# Power, Politics & Secrecy:

## Newspaper reporting of submarine procurement in Australia

Kieran McGuinness

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Communication

News & Media Research Centre

University of Canberra

June, 2020

## Abstract

Purchasing submarines in Australia has long been a controversial exercise. Naval procurement presents an ideal opportunity for politicians and defence contractors to deliver projects worth billions of dollars and create thousands of jobs. But Defence contracts can be dogged by leaks, power plays and political scandal. The discursive struggle between political and commercial rivals plays out in news media, where journalists publicly tell the story of Australia's naval procurements. Through the discursive analysis of media texts, this research explores the collision of national security, rising secrecy and commercial interests, and intensifying local politics in a time of transformation for Australian news media industries.

This thesis analyses Australian newspaper reporting of the Attack class submarine procurement between September, 2013 and April, 2016. Using an approach informed by Critical Discourse Analysis, it emphasises the role that journalism played in structuring public discussion of this important national security policy. The thesis takes a critical approach as normative scholarship provides a limited framework within which to understand the complexities of news discourses as mutually influential, ideological and socially constitutive. Its primary theoretical framework is informed by Foucault's theories of power and discourse, and it uses a methodology derived from Fairclough's articulation of Critical Discourse Analysis. In total, 879 texts from four major Australian newspapers were analysed using a broad qualitative approach to textual analysis, including a subsample of 188 articles analysed using an in-depth CDA approach.

The thesis demonstrates that newspaper discourses of the Attack class procurement drew from and were connected to broader discourses of social change in Australian society. News discourses of the Attack class procurement became entangled in ongoing discourses of the Liberal Party of Australia's leadership crisis, South Australia's growing unemployment, strategic alliances between Western powers and the emerging 'China threat'. By privileging the voices of political and industry elites, journalists centred public debate over the

submarines around political conflict and commercialised discourses. This thesis argues that the politicisation of the Attack class is a response to structural influences within the changing news media environment. Journalism is in crisis, with financial insecurity combining with pressure from a more secretive government and a well-resourced public relations industry. As journalistic practices adapt to meet the changing political and economic landscape, the balance of power between journalists and their sources is shifting. As findings from this study suggest, while journalists still work to provide scrutiny, chase scandals, leak information and hold the powerful to account, there is an emerging vulnerability in the Australian press. The reporting of the Attack class procurement provides a window on how journalistic choices are made and how news is being reshaped by the 21st century Australian political economy. The news media are caught between digital media disruption, a secretive surveillance state, and the power and resources of the global defence industry. But as this thesis argues, the complex interconnected nature of news media discourses in the digital era require a novel approach to understanding media power and influence. This thesis contributes to an understanding of the disruption of power relations in news in this changing media environment.

## Acknowledgements

This thesis was written on the lands of the Ngunnawal people. I acknowledge the traditional owners and custodians of these lands and I pay my respects to their elders, past, present and future. Sovereignty has never been ceded.

To Kerry McCallum. For your tireless effort in guiding this thesis to completion while balancing many other and more substantial obligations. Thank you for going above and beyond, for the hours spent reviewing drafts after work and on weekends, and for your patience and consideration when things were rough. Thank you for your compassion, and the genuine care and honesty with which you approached your role as primary supervisor.

To Caroline Fisher. For being a beacon of courage and determination. Your frank advice is a key reason this thesis made it to the finish line. Thank you for your good humour, for cheering me on and pushing me to change my way of thinking, and for challenging me when I let complacency slip into my work. Thank you for the clarity of your discussions with me and your dedication to reviewing this thesis line by line.

To Peter Putnis. For providing sage advice on all occasions. Thank you for inspiring me to study and to improve my academic work when I was an undergraduate. And thank you for continuing to take the time, care and effort to provide mentorship throughout the development of this thesis. Above all, thank you for your honest feedback and for always finding a way to express the heart of the matter.

### A Dedication

To my wife, Jessica. Thank you for your love, patience and encouragement. You are my better half, and you were always there to listen, to cheer me up and to give me a different perspective. It would have been impossible for me to complete this without your support and your incredible patience. Thank you for putting up with me while I spent many long weeks locked away in the study. And thank you for always being there with a smile and a laugh when I needed to change my pace. I could not have done this, nor would I have wanted to do this, without you.

## Table of Contents

# Chapter 1- Secrets, Power and the Reporting of Submarine Procurement in Australia

> *"It's become… the most talked about submarine adventure of all time. Even my newsagent tells me how to fix it"*. John Moore, Minister for Defence. (Daley, 1999, February 7)

Few aspects of Australia's defence garner as much political controversy and media attention as the procurement of submarines. The history of this can be traced back to the development of the Collins class submarines. In 1987, Bob Hawke's Labor government earmarked four billion dollars to build six of the most technically sophisticated warships ever designed—in a country that had never built a submarine before. The procurement of the Collins class was an extraordinarily ambitious programme. With limited local design and shipbuilding capacity an entire industry needed to be created from scratch and a unique design developed in partnership with U.S. and European submarine builders. Derek Woolner (2001) puts the construction of the Collins on par with the Snowy Mountains Scheme in terms of the magnitude and complexity of its engineering. In 1996 HMAS *Collins* was commissioned into service. In the same year John Howard led the Liberal National Coalition to victory in a federal election. By early 1998, plans were advanced to export the submarines to foreign buyers (Yule and Woolner, 2008) and technology developed through the Collins program was considered world leading and highly marketable (Sinclair, 1998, March 17). Private companies, most notably Richard Pratt's Visy Industries, were considering bids of up to $300 million to purchase the publicly owned shipbuilder: Australian Submarine Corporation (Maiden, 1997, April 19). Those involved in the project were publicly optimistic. As one headline in the *Sydney Morning Herald* read: 'Australian sub system out to conquer the world' (Sinclair, 1998, March 17). However, despite the apparent success of the Collins some of the government's own MPs were publicly critical. Then Defence Industry Minister Bronwyn

Bishop was particularly vocal, blaming the previous Labor government for saddling the Navy with "floating targets", "rust buckets" and submarines that were "not up to standard" (Greene, 1998, June 3). As the level of media scrutiny on the submarines intensified, so did the concerns of those inside the project.

Out of the public eye there were ongoing technical and project management issues. According to military historians Peter Yule and Derek Woolner (2008), there were mistakes; engine failures, fabrication and welding errors, unresolved periscope vibration and a louder than anticipated noise signature. However, as Yule and Woolner argue, these were the kind of faults designers would expect to see in what was, effectively, a prototype submarine built by an inexperienced workforce. As such, many of the issues would be fixed by the time the second and third submarines went into the water. Nevertheless, political sentiment towards the Collins class submarine had already started to sour. For some time, Liberal National government MPs had been leveraging issues with it for political point-scoring (Greene, 1998). It was also an election year and Labor opposition leader Kim Beazley was seen as a key figure responsible for the development of the Collins. As then managing director of the ASC Hans Ohff stated "the government was prepared to destroy the project if this could help destroy Beazley" (Yule and Woolner, 2008, p. 266).

Howard called an early election scheduled for October 3, 1998. The campaign was largely dominated by debate over the government's plan to levy a goods and services tax if re-elected. When voters went to the polls, the Coalition was surprised by a heavy swing against it; losing 18 seats to Labor while only narrowly retaining control of the House of Representatives (Green, 2018, March 20). Beazley had not won the election but had cast doubt on Howard's prospects of winning a third term.

The week after the election a US Navy report was leaked to *The Herald Sun.* The paper reported that the secret study into Australia's submarines had revealed that the US Navy considered the Collins to be "noisy duds" and "unable to defend themselves" (McPhedran, 1998, October 8). In a subsequent press conference, a RAN Admiral appeared to confirm that the report was real; the Collins were having problems with noise and weapons control and the

submarines were no stealthier than the fleet they were commissioned to replace (Woodford, 1998, October 9; 1998, October 10). What followed was a surge of negative media coverage of the submarines. As Minister of Defence John Moore stated at the time: "It's become […] the most talked about submarine adventure of all time. Even my newsagent tells me how to fix it" (Daley, 1999). Yule and Woolner (2008) argue that from 1998 onwards this "barrage of bad publicity" had a substantial impact on the reputation of the submarine and the morale of those working on it:

> For the crews of the submarines and the staff of ASC and the project office the impact of the ceaseless disparagement was demoralising; for the navy hierarchy it was a daily reminder that their largest project was under threat, but for the politicians it suggested that there were political points to be won or lost. (p. 265)

In the scandal that followed, the early successes of the programme were squandered. Plans to build and sell the Collins class submarines to foreign buyers were cancelled as "a storm of media criticism made them virtually unsaleable" (p. 204). Offers from private industry to purchase the ASC or Collins derived technology were withdrawn. Behind the scenes, relationships between key stakeholders broke down leading to a series of ill-fated plans to shut out the media and shift responsibility for the perceived failures of the project (Yule and Woolner, 2008). The Collins had become a public embarrassment for both the RAN and the Government. Future decisions regarding submarine procurement became burdened by scrutiny as governments became "sensitive to the public perception of [future] submarines becoming 'dud subs'" as well (Spong, 2015, p.2). Ironically, the Collins went on to be regarded by naval insiders as one of the best conventional submarines ever designed (Fayle, 2015, March 11; Kelton, 2004; Nicholson, 2015, April 1; Woolner, 2008; Yule and Woolner, 2008). In joint naval exercises held in 2000, HMAS *Waller* was reportedly quieter, faster and more agile than the U.S. Pacific Fleet expected (Thompson, 2007). She "sunk" two Los Angeles class nuclear submarines and got "dangerously close" to the USS *Abraham Lincoln* taking periscope photos of the aircraft carrier (Kelton, 2004). These were extraordinary feats for a submarine

that was supposed to be as "noisy as a rock concert under water" (McPhedran, 1998, October 8).

It would be a mistake to attribute this turn of events to mere chance or the 'fog of war'. Journalists, politicians and military personnel all contributed to the public debate about the Collins class submarine. Their contributions, in the form of newspaper articles, press releases, public speeches and televised interviews, facilitated a process of social and cultural deliberation which resulted in the conception of the Collins class as a failure in the collective imagination of the Australian people. That is to say, these media, political and military actors used language to engage in *discourse as social change* (Fairclough, 1992). As Fairclough argues, language is not transparent, it is always linked to the historic, social and political context in which it is used, and it has the power to influence and shape the interpretation of facts, events and social relationships. When journalists, politicians and other communicators write or speak about topics they necessarily draw from and contribute to broader discourses, and in doing so they participate in broader movements of social change and conservation. As the story of the Collins class shows, public discourses of military procurement are rarely simply about the acquisition of a particular submarine or aircraft. Politicians and their media staff have a powerful incentive to view policies in terms of their strategic communication objectives: discrediting their opponents and galvanising their own support (Fisher, 2016b). In addition, as Tiffin (1989) argues, journalists are "in the grip of news values" (p. 66) that drive them to publish provocative and competitive news stories that often privilege discourses of conflict and scandal over routine and informational reporting. The military, and defence industry organisations, also have distinct communication agendas, driven by commercial and other interests, and often draw from a rich history of how war, conflict and the Australian soldier are represented in media. The strategic motives of all four, combine to steer the discourse, and the fate, of submarine procurement in Australia.

The conditions in which discourses arise and are deliberated is neither natural or accidental, but the product of historically established norms and procedures of exclusion and control of speech that pervade institutions and society (Foucault, 2001). The story of the

Collins was therefore not simply a product of the facts as they arose, but of how individuals and organisations with competing agendas worked to reinterpret, reflect and control the public discussion of the submarines. It is also the story of how such individuals and organisations fundamentally reshaped the way Australia talks about submarines.

The case of the Collins class demonstrates the impact that news media scrutiny can have on defence procurement policy. What could have been a larger fleet of world class submarines, an export industry and a source of revenue for the government owned ASC, instead became a political albatross around the necks of government and the Navy. As Spong (2015) argues, fear of repeating the embarrassing Collins scandal was a key factor in decisions to delay the introduction of any future fleet of submarines to be constructed in Australia. As he suggests, subsequent governments devoted undue focus and attention to the remediation of the Collins class before advancing plans to transition to the future fleet. The Collins was never able to outrun its unearned reputation. Retired submarine commander Rod Fayle served on the Collins submarines. In 2015 he wrote:

> I continue to be confronted and annoyed by the repeated negative claims and distortions being reported in the Australian media about submarine matters. What started as an orchestrated misinformation campaign against the Collins has now spilt over to the next generation of submarines. […] it seems that issues were seized upon, blown out of all proportion and repeated time and time again, creating the widespread impression of a "dud" submarine. Playing politics with a major part of Australia's Strategic Defence should not occur. (Fayle, 2015, March 11, paras. 1-2)

By late 2013, the Collins was considered to be close to the end of its service cycle (Davies, 2013). As Davies states, the government was aware that it would need to begin work on procurement of a new fleet of submarines soon if it were to avoid a gap in operation between the Collins and what would come next. In 2009, the Rudd Labor Government had introduced plans for a new fleet of Australian built submarines to replace the Collins class. This proposed "future submarine" would eventually become the Royal Australian Navy's Attack class submarine. The Attack class is currently in its design phase with construction anticipated to

begin in the 2020s. As this thesis will show, the news media played as significant a role in the politics and policy of the Attack class submarines as it did with the Collins. However, it did so in different ways and under substantially different circumstances.

The story of how media discourses influenced the development of the Collins class submarines provides the impetus for this thesis. For a time, the Collins submarines were the "most talked about" aspect of military procurement in Australia. And as Yule and Woolner (2008) articulate, interviews with those who worked on the submarines reveal that the degree of media scrutiny did have an impact on morale and decision-making. However, policy analyses of the Collins rarely engage media scrutiny of policy as a substantial part of that analysis. Historians and policy analysts such as Spong (2015), Kelton (2004) and Yule and Woolner (2008) argue that news reporting of submarine procurement in Australia has put pressure on politicians and decision-makers and that this has changed the course of military planning. But their conception of media scrutiny of policy is as a relatively ambiguous external force. Absent from these characterisations of the news media are details of the decisions that journalists make, how news stories are written and the interconnected nature of journalism, politics and military industries. Discourses of submarine procurement in Australia are complex mediated spaces in which political, military and defence industry news sources engage with journalists and public relations officials to actively deliberate and compete to influence media audiences. Research is needed that critically analyses the role of media discourse in defence procurement to provide detail and context beyond simply the broad characterisations of bad publicity and media criticism. This thesis aims to provide such an analysis through a case study of the newspaper reporting of the Attack class submarine procurement programme from September 2013 to April 2016.

This research seeks to address a poorly understood and rarely explored aspect of defence policymaking; whether and in what way news media scrutiny politicises and otherwise alters the ordinary course of public debate over military procurement. It also seeks to understand how power, influence and advocacy interact with discourses of defence policymaking in ways that have significant material and political consequences. In doing so,

this research establishes a broader understanding of how changes in news media industries could in turn influence the content and tenor of public debate over procurement. In light of the enormous scale of public spending on defence and the tightening of security and intelligence laws in recent years, such changes have consequences that likely extend far beyond the spheres of media and politics, and as such are worthy of more detailed study.

Journalism in Australia is in crisis. As news companies around the country face cuts to resources, specialised and time-consuming defence reporting is likely to be one of elements of news production that face immediate cuts and reductions. The risk is that the reporting of defence issues in Australia will shift from more active modes of reporting and coverage, to passive reporting that is reliant on press releases and government announcements. The damage must be understood before it can be addressed. This research aims to assist in that regard.

## 1.1—Reporting on Defence in a Changing News Environment

The contemporary relationship between the Australian news media and the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is complicated and poorly understood. The advent of digital news and social media has reshaped the information landscape, and traditional models of news production are struggling to compete for diminishing revenue. How this has influenced the reporting of national security issues has received limited academic attention. Journalism continues to play an important role in informing Australians about the work of their military. In every conflict that Australia has committed troops, journalists have followed to document their stories (Anderson and Trembath, 2011). At times the war reporters have played the role of propagandists by self-censoring and relaying a positive version of events designed to inspire patriotic confidence (Hilvert, 1984; Williams, 1999). This tradition continues in the news media's annual perpetuation of heroic Anzac mythology, which positions the soldierly traits of mateship, gallantry and sacrifice as organising aspects of the national identity (Tranter and Donoghue, 2015; Ubayasiri, 2015). On other occasions journalists have sought to cast light on the misconduct of soldiers that has been concealed by the cloak of national security. For

instance, the 'Afghan Files' reported by the ABC in 2017, which exposed the murder of Afghani civilians by Australian soldiers. Domestically, journalism has developed an uneasy relationship with Defence. Military scandals, in which news media becomes a venue in which hidden or secret misconduct and violence is exposed, have become an established genre of news reporting (Wadham, 2016a). News is published with some regularity exposing incidents of assault, rape, bastardisation and hazing within the armed forces, with the victims often being female and LGBT personnel (Wadham, 2016a; 2016b). As the story of the Collins class shows, scandals in military procurement are also newsworthy occurrences. Programmes such as the Super Seasprite Helicopter (Cookes, 2013, August 23), the Hobart class Air Warfare Destroyer (Thomson, 2013, October 18) and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter procurements (Doherty, 2014, June 16) have all attracted substantial public criticism. The reporting of defence matters thus draws from a range of historic, social and cultural discourses with roots in military idealism, national identity and institutional scandal. This makes researching the reporting of military matters in Australia difficult to approach from a single theoretical or methodological position.

