fundamental world views and principles in those many cases that do not require agreement "all the way down." Others suggest thinking of consensus as a "working agreement" (Eriksen 2009) that entails "some movements of positions and normative learning" yet also ultimately rests not on the "same reasons" as in Habermas ([1992] 1996), but on "different, but reasonable and mutually acceptable grounds" (Eriksen 2009, 51; Gutmann and Thompson 2004, chaps. 2, 4; see also Sunstein 1995).

These re-workings of consensus recognize and value diversity in modern pluralistic societies. But, as noted above, these reworked concepts should not be viewed as the only defensible principles for good deliberative process. For instance, participants might initially think that their preferences are reconcilable (or not too distant), but find out in discussion that the opposite is true (Bachrach 1974). Knight and Johnson (2011: 145) point out that "even if as a result of the increased information that political argument makes available, individuals come to hold their preferences more reflectively, it in no way follows that this will lead to greater substantive agreement at the aggregate level." Like many of today's deliberative democrats, they consider opinion clarification and "structured disagreement" more important than consensus. Most recent research shows that in well-formed deliberative venues those whose opinions move away from the opinions of the opposing group after deliberation learn and clarify their opinions at rates equal to those whose opinions move toward the opinions of the opposing group (Lindell et al. 2016). In short, a good deliberative process can have a variety of outcomes, of which consensus is only one -- and perhaps not even the most important one.

Deliberative democracy misunderstands human motivations and the limits to the cognitive capacities of ordinary citizens. One such criticism is that deliberative democrats overestimate the demand for deliberative democracy. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) argue in *Stealth Democracy* that in the US citizens dislike politics, and are thus happy to let elites govern, provided the elites are honest and can be trusted; when citizens participate, it is because they think they need to monitor and sanction the untrustworthy. Yet the conclusions of Hibbing and Theiss-Morse derive from what citizens think about opportunities to participate in a currently deficient system. Empirical studies of more authentically deliberative opportunities tell a different story. On the basis of an experiment with deliberative sessions of citizens with members of the U.S. Congress, Neblo et al. (2010) conclude that Hibbing and Theiss-Morse are wrong. Their seminal study shows that in the U.S. the willingness to deliberate is much higher than usually presumed and, importantly, is highest of all among the cynical, those "turned off by standard partisan and interest group politics" (p. 582).

A related and frequently mentioned criticism is that ordinary citizens lack the cognitive capacities for deliberative democracy (e.g., Achen and Bartels 2016, 301; see also Brennan 2016). On the basis of a study of some US citizen groups, Rosenberg (2014) reports that "most 'participants' who attend a deliberation do not, in fact, engage in the give and take of the discussion." Instead they "offer simple, short, unelaborated statements of their views of an event." Biases in human reasoning compound the problem (Kahneman 2011). Notably, "motivated reasoning" makes people who initially feel strongly about an issue evaluate supportive arguments as more compelling than opposing arguments, even when they try to be objective (Taber and Lodge 2006). The individual capability for weighing arguments in an unbiased way would thus seem quite limited. Finally, studies on the social psychology of group

polarization reveal that discussion often induces groups to move to extremes as individuals hear new arguments in support of the positions they already hold, leading them on average to hold those positions more strongly (Sunstein 2002). In summary, as Mutz (2008, 533) has put it: "As an empirical theory, deliberative theory has been widely criticized for making assumptions that seem to fly in the face of what scholars already know about human behavior."

Many of these skeptical findings, however, are based on experiments and empirical studies that were not designed with deliberation in mind. Empirical studies more closely attuned to good deliberative conditions produce different conclusions. Close analysis of the British Columbia Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform suggests that members gained levels of knowledge about electoral systems at the level of most experts (Blais et. al. 2008). In a prominent study of citizen deliberation in an online forum, Stromer-Galley finds "[t]he participants generally produced fairly a high volume of reasoned opinion" (2007, 18-19). In addition, several empirical studies indicate that opinion change in well-structured deliberative events can be substantially attributed to systematic engagement with arguments, rather than to group polarization or motivated reasoning (Gerber et al. 2016; Esterling et al. 2016; Warren and Gastil 2015).