The reporting of defence issues ranges from the critical to the propagandistic. Journalists are as drawn to the reporting of commemorative events like the centenary of the Battle of Fromelles as they are to allegations of the murder of civilians by special forces in Afghanistan. However, members of the Defence Force observe the work of journalists with frustration (Foster and Pallant, 2013; 2016). Based mainly on surveys of Canberra based full-time and reserve Army personnel, Foster and Pallant (2013) show that officers throughout the ADF hierarchy tend to view journalists as untrustworthy scandal chasers, who are unqualified to report on the activities of the ADF and are working at odds with the ADF's informational goals. While many respondents in Foster and Pallant's studies agreed that the public had a right to be informed about the ADF's activities, they believed that Defence Public Affairs should play the primary role in achieving that. As former journalist Brendan Nicholson (2019) suggests, this reflects an increasingly risk-averse culture in Defence-media relations. He argues that successive governments have restricted the flow of information from Defence,

handing control over media relations to politicians and staffers. He states that "members of the media are increasingly being painted within Defence as the enemy" (para. 18). However, Nicholson also argues that this disadvantages Defence as it denies them the ability to advocate for their own interests and provide corrections to news stories before they are published. The politicisation of defence issues in Australia is partly stems from the degree of control that politicians wield over Defence information. The result is that Defence has become a uniquely opaque organisation despite the central role it plays in Australian society.

While the culture of secrecy has become increasingly entrenched within the Australian Defence Organisation, reporters are also facing substantial changes to the business of journalism. The digital revolution has brought journalists many new avenues for the production and distribution of news. Unfortunately, this has coincided with the redirection of substantial portions of advertising revenue from traditional news organisations to digital giants such as Facebook and Google (Benson, 2018; Carlson, 2015; Kaye and Quinn, 2010). Without these resources traditional newsrooms have been forced to reduce staff numbers and increase the workloads of journalists already overburdened by the competitive demands of the 24-hour news cycle. Murphy (2015) argues that Australian journalists have had to adapt and diversify; publishing news across print and digital platforms and building on established routines of beat journalism to access insider information. As Foster and Pallant (2013) say:

> Defence [reporting] increasingly is assigned to the harried generalist who, beset by other responsibilities and the pressure to file throughout the day, will have neither the time nor the resources to build professional expertise or develop crucial relationships within the military. (p. 35)

The digitisation of news is an ongoing process, so the full impacts of this shift in the foundational revenue model of journalism are emergent. Some scholarship suggests that it has increased the reliance of journalists on sources of convenience, such as public relations practitioners, political staffers and lobbyists, who provide reliable ways for journalists to access newsworthy information (Hecht, Martin, Donnelly, Larson and Sweetser, 2017; Lee and Lin, 2017; Lewis, Williams and Franklin, 2008; Macnamara, 2014; Valentini, 2014). Journalists

and news organisations are looking for ways to make news reporting both informative and economically viable. The crisis in journalism prompts questions about the future of specialised reporting that focuses on single issues, such as defence reporting.

While news organisations face a financial crisis, government has enacted legislation that further restricts the ability for journalists to report on defence and national security issues. Since 2001 laws have been introduced by successive governments that have increased the surveillance of private citizens' digital lives, permitted the storage of meta-data relating to private communications and reduced legal protections for journalists and whistleblowers (De Zwart, Humphreys and Van Dissel, 2014; Humphreys and De Zwart, 2017; McCulloch and Tham, 2015; Pearson and Fernandez, 2015). Such legislation has reduced the ability for journalists to maintain the confidentiality of sources who leak secret information, even if it can be proven to be genuinely in the public interest. Recent raids on journalists and media organisations suggest that journalists are being targeted directly as persons of interest in cases where information the government defines as important to national security is leaked (Knowles, Worthington and Blumer, 2019, June 6). This increasing resistance of government to journalistic scrutiny is of significant concern (Lidberg and Muller, 2018). While censorship and information control have always been a feature of national security the rise of sophisticated technological and legal suites designed to surveil and prevent information being passed to journalists represents a substantial shift in power. Journalists are caught between a crisis in funding, an opaque military and an increasingly secretive government. As such, the need for research in these areas is significant.

## 1.2—The Purposes and Aims of this Research

This thesis sets out to provide an analysis of newspaper reporting of the Attack class submarine procurement between September 2013 and April 2016. While all news media in Australia are currently facing challenging circumstances, print newspapers have been uniquely impacted by declining revenue and diminishing audiences. Newspaper journalists remain important agenda setters and play a vital role in breaking and developing stories that

are often republished and expanded on in hybrid media systems (Chadwick, 2017; Conway, Kenski and Wang, 2015; Djerf-Pierre and Shehata, 2017; Swart, Peters and Broersma, 2016). Additionally, particularly in the field of defence journalism, print newspapers have played an outsized role in the media landscape by hosting many of Australia's more influential and prolific defence correspondents (Anderson and Trembath, 2011; Foster, 2012). In the period between September 2013 and April 2016 the number of news articles published in print newspapers on the topic of the Attack class was substantial. To limit the scope of this research to a manageable scale, and to explore the unique factors affecting print journalism in Australia during a period of significant change, the decision was made to focus this inquiry on a representative sample of Australian newspapers.

The purpose of this research is to provide a more thorough understanding of the role that journalism plays in public debate and discourses of national security issues in news media. In particular, it aims to provide a qualitative assessment of the characteristics of newspaper reporting of defence procurement within the context of a changing news environment. Through the lens of Critical Discourse Analysis, it addresses the role that politicians, journalists, military officials and defence industry advocates play in the public deliberation of critical defence policy decision-making. While CDA will underpin the methodological approach for this research, the primary theoretical framework will be informed by Foucault's theories of power and discourse, particularly as articulated in his work *The Order of Discourse* (Foucault, 2001). There is substantial research into submarine procurement in Australia that examines the subject from a strategic and policy analysis perspective (Yule and Woolner, 2008). However, there are few studies that address the central role that news media play in shaping the political discourse of submarine procurement policy. As Foster and Pallant (2013; 2016) also point out, while there is some research addressing the ADF's perceptions of how it is reported on in news media; few studies have actually explored whether the ADF's low opinion of news media reporting of military issues is justified. Additionally, this research approaches the subject from a critical perspective that places

power, influence and discursive control at the core of its analysis of mediated public debate. As such, this thesis was driven by the following aims:

- To undertake a textual analysis of the linguistic and social practice characteristics of discourses of military procurement in newspaper reporting of the Attack class submarines;
- To interpret and explain the characteristics of newspaper reporting of the Attack class procurement and how they demonstrate the changing nature of journalism in the context of rising government and military secrecy;
- To describe the political features of newspaper reporting of the Attack class procurement and discuss the evolving relationships of power between national security journalists and sources; and
- To discuss the role that newspaper reporting played in influencing government decision-making on the Attack class procurement.

Overall, this research will focus on journalistic reporting of the Attack class to build a broader understanding of how the traditional model of beat focused journalism applied scrutiny to the political and policy-making processes that informed the future fleet's development. It will examine the discursive practices used by national security journalists, and discuss what the reporting of the Attack class reveals about the changing nature of journalism in Australia and the increasing pressures faced by those working as defence reporters.

## 1.3—Critical Discourse Analysis as an Approach to Research

This thesis uses Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as the approach for investigation and analysis. CDA is an approach to textual analysis that aims to interpret and explain the linguistic features, discursive practices and social practices associated with a corpus of texts (Fairclough, 1992; Van Dijk, 2008). It is widely used in qualitative research as an analytical approach that explores both the ideological function of language and the historic, social and political context in which texts are produced and consumed. A discourse focused approach involves analysing how the language and production factors of a given text reproduce or

challenge social relationships and ideologies. In this way CDA can reveal patterns of language use that structure social reality, influence norms and values and reproduce relationships of inequality between groups and individuals. The theoretic and methodological approach of CDA will be explained in further detail in Chapter 4 of this thesis. To assist with the use of CDA an analysis instrument was prepared that summarises many of the key evidence points and analytical questions posed by Fairclough (See Appendix B).

CDA is a critique of power. It advances a theory of language practice as being central to the ways in which society establishes limits around individual expression. Drawing on Foucault's (2001) theory of the orders of discourse, it argues that discourse is key to understanding how society develops and changes its hierarchy of values, establishes agreed upon truths and constructs social relationships. CDA is a way to identify and explain the underlying social processes that divide, prohibit and structure public debate and discussion, and in doing so reproduce relationships of dominance and control. CDA is not only an approach to scholarly research but it is also a political programme. As Fairclough (1992) argues, it is insufficient to simply use CDA to describe the patterns of language use and practice that reproduce inequality in society; research must also aim to address the causes of such inequality. CDA advises practitioners to approach social problems with the aim of challenging them in a way that helps to create a fairer society.

CDA is also a theory of social change. Fairclough (1992) argues that discourse is not only the structuring force that establishes and reproduces social relationships but it also the means through which such relationships are challenged and reformed. But by interpreting and explaining the way in which discourses are combined and subverted in novel ways CDA can explain how language gives rise to resistance and political action.

In this thesis CDA is used to analyse newspaper reporting of the Attack class submarines. This involves a three-factor analysis aimed at describing the textual features, discursive practices and social practices related to the news articles being analysed. First, texts are analysed in terms of how they are produced and received. This stage involves interpreting and explaining the manner of their production, the intended audiences and preferred

interpretations encoded in the texts. It focuses on features such as the use of news genres, sourcing practices, external texts referred to, as well as audience orientation. Second, texts are analysed in terms of their linguistic features. This stage includes an analysis of the use of themes, words and word meanings, metaphors, rhetorical argumentation and other grammatic features that influence a particular interpretation. Third, texts are analysed in terms of how they relate to broader social, political, economic and historic contextual factors that surround and influence their creation. This stage focuses on how overall social, structural and hegemonic influences produce patterns of discursive and textual practices. It aims to identify features of texts that are suggestive of the orders of discourse that structure them and the ideological and political effects that lead from them.

CDA provides a flexible approach that can be applied to the analysis of both talk and text. It has been widely used to analyse news media discourses (Matheson, 2005). Fairclough (1992) argues that news plays a significant role in selecting and reproducing the views of powerful institutions and elite individuals. CDA approaches to news often focus on the linguistic features and production factors that reveal the ideological function of an article. News production is an inherently selective process. Journalists constitute their audiences in particular ways through the use of key words, themes, narratives and genres. Patterns in source selection can reveal the structuring force of broader newsroom practices and preferences. Journalists also make choices about adhering to traditional journalistic norms such as impartiality, balance and public service. The aim of discursive analysis of news is not to make judgements as to whether reporting represents 'good' or 'bad' journalism. Rather, CDA asks practitioners to consider how news functions to perpetuate certain modes of language, thought and meaning making that reproduce unequal power relationships in society.

## 1.4—Sources of Information

This thesis interprets and explains the discursive features of newspaper reporting of the Attack class submarines. Newspaper articles were selected as subjects of inquiry for a

number of reasons. Print newspaper organisations have been particularly impacted by the decline in revenue from advertising (Benson, 2018). Furthermore, recent scholarship has suggested that despite their financial uncertainty newspapers remain important agenda setters and producers of news in a multi-platform and hybrid media environment (Chadwick, 2017; Conway, Kenski and Wang, 2015; Djerf-Pierre and Shehata, 2017; Swart, Peters and Broersma, 2016). Key newspapers still employ veteran reporters that have substantial experience reporting on defence and national security issues (Anderson and Trembath, 2011; Foster, 2013). The crisis in journalism has fallen heavily on traditional news organisations—including newspapers. Because the digital revolution is an ongoing process which is fundamentally altering the broader media environment there is a pressing need to research news institutions that may be facing further uncertainty and decline.

The analysis focuses on articles drawn from two local and two national level newspapers: *The Australian, The Australian Financial Review, The Advertiser and The Canberra Times.* Articles were gathered through the news database *Nexis* (See Chapter 4). A total of 879 newspaper articles were selected for analysis. These articles are not representative of journalism about the issue as a whole, but they capture a particular discursive context in which the Attack class was publicly deliberated on by politicians, journalists and industry sources. These articles were published between 1 September, 2013 and 27 April, 2016. These dates were selected because they correspond with key moments in the initial procurement and competitive evaluation process of the Attack class submarines, leading to the decision to select a design partner in April of 2016.

A range of secondary sources of information also provided historic, social and political context for the analysis. This included Defence reports such as the *2013 Defence White Paper, Defence Issues Paper 2014, 2016 Defence White Paper, Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan, First Principles Review of Defence* and the *Defence Industry Capability Plan 2018.* Government press releases and transcripts of speeches were also accessed through the relevant departmental records. The purpose of these additional resources was to inform a

broader Critical Discourse Analysis that incorporated an understanding of the social, political and historic context in which reporting of the procurement took place.

## 1.5—Timeline of Key Events

Procurement programmes generally unfold over a considerable period of time. The reporting of the Attack class submarine procurement took place alongside a number of significant events and changes in the Australian political landscape. An analysis of the role of the news media in the political debate over the Attack class requires an overview of the exact timeline of events, key government announcements and decisions made.

In 2009 the Labor Government released the *Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century* White Paper. The document outlined the government's plans to replace the Collins class fleet with a fleet of 12 future submarines with the requirements that they have greater range, capabilities and endurance. For reasons outlined by Spong (2015), little progress was made on these plans throughout the Rudd and Gillard administrations. By the release of the 2013 Defence White paper the only change was the inclusion of the statement that indicated the submarines were to be constructed in South Australia.

*2013-2014—The Abbott Government's Initial Planning*

- **7 September, 2013:** The Liberal National Coalition defeated Labor at the federal election. Tony Abbott appointed David Johnston as Minister for Defence. Prior to the election the Coalition had indicated it would decide on a new fleet of submarines within 18 months of taking office.
- **8 April, 2014**: David Johnston spoke at an ASPI conference announcing that a decision on the new submarines would be framed in terms of "defence requirements" and not "industrial or regional policy" (Department of Defence Ministers, 2014). On the same day, *The Advertiser* reported a leak that government officials were considering purchasing submarines from Japan.

- **25 June, 2014**: The Senate voted to refer an inquiry into the future of Australia's naval shipbuilding industry. An investigation of the procurement process for the Attack class submarine is scheduled for November.
- **28 July, 2014:** The government released the *Defence Issues Paper 2014*. The report reaffirmed that in procuring the Attack class submarines the Abbott administration would place capability and defence requirements above regional assistance imperatives.
- **8 September, 2014:** *The Advertiser* reported anonymous government sources claiming that Australia would "all but certainly" purchase the new fleet from Japan. A period of substantial news coverage followed.
- **26 November, 2014:** Under Senate questioning David Johnston declared that he "wouldn't trust the ASC to build a canoe", which sparked calls for him to apologise in Parliament and the press.
- **22 December 2014:** Abbott reshuffled his cabinet, replacing David Johnston with Kevin Andrews

*2015—The February Leadership Spill, Defence Reshuffle and the Competitive Evaluation Process*

- **9 February 2015:** The leadership of the Liberal Party was spilled. News reports allege Tony Abbott secured the votes of South Australian MPs by promising a competitive tender process for the Attack class submarines. He is returned as leader of the Liberal Party.
- **10 February 2015:** Kevin Andrews announced a Competitive Evaluation Process would be held to decide the design partner for the Attack class submarine. SAAB is excluded from the process. Naval Group (formerly DCNS), ThyssenKrupp Marine Services and a joint bid from Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Heavy Industries were the main bidding parties.

- **2 March 2015:** *The Australian* reported that the push to purchase submarines from Japan was directed largely by the Prime Minister's office. Plans were halted as late as November of 2014.
- **4 August, 2015:** Tony Abbott travelled to South Australia to announce the government's $89 billion shipbuilding plan. However, Abbott refused to commit to building the submarines in South Australia, instead stating that sustainment would be "centred" on Adelaide.
- **15 September, 2015:** The leadership of the Liberal Party is spilled. Malcolm Turnbull defeated Tony Abbott to become Prime Minister. Kevin Andrews was subsequently replaced as Minister for Defence by Marise Payne.
- **25 September, 2015:** Japan committed to building the Attack class submarines in Australia if requested. By this time, all bidding parties had committed to an Australia based build.
- **6 October, 2015:** The Japanese delegation agreed to hand over even its most top-secret submarine technology to Australia if it is the successful bidder.

*2016—The Turnbull Government and the Final Outcome of the Competitive Evaluation Process*

- **25 January, 2016:** *The Australian* reported leaked information from government sources that suggest the U.S. would be unwilling to put their most advanced weapon systems in French or German submarines.
- **25 February, 2016:** Defence released the 2016 White Paper, confirming that the fleet size for the Attack class will be 12 submarines.
- **2 March, 2016:** *The Australian* reported leaked sections of the draft 2016 White Paper implying that the Turnbull administration has further delayed the timeline for the Attack class submarine.
- **19 April, 2016:** Malcolm Turnbull announced that Naval Group (DCNS) was the successful bidder and that all 12 submarines will be built in South Australia.

## 1.6—The Outline of the Thesis

This chapter has outlined the central focus of this inquiry, its purpose and aims. It has described the sources of information analysed and provided a timeline of key events. It has also introduced the theoretical and methodological approach used and provided conceptual background.

Chapter 2 outlines relevant theories and literature of journalism and its role in the broader cultural and political fabric of society. Part one of this chapter discusses theories of journalism's role in democracy, normative conceptions of journalism, external influences on journalism and contemporary critiques of journalism and journalism studies. Part two focuses on theories of journalism and power. This includes a discussion of the relationship between journalists and their sources, journalism's reliance on expert and official sources, media capture, the agenda setting function of the press, and the influence of public relations on journalism.

Chapter 3 provides background literature relating specifically to Defence-media relations. This provides additional social, historic and political context that is needed for an analysis of the reporting of the Attack class submarine procurement. The chapter then discusses the Attack class procurement in greater detail. It also examines literature relating to the Australian Defence Force as a source of news, historic ADF-media relations, and defence industry and media relations. It debates the discursive place of the military in Australian news media through a discussion of the history of military reporting, Anzac and national identity. Finally, it examines historic news discourses of procurement in Australia, discourses of secrecy and public scrutiny and the role of leaks and unauthorised disclosures in Australian journalism.

Chapter 4 outlines the research agenda for this inquiry. It provides an overview of the theoretical and methodological approach for this research: Critical Discourse Analysis. This chapter outlines theories of discourse, the critical underpinning of CDA as well as the key thinkers in the history and development of CDA. It explains the methodological approach taken for this thesis including the process of sampling and analysing texts. Furthermore, it

provides examples of CDA as it has been used in a range of research contexts including newspaper analysis.

Chapter 5 analyses the role that national security beat journalists played in the reporting of the procurement of the Attack class submarines. The chapter discusses how political access and insider expertise were key factors in how journalists covering the procurement process reported on the issue. National security beat journalists were responsible for the majority of reporting on the programme. As such, this chapter outlines how the routines of beat journalism are key to understanding why news discourses about the commissioning of the Attack class submarine became centred around political conflict, leadership questions and leaks from inside Defence and government.

Chapter 6 analyses in further detail the role that unnamed sources played in journalistic representations of the Attack class submarines programme. Leaks and anonymous sources were important elements that allowed journalists to subvert political control of the overall discourse about the submarine's procurement. The use of anonymous sources and leaked information was widespread throughout the reporting of the programme. The practice of using anonymous sources provided transparency at particular moments during the process where limited information was available. Leaks also played a fundamental role in the politicisation of the Attack class submarine by undermining politicians and advancing particular political narratives.

Chapter 7 analyses how news reporting of the Attack class procurement represented China as the enemy from whom the submarines were intended to defend the nation. The chapter discusses how journalistic discourses of the Attack class submarine were underpinned by narratives of China's growing power and influence in the region, and concerns that China should be considered an economic and military threat to Australia's interests.

Chapter 8 analyses the influence of public relations and advocacy discourses on reporting of the Attack class procurement. The chapter outlines how sourcing practices that incorporate lobbyists, public relations practitioners and advocates played a significant role in how the Attack class was represented in the news. It details how through journalists' selection

of industry sources privileged certain narratives and interpretations of the local defence industry. It further describes how industry discourses and narratives came to dominate reporting of the Attack class submarine at certain points during the procurement process.

Chapter 9 analyses the role played by *The Advertiser* in running a targeted advocacy campaign designed to pressure federal politicians to build the submarines in Adelaide. *The Advertiser* played a different role to the national newspapers in its reporting of the Attack class. It assumed the role of local advocate and as such its discursive contributions were focused on amplifying local industry and community voices, representing local concerns and advancing particular narratives. In doing so, *The Advertiser* also constituted the identity of its audience as citizens of 'the forgotten state', employed 'us versus them' narratives and provided a voice for its readership.

Chapter 10 provides a summary of findings and its conclusions. It also discusses the limitations of the scope, methodology and analytic approaches of the thesis. Finally, it outlines prospects for future research developed from this inquiry focusing on issues of Defence-media relations and the reporting of military procurement in a changing media environment.

# Chapter 2—Literature Review: Power and the Role of the Press in Society

This research explores the discourses used by journalists to report on the Attack class submarine procurement project. It must therefore begin by discussing a theoretical perspective that explains the role that journalists play in contributing to public discourse. As detailed in Chapter 4 (4.1a), this thesis draws on Foucault's (2001) conceptualisation of discourse to explore this subject, discourse being characterised not only as text or speech between individuals or groups but also the structural procedures of communication that control, select and organise knowledge and beliefs. Journalism is not produced in a vacuum. As this literature will argue, journalists must draw from and are influenced by the social and political discourses that surround and run parallel to their work. It will argue that there are diverse academic approaches to understanding the role of journalists in relation to discourse and society. It will further argue, that a critical discursive approach is a more complete and appropriate way to understand this relationship. This inquiry takes the view that journalism does not begin and end on the page. Rather, journalism is a process that is strongly intertwined with social and political discourses, and that any inquiry into journalism that omits analysis of these discourses is incomplete.

This chapter provides an overview of the theoretical and disciplinary foundations for this inquiry. The literature is broadly divided into two parts: first, theory and research that focuses on journalism and how it contributes to and draws from public discourses; and second, theory and research that explores how power influences journalists in their relations with their sources. This overview of academic research into journalism includes discussion of journalism's perceived role in democracy; the normative functions of journalism; institutional influences on journalism; and contemporary critiques of journalism.

Because the focus of this inquiry takes a critical approach to understanding how journalists report on defence and national security issues, this literature review also explores conceptions of journalism and power, including: power, journalism and source relationships;

journalism and reliance on expert sources; media capture; the influence of public relations and advocacy on journalism; and the agenda setting function of the media.

The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that while scholarship from a range of disciplines can contribute to our understanding of journalism, to date there has been limited focus on how social change in the media environment impacts on national security discourses. What is needed is an approach that acknowledges defence journalists as having agency within the broad and interconnected network of language, power and social influence. Much academic inquiry has explored how journalism is the product of its professional norms, history, practices, and institutions. Others have looked at the role journalism plays in shaping or being shaped by more significant influences such as politics and the economy. However, the substantive volume of journalism studies literature sometimes focuses more on the study of the profession itself rather than the influential role it plays in social and political change.

Although journalists may often be the subject of external power and influence, they are not passive in their construction of truth. The professional ideology, practices and cultural identity of journalists act as unique influences on how journalists structure discourses of belief and reality. Arguably it is what Kovach and Rosenstiel (2007) call the journalistic norm of "disinterested pursuit of truth" (p. 41) that particularly makes this so. However, the ephemeral nature of journalism—always reporting on the here—means it is not always given consideration equal to its ideological significance. This thesis therefore hopes to contribute to the field of critical journalism studies by extending the critique of journalism's ideological function to a politically sensitive subject: the reporting of naval procurement in Australia.

As this thesis will show, journalists reporting on the Attack-class submarines were oriented towards themes of political conflict, competition, public scrutiny, secrecy and scandal. As such, journalists reporting on the submarines did not always focus on what scholars might call normative journalistic roles, such as purely informing the public and fostering debate about the policy aspects. As the thesis will discuss in forthcoming chapters, this subtle shift in performance requires a theoretical approach that considers the limits of normative journalism in a changing and adaptive media environment.

## 2.1—Journalism's Perceived Role in Democracy

Examination of journalism's role in democracy occurs in a wide range of communication research, including journalism studies, political communication and media studies. Given the breadth of scholarship on the topic, only selected literature has been included here. It must also be stated the scholarship here prioritises literature from a western liberal democratic perspective, because it most closely reflects the national Australian political and media context. In doing so, the author acknowledges this Western democratic lens is not representative of journalism being practised in many parts of the world (Hanitzch, Hanusch, Ramaprasad and de Beer, 2019).

Journalism studies have often focused on how journalism relates to other influential institutions such as politics and government. In this context, journalism is sometimes seen as being significant only by virtue of the role it plays in democracy. Kovach and Rosenstiel (2007) suggest, journalism as a Western tradition has historically been linked with the rise and spread of democracy. As they observe the rise of journalism has coincided with the rise of democracy, and further: "the more democratic the society, the more news and information it tends to have" (p. 16). Schudson (2001) argues that as the rise of journalism in the west coincided with urbanisation and democratisation, public interest in crime, politics and society gave rise to journalistic norms of public service, objectivity and fairness. Academic scholarship from a range of theoretical and conceptual approaches has suggested that journalism is significant to democracy. Political communication scholarship has suggested that journalism mediates the political process and that as media systems change journalists, politicians and the public adapt (Chadwick and Stanyer, 2010; Chadwick, 2017; McNair, 2011). Journalism and media scholars argue that journalists are influential in shaping political agendas and influencing what the voting public regards as being significant and important (Entman, 2004; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; McCombs, Shaw and Weaver, 1997; Scheufele, 1999). Normative journalism scholarship, political communications research and journalism studies also broadly overlap with media effects scholarship. However, this thesis does not aim

to provide a theory of media effects, rather it is a critique of journalism's contribution to broader public discourse. The literature reviewed here concerns itself generally with answering questions about how journalism impacts political, cultural, discursive and democratic processes. It also tends to focus on political outcomes, rather than exploring underlying journalistic practices and perspectives.

Democracy and journalism share historic roots. McNair (2009; Habermas, 1989) argues the rise of journalism coincided with the rise of the European bourgeoisie and the challenges they posed to feudalism and the unilateral power of kings. McNair highlights the English civil war as being particularly noteworthy because it was one of the first times in history that journalists played an active role in the outcome of a political conflict. As McNair states, "journalists took sides, becoming partisans and activists in the shaping of political reality, as opposed to mere reporters of it" (p. 238). Carey (2007) suggests, the process of industrialisation and urbanisation throughout the 18th and 19th century resulted in more urbanised, wealthier and centralised populations of citizens. The idea of "the public" arose as a way to understand how large, organised but estranged collectives of individuals could engage in discourse to form opinions on everything from gossip to matters of church and government (Habermas, 1989). The rise of the presses gave the once largely voiceless citizenry a venue to read about and discuss current affairs. Liberalist philosophers such as Milton, Paine, Hume and Mill would come to view the elite press as a vanguard for the expansion of individual rights as it challenged the authority of government and provided a venue for the "marketplace of ideas" (Ward, 2009). Thomas Carlyle (2008) viewed the press as indispensable in that it allowed the public to debate and discuss the affairs of the nation far beyond the walls of parliament. To Carlyle, democracy could not arise without the free press, as he states: "printing, which comes necessarily out of writing, I say often, is *equivalent* to Democracy: invent writing, Democracy is inevitable" (p. 223, emphasis added). The shortcoming of this approach is that it reduces the ideological function of journalism to only its political dimensions. While democracy and journalism share historic roots, their contemporary incarnations—and their functions—have changed over time.

Despite this, much journalism scholarship remains anchored to conceptions of journalism's as central to democracy (Zelizer, 2012). A common justification for this is that news media continue to be the most significant source of political information for publics globally and a primary avenue through which public opinion is formed (Fraile, 2011; Graber and Dunaway, 2017; Moeller and De Vreese, 2015; Strömbäck, 2005). This has led some journalism scholars to problematise declining news consumption by audiences and a perceived decline in the relative quality of political journalism over time (Aalberg, Blekesaune, and Elvestad, 2013; Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995; McNair, 2000). Significant academic attention has been focused on the various qualities of political journalism and its possible impacts on public opinion, debate, ideology and voting behaviour (De Vreese, Esser and Hopmann, 2017; Falasca, 2014; Fraile and Iyengar, 2014; Gibson and McAllister, 2015; Hoffman, 2012; Smith, 2016; Strömbäck, 2005). It is not uncommon, as Kovach and Rosenstiel (2007) suggest, for journalists and scholars to view the most significant contributions of journalism to be political scrutiny and democratic debate. Kovach and Rosenstiel themselves argue that "the *primary purpose* [emphasis added] of journalism is to provide citizens with the information they need to be free and self-governing" (p. 12).

Journalism scholarship often splits along lines discussing how journalism has either failed or succeeded in its perceived role in service of democracy. Gurevitch and Blumler (2000) for example, explore how the notionally democratic principles of journalists are undermined by commercial interests and concentration of media ownership. Market pressures, they argue, lead to limited public affairs coverage, rigid and reductive time slots for news stories and a blandness of coverage of social issues as demanded by advertiser guidelines (p. 276). Ungar (1990) by distinction uses case studies to demonstrate how the rise of free and open journalism in Eastern Europe, South America, Asia, Africa and The Middle East has worked to undermine autocratic regimes and contributed to the spread of democracy. Early scholarship by Lippmann (1965; 1993) and Lasswell (2007; 2013) took a systematic approach to exploring journalism, but principally to understand how journalists influenced the formation of public opinion and propagated certain political ideology and stereotypes.

Framing approaches to journalism (Cacciatore, Scheufele and Iyengar, 2016; Entman, 2004; Iyengar, 1990; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987) and agenda setting research (McCombs, 1993, McCombs, Shaw and Weaver, 1997), instead looked at how journalism could influence what issues and events journalists, politicians and audiences perceived to be important and how this in turn might undermine or facilitate the democratic process. As Zelizer (2004) suggests, much of this research tradition is concerned primarily with journalism as a cog in the greater functioning of the political system as a whole.

## 2.2—The Normative Functions of Journalism

Other scholarship has focused less on the broader political context that surrounds journalism and more on the conceptualisation of what represents quality in journalism. Such scholarship often deals with the underlying standards, ethics and principles of journalism as a framework within which to analyse and critique journalism, media culture and media industries. In this context journalism scholarship largely concerns itself with the optimal functioning of the profession (Kovach and Rosenstiel, 2007; Schudson, 1989; 2001). Research by Van der Wurff and Schoenbach (2014) for example, discusses how notions of high quality in journalism are driven by both audience expectations and journalists' own conceptions of social responsibility and the democratic function of the press. As Deuze (2005) states, journalists follow a professional ideology dominated by historically established values such as objectivity, public service, independence and ethical reporting. Research in this field often explores questions about how journalists can adhere to audience expectations and establish trust in their work and the profession (Yamamoto, Lee and Ran, 2016) and the potential factors and consequences related to losing media trust (Wise and McLaughlin, 2016). Of equal concern is how journalists conceive of their ethical obligations—particularly to readers and sources—and how ethical norms influence decisions around the reporting process (Plaisance, Skewes and Hanitzsch, 2012). And further, journalism is often conceived of in the context of its public service role or the civic responsibilities of journalists (Ahva, 2012; Ferrucci, 2015; 2017; Haas and Steiner, 2001). Substantive scholarship is also directed towards studies of bias

in journalism and the perceived influence this might have on audiences—particularly within the context of political outcomes (Eberl, Boomgaarden and Wagner, 2017; Tresch, 2009; Watanabe, 2017). Objectivity, balance and impartiality are considered such organising principles of journalism that some scholars have argued they should also inform journalism research (Raeijmaekers and Maeseele, 2017). In other words, journalism studies scholarship assumes that journalism should be critiqued using criteria drawn from its own historic and normative traditions (Zelizer, 2004).

Normative journalism scholarship is driven by principles derived from liberal political philosophy. Such scholarship often begins from the premise that journalism—and subsequently democracy—is being undermined or challenged by various factors that are preventing journalism from fulfilling its role. In making the central focus of journalism research "the role of journalism" in society this research tradition concerns itself with not only questions of what journalism is but also what journalism *should* be (Christians, Glasser, McQuail, Nordenstreng and White, 2009). Core arguments include: that journalism should have a public service ethic and be accountable and responsible to the public to produce quality journalism (Glasser and Craft, 1996); that it should produce reliable and objective monitoring of the social world (Glasser and Ettema, 1989; McQuail, 2006); that it should facilitate informed decision-making in a rational public sphere (Dahlgren, 2006); that it should develop and apply models of ethical reporting behaviour (Glasser and Ettema, 2008); and that journalism should do these things while maintaining a functioning competitive business model in a liberal economic system (Glasser, Varma and Zou, 2019). Normative theories of journalism often draw from and extend the theorisation of Habermas, particularly the notion that journalism can—or should—ideally facilitate a rational process of consensus making across individuals in the public sphere (Dahlgren, 2006; Glasser, Awad and Kim, 2009). Nieminen (2006) notes that Habermas's model of the public sphere advances the notion of the moral autonomy of the individual against the power of the autocratic state or church. And as Nieminen also suggests, while scholarship has advanced various models and approaches to the public sphere, most rely on Habermas's idealised individual-centric model as a starting point.

Zelizer (2004) argues that normative research in part derives its idealised standards of journalism—and its roles and functions—from Habermas's ideal of the development of rational public opinion through the public sphere. By centring journalism scholarship on notions of the role of journalism and ideas about what journalism *should* be, normative scholarship provides a limiting framework for understanding the ideological function of journalism. By focusing on whether or not journalists adhere to particular standards this normative scholarship deals uneasily with the more substantive question of how such standards arise and develop within the profession to begin with. Only an approach that explores journalism within the broader social and political context of discourse can adequately deal with such questions.

## 2.3—Outside Influences on Journalism

Another field of research concerned with the role of journalism in society deals with the impact of a range of external factors, such as the economic and political environment. Political economy of the media theorists (Herman and Chomsky, 1988; McChesney, 2008) examine the power dynamics between media, politics and the economy. In Australia, one of the key concerns is centred around concentration of ownership and the impact of the Murdoch family (McKnight, 2012). These studies provide an important body of knowledge about power in the media. This thesis adopts a Foucauldian approach to the study of power in media via analysis of texts. Other media studies scholarship is concerned with how new technologies, ownership, commercial factors, centralisation, audience feedback, governments and other external factors influence the practice of journalism (Hanitzsch and Mellado, 2011). Of major concern in media studies scholarship is how digital and networked media have disrupted traditional modes of journalism delivery. Significant scholarship suggests that while digital media have changed journalism in fundamental ways hybrid print/online newsrooms remain a significant site for journalism (Chadwick, 2017). As Chadwick suggests, consumption of news is moving away from an either/or model and towards a both/and model where audiences select and consume news from a range of platforms and media services. As a

consequence, Conway, Kenski and Wang (2015) argue, traditional media companies—such as print media—are developing a symbiotic relationship with social and digital media. Using an analysis of political Twitter feeds during the 2012 presidential election the authors argue that print journalists had a strong agenda setting influence on what politicians tweeted about. Overall, print media were a dominant leader of issues that were discussed on Twitter in their sample. A study by Harder, Sevenans and Van Aelst (2017) that explored news coverage of the 2014 Belgian elections found similar results. Their conclusions suggest that print media—along with television news—were slower to report on events than online news sites and social media. Nevertheless, they state: "newspapers and television not seldom *do* cover a news story before it is published by media platforms that are typically faster" (p. 288). However, there have been other studies that offer more contradictory results. A study by Valenzuela, Puente and Flores (2017) for example, argues that social media was more influential in breaking stories and setting the agenda during media coverage of the 2010 Chilean earthquake and tsunami. Additionally, journalists using Twitter were more likely to cover stories relating to victims and evacuees, whereas television journalists covered macro-level issues such as damage to infrastructure and housing. The suggestion that newspaper journalists are more likely to break stories or set the agenda is thus blurred. Part of what makes this such a complex question for researchers to answer is that in the contemporary environment newspaper journalists *are* social media journalists. As research by Hanusch and Bruns (2017) suggests, Twitter has become an essential and important feature of Australian journalists' work, regardless of whether they work in print, radio, television or digital only publications. As the trend towards multi-platform news consumption among audiences increases (Diehl, Barnidge and De Zúñiga, 2018; Kim, 2016), so too are individual journalists being stretched across and between different platforms (Schlesinger and Doyle, 2015). And while research suggests significant cultural and qualitative differences in the norms and practices of journalists working in different media platforms (Hanusch, 2017), those differences alone may become meaningless in a future where freelancing and multi-platform journalism become the rule rather than the exception.