Institutional designs can play a crucial role in countering otherwise expected biases. Strandberg et al. (2017) varied discussion rules in an experiment on attitudes toward immigrants in Finland. Among groups deliberately selected to be composed only of individuals whose attitudes ranged from mildly hostile to very hostile to immigrants, discussion with facilitation guided by deliberative norms reversed the usual tendencies toward polarization as the group on average became less hostile, whereas discussion without facilitation produced the polarization described by Sunstein and some social psychologists. The Deliberative Polls organized by James Fishkin show no evidence of polarization, probably because they recruit diverse individuals and put them

into diverse discussion groups with facilitators (Fishkin and Luskin 2005). Institutional design informed by deliberative principles can negate anti-deliberative tendencies in human behavior.

Even outside the "safe havens" of deliberative mini-publics, citizens have a deliberative potential far beyond that postulated by a Schumpeterian or "realist" account of democracy. New research on opinion formation in direct democratic votes in Switzerland shows that substantial numbers of citizens form their opinions on the basis of substantive and well-justified arguments and not on the basis of partisan cues, contrary to much public opinion research (Colombo 2016). Again, the results are highly context-specific, in that argument-based pathways of opinion formation are more prevalent in direct democratic settings with relatively low elite polarization, as in Switzerland.

In short, assumptions in deliberative theory do not fly in the face of what we already know about human motivations and cognitive limitations. Rather we need an empirical psychology that takes into account the context-specific realizations of deliberative ideals, including institutional designs that compensate for well-known cognitive and emotional biases.

Deliberation is too rational, excluding the informal social and speaking styles typical of many marginalized groups. Drawing from existing psychological experiments and jury studies, as well as well as real-world observation, early critics claimed that "deliberative" capacities are strongly stratified in a way that reinforces socio-economic and cultural inequality. According to Sanders (1997), not only may disadvantaged people have less access to the necessary pre-requisites for deliberation, the focus of deliberative theorists on rational, calm, and dispassionate discussions also excludes or marginalizes positions that are voiced in an immoderate or emotional way. When this is true, the ideal of democratic inclusion is violated. Hooghe has boldly claimed that

participants with greater verbal and rhetorical skills always have an "undue advantage" in deliberative venues: "Even in perfect circumstances, a university professor will always have better chances of convincing others than a manual worker has" (1999, 292).

Empirical research shows that in most deliberatively well-designed situations these criticisms do not withstand scrutiny. It is true that the early studies of deliberation in juries showed gender, occupation, and income influencing both participation and choice of "foreman" for the jury (see Hickerson and Gastil 2006 and Siu 2117). Yet in his pioneering study on deliberative quality in a citizen forum, Dutwin (2003) found no evidence in this forum that socio-economic status affected the quality of deliberation: the overall amount of speaking and the number of topics discussed were roughly equal across gender, race, and perceived political minority status. The major factor behind differences in deliberative quality was experience with political conversation in everyday life. This surprising absence of socio-economic biases is corroborated in several other studies (e.g., Siu 2009; 2017). An in-depth evaluation of a European-wide Deliberative Poll ("Europolis") showed that the less privileged people in the discussion groups – lower-class participants, particularly from the European periphery – were also the least skilled deliberators (Gerber et al. 2016). Yet the same study also found that the deliberatively-skilled and otherwise advantaged participants did not have greater success than other participants in changing the minds of others in the deliberation (a result corroborated by a meta-study of Deliberative Polls; Luskin et al. 2015). Those who were good at providing sophisticated justifications in the Europolis discussions also listened respectfully and seemed as open-minded as participants with lower deliberative skills.