The second major focus of media studies scholarship is the collapse of the funding model for journalism in liberal/capitalist economic systems. With the exception of public broadcasting services, the dominant model of funding journalism was—and for many still is—largely driven by revenue from advertising sales. There is broad agreement that with the advent of digital and social media competing for advertising this funding model for legacy news media is no longer viable (Benson, 2018; Carlson, 2015: Kaye and Quinn, 2010). As a consequence, newsrooms are reducing staff sizes, eliminating positions and pushing remaining journalists to increase the range and frequency of their reporting (Franklin, 2014; Nikunen, 2014; O'Donnell, Zion and Sherwood, 2016; Sherwood and O'Donnell, 2018). Where once print newspapers, wire services and news agencies were able to flourish thanks to extremely profitable sales to advertisers, that revenue has largely been redirected towards digital advertising (Carlson, 2015). Much of that revenue has been soaked up by giant search, social media and online retail platforms such as Google, Facebook and Amazon (Dolata, 2017). In the U.S. market, for example, Google and Facebook between them have grown to such a size that together they take up more than sixty per cent of the entire market for digital advertising revenue (AppNexus, 2018; Polar, 2019). Far from being isolated from this crisis, public broadcasting and news services have also come under pressure—particularly political—as they are increasingly called upon to adapt to changing media consumption patterns and justify their public funding (Lim, Bali and Moo, 2017; Sjøvaag, Pedersen and Owren, 2018; Turner, 2016).

Significant scholarship in this area focuses on how journalists and news companies are dealing with these changes. Research by Reinardy (2011) shows that journalists are increasingly under pressure due to increasing workloads and financial limitations. They found that print journalists across America were reporting high rates of burnout, were more likely to be cynical about the future prospects of their industry and express a likelihood of leaving the profession. Sarrimo (2017) found that journalists in Sweden reported a cultural shift in newsroom towards loss of autonomy and insecure working conditions. Their findings suggest pressure to remain profitable is pushing newsroom managers to exert more control over

individual journalists. Other researchers have explored the increasing use of convergence of newsroom roles and functions to minimise costs. This includes both the convergence of platforms—TV and radio for example—and the merging of specialisations or reporting responsibilities (Nikunen, 2014; Tameling and Broersma, 2013). Other scholarship explores possible funding models that could replace the existing advertising dependent model. Carson (2015) provides an overview of how some newspapers have adapted using strategies such as donations, crowdfunding and paywalls, all of which have been met with mixed results. Benson (2018) argues that in America, a country with limited public broadcasting services, journalism is increasingly being funded by not-for-profit organisations and philanthropic foundations. Benson suggests however that this is neither a sustainable model for public journalism, nor does it meet journalistic norms of accountability and regulation. Another proposed solution to funding journalism is the increased use of native and programmatic advertising: advertising that is targeted at specific audiences and designed to appear almost indistinguishable from traditional journalistic reporting (Carlson, 2015; Glasser, Varma and Zou, 2019; Schauster, Ferrucci and Neill, 2016). Normative journalism scholarship has tended to treat native advertising in a problematic fashion, regarding it as having the potential to reduce trust in news, be regarded as deceptive and breaches moral and ethical norms of journalism (Glasser, Varma and Zou, 2019; Iversen and Knudsen, 2017; Wojdynski, 2016). Allern and Pollack (2017) argue that a possible solution may be to have governments publicly subsidise the production of news as a public good. They suggest this might be achieved by a combination of direct and indirect subsidies that make journalism more affordable for companies to produce and less expensive for consumers to access.

As this literature suggests, the crisis of journalism is a significant factor that is influencing corporate and newsroom decision-making. While Media Studies scholarship is important it often falls short of explaining how awareness of the ongoing funding crisis is influencing journalistic output. This is perhaps because the central focus of that scholarship focuses on articulating the problem itself, rather than addressing it with a solution. Journalists are not presented as active participants in the shaping of public discourses about their own

crisis. As such, a more complete approach to understanding news media should address not only the technological and economic influences on journalism but the socio-political and ideological. It should also consider the centrality of journalists as agents of change who play an active role in challenging or perpetuating patterns of news production and representation.

## 2.4—Contemporary Critiques of Journalism

In recent years new approaches to understanding news and media have emerged. Mediatisation theory is one approach that seeks to place media as central to and interdependent upon other social and political institutions. Over the course of the 20th century media audiences rapidly increased in size and became significantly more complex, diverse and fragmented (Edgerly and Vraga, 2017; Lindell and Hovden, 2018; Nelson and Taneja, 2018; Ohlsson, Lindell and Arkhede, 2017). This has complicated the function of many organisations that depend on widespread publicity to achieve their goals. Journalism, for example, now competes for its political gatekeeper role with other specialised media—such as talk back radio and social media—that offer formats tailored to specific targeted audiences (Fisher, Marshall and McCallum, 2018). Mediatisation researchers argue for both a theoretical and empirical approach to social research that is media-centred in how it attempts to explain the changing relationships between cultural, social and political institutions and practices (Hepp, Hjarvard and Lundby, 2015). In general, the concept of mediatisation tries to capture long-term interrelation processes between media change on the one hand and social and cultural change on the other (Hepp, Hjarvard and Lundby, 2015). Particularly within the context of government, mediatisation theory suggests that politicians are becoming increasingly oriented towards media as a matter of necessity when faced with the growing difficulties in reaching their audiences (Strömbäck, 2008). But equally, as Hepp (2016) suggests, mediatisation argues that the everyday practices of all in the social world—not just politicians—are becoming increasingly reliant on and influenced by media. Further, Hepp argues that mediatisation as a process is not simply something that happens by itself but rather is the product of intended and unintended consequences of actors and groups within

networks interacting, creating media-supported influences, developing and employing digital technologies and reflecting on communication practices. Strömbäck (2005; 2008) identifies the shift towards mediatisation as being non-uniform across actors and institutions, but also suggests it can be explored in four phases. Mediatisation, he suggests, occurs in any given context when the media becomes the most important source of information, is able to act independently of or subvert the influence of political institutions, and its practices are governed by its own media logics.

Mediatisation theory provides a useful theoretical lens for this inquiry that employs discursive analysis of news texts to better understand how the changing news environment has influenced the reporting on and public debate around national security issues. Although critical discourse analysis comes from a different theoretical background there is overlap in terms of how both approaches conceive of media. Mediatisation highlights that seemingly disconnected groups of people in society are becoming increasingly interdependent as they are moulded by media use, and that this is reflected in the discourses that such groups produce (Hepp, 2016). In other words, mediatisation emphasises the big picture relationships between journalism and other social institutions not as isolated factors but as a network of interconnected contexts where discourse takes place. But more significantly, mediatisation provides an explanation for the ideological function of journalism that is novel and intuitive. Falasca (2014) argues that journalism is influenced not just by political actors and the values of individual journalists, but also by institutional factors, specific contexts and media logic. The ideological function of journalism is therefore reciprocal with other institutions and partly mediated by the *logics* of the social institutions in which journalism is produced and connected to. This echoes Foucault's (2001) argument that social institutions are instrumental in the procedural control and organisation of discourse through the structuring of social and political beliefs around acceptable speech and speakers. However, rather than presenting the ideological function of journalism as a consequence of persuasion, constitution or transmitting hegemonic patterns of belief (Althusser, 2004; Charland, 1987; Hall, 1985), mediatisation argues that the logics of social institutions are a product of a wide range of

intentional and unintentional social practices. Mediatisation acts as a metaprocess (Hepp, 2016; Hjarvard, 2008; Krotz, 2007) by subtly restructuring practices and behaviours that over time result in ideological influences on culture and society. Mediatisation places the focus of research on not only ideology, but also how intentional and unintentional practices and media logic mediate the production of ideological discourses. It also places understanding journalistic practices and media logic as central to understanding the role journalists play in contributing to public discourses.

For the purposes of this research, mediatisation will assist in an ancillary manner as a helpful lens through which to consider the changing relationship between power and discourse production in contemporary society. However, the primary theoretical framework draws more directly from Foucault's conception of power and discourse.

## 2.5—Power, Journalism and Source Relations

Understanding journalism practice from a discourse perspective requires a sound exploration of foundational literature that explores the relationship between media and power. Power is an important factor that underpins and influences journalistic decision-making and a range of scholarship has addressed the role of power in influencing journalism. This review of literature will argue that while the existing scholarship provides an understanding of how relationships of power and control shape journalism roles and institutions, there is less examining the impact on texts. Studies of power in journalism often focus on the relationship between journalists and their sources, although as contemporary research shows this is no longer the only or the most significant site of influence. Journalist-source relationships are transactional. Traditionally, sources have information that journalists need but no audience to broadcast it to. Journalists have an audience and the means to reach them, but no information of their own. Power is often the decisive factor in who gets the better end of the bargain.

Journalists' interactions with politicians and other sources of news are a focal point of academic research. As Fisher (2018) states, digital media has significantly changed historic

understanding of source-journalist relations. Power dynamics have shifted as new and diverse channels for communicating to audiences have allowed some sources to bypass the press, or opt-in/opt-out of relationships with journalists. New scholarship is needed to extend older models of analysis or develop new ways of understanding the source-journalist relationship. Different branches of journalism scholarship have approached the relationship by focusing on assorted qualities and characteristics. Journalism studies research often explores the practicalities of establishing and negotiating source relationships from the perspectives of journalists and politicians (Berkowitz, 2009; Carlson, 2015). In political communication research the focus is often centred more on how journalists and politicians compete for control over who sets the political agenda (McCombs, 1993; McCombs and Shaw, 1972). As Gans (1980) put it, one of the primary questions of political communication and agenda setting research is often "who leads the tango?" A third major branch of scholarship focuses on the interaction between public relations practitioners and journalists (Koch, Obermaier and Riesmeyer, 2017; Macnamara, 2014; Moloney, 2007; Ericson, Baranek and Chan, 1989). These research approaches ascribe varying levels of agency to journalists in both the discursive choices they make in reporting and their decisions in light of social and political contexts. The following section (2.5a) will discuss journalism and politics, and how power and agenda setting mediate that relationship.

### 2.5a—Elite Sources

One long standing focus of journalism studies is the reliance of journalists on elite and institutional sources. Scholarship in this field argues that journalists are drawn to experts, public officials and politicians as sources of news because these sources are regarded as having greater access to information and proximity to decision-making (Berkowitz, 2009; Blumler and Cushion, 2014; Hallin, 1984; Manning, 2001). This results in patterns of reporting that overwhelmingly preference the voices of elite sources, with journalists reproducing what some argue is a distorted view of public opinion (Hallin, 1984; Hayes and Guardino, 2010; Kleemans, Schaap and Hermans, 2015; Turcotte, 2017). This has led some theorists to

conclude that journalists are constrained by their reliance on elite sources and must tie or index the framing of events and issues to the limited viewpoints provided by officials in positions of power (Bennett, 1990; 1996; Bennett, Lawrence and Livingston, 2006; Lawrence and Bennett, 2000). Indexing theory argues that even when journalists try to reframe or reinterpret events, they "are soon reined in by officials who strive to 'get on top' of an event-driven story" (Bennett, Lawrence and Livingston, 2006, p. 468-467). Furthermore, if politicians or experts do not provide oppositional interpretations of issues or events journalists often allow official viewpoints to remain unchallenged in their reporting (Althaus, Edy, Entman and Phalen, 1996; Hayes and Guardino, 2010). This branch of research suggests that although journalists subscribe to norms of "watchdog" public scrutiny when approaching sources (Berkowitz and TerKeurst, 1999) their own routines and practices prevent them from effectively achieving this. For instance, journalists may select sources based on familiarity or ease of access rather than their level of knowledge of the event or issue (Berkowitz, 2009; Manning, 2001, Splendore, 2017), they may rely on routinised work practices that prioritise credentialism and cultural authority when assessing source credibility and expertise (Saikkonen, 2017), and may adhere uncritically to the official view of events or issues out of a desire to remain objective (Althaus, Edy, Entman and Phalen, 1996; Cunningham, 2003; Hallin, 1984; Hayes and Guardino, 2010). Berkowitz (2009) suggests that journalism's reliance on elite and official sources is largely a consequence of organisational limitations. Journalists are time poor: recording the news means reporting on events and issues as they unfold. Known sources are generally easier to access than unknown; and of unknown sources those who make themselves available through public relations offices are easiest to reach. As Berkowitz states: "reporters learn how to find sources that can readily be scheduled and who will provide the kinds of information they seek in a concise and manageable way" (p. 104). While this may be a necessary feature of the journalistic process it can, as this research suggests, result in a one-sided representation of issues and events.

While indexing theory suggests that journalists are constrained by sourcing practices there are also other factors that influence the journalist-source relationship. One aspect is the

balance of power between journalist and source. Berkowitz (2009) suggests that journalists may have more negotiating power with sources if they have more experience, a strong reputation, a track record of impactful reporting, and are granted significant autonomy by their organisation. The scale and type of audience commanded by the journalist's organisation may also be a factor influencing the power differential (Berkowitz and TerKeurst, 1999). A notable journalist from an internationally recognised newspaper may command more influence in source interactions than a junior reporter from a local tabloid. Conversely, not all sources are equally powerful. As Reese (1991) argues, sources with highly regarded official positions, experience and resources may be able to balance the power of journalists with wide audiences and strong track records. Or more likely, as they suggest, powerful sources will be able to bypass journalistic scrutiny altogether "by denying access, claiming media bias [and] threatening reprisals" (p. 326). For example, high profile politicians and experts may be able to shop around for sympathetic and less scrutinising journalists and still be able to get their message across. Ericson, Baranek and Chan (1989) argue that sources are also able to take advantage of the credibility offered by their rank, title or position to garner more favourable treatment from journalists. They also suggest that in contexts where information is highly restricted—such as public security and the courts—sources may have additional leeway to set the terms of relations between journalists. Their research around crime reporting for instance suggests that police are able to establish an inner circle of compliant and trusted journalists to pass information to. In the context of courts, sources may have the power to have certain information embargoed or sealed under threat of legal punishment for journalists seeking to report on it. Ericson, Baranek and Chan also argue that source relations are often transactional in nature: thus, if a journalist has nothing to offer—information or influence wise—this puts them in a less favourable position with their source. Power in journalist-source relationships is therefore not always about rank or position, but sometimes about information access, who is holding the cards and who has the most to offer.

Indexing theory is relevant to this inquiry because it provides a framework to understand how journalistic routines—based around organisations restraints—as well as the

norm of objectivity may result in overrepresentation of elite perspectives and uncritical engagement with official narratives. This scholarship's drawback however is that it tends to present power as only a binary relationship between elite source and journalist. Few indexing studies explore the broader socio-political influences that drive the formation of elite discourses or the factors that limit the available frames and narratives elites can choose from (Entman, Matthes and Pellicano, 2009; Turcotte, 2017). The broader context of how and why elite sources tailor their interactions with journalists is often unstated. As Hjarvard (2013) argues, the process of mediatisation is transformative and interdependent: meaning that as elite and political actors interact with media they adapt and conform to the logics of media, and vice versa. While indexing scholarship provides valuable insight into how organisational and procedural limitations placed around journalists may result in uncritical reporting, it leaves many questions unanswered.

### 2.5b—Capture

One branch of scholarship that approaches the broader consequences of power and the media is capture theory. Media capture theory argues that the balance of power can shift at a societal level resulting in media organisations becoming "captured" by the interests of elites. While indexing theory focuses on how elites influence public discourses as an indirect consequence of journalistic sourcing practices, capture theory takes a broader look at how elites influence media and media industries. Mungiu-Pippidi (2008) defines media capture as a state where networks of vested interests and politicians exert influence on the media directly and indirectly preventing journalists from acting autonomously. Schiffrin (2018) suggests that politicians can use a range of strategies including exclusion of non-compliant journalists and outlets, alliances with vested interests, legislation, restriction/loosening of ownership laws and browbeating or publicly attacking journalists and media institutions to coerce journalists. The result is a media environment in which journalists make conscious or unconscious decisions to self-censor or modify their reporting behaviours to align with the best interests of politicians, government and vested interests (Besley and Prat, 2006; Corneo, 2006; Noam,

2018; Petrova, 2008). Politicians can also indirectly influence media coverage by networking with the vested interests and commercial entities that the media rely on for advertising revenue and investment capital. As Milosavljević and Poler (2018) state, weak economies and increasing competition in advertising markets means media organisations are more dependent on revenue from corporations whose interests may align more closely with the political class. Nechushtai (2018) particularly highlights the dominance of Google and Facebook as news aggregators as a factor influencing journalists decision-making. As they state, news organisations are significantly invested in Google, Google News and Facebook for exposure and referral to news stories; as well as Google Analytics and Facebook's Page Insight and Audience Optimisation services for analytics and audience data. The need to remain commercially viable in a more competitive and centrally organised news market may result in additional pressure from advertisers and corporations (Atal, 2018). Capture theory suggests that journalists will take a more compliant approach to reporting on potential advertising partners (Schiffrin, 2018; Milosavljević and Poler, 2018); and become more accepting of commercialised discourses in news such as native advertising and sponsored content, (Atal, 2018). Furthermore, as ownership of media organisations becomes more heavily conglomerated with other commercial interests this will result in additional intra-institutional pressure to self-censor reporting of vested interest corporations (Noam, 2018). Capture theory thus suggests what is—or might be—the case when the power imbalance between journalists and political and elite sources becomes systematic in size and scale. This is particularly significant when considering the function of power in relationships between journalists and particularly large and influential organisations such as the military and defence industries.

As this literature suggests certain journalist-source relationships demonstrate a more significant imbalance of power. Research by Diamond (2017) and Woodall (2018) suggests that in areas such as politics and national security reporting journalists might be uniquely vulnerable to capture strategies. As Woodall argues, breaking or advancing stories in such areas is often dependent entirely on either unauthorised disclosure of classified information or the whims of the politicians who call the shots. As Ericson, Baranek and Chan (1989) noted,

contexts in which information is highly restricted—such as in court or crime reporting—can result in officials selecting an inner circle of journalists that are compliant and trusted. This has particular relevance for the study of media discourses around defence procurement. Diamond suggests that in the case of national security reporting journalists are increasingly reliant on fostering close relationships with trusted sources in positions of power and authority. Additionally, due to harsh penalties for leaking confidential information national security officials have little to gain from speaking to the press. Diamond argues that when national security sources pass on information to the press it is only with trusted journalists and generally on condition of anonymity. As capture theory suggests, this places the balance of power in the source's favour. Reich (2008) argues that politicians take advantage of this state of affairs by directing journalists to leak selected information as part of a broader political strategy. They suggest that the leaking of confidential—or at the very least private—information has become a routine part of political journalism.

Capture theory provides sound insight into the factors that limit and shape journalistic choices when reporting on issues and events. While indexing theory is more focused on how procedural journalism's reliance on expert sources constrains what views are presented in news media, capture describes more fully the socio-political forces that impact media industries. Media capture provides an understanding of how and why journalists might come to align their views with those of elite classes due to direct and indirect pressures. It also explains to some extent how the power relationship between journalists and sources may be changing as the market for advertising becomes more competitive. What capture theory does not provide is a more in depth understanding of how these big picture changes translate to decisions made in the newsroom or on the page. This is in part because capture theory originated as primarily an economic model of media power using indirect measures and predictions of influence (Besley and Prat, 2006; Corneo, 2006; Petrova, 2008). Capture scholarship observes the outcomes of micro and macroeconomic pressure on changes in regulation, journalistic freedoms, concentration of ownership and advertising revenues. It does not however explore how these broader pressures affect specific newsroom practices and

journalist decisions. Rather, capture scholarship tends to take a logical leap—based on modelling and the views of media regulatory and monitoring NGOs—that the observed large scale economic and political changes are influencing journalistic practices (Frisch, Belair-Gagnon and Agur, 2018; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2008). Capture scholarship is therefore an incomplete picture of how large social and political changes may impact on newsroom practices, and as such it is not sufficient to understand media discourses.

### 2.5c—Agenda Setting

Scholarship of journalist-source relationships tends to resolve around a single question: who is more influential, the source or the journalist? Are elites, politicians and vested interests powerful enough to make meaningless the agency of individual journalists? Capture and indexing theories tend to model journalists as relatively passive channels through which elite views are passed—largely unaltered—to the public. As an alternative, agenda setting presents journalists as more active negotiators in the process of shaping political reality (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; McCombs, Shaw and Weaver 2014). An organising perspective of agenda setting is that the relationship between journalists and sources is like a dance where both participants must negotiate who leads and who follows (Lück, Wessler, Maia and Wozniak, 2018; Strömbäck and Nord, 2006). Drawing on Habermas's articulation of the public sphere as a marketplace of ideas, agenda setting theorists argue that journalists and sources are in competition to determine the frequency and prominence of issues and events in public debate (Coleman, McCombs, Shaw and Weaver, 2009). As McCombs (1993) states, agenda setting asserts that the news tells society "what to think about" and "how to think about it" (p. 62). Influencing the agenda—as such—means influencing not only what the public think about but the structures surrounding how issues are discussed. In practice, agenda setting scholarship seeks to analyse and identify whose priorities, interests and actions are more represented and advanced within journalistic reporting (Coleman, McCombs, Shaw and Weaver, 2009; Guo and Vargo, 2017; Watanabe, 2017) as well as who is more influential in instigating and altering the course of news trends over time (Djerf-Pierre and Shehata,

2017; Harder, Sevenans and Van Aelst, 2017; Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2011, Zhu and Boroson, 1997). Agenda setting scholarship is also concerned with determining the consequences of agenda setting—in terms of audience beliefs and behaviour (Coleman, McCombs, Shaw and Weaver, 2009). As Walgrave (2008) argues, the results of agenda setting research have been mixed, suggesting that the source-journalist relationship is more complex than can be explained using unidirectional models of influence. In agenda setting the answer to the question 'who leads the dance?', is very often: 'that depends'.

A significant amount of agenda settings research is preoccupied with the agenda setting relationship between politicians and journalists. Particularly, who ultimately has the power to influence the voting public? As Van Aelst and Walgrave (2011) state, agenda setting theory is generally used as a means to understand media effects. Coleman, McCombs, Shaw and Weaver (2009) suggest that agenda setting can be linked to effects on public sentiment, salience of issues and some public behaviours. There is as such significant scholarship devoted to questioning agenda setting impacts on political discourses, public opinion and voter behaviour (Ahmed and Hussain, 2016; Blasco-Duatis, Saez and García, 2018; Cushion, Kilby, Thomas, Morani and Sambrook, 2018; Eberl, Boomgaarden and Wagner, 2017). Kiousis, Strömbäck and McDevitt (2015) argue that understanding who sets the agenda is not enough to understand voter behaviour. From their analysis of telephone interviews of prospective voters in Sweden they conclude that voting behaviour is influenced by a complicated range of factors, including: attention to political news; issue salience and importance; engagement with political discussions; and, party issue and leadership evaluation. Various studies have concluded that politicians do have the capacity to through a range of discursive and public relations strategies influence what issues and events are discussed in the news (Bennett, Lawrence and Livingstone, 2006; Patterson, 1998; Vliegenthart and Roggeband, 2007). However, there is also scholarship suggesting that media organisations are not passive and are actively capable of influencing the political agenda particularly in certain circumstances (Graziano and Percoco, 2017; Vliegenthart and Walgrave, 2010; Walgrave, Soroka and Nuytemans, 2008). Some scholars themselves acknowledge that the results of agenda setting

research have often been contradictory, or resulted in modest or minimal effects for media agenda setting (Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2011; Walgrave and Van Aelst, 2006). As such, agenda setting scholarship provides a sometimes-contradictory explanation for why politicians or journalists act in the ways that they do.

Van Aelst and Walgrave (2011) and Vesa, Blomberg and Kroll (2015) suggest, politicians in a number of countries *believe* at least that the media does have an influence over politicians' priorities, and in particular on what issues are most publicly visible in political discourse. Vesa, Blomberg and Kroll's findings qualify this by suggesting that politicians in their study remained of the belief that the 'behind closed doors' policymaking process remained less affected by media agenda setting. Research by Zoizner, Sheafer and Walgrave (2017) suggests that individual politicians' real-life responsiveness to media and their personal goals and attitudes were closely related. Their study suggests that the agenda setting function of the media depends in part on how politicians conceive of their role— or whom they aim to represent. They argue that "those who view themselves as a conduit of the public's demands (delegates) are more responsive to the media than politicians who act upon their own judgement (trustees), [and further that] MPs who are involved in a wide range of issues (generalists) are also more responsive to the media agenda" (p. 445). Research exploring whether politicians believe they are influenced by media is particularly interesting when contrasted with political advertising research. Regardless of whether politicians believe *they* are influenced by the media, the increasing complexity, cost and sheer weight of campaign finances devoted to political advertising seems to suggest politicians believe *voters* are influenced (Fulgoni, Lipsman and Davidsen, 2016; Ridout, Fowler, Franz and Goldstein, 2018). And in the contemporary fast-paced environment of news and politics, it is perhaps this *belief* that matters more than any empirical standard of truth.

### 2.5d—Influence of Public Relations on Journalism

While the focus of agenda setting research generally rests with politician/journalist relations, there is also significant scholarship that explores how public relations (PR) has

influenced journalism. Scholarship in this area suggests that the roles, routines and practices of journalists and public relations officials are converging (Edwards and Pieczka, 2013; Macnamara, 2014; Obermaier and Koch, 2015; Sherwood and Nicholson, 2017; Sinaga and Callison, 2008; Valentini, 2014; Zerfass and Schramm, 2013). The growing scope and scale of public relations and its integration with journalism has been met with scepticism by many journalism scholars. As McNair (2009) states, there is significant journalism scholarship on the influence of public relations "which reads it as a deviation from or distortion of the normative public sphere" (p. 243). Lewis, Williams and Franklin (2008) suggest the increasing reliance of journalists on public relations professionals as sources for news is resulting in reporting that lacks independence and reproduces uncritically the views of corporations. PR work is considered by some to be a pernicious and undermining influence on more legitimate modes of public opinion formation and democratic discourse (Miller and Dinan, 2000; Miller and Harkins, 2010; Salter, 2005). A chief criticism here is that PR is fundamentally deceptive, because as Salter (2005) argues "public relations, in contrast to journalism, is primarily concerned with the world of appearances, rather than reality" (p. 102). Where normative journalism is perceived to be organised around quick and accurate reporting of verified factual information (Willnat, Weaver and Wilhoit, 2019), PR work is represented as, and is perceived by the public as, being less truthful and less ethical (Callison, 2004; Callison, Merle and Seltzer, 2014; White and Park, 2010). Whether this reputation is deserved or not, there is a perception in journalism scholarship that the convergence of journalism and public relations is not in the public's best interest.

Scholarship suggests that journalism is being influenced by public relations practitioners in a range of ways. Much scholarship begins from the position that the collapse of the business model of journalism and increasing workloads and commercial pressure has resulted in newsrooms and journalists more willing to reach for PR material as pre-packaged news (Lewis, Williams and Franklin, 2008; Valentini, 2014). PR practitioners actively produce press releases designed using journalistic language, contact journalists, organise media conferences and make themselves readily available for interviews. In doing so they act as an

"information subsidy" (Lewis, Williams and Franklin, 2008, p. 2) that reduces the cost and effort required for journalists to produce output (Fortunato, 2000; Hecht, Martin, Donnelly, Larson and Sweetser, 2017; Lee and Lin, 2017). This has led to the criticism that in commercial newsrooms any structural increase in demand for journalistic output will result in an increased use of public relations material, thereby ceding journalistic independence to PR officers (Sherwood and Nicholson, 2017). Macnamara (2014; 2016) argues that a significant proportion of mass media content—between 50 and 75 per cent—is either provided or influenced by PR. Scholarship by Sallot and Johnston (2006) suggests that—despite how journalism scholars might view them—journalists themselves tended to perceive PR practitioners as generally positive or at the least a "necessary evil" (p. 154). As Macnamara (2014) details, journalists and PR practitioners are frequently in contact through the course of their work, and while they may have competing agendas generally approach such relationships pragmatically. This may or may not result in what either party regards as being ethical behaviour. Moloney (2007) argues that such pragmatism has resulted in many journalists allowing PR to 'colonise' journalism, and in doing so have allowed information subsidies to—in effect—become part of the journalistic routine. This scholarship argues that by choosing the path of least resistance journalists have become willing participants in the promotional and advocacy work of others.

The shortcoming of much of this scholarship is that it tends to treat PR and journalism as unnecessarily dichotomous. While it may be true, as Macnamara (2014) argues, that PR voices have become privileged in public discourse—this is arguably less a consequence of the perniciousness of PR and more a consequence of the failure of journalism to independently meet the demands of the 24 hour news cycle and find a balanced funding model. In other regards PR and journalism are complementary arts. Fisher (2016a) argues that the normative views of PR as *advocacy* and journalism as *informative* ignore the reality that both professions engage in informative and advocacy behaviours. Journalists support and advance civic or personal causes, particularly when they see them as aligned with the interests of readers and the community (Hess and Waller, 2014; Vine, 2017; Waisbord, 2010). Likewise,

as Macnamara (2014) suggests PR practitioners generally do not see their work as being incompatible with following an ethical framework and providing factual information to the public. Understanding the influence of PR on journalism as such requires a broader view of how both professions interact with the social and political context in which they work.

### 2.5e—Think Tanks and Lobbying

A factor that has changed in recent decades is that public relations practitioners are not the only actors offering information subsidies to journalists. The voices of think tanks and lobbyists are becoming increasingly prominent within news media discourses. Rashid (2013) suggests that journalists and members of think tanks are similarly oriented towards one another. Think tanks are generally research and public policy oriented non-government/not for profit organisations organised with a goal of publishing research, advocating for particular policy outcomes and influencing public debate (McNutt and Marchildon, 2009). As Anstead and Chadwick (2018) suggest, think tanks often tailor their research output to journalists by writing media briefs on particular subjects and by making themselves readily available to provide interviews or quotes. As Pautz (2013) states, well connected and resourced think tanks can come to dominate public discourse on certain issues by their sheer ubiquity as a source of news.

Think tanks are a particularly significant contributor to discourses relating to public policy including national security policy. As Drezner (2015) suggests, particularly following the September 11 attacks in 2001 defence and national security think tanks proliferated widely throughout the United States. Foreign policy and security related think tanks have also played a significant role in influencing government policy development in other European and Commonwealth nations (Pautz, 2010; Roberts, 2015; Woo, 2015), as well as in China and Japan (Abb and Koellner, 2015). The rise and significance of think tanks in Australia has been explored only minimally by researchers. Some case studies, such as research by Lupton and Hayes (2017), provides activity profiles of education policy think tanks working in Australia and the United Kingdom, however the scope of this study does not cover particular media and

news strategies employed by the organisations. More in-depth research by Fraussen and Halpin (2017) provides an overview of how 20 Australian think tanks contribute to strategic policy development and policy advice. The researchers interviewed members from think tanks based in Australia that undertook work in a range of fields and disciplines. Their findings suggest that few think tanks regarded a high degree of media exposure as being important to their work, instead members nominated maintaining a reputation for integrity and intellectual quality as their most important goal. Nevertheless, the authors point out that in a review of news media mentions of the think tanks, a handful of general policy organisations were mentioned frequently and prominently in newspaper reporting in the sample time period. As one case study by McKewon (2012) suggests, certain high profile think tanks such as the Institute of Public Affairs (IPA) appear to deliberately go out of their way to contribute as much to media coverage of certain political issues as they can. McKewon highlights that the IPA even go as far as to regularly write op-eds and columns for major Australian newspapers. Their analysis detailed how IPA writers and interviewees employed particular themes and narratives that preferenced the view that humans were not responsible for climate change. Further research by Smith and Marden (2008) suggests that the IPA and the Centre for Independent Studies (CIS) are offered a privileged position in public debate both by their access to news media as a source and their connections to politics and political parties. Cahill and Beder (2005) argue these think tanks are also advantaged by their connections to the business community. As McKewon (2012) states the IPA receives funding from the fossil fuel industry, tobacco companies, oil companies, the forestry industry and energy companies. So, while as Fraussen and Halpin (2017) suggest a significant number of think tanks are not primarily concerned with media attention there is a small minority for whom this is the exact opposite. Research within the Australian context suggests that well-financed, corporate and/or politically backed, think tanks can and do play a significant role in influencing media discourses.

A second category of expert that may appear in stories about policy issues are members of lobbying and interest groups. Lobbyists are distinct from think tank employees in

that they are generally employed directly by industry either as a spokesperson of a particular company or as part of a firm hired to represent their interests (Prosser and Denniss, 2015). As Jacobs (2015) suggests, some lobbying groups in Australia are large, well-resourced, supported financially by industries and staffed by influential, well connected and credible representatives. Furthermore, as Hogan, Murphy and Chari (2011) suggest, Australia has had a patchy history with lobbyist regulations and compared to similar Western countries Australia's system is relatively weak. Of particular concern is the practice of lobby groups employing legislators and bureaucrats who have only recently left decision-making positions that directly affect the commercial interests represented by the lobbyists.

The traditional conception of lobbying organisations is that they focus on "inside lobbying" (Hanegraaff, Beyers and De Bruycker, 2016, p. 569)—the practice of seeking out legislators or influential policy developers and directly talking with them to attempt to persuade them. It is a behind-the-scenes activity, rather than a public one (Tresch and Fischer, 2015). Increasingly however, lobbying firms have directed more resources towards public relations activities and efforts to influence journalistic reporting (Miller and Harkins, 2010). This relatively new form of lobbying can sometimes take the form of "grassroots lobbying" (Bergan, 2009, p. 329) aimed at shifting general public opinion on an issue to more sophisticated strategies designed to influence media coverage and mobilise public support and protest (Tresch and Fischer, 2015). The influence of lobbying on journalists remains a relatively under-researched despite the growth and proliferation of such practices. Think tanks and lobbying organisations do not share the same relationship with journalism as public relations. Where PR shares similar routines and practices, think tanks are normatively academic organisations with deliberate advocacy goals. Lobbying organisations are increasingly well-funded and oriented towards the media through outside lobbying and grassroots campaigns. However, they are distinct from other media sources in their desire to reduce their own media exposure. Despite this, there is limited scholarship exploring either their interactions with journalists or their impact on news media discourses.

## 2.6—Summary of Literature

In conclusion, this literature review has presented a range of scholarship explaining the factors that influence how journalists use discourse to discuss and report on significant issues and events. In particular, it has focused on two key branches of scholarship. First, how journalists interact with discourses of their own professional identity, democratic and political institutions as well as outside factors such as economic, technological and social changes. Second, it has addressed scholarship that considers how journalists relate to their sources, including politicians, corporations, vested interests, public relations practitioners, think tanks and lobbyists. As this review has argued, journalists draw from and are influenced by a significant and diverse range of social and political discourses. It has also detailed how each branch of scholarship has shortcomings and limitations that could be addressed by further research. This literature proposes that a holistic approach is necessary to explore journalistic texts/discourses within the broader social and political context.

Journalism scholarship has traditionally focused on journalism's normative function in a democratic political system. This approach argues that journalism mediates the political process (Chadwick and Stanyer, 2010; McNair, 2011) and that its primary function is to serve as a venue for the public to discuss matters of contention and develop public opinion (Glasser, Awad and Kim, 2009; Kovach and Rosenstiel, 2007). Normative journalism scholarship argues that journalism must live up to the principles of its profession derived from its history as a liberal institution. This provides a limited framework for conceiving journalism as an ideological process wherein journalists—through their discursive practices—draw from, transform and develop new discursive statements about reality and truth. It is also limited to fix the focal point of journalism studies to the binary of journalism and democracy within the context of emerging digital technologies, the networked fourth estate (Castells, 2012) and the contemporary hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2017). Journalism has changed fundamentally in recent decades as technology and society have changed. As an institution, traditional journalism also faces significant commercial and economic issues that may fundamentally

reshape it forever (Benson, 2018; Carlson, 2015). As such an approach to journalism studies should focus on the bigger picture of how journalism relates to the constellation of institutions and industries that are increasingly reliant on and interdependent on media (Hepp, 2016; Hjarvard, 2013). Mediatisation suggests a theoretical perspective that conceives how media influences society that moves beyond the traditional models.