Second generation approaches to deliberative democracy have also helped to broaden the idea of what counts as communicative rationality and are more fully inclusive of diverse people and

their histories, identities, biases, and imperfections. Once we include stories and narratives in the conceptual apparatus of good deliberation, it is more difficult to claim that effective deliberation in a heterogeneous group of citizens is impossible. Empirical studies show that almost all participants can tell stories and share experiences to make their points; these studies also suggest that stories can help to include disadvantaged perspectives (Polletta and Gardner, this volume). Even from a purely epistemic, or knowledge-centered, perspective, deliberative virtues can be seen as distributed goods. Although some people may be poor in presenting logical arguments for their positions, they can represent their perspectives by other means. Even those who participate at minimum levels can be represented by other participants who have the relevant abilities (see Chambers 2013).

Although many longstanding critiques can be rebutted by systematic empirical research, deliberative democracy is far from being a finished project. Future research should continue to contest and reevaluate deliberative ideals, connect deliberative with democratic ideals (such as inclusion and decisiveness; see Bächtiger and Parkinson 2018), and investigate both the democratic contributions that deliberation can make to our political systems and the possible trade-offs in other valued outcomes when we promote greater deliberation.

Outline of the volume

We have organized this volume with several purposes in view. We survey the diverse origins of deliberative democracy as a set of theories, as a research paradigm, and as a family of practices. We provide a representative selection from the field that portrays its fertility, multidimensionality, and rapid evolution. We cover the many spaces and styles of deliberative

democracy within political institutions and a variety of contexts beyond those institutions. We document the emergence and development of deliberative democracy as an approach within many disciplines and across a large number of contexts around the world.

Part I surveys the origins of deliberative approaches to democracy and politics. As we suggested earlier, the basic idea of deliberative democracy is straightforward: all other things being equal, it is better to deal with conflict and solve collective action problems through deliberation – the give and take of reasons and justification – among those affected, rather than through other means, such as coercion or conformity to tradition. Deliberative approaches connect individual knowledge, needs, interests, values, and preferences to collective decisions and generate collective actions that will tend to be more legitimate, more intelligent, and more socially stable than the alternatives. This broad idea was not invented by contemporary deliberative democrats: it can be found in Aristotle reflecting on the practices of Athenian democracy, among early modern republicans, and in the American founding; it found its way into more explicit democratic theory in the work of J. S. Mill, John Dewey and others. Nor are the origins of deliberative ideas solely Western. Many cultures, both ancient and contemporary, including Confucian and many indigenous cultures, have valued deliberative politics. Twentieth century philosophers of language identified the ways in which some "truths" are performative, dependent upon both speaker and audience for not only their validity but also their availability as motives. Other philosophers, such as Arendt and Rawls, noted the rightful dependence of political truths – those truths we hold in common and use to guide collective actions – upon inclusive processes of opinion-formation. Habermas, Cohen, Gutmann and Thompson and others built similar ideas into full-fledged democratic theories. The chapters in Part I trace these multiple origins of democratic deliberative ideas.

Part II focuses on contemporary deliberative democratic theory, representing the many ways in which it has evolved in relation to a range of problems that define contemporary political theory. Contemporary deliberative democracy derived, effectively, from a fusion of democratic ideals of inclusion with deliberative ideals focused on talk-based approaches to common issues and collective decisions. Many recent developments involve incorporating ideals traditionally associated with democratic theory – ideals such as inclusive participation, equality, mutual respect, reciprocity, reflection, and empathy – into *deliberative* democratic theory. Several chapters in this section focus on the relationship between democratic ideals and deliberative ideals. But the problems animating contemporary political theory are more wide-ranging than those that derive from traditional democratic theory, and several chapters in this section relate deliberative democratic theory to these other issues and problems. These include the relationships between deliberative democracy and epistemically good decisions, justice, multiculturalism, political representation, religion, voting, and recognition of future generations.