Equally relevant to this study, however, is the dynamics of power and influence between journalists and their sources. Again, within this context technological and cultural changes have altered traditional journalism-source relationships. Where once sources were reliant on journalists to reach audiences, now there are many and varied ways to bypass journalism or opt-in/opt-out of the mainstream media as needed. In contrast, the decline in advertising revenue and increasing workloads have made journalists more reliant on elite sources, public relations and advocacy sources. There is, however, ongoing scholarly debate about what that reliance means for who controls the agenda, and how much that might influence public opinion formation. As this overview of literature shows, there is significant indexing, capture and agenda setting scholarship that suggests the impact on public opinion is—or should be—significant. However, as this literature has also discussed there are flaws in each of these approaches. The broader ideological question—of how and why elite discourses arise, how they are transformed by the discursive process, and how they influence discursive practices—remains unanswered. This thesis hopes to make a meaningful contribution to scholarship addressing this broader question.

# Chapter 3—Background: Defence, Naval Procurement and Reporting on the Military in Australia

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the historic, social and political contexts relevant to an investigation of national security discourses in Australia. While Chapter 2 appraised research literature about the study of journalism in a changing context, this Chapter addresses literature relating to historic reporting of war and procurement, the place of the military in Australian culture and society, and the ongoing role that defence and national security plays in Australian public discourse. Chapter 4 will outline the methodological approach for this research and provide a rationale for conducting a discursive analysis of newspaper texts.

This thesis explores Australian newspaper journalists and their reporting of the Attack Class submarine procurement programme. As such this background chapter will also provide additional context and literature relevant to: firstly, the Attack class submarine procurement project; and secondly, discourses relevant to the institutions, practices and professional fields that national security journalists report on. As Fairclough (1992) and Van Dijk (2008) suggest, a critical discourse analysis should broadly consider not only the texts that are being analysed but the social and political context those texts are produced in and contribute to. For this reason, this chapter provides a substantive overview of the context surrounding Australia's future submarine project and the factors that are likely present in the minds of those reporting on it. Taking a broadly critical approach, this chapter will engage with research and government documents that discuss Australia's military, its history and the way it goes about procuring vehicles such as submarines. It will briefly overview the context surrounding the announcement and initial political representation of the Attack Class submarines. It will also review research into the relationship between the military and the journalists who seek to ask questions and report on their activities. It will discuss the reputation of the Australian Defence Forces and ongoing discourses of military

commemoration and national identity. Finally, it will discuss government and military secrecy, and how the changing nature of Australia's national security, political and journalistic landscape are shaping discourses of media scrutiny and the public's right to know.

## 3.1—Background to the Procurement of the Attack Class Submarine

The Attack class procurement programme is the ongoing purchase of a fleet of 12 submarines by the Australian Defence Force, for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). Throughout the timeframe of this inquiry (September 2013 to April of 2016) this procurement process was referred to in news and political texts as the "future submarine project". It was not until 2018 that the decision was made to name the future fleet the "Attack class" submarine (Keane, 2018, December 13). In this thesis I will refer to the programme as the Attack class procurement programme. The RAN currently operates six Collins class submarines that were designed and constructed during the 1980s and 1990s. The story of the procurement of the Collins class submarines was outlined in Chapter 1. In the late 2000s the Rudd Government and the RAN regarded the Collins class as needing to be replaced and began work to procure a new fleet of submarines under the project name SEA 1000. Subsequently, in 2009 Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd announced the following: first, that the fleet of six Collins class submarines would be replaced with 12 new submarines; and second, the new submarines, like the Collins class, would be constructed in South Australia (Bisley and Envall, 2016). This set the stage for what would become a significant public debate that would often hinge on two significant questions: Why twelve, and why South Australia?

The Rudd government published a Defence White Paper in 2009 entitled *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030* (Department of Defence, 2009). The White Paper suggests that the ADF's primary focus in deterring and defeating attacks on Australia should be a "fundamentally maritime strategy" involving sea control over Australia's "northern maritime and littoral approaches" (p. 59). Submarines were therefore considered a logical choice. However, the 2009 White Paper provides limited justification for the key

questions raised above. It states that 12 boats represent a fleet size "large enough in a crisis or conflict […] to defend our approaches" and that the fleet would act to:

> Significantly increase the military planning challenges faced by any adversaries, and increase the size and capabilities of the force they would have to be prepared to commit to attack us directly, or coerce, intimidate or otherwise employ military power against us. (Department of Defence, 2009, p. 64)

While this justification answers the question of why a larger number of submarines is better, it does not answer the question of why twelve is enough. The White Paper provides no justification for why the submarines should be built in South Australia. This is not to say that either constructing the submarines in South Australia, or their final number being twelve, are not both the appropriate policy decisions. Rather the White Paper suggests that both decisions were decisions made prior to design considerations regarding the submarines' planned capabilities and the tasks they would be expected to perform. Despite the White Paper being the peak planning document for the ADF, these decisions were left poorly explained.

The third major point of political contention between the major political parties was timing. Despite the 2009 White Paper calling for work on the Attack class design and construction to begin "without delay" (p. 70), *delay* is exactly what happened. As Spong (2015) suggests, between 2009 and 2015 work on the procurement effectively stalled for political reasons. Spong argues that following the publicly embarrassing Collins class procurement "both sides of politics have become highly sensitised" to the potential for similar failures with SEA 1000 (p. 4). Additionally, Spong (2015) argues that the Australian shipbuilding industry and its economic viability remain largely unproven points of political contention. While SEA 1000 was under consideration, for example, the ongoing Air Warfare Destroyer procurement was experiencing significant cost overruns, schedule delays and management problems (Australian National Audit Office, 2014; Greene, 2015, May 9). As Greene suggests, the ASC—the government owned South Australia based shipbuilder most likely to take the contract—was underperforming, producing significant amounts of work with defects, and running over-budget and over-schedule. Spong further argues, this led to

broader political divergence over whether Australia should even consider domestic construction of the Attack class submarines at all. Ultimately, "vested interest groups and key stakeholders" were able to ensure frequent media scrutiny over the procurement project, which further contributed to delays in the project (Spong, 2015, p. 8). Overall, hesitancy regarding the domestic shipbuilding industry, fear of creating a second Collins embarrassment, media and interest group scrutiny, combined with the climate of political leadership instability, all contributed to delaying action on the Attack class submarine programme.

This inquiry is partly focused on the role that journalists played in applying scrutiny and contributing to public discourse around the Attack class submarine procurement project. While Spong (2015) suggests that media attention and scrutiny were contributing factors in the politicisation and delay of the procurement, he represents journalists as being mostly passive in this process. Spong argues that vested interests and stakeholders were able to work with the media to advance their views, and positions the media as simply one in a list of many stakeholders who contributed to public discourse on the Attack class procurement. This largely ignores the active role that journalists play in seeking out sources of information, engaging with events critically and attempting to set the agenda using their own discursive strategies and practices. There are many other scholars who suggest that media scrutiny and pressure play a significant role in influencing defence decision-making (Kelton, 2004; Livingston, 1997; Schank, Ip, Kamarck, Murphy, Arena, Lacroix and Lee, 2011; Yule and Woolner, 2008). However, like Spong, rarely do they highlight the news text as having an active role in this deliberation process or explore in depth how and in what way journalists contribute to and shape such scrutiny. This research seeks to address this shortcoming in the literature.

In the following sections, this chapter will explain in detail what factors within the social and political context might shape journalists' decisions about reporting on national security issues in Australia. These include factors such as potential sources of news in the national security enterprise, existing discourses of procurement, relations with government

and defence public affairs practitioners, and restrictions surrounding accessing and publishing confidential information.

## 3.2—The National Security Enterprise as a Source of News

### 3.2a—The Ministry as a Source of News

For many journalists a primary source of information on defence issues is the executive branch of government. More specifically the office of the minister in charge of defence policy; the Minister for Defence. In Australia's parliamentary democracy the Minister for Defence is a member of the government who is appointed by the Prime Minister to oversee all defence related issues. The Minister for Defence has responsibility over how the Department of Defence and the Australian Defence Forces engage with journalists. The control that ministers can wield in determining Defence-media relations is significant. As Ward (2003) discusses, during the "children overboard" crisis during the 2001 election then Defence Minister Peter Reith gave directions that all defence personnel were forbidden from engaging with the media. All inquiries were to bypass Defence Public Affairs and go directly to Reith's own press secretary Ross Hampton. In relation to Defence procurement projects, the Minister has oversight of what information is released to the public, and the public listing of "projects of concern" that fail to reach their performance targets (Stewart and Ablong, 2013). For journalists seeking information, much of the Defence Forces' engagement with the media is coordinated through the Minister's office, the Ministerial and Executive Coordination and Communication Team, Defence Public Affairs or Defence Social Media. Nicholson (2019) suggests that over time control of information about Defence has become increasingly centralised in the office of the Minister and their staff. The Australian military is regarded by many journalists as being particularly opaque, and difficult to engage with (Anderson and Trembath, 2011). As Nicholson (2019) argues, by consolidating control of media relations into the organisation's "strategic centre" the Defence bureaucracy has to a

certain degree been cut out of mainstream media discourses of important national security issues.

### 3.2b—The Australian Defence Organisation and the Royal Australian Navy

For journalists reporting on national security issues a second major source is the Australian Defence Organisation itself, which includes both the Department of Defence and the Australian Defence Force. The Australian military has a complicated relationship with journalists and the media. Defence has extensive public affairs resources, including Navy, Army and Airforce Public Affairs Officers who are all involved in a range of public relations activities at many levels in the command structure (Hibbert and Hannah, 2006). However, by their own admission, as Army Colonel Jason Logue (2010) states: "Military Public Affairs, for the most part, does not engage directly with the media" (p. 152), nor do they have the command authority or freedom to change that. Defence Public Affairs officers do not see engaging with journalists as a central part of their role, and effectively see little distinction between their Public Affairs functions and "supporting an operational commander in achieving effects within the Information Dominance and Influence Battlespace" (p. 153). In effect, as Colonel Logue suggests, Australia's Defence Public Affairs Officers are concerned first and foremost with achieving military operational and strategic goals, not—to the frustration of journalists—with facing public scrutiny and answering questions from reporters. This has sometimes resulted in contact between Australian journalists and the military that is characterised by silence, obfuscation and hostility (Anderson and Trembath, 2011; Foster, 2012; Foster and Pallant, 2013; Hibbert and Simmons, 2006; Hibbert and Starr, 2004). As Anderson and Trembath (2011) point out, journalists face significant difficulties reporting on ADF activities in conflict zones. These difficulties extend to their reporting of domestic issues, including procurement.

### 3.2c—Defence Materiel Organisation, Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group and Project Offices

A third possible avenue for sourcing news about national security and procurement would be those sub-divisions of Defence that are in charge of procurement, materiel and projects. Here again, journalists have previously become frustrated by a lack of public-facing accountability. As Yule and Woolner (2008) suggest in their analysis of the Collins class submarine procurement process, in the early days the Project Office did not consider it part of their role to engage with and inform journalists about their activities. It was only after years of media scrutiny, low workforce morale, and the leaking of information about delays, noise problems and technical issues, that the Project Office engaged a PR firm to work with the media. To further complicate matters, major procurements—for example the Air Warfare Destroyers—are often handled through complicated public-private joint contractual alliances and management structures that may not have either the time, resources or authority to engage with journalists. The office responsible for procurement issues in the ADF has also changed in recent years. Until June of 2015 procurement for the ADF was managed by the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO): a partially independent agency that was tasked with acting as the purchasing intermediary between Defence and defence industry companies. After its shuttering, DMO's responsibilities were moved back into the main hierarchy of Defence as the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG). Both iterations of the ADF's procurement sub-department are bound by strict confidentiality requirements relating to both national security and commercial in confidence secrets. According to CASG's Business Framework (Department of Defence, 2017) the organisation has no explicit responsibilities related to public affairs or engaging with journalists. In summary, defence procurement in Australia has distributed responsibilities across a wide range of organisations and individuals and as such are resistant to journalistic scrutiny.

### 3.2d—Private Defence Industry Corporations, Lobby Groups and Advocacy Organisations

Outside of Government, there are a range of companies, interest groups and lobbyists who work within the broader framework of defence industries. In contrast to the Defence Forces, defence industry organisations are often more than willing to engage with journalists. As Spong (2015) suggests, and as will be discursively analysed in Chapter 8 of this thesis, during the procurement process for the Attack class submarines industry lobbying groups, companies, their directly employed lobbyists and public relations practitioners were in frequent contact with journalists. In the case of the Attack class procurement this includes PR practitioners and lobbyists acting on behalf of the main bidders for the contract to design the submarines. Those companies were: Kawasaki Heavy Industries (and its joint bidder Mitsubishi Heavy Industries); *Direction des Constructions Navales Services* (DCNS) (now Naval Group); ThyssenKrupp Marine Services (TKMS); and Saab AB.

The ASC (formerly: Australian Submarine Corporation) also employed PR and lobbying professionals to act as sources for journalists, as did industry organisations, peak groups and lobbying organisations. Some examples of firms who provided lobbying and PR influence included: Ai Group; Australian Made Defence (Defence Teaming Centre); Submarine Institute of Australia; and the Australian Manufacturing Workers Union.

The South Australian Government also invested significant resources into lobbying for the submarines to be built in South Australia through the Defence SA Advisory Board and Defence SA. Overall, there are a significant number of vested interests and lobbying groups that are involved in discourses around national security and defence procurement. According to research by Halpin and Warhurst (2015), regulation of lobbying in Australia is relatively weak compared to other countries and has not adequately addressed concerns about corruption. As they suggest, many in-house lobbyists, lobbyists employed by not-for-profit organisations or third-party organisations, and lobbyists employed by industry groups, do not have to register as lobbyists. Tresch and Fisher (2015) state, the practice of "outside lobbying" (p. 356)—where lobbyists attempt to influence public opinion by providing commentary and

interviews to journalists—is relatively common. The lack of an adequate register of lobbyists in Australia also leaves journalists in the dark about where potential interviewees might be receiving remuneration.

### 3.2e—Defence Think Tanks and Research Organisations

As a further resource, journalists often seek out comment from independent or not-for profit think tanks that produce research and advocacy on defence and national security issues. Two of the more prominent include the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) and the Lowy Institute, however there are also several other organisations that produce research that influences discourse on this matter, including The Centre for Independent Studies, The Australia Institute and the Institute for Public Affairs. Hart and Vromen (2008) explain, think tanks in Australia can receive funding from a range of sources including donations, corporate subscriptions, university funding or government grants. In Australia think tanks are not required to disclose where their funding comes from, and reporting of voluntary declaration of income can be patchy and inconsistent (Hart and Vromen). In some cases, funding is distributed across a range of sources. The ASPI for example—which was established by an act of parliament and receives funding from the Department of Defence—also receives funding from corporate donors, members and privately commissioned work. Lingard (2016) contends that think tanks in Australia have recently come to play a more significant role in media discourses of public policy—particularly as they adopt strategies that centre on applying political pressure through public advocacy and media coverage. For journalists it is not always clear whether a think tank has commercial, political or advocacy motivations underlying its research.

## 3.3—Historic Discourses of War, Anzac and National Identity

Journalists writing on contemporary national security issues must also contend with deeply established public perceptions of Australia's military, war and the history of conflict reportage. The Australian soldier is regarded by many as an iconic hero and symbol of

nationhood (Simpson, 2010). Throughout the twentieth century, Australian soldiers participated in almost all major armed conflicts. In the 20th Century Australia contributed troops to fight in World Wars I and II, the Malayan Emergency, the Korean War, the Vietnam War and the first Gulf War. Alongside them, in each case, went Australian journalists and war correspondents. Past wars, as interpreted through the lens of Australian journalism, have shaped public perceptions of the modern Australian military and its purpose. As Donoghue and Tranter (2015) suggest, many Australian's still look to idealised myths of service during war time as not only an important organising narrative for understanding the role of the military but also for understanding contemporary Australian national identity. The history of "Australia at war" from both official and journalistic sources has formed the narratives and genres that contemporary journalists draw upon when producing texts that deal with current defence and military policies. In a sense, contemporary journalism cannot talk about the Australian military without referencing, at the very least indirectly, existing discourses of Australia's past wars.

War reporting shapes themes, narratives and ideas from which journalists can draw when reporting on defence and national security issues. Even wars that are relatively distant geographically—as some of Australia's have been—loom large in the national imagination. As Hilvert (1984) contends, war represents a time of "national crisis", and "when a nation goes to war, a formerly diverse society must become a co-ordinated fighting machine" which has a focusing effect on journalists, audiences and the public at large (p. 1). The historic pull of war on the public consciousness helps to explain how certain narratives of war have come to dominate Australia's military commemoration. As Williams (1999) has noted, the Anzac myth became central to post-war nationalism in Australia in the early 20th century. In public discourse The Gallipoli Campaign constituted Australia in two distinct ways. Australian soldiers were represented by news media as stoic, rugged, self-sacrificing and set apart from soldiers of other nationalities by their larrikin sensibilities and egalitarian disregard for authority (Williams, 1999; Ubayasiri, 2015). The construction of this image was due, in no small part, to the efforts of official war correspondents such as C. E. W. Bean, but also to the

writings of a relatively compliant press corps working throughout WWI. According to Williams (1999) many of the war reporters were aware of, and at times struggled with, the extent to which they obscured the truth of the conflict. The other common reading of the Anzac myth is as a constitutive event. The shedding of young lives marked the nation's separation from Britain, loss of innocence and coming of age: the "birth of the nation" (Donoghue and Tranter, 2015, p. 460). The image of Anzac as both an idealised version of military masculinity and Australianness, and the invasion of Gallipoli as an event that gave birth to the nation, is deeply rooted in discourses of military service and commemoration in Australia (Marti, 2018; Riseman, 2017; Williams, 1999). The image of the Anzac soldier came to be represented as something of a talisman for future generations of soldiers, particularly those departing for service during World War II (Foster, 2016). Discourses such as these serve to reinforce notions of respect and honour towards those individuals who undertake military service. However, as Riseman (2017) points out, challenging entrenched views about Anzac can be difficult.

For journalists writing about contemporary national security and defence issues, the myth of Anzac is impossible to outrun. As Williams (1999) argues the Australian media have been complicit not only in the formation of the myth—and other idealised representations of war and Australian war efforts—but also its continued propagation throughout the 20th century. Ubayasiri (2015) contends, that contemporary reporting of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars used the Anzac myth and the trope of the heroic digger to shield the reputation of soldiers—and the military—from the broader political controversy that surrounded those interventions. According to research by the Grattan Institute think tank, today the armed forces are regarded as the most trustworthy institution in Australia, and conversely the press is regarded as one of the least trustworthy (Wood and Daley, 2018). Anzac and the Australian soldier are idealised as not only historic—but contemporary—heroes. The yearly commemoration of military service in Australia—centring on Anzac Day and Remembrance Day—has grown in focus over the past decade. As Waterton and Dittmer (2016) argue, Australia's military heritage has essentially become "*the* national heritage concern" (p. 59) at

the exclusion of perhaps other more outward looking and transnational conceptualisations of heritage.

For journalists writing or commenting about the military in Australia—and particularly within the context of military heritage—the Anzac myth can be dangerous to question. Notably, in 2015 journalist Scott McIntyre was sacked from his reporting position at SBS after a public controversy arose following tweets McIntyre published during Anzac Day commemorations. McIntyre had sought to draw attention to less celebrated historic events such as the "rape and theft committed by these 'brave' Anzacs in Egypt, Palestine and Japan" (Visentin, 2016, April 11). Similarly, part-time ABC presenter Yassmin Abdel-Magied faced widespread public condemnation over a comment made on her Facebook account critical of war memorialisation: "Lest. We. Forget. (Manus, Nauru, Syria, Palestine…)" (Grattan, 2017, April 26). Subsequently, Abdel-Magied's contract with the ABC was not renewed. In both cases politicians and commentators were quick to declare the comments by these journalists as "un-Australian". In the case of Abdel-Magied, *The Daily Telegraph* declared her comments to be an "insult to [the] Anzac legend." The military in Australia is a trusted institution, and the commemoration of Australia's military history is a significant part of Australian culture. As a consequence, reporters tread carefully.

## 3.4—Historic Discourses of Defence Procurement

Contemporary journalists writing about defence issues are aware of and draw from historic representations of defence issues and major procurements. Domestic construction of military hardware is a relatively recent innovation in Australia. Historically, the defence forces have had to rely on imported military hardware from foreign suppliers. Over the years some acquisitions have attracted significant news media attention and political controversy. This was the case in 1963 when the Menzies government announced that Australia would purchase F-111 fighter/bombers from the United States. As Weisbrod (1969) indicated at the time, the decision became the subject of continuous public criticism for a number of reasons, including that the F-111 only existed on paper, that the decision was unduly political, and that the

government should have followed its loyalties and gone with the British TSR-2 fighters instead. Prior to the decision there was significant media pressure around the issue of aircraft procurement, particularly from *The Sydney Morning Herald.* The newspaper's defence correspondent, Guy Harriot, wrote in October 1962 that Indonesian operated Soviet-bombers had the range to destroy "any city in Australia" (Weisbrod, 1969, p. 8). Throughout the 60s and 70s the Labor party, along with a number of journalists, continued to insist that the decision to buy the fighters was made for political reasons (Lax, 2010). This partly stemmed from allegations of suspect timing, because Menzies announced the high-profile acquisition only a few short weeks after calling the 1963 federal election.

Privately, then opposition leader Gough Whitlam was something of a supporter of the F-111s and believed them to be suitable for service in the RAAF (Lax, 2010). However, Lax suggests, Whitlam saw the political value in publicly campaigning against them as an election issue. In 1969 Whitlam told reporters from *The Canberra Times* that if elected he would dump plans for the RAAF to operate F-111s, and "would try to trade it in for something more suitable" (Labor would try to trade F-111, 1969, October 15, para. 9). The press had been generally hostile to the F-111s for years and Whitlam was taking advantage of the widely held perception that Australia had wasted its money on planes that only existed on paper (Lax, 2010). Despite the aircraft being ordered in 1963, a long development cycle meant that the first of Australia's F-111s were still not in service in the lead-up to the 1972 election. According to Lax, news media pilloried the planes as a waste of time and money. Even once they were finally put into service in 1973, the Airforce was so concerned that a crash would inflame the controversy further, that they put the aircraft on restricted duties. However, the public debate over the F-111 would be eclipsed by the storm of political and journalistic attention devoted to perhaps the military's most infamous procurement.

As discussed in Chapter 1, the Collins class submarine procurement resulted in a considerable media scandal for the Australian Government and the Navy. As Yule and Woolner (2008) state: to this day "the general public perception of the Collins class submarines is that they have been an enormously expensive disaster" (p. 221). Yule and

Woolner extensively researched the procurement process for the Collins class submarines from the earliest decisions made in the 1980s to replace the UK built Oberon class fleet that served the Navy through most of the Cold War. They argue that the generally negative view of the Collins is "the result of a barrage of bad publicity" (p. 221) directed at them, mainly through news media and journalists, particularly from 1998 onwards. Those who were working on the submarines—at the ASC, in the Navy and in government—were acutely aware of the media discourse unfolding around them, particularly of charges that the submarines were "dud subs" or that they were "as noisy as a rock concert" (McPhedran, 1998, October 8). As Yule and Woolner suggest, this did not foster a constructive and collegiate work atmosphere between the key stakeholders:

> For the crews of the submarines and the staff of ASC and the project office the impact of the ceaseless disparagement was demoralising; for the navy hierarchy it was a daily reminder that their largest project was under threat, but for the politicians it suggested that there were political points to be won or lost (p. 265).

The story of the Collins class submarine is a case study in how media criticism of a high-profile defence procurement project can influence policy options and decision-making.

News media scrutiny shaped the Collins project in a number of key ways. For example, as Yule and Woolner (2008) point out, exporting Australian-built submarines to foreign buyers could have made the project more viable. Canada and New Zealand were considered likely buyers as Canada was considering replacing its own Oberon class submarines at the time, and New Zealand had close ties to Australia and no industrial capacity to build submarines on its own. Exporting Collins' would have had precedent, because at around the same time in 1989 New Zealand had agreed to purchase two Anzac class guided missile frigates to be constructed at Williamstown, Victoria under a 'Collinsesque' partnership between AMECON, Saab and the Commonwealth Government (Mo, Zhou, Anticev, Nemes, Jones and Hall, 2006). Yule and Woolner (2008) contend that any possibility of exporting the Collins ended when "a storm of media criticism made them virtually unsaleable," (p. 204). In addition to closing off the option of exporting finished submarines, media scrutiny put

pressure on political decision making within government and the Navy. This led to ill-advised decisions made with optics in mind rather than more substantive outcomes (Yule and Woolner, 2008).

HMAS *Collins* was launched in August of 1993 in front of a crowd of 4500 people, however at that time the boat wasn't complete. Yule and Woolner point out that key sections of piping had not been finished and that "some of the 'steel plates' were just timber painted black" (p. 193). The launch was stagecraft, designed to give the impression that the construction was going as planned while behind the scenes key stakeholders were at loggerheads and progress on dealing with fabrication issues was stalling. During sea trials *Collins* propulsion system cut out as it was approaching the ASC wharf causing the boat to crash into a ship lift, significantly damaging its sonar dome. Despite damage being clearly visible to photographers across the river, ASC and the project team publicly denied anything had happened. According to Yule and Woolner "this naturally made the media unwilling to accept that ASC and the project office were telling the truth when they denied later stories" (p. 214). By 2000 there was growing recognition that the barrage of poor media was taking its toll. Yule and Woolner suggest, one significant issue was that morale had collapsed for the ASC workforce due to a growing sense of unease that the project would be scrapped and people would lose their jobs. Part of the effort to save the Collins project was to finally hire a public relations firm, the Philips Group, to formulate a plan to acknowledge faults and establish credibility with the media.

The troubled Collins class procurement remains one of the main narratives that Australian journalists draw from when discussing defence procurement. Spong (2015) suggests, the Collins saga looms particularly large for the Attack class submarine programme. As he argues, fear of creating another Collins is likely one of the key reasons that successive governments prevaricated for almost four years before beginning preliminary design and contracting work. As for journalists, the narratives of "dud subs" and "noisy as a rock concert" still ring in the ears whenever there is mention of procuring new submarines.

## 3.5—Discourses of Secrecy and Public Scrutiny

Secrecy is a central theme in discussions of military procurement and national security issues. Contemporary journalists cannot write about defence matters without drawing from ongoing discourses relating to the balance between secrecy and scrutiny. Keeping secrets has always been a necessary aspect of defending a nation, but as Weitzel (2004) suggests the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Virginia changed the nature of this secrecy in Western countries. Rodden (2016) argues, America's—and by extension the West's—reaction to the 'war on terrorism' was in many ways an extension of the secrecy and paranoia of the Cold War era. However, rather than facing off against a conventionally armed nation state (the USSR), and an organised economic and political ideology (communism), the enemy was digitally connected, omnipresent and wore no uniform or colours. Earl (2009) argues, the war on terrorism became a ready justification for an ever-encroaching veil of secrecy to protect against an invisible enemy, who could in theory strike anywhere at any time. Since September 11, 2001, Lidberg and Muller (2019) state "Australia has passed more than 70 pieces of legislation under the rubric of national security" (p.1).

The Howard Government (1996-2007) was quick to pass a raft of national security legislation through parliament covering new terrorism laws, changes to the criminal code, extensions to telecommunications intercepts laws, and changes to the ASIO act that significantly increased ministerial powers over information and secrecy (Larkin and Uhr, 2009). As Larkin and Uhr suggest, while there was parliamentary scrutiny of the bills, support for new legislation was broadly bipartisan and the Howard government intended to pass the new laws quickly. Since the passage of these initial anti-terror laws successive governments have passed legislation significantly increasing the degree of surveillance of private citizens in Australia (De Zwart, Humphreys and Van Dissel, 2014; Humphreys and De Zwart, 2017; Lidberg and Muller, 2018). Press freedoms in Australia have also been limited through the use of blanket suppression orders, political and bureaucratic intimidation, threats of fines and jail

time and targeted surveillance of individual journalists (Pearson and Fernandez, 2015). Expanded secrecy laws also protect much of Australia's national security enterprise from media scrutiny—even in cases of misconduct (McCulloch and Tham, 2015). The passage of these laws, and the general shift to a heightened level of government opacity, are having a profound effect on journalists in Australia (Lidberg and Muller, 2018).

For journalists working in Australia the increasing surveillance and security powers of the government have unique implications. As Pearson and Fernandez (2015) suggest, media freedoms in Australia have come under threat by various means. They argue that post-2001 anti-terrorism laws have been broadened to suppress reporting particularly on legal proceedings and national security issues, and that this has been used by the government for political effect. They further argue that changes to data-retention and telecommunication laws have undermined journalists' abilities to keep their sources confidential, which will likely have a chilling effect on potential whistleblowers and confidential informants. Humphreys and De Zwart (2017) argue, the introduction of laws covering the interception of private citizens' metadata and the warrantless access to such data is particularly constraining for journalism. New laws have also increased jail time and penalties for whistleblowers as well as extending constraints to professionals such as doctors and counsellors working in offshore detention centres. Laws introduced in Australia also "offer the narrowest of protections and essentially criminalise most whistleblower actions, whether they prove to be in the public interest or not," (p. 104). Much the same can be said about journalist shield laws—or rather Australia's lack thereof—that protect journalists from being compelled by police or courts from revealing the identity of their sources, or protect journalists themselves from legal consequences including jail time for publishing information considered relevant to national security (Fernandez, 2017; Humphreys and De Zwart; 2017, Lidberg and Muller, 2018; MEAA, 2019a). Journalists working in the national security space often depend on confidential informants to pass on information that is arguably in the public's interest to know.

When faced with increasing secrecy journalists often draw from established narratives of watchdog journalism as an important organising principle for the profession. As

Harwood (2017) suggests, Western liberal democracies are often organised around principles of individual privacy, public scrutiny of government and a balance between competing needs for transparency and security. For many journalists there is a strong professional ideology that suggests the role of a journalist is to resist secrecy and always apply public scrutiny on behalf of the public's "right to know" (Deuze, 2005; Hillebrand, 2012; Kalogeropoulos, Svensson, Van Dalen, De Vreese and Albæk, 2015). As authors such as Dreyfus, Lederman, Bosua and Milton (2011) suggest, the impetus for watchdog journalism springs from the belief that existing checks and balances—statutory oversight, the democratic process and the separation of powers—are not enough to guarantee honest government. However, there is always the question of how far should the public's right to know extend? Radio personality Derryn Hinch's decision to name and shame a former priest accused of child sex offences before their trial—and Hinch's subsequent goaling for contempt of court—remains a divisive example of how journalists can disagree about what exactly the public has a right to know about (Given, 2014). In the national security context politicians are quick to point out that the reporting of leaked or classified information could result in damage to national security, operational secrecy and risk to the lives of soldiers and intelligence officers stationed abroad (Hindman and Thomas, 2014; Harwood, 2017). Journalists writing and publishing material relating to national security—even in the context of procurement—are necessarily aware of these and other ongoing discourses of secrecy.

## 3.6—Discourses of Leaks and Anonymous Disclosure

In a networked society, journalists are increasingly aware that the next big story may not come from a traditional source relationship. In recent years Julian Assange, Edward Snowden, Chelsea Manning and other unnamed sources, have been responsible for the disclosure of an unprecedented quantity of classified government and corporate documents. The advent of "megaleaks" (Woodall, 2018, p. 1) such as the Panama Papers represent a new context in which journalists interface with whistleblowers and confidential information (Woodall, 2018). In the past, as Hindman and Thomas (2014) suggest, major leaks such as

The Pentagon Papers in 1971 were carefully orchestrated through a limited number of journalists. The normative standard, as the authors note, was for journalists to employ moral and ethical judgements to carefully decide what information was released in the public interest and what remained secret. WikiLeaks effectively imploded this model in 2011 with its release of hundreds of thousands of confidential US diplomatic communications—dubbed Cablegate—with little scrutiny of their contents. As Lynch (2010) suggests, the sheer quantity of files provided to WikiLeaks meant that they were unable to read, review and redact them of sensitive information. WikiLeaks was therefore dependent on global news organisations to review the cables for them. However, in 2011, as WikiLeaks activists became increasingly frustrated with the slow pace of information being released, the entire cache of unredacted documents was released anonymously onto the internet. This resulted in widespread—and sometimes vehement—condemnation from politicians, news organisations and journalists (Hindman and Thomas, 2014). The backlash from Cablegate would cause later leakers to be more cautious in the way they released their information and to whom. Edward Snowden—for example—made a conscious decision to only release his cache of stolen NSA documents to a handful of trusted journalists from *The Guardian* and *The Washington Post* (Bell, Owen, Khorana and Henrichsen, 2017). Furthermore, when the Panama Papers were leaked anonymously to the German newspaper *Süddeutsche Zeitung,* the paper worked with the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists to carefully and collaboratively manage the reporting (Woodall, 2018). As Woodall argues, the advent of megaleaks has "encouraged a culture of collaborative work that favour[s] independence from official sources" (p. 1191) in journalism. It remains to be seen, however, if this new ethos becomes part of the canon of journalistic norms.

For journalists in Australia, WikiLeaks, Snowden and other megaleaks prompt an ongoing discussion about the role of journalism in managing confidential information and the public's right to know. As the above literature suggests, while the leaking of secret government documents has become more significant in recent years—at least in terms of the scale of the leaks—journalism continues to grapple with the role the profession should play in managing

leaks. It connects with another significant and more long-standing journalistic convention that is also under question: the use of anonymous sources. As Duffy (2014) suggests, the use of anonymous sources—whether the information the pass on is classified or not—has long been a point of contention among journalists. Carlson (2011) says the use of anonymous sources has been controversial for a number of reasons. Firstly, in releasing confidential information, sources may have ulterior motives—ones not apparent or disclosed to either the journalist or the reader. Second, the credibility and authority of anonymous sources cannot be verified, and so the public cannot always trust what is revealed. Third, overuse of anonymous sources has been suggested to lead to a decline in trust in news outlets (Purvis, 2015). Fourth, there have been a number of high-profile cases where anonymous sources were later revealed to have significant conflicts of interest, or in some circumstances a complete fabrication of the journalist. However, despite the controversial nature of the practice, the use of anonymous sources remains widespread. According to Carson (2011) and Kimball (2011), in traditional news organisations complex rules, ethical principles and practices are often placed around the use of anonymous sources to limit liability. And of course, as Fernandez (2015) reminds us, protecting your sources remains one of the most enduring principles of journalism in Australia and is enshrined in the Australian journalists' code of ethics (MEAA, 2019b). However, it is unclear whether the kinds of checks and balances suggested by Carson and Kimball (2011) will survive in a world of shrinking newsrooms and shortening deadlines.

For journalists in Australia reporting on national security and defence issues, the question of anonymous sources is a particularly vexing one. As outlined in this chapter, the introduction of successive security and surveillance laws has made it more difficult for journalists to contact confidential informants without risking their identity being revealed to authorities (Fernandez, 2015; Humphreys and De Zwart, 2017). Almost any information related to military procurement in Australia is regarded as information that is highly classified and related to national security. Information about submarines is considered particularly important. The effectiveness of submarines in a military or espionage capacity depends significantly on their ability to remain undetected (Cocking, Davis and Norwood, 2016;

Stewart, 2016). Leaked design information could effectively render them useless by providing other nations or third-parties information to help reverse engineer a means of tracking and uncovering the submarines' locations. Penalties for leaking classified national security secrets in Australia—even if it can be proved to be in the public's interest—are significant. As Ferguson (2019, February 27) points out, a recent whistleblower who leaked information on what they viewed as unethical conduct within the Australian Taxation Office faced a maximum sentence of 161 years imprisonment. It follows that confidential informants within the national security enterprise in Australia would also be exercising extreme caution. At the same time, the inherent secrecy of Defence and its resistance to media scrutiny means leaks are sometimes the only way journalists can report on what is actually going on.