Part III looks at deliberative politics from the standpoint of political institutions and systems. Deliberative democracy as a focus of research has spread well beyond political theory, informing empirical research as well as practical experiments and innovations. This part is oriented by a deliberative systems frame, viewing deliberative politics both as differing by the kind of institution or location and as a holistic property of political systems. The first chapters introduce the deliberative systems approach. Subsequent chapters examine deliberative politics within institutions of government such as legislatures as well as within governance networks, in popular forums, in the media, and in social movements and protests. The other chapters in this part examine new venues explicitly designed for deliberative purposes, such as deliberative mini-publics, online deliberation, and deliberative media.

One remarkable feature of deliberative democracy research is that the many uses of deliberative politics, interaction, and governance have been "discovered" almost simultaneously within numerous disciplines – although each discipline has its distinctive interests and focus. Part IV approaches deliberative democracy from the standpoint of disciplinary problems and conversations. Two chapters examine the problem of measuring deliberation. How do we know when it exists, and how can we measure its quality? Subsequent chapters explain disciplinary interests in deliberation: in social and rational choice, democratization studies, communication studies, international relations, psychology, sociology, public policy, planning, law, and studies of science and technology.

The deliberative approach to democracy and politics is not just an academic enterprise. Part V looks at current deliberative practices, with a focus on challenging contexts. Chapters in this section identify and discuss deliberative democracy as a reform movement, deliberative approaches to conflict resolution, and deliberation within deeply divided societies. Further chapters in this section ask what deliberation can contribute to problems characterized by extreme difficulty – "wicked" problems such as climate change or problems driven by the potential for catastrophic outcomes.

Part VI surveys deliberative politics around the world. Deliberative approaches to conflict can be found in many cultures and contexts—not just in the "West" and "Global North," from which much current theory has emanated. Although it is difficult to be globally comprehensive, chapters in this section identify and discuss deliberative politics in East Asia, India, Latin America, Africa, the European Union, and within global and transnational public spheres and institutions.

Part VII concludes with reflections on deliberative democracy by several political theorists – Jürgen Habermas, Amy Gutmann, Dennis Thompson, and Robert Goodin -- who have played key roles developing deliberative democratic theory and the research programs and paradigms that have evolved from that theory.

Although we have no doubt failed to include and discuss every development within deliberative democracy, given that theory, research, and practice grow apace daily, we hope that this volume provides both an introduction to the breadth, depth, and diversity of this expansive and multidimensional enterprise as it exists today, and a resource for those who want to contribute to the future development of the field. We cannot know what the future holds for this field, but we hope that it will be exemplary in its engagement with critics and in its integration of micro forums and macro systems, normative and empirical inquiry, theory and practice.

Notes

[1] Immanuel Kant called these kinds of ideals "regulative" ideals (Kant [1781] 1998, p. 552, A569/B597; also A570/B598 on a "regulative principle" as a standard "with which we can compare ourselves, judging ourselves and thereby improving ourselves, even though we can never reach the standard"). An ideal may be unachievable in its fullness for practical reasons, because it conflicts with other ideals, or because, in conditions of "the second best," it may be right to act contrary to the ideal (see Elster 1986, 116, 119; Lipsey and Lancaster 1956-57, and Mansbridge et al. 2010, n. 3).

[2] For some reasons why it may be hard to speak meaningfully of generations of deliberative democratic theory, see Dryzek 2016, 209.

[3] We use the words "standards" and "ideals" interchangeably to describe normative aims to which we ought to aspire.

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Table 1: Standards for good deliberation

First generation	***Second generation***
Respect	Unchallenged, unrevised
Absence of power	Unchallenged, unrevised
Equality	Equal opportunity of influence, inclusion, equal respect
Reasons	Relevant considerations
Aim at consensus	Aim at both consensus and clarifying conflict
Common good orientation	Orientation to both common good and self-interest constrained by fairness
Publicity	Publicity in many conditions, but not all (e.g., in negotiations when representatives can be trusted)
Accountability	Accountability to constituents when elected; to other participants and citizens when not elected
Sincerity	Sincerity in matters of importance; allowable insincerity in greetings, complements and other communications intended to increase sociality