## 3.7—Summary of Background Research

This chapter has provided an overview of context and discourses that relate to the subject of this inquiry; the Attack class submarine procurement. Drawing on the principles of Critical Discourse Analysis elaborated by Fairclough (1992) and Van Dijk (2008), this chapter has provided an overview of the social and political context in which journalistic discourses of military procurement in Australia take place. It shows that when journalists write and explore topics they necessarily draw from and contribute to broader discourses, and in doing so, they participate in broader movements of social change or conservation.

From the outset, the announcement of the future submarine fleet by the Rudd Government in 2009 set up significant points of contention. Prior to any consideration of design, cost or function, the submarines were announced to be twelve in number and to be constructed in South Australia. This initial framing of the project was poorly communicated and justified in the 2009 and 2013 Defence White Papers. In the lead up to the 2013 election the Shadow Defence Minister, David Johnston, committed an incoming Coalition Government to building twelve submarines in Adelaide (Garcia and Scopelianos, 2016, August 26). As all of these decisions were made prior to a design partner for the submarines being selected, it is therefore probable that these early decisions were fundamentally political.

Additionally, as Spong (2015) suggests, for largely political reasons the decision to begin the design and construction phase of the submarine project was significantly delayed. This placed pressure on any future government to act quickly with regard to beginning work.

However, a range of significant institutional, historical and professional discourses continued alongside the evolution of the submarine procurement project. Defence, the military and more broadly the national security enterprise in Australia is a complicated and sophisticated institution that is resistant to media scrutiny. Control over what information is provided to journalists about ongoing projects—including procurement—is generally restricted to the Ministry and comes in the form of media releases. As the literature also suggests, Defence Public Affairs officials are generally resistant to scrutiny, and Defence as a whole is distrusting of and at times hostile to journalists seeking to report on their activities. This represents a significant ongoing discourse within the national security establishment that contests journalists' rights to question the military and its activities.

In contrast, public discourses of the military are of an institution that is both trusted and heroic. As research above has suggested, the myth of Anzac, Australia's wartime history and military commemoration continue to inform national identity and modern reporting of Defence and its activities. As Ubayasiri (2015) suggests, the contemporary military in Australia is cloaked and protected in part by the persistence of—and national fixation on—discourses of heroism. To talk about procurement and submarines necessitates drawing from such discourses particularly with reference to the sailors that will eventually serve as crew.

Discourses of procurement in Australia—particularly submarines—have been and continue to be significantly politicised. As the procurement of the Collins class submarine and the F-111 Fighter aircraft suggest, acquisition projects have long attracted significant political and media attention. The Collins class procurement in particular represents an excellent case study of how media scrutiny indirectly and directly leads to changes in Defence and Government decision-making on major projects. Furthermore, the reputation of the Collins as a costly and embarrassing failure looms particularly large over the purchasing of future submarines and the decisions made surrounding them.

Finally—but no less significantly—this reporting focuses on the activities of a highly secretive and restrictive institution in a period where secrecy is increasing, and the capacity for journalistic organisations to apply public scrutiny is in some ways diminishing. Journalists who write about Defence and national security issues do so understanding the impact that tightening surveillance and security laws have on their ability to function as a democratic watchdog. The post 9/11 'war on terrorism' continues to act as a rallying point for governments and their attempts to control information and target whistleblowers. Some solace can perhaps be drawn from the changing nature of leaks and anonymous disclosures. As Australia enters the era of the megaleak, journalists must be aware of new potential avenues for gathering secret information and revealing information that is in the public interest. These include collaborating with other journalists and protected confidential informants to break new stories.

It is in this rich context that reporting of the Attack class submarines takes place, as journalists draw from and contribute to this range of interrelated discourses. While this chapter has provided only a snapshot of the disparate array of relevant discourses, it has demonstrated there is far more to consider in an analysis of journalism than simply the words on the page or the discursive practices used to produce them. In this sense, this chapter demonstrates the appropriateness of a critical discourse analysis approach to understanding this subject.

# Chapter 4—Methodology: Critical Discursive Analysis and Approaches to Journalism

This chapter provides an overview of the methodological approach used for the research project on which this thesis is based. Building on the thesis' introduction, it provides details of the theoretical underpinnings of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), including some of its history and initial applications. CDA is a widely used approach for analysing texts—including journalistic texts—and aims primarily to establish the links between the discursive features of texts and the ways in which social relationships and realities are constructed. As a critical approach to discursive research it begins from the premise that language is ideological; that it structures the relationships between individuals and institutions in society; and that it mediates social change (Fairclough, 1992). As Fairclough (1992) defines them, ideologies are "significations/constructions of reality (the physical world, social relations, social identity)" that through discursive practices "contribute to the production, reproduction and transformation of relationships of domination" (p. 87). CDA as a theory therefore argues that language (and in particular discourse) is central to understanding power and social change.

The previous chapters addressed the conceptual approach for this research including a discussion of the role of journalism in society as well as theories of journalism as a subject of academic inquiry. This included an overview of theories of journalism and its role in democracies; the normative functions of journalism; journalist source relationships; media capture; and journalism's increasing reliance on experts, public relations practitioners and other information subsidies. Preceding chapters also discussed the field of study—military procurement in Australia—and how this relates to other areas of inquiry such as military history, war journalism and national identity studies. This chapter will discuss how news reporting of the Attack class submarine procurement can be conceptualised as a collection of discourses through which journalists and commentators establish and conduct a public debate about national security policy. Furthermore, this chapter will establish how CDA can provide

a more complete and appropriate understanding of the news reporting of the Attack class submarine procurement, one that places central emphasis on power, influence and the role of news discourses in challenging or advancing social and political change.

Discourse in its simplest terms is an exchange of ideas using spoken or written language—however the analysis of discourse also focuses on the interactional nature of such an exchange. However, according to Fairclough (1992), the characteristics of discourse producers and audiences—as well as the social and political context in which the exchange is taking place—are just as significant factors in understanding a discourse as the linguistic features that describe it. CDA has its roots in the broader field of linguistic discourse studies, in particular Halliday's (1978; 1985) functional linguistics and critical semiotics (Bakhtin, 2001; Hall, 1985).

This chapter will begin with a discussion of the meaning of "discourse" and provide some details of CDA's theoretical background and ontological underpinnings. Next it will outline Critical Discursive Analysis as an established approach to qualitative research. Finally, it will provide some examples of CDA as it has been used to analyse news media texts.

## 4.1—Theories of Discourse

Discourse is sometimes interpreted as simply being a conversation or text and speech between two people (Fairclough, 1992). A dictionary definition might include that discourse often relates to debate, or speech or text produced in a field of which the author is an expert. Theories of discourse analysis, however, tend to place special emphasis on the role of discourse in the construction of social meaning and the establishment of social relationships. The classical scholar Isocrates (2001) argued that the art of discourse was what allowed humans to "escape the life of wild beasts" (p. 75) and for Greek civilisation to flourish. Isocrates stated that above all the strengths of humanity it was ultimately "the power to persuade each other and to make clear to each other whatever we desire" (p. 75) that made cities, law and arts possible. As Isocrates (2001) argued:

> Generally speaking, there is no institution devised by man which the power of speech has not helped us to establish. (p. 75)

Fairclough (1992) suggests defining "discourse" is not easy in part because it has often been used throughout history by academics and philosophers in overlapping and contradictory ways. The English word has roots in the Latin *discursus* meaning "a run about", "a running to and fro", "bustling" or "a foray" (Gepp and Haigh, 1914, p. 151). The ancient Greeks had no word that directly corresponds with the term discourse but Plato and Aristotle, among others, made clear the significance of speech, oratory, debate and spoken dialectic to early Greek law, philosophy and science (Bizzell and Herzberg, 2001). As Ostrowska (2014) notes, the Latin *discursus* implies something beyond simply speech, dialogue, conversation or two-way communication, instead there is a "controversial" or "polemic" nature inherent in *discursus.* Furthermore, as an adjective—*discursive*—it means "comprehensive, logical, reflexive" and based on premises and arguments (p. 95). As these definitions suggest, the ordinary meaning of discourse does not adequately describe its social and political dimensions—which are the focal points of this research.

*4.1a—A Definition of Discourse*

For the purposes of this inquiry discourse shall be defined by the meaning imparted to it by Michel Foucault. Foucault (2001) discusses discourse largely in terms of how—through its linguistic and rhetorical features—it structures, challenges and reproduces the social order. It is this feature of discourse that is the focus of this inquiry. Foucault suggests in *The Order of Discourse* that "in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised, and redistributed by a certain number of procedures" (p. 1461) that have an essential role in shaping and controlling its power. Some of these "procedures" are cultural or social; norms of what is and is not acceptable. In other instances, they derive their power from authority; what is legally (or punishably) acceptable and unacceptable. Among these procedures, Foucault suggests, is *exclusion*. The 'rules' of acceptable discourse frequently shape power structures in society by selecting *who* can speak, *when,* in what *context*, the *nature* of what they can speak on, and to *whom* they can speak. Foucault summarises this

process as a form of prohibition. Certain subjects are discursively established as taboo or forbidden and in doing so the limits of acceptable debate and discussion are set. As such, Foucault (2001) argues, discourse is "not simply that which translates struggles or systems of domination, but is the thing for which and by which there is struggle" (p. 1461). Competition to control what is included or excluded as a subject of public debate is central to the process of social change. But as Foucault (2001) suggests, left unchallenged the privilege to define the terms of acceptable debate remain the exclusive rights of the powerful.

Foucault (2001) further argues that discourse is structured by norms that divide society into groups. He frames this in terms of the "opposition between reason and madness" (p. 1461). Discourse is structured by a process of division and rejection, separating those who are permitted to speak or write—those with reason—from those deemed irrational or invalid. Foucault uses the example of "the madman", whose words are "considered null and void, having neither truth nor importance" (p. 1461). He argues that the words of the madman—prior to the invention of 18th century psychiatry—"strictly, did not exist" (p. 1461) as they were neither listened to, recorded or afforded any attention by society at large. Division changes as society changes, with new divisional structures establishing themselves as older ones subside. Today those with psychological illness are not regarded as madmen and alienated from society; but Foucault argues that this structure lives on in the division between *doctor*—who knows best—and *patient*—whose words are regarded as less important. As Foucault (2001) states, "division, far from being effaced, is working differently along other lines, through new institutions, and with effects that are not at all the same" (p. 1462). Historic social and cultural divisions continue as new incarnations of their older forms, and in doing so perpetuate relationships of dominance and control that extend to speech. Social divisions define discursive relationships, separate the heeded from the ignored and in doing so limit the scope and content of public debate and discussion.

Finally, Foucault (2001) details how discourse is structured by normative assumptions of truth and reality: what he refers to as "the will to truth" (p. 1463). Here Foucault argues that perceptions of what is true are influenced by social and cultural processes

that privilege some forms of knowledge and pedagogies over others. Foucault suggests that the discursive construction of social truth is particularly rooted—for historic reasons—in institutions. He states, "it is both reinforced and renewed by a whole strata of practices […] and the system of books, publishing, libraries; learned societies in the past and laboratories now" (p. 1462). Foucault argues that professional, academic and educational institutions are as much a part of social structures of power and domination as governments. In deciding what forms of knowledge and inquiry become accepted as orthodoxy institutions play a role in forming the boundaries of acceptable discourse. Institutions privilege certain ways of knowing and certain *truths* over others; and in doing so set the limits of what constitutes acceptable facts, evidence and argumentation in a public exchange of ideas. But as Foucault (2001) argues, "'true' discourse, freed from desire and power by the necessity of its form, cannot recognise the will to truth which pervades it" (p. 1463). In other words, the social and political construction of truth as a concept obscures the very selective process by which it is established.

Discourse then is not simply the text or speech that represents an exchange of ideas between people but also the associated structure of rules and procedures that influences it. Foucault describes these as "procedures which function rather as principles of classification, of ordering, of distribution" (Foucault, 2001, p. 1464). Foucault's definition of discourse and his description of its interlinked relationships with social, cultural and institutional influences constitute significant contributions to the academic understanding of language and ideology. However, as Fairclough (1992) notes, while Foucault charted the theoretical outlines of the order of discourses, he did not approach discourse as a subject of systematic analysis. He states, "Foucault's analysis of discourse does not include discursive and linguistic analysis of real texts" (Fairclough, 1992, p. 56) and this, in essence, makes the application of Foucault's theory to contemporary media discourses difficult. Fairclough (1992) also argues that Foucault conceives of power as being immutable, and that "he gives the impression that resistance is generally contained by power and poses no threat" (p. 57). Fairclough's concern is that Foucault provided little in his theories of discourse to identify the detailed mechanisms

of change that might show how discourse is resisted and reconfigured, and through which social reformation is achieved. As such, Fairclough's articulation of discourse analysis emerges from a desire to apply a more structured and analytical approach to discourse than the one employed by Foucault.

## 4.2—The Theory of Critical Discursive Analysis

The roots of CDA emerged from what some scholars have referred to as 'the linguistic turn' in social studies (Rogers, Malancharuvil-Berkes, Mosley, Hui and Joseph, 2005). Towards the late 1970s various authors worked to advance an approach to analysing politics and ideology that incorporated elements of established traditions of linguistic analysis. These include notable contributions such as Kress and Hodge's (1979) *Language as Ideology*, Fowler, Hodge, Kress and Trew's (1979) *Language and Control,* as well as Michael Halliday's (1978) *Language as Social Semiotic,* and (1985) *Introduction to Functional Grammar.* The incorporation of critical linguistics into the broader study of social phenomena prompted the development of a range of post-structural and post-modern based methodologies (Rogers et al., 2005). A common thread in some of these approaches was a systematic approach which centred on textual analysis and the ideological function of language. As Rogers et al. (2005) state, scholars from varied disciplinary backgrounds gathered in the early 1990s to develop the theoretical and methodological foundations of CDA. This group included Roger Fowler, Gunther Kress, Norman Fairclough, Teun van Dijk, Theo van Leeuwen and Ruth Wodak. Fowler (2003) argues, "critical linguistics"—the broader field of study that CDA stems from—was formulated as "an analysis of public discourse […] designed to get at the ideology coded implicitly behind the overt propositions" (p. 3). As such, critical linguistic analysis focuses on the exploration of texts and their structure, genres, themes, word choices, and other linguistic features that point to the ideological function of a text. Fairclough's (1992) CDA builds on this by highlighting the context in which the text is produced and received—as well as the broader socio-political circumstances surrounding it—as equally significant to interpreting the ideological function of the text. As Meyer (2001) argues, CDA assumes "all discourses are

historical and can therefore only be understood with reference to their context" (p. 15). While critical linguistics as an approach tends to focus mainly on those aspects of a text that can be directly observed; CDA argues for an approach that incorporates an investigation of related texts, practices, events and circumstances that are contextually related.

Theoretically, CDA seeks to explain, identify and seek solutions to social inequality. Expanding on the work of Foucault, Fairclough argues that through an analysis of the linguistic features of text and speech—in context—scholars can identify the underlying processes that prohibit, divide and structure public debate and discussion. To Fairclough, discourse is the key to understanding how society develops and changes its hierarchy of values, establishes agreed upon truths and constructs social relationships. As he argues, "discourses do not just reflect or represent social entities and relations, they construct or 'constitute' them" (Fairclough, 1992, p. 3). Like Foucault, Fairclough argues that by controlling discourse powerful institutions influence social norms and values, establish divisions in social relationships and construct social reality. But importantly, at the core of Fairclough's theory of discourse is that it has the capacity to challenge existing power structures. In distinction to Foucault's articulation of the almost inescapable power of discourse; Fairclough argues discourse can be subverted even by those in society with limited means and access. CDA as a research approach therefore asks its practitioners to identify how the ideological function of language perpetuates unequal social relationships between individuals and groups. But CDA goes further by arguing that the researcher has a role to play in precipitating social change. As Caldas-Coulthard and Coulthard (2003) state:

> Critical Discourse Analysis is essentially political in intent with its practitioners acting upon the world in order to transform it and thereby help create a world where people are not discriminated against because of sex, colour, creed, age or social class. (p. xi)

This is a central argument of CDA as a theoretical approach. It is not enough to simply identify the ideological function of texts and how they reproduce inequality through social relationships. Researchers should also play a role in bringing such inequality to an end.

CDA is as much a critique of power as it is an approach to analysing text and speech. It positions the analysis of language practice as being important to understanding the ways in which society establishes limits around individual expression. CDA theory argues that a fundamental power in society is the ability to structure who has the right to speak and what they are permitted to speak about. As Van Dijk (2008) argues:

> People are no longer free to speak or write when, where, to whom, about what and how they want, but are partly or wholly controlled by powerful others, such as the state, the police, the mass media or a business corporation interested in suppressing the freedom of (typically critical) text and talk. Or conversely, they must speak or write as they are told to do. (p. 9)

The mechanisms of control suggested by Van Dijk include laws—regulated speech, libel laws, defamation, confidentiality and secrecy laws etc.—and norms of appropriateness—which if not followed may result in social punishment such as isolation and reproach. Van Dijk suggests capital is also a structuring factor. As most people must exchange their labour for money, expression is limited by both contractual obligations as well as corporate norms and values—transgression of which may result in loss of promotion, sidelining or withdrawal of employment opportunities. But more broadly, CDA urges practitioners to identify how discourse can result in the abuse of power in service of particular ideological ends. Fairclough (1992) and Van Dijk (2008) for example, both point to the rising influence of commercial and commodifying logics on discourse as cause for concern. Van Dijk (2008) argues that discourse influences "knowledge, opinions, attitudes, ideologies as well as other personal or social representations" (p. 9) and as such discourses of commodification influence the way individuals perceive the world. In its most extreme expression, the normalisation of commodifying discourse can influence individuals such that they cannot imagine the value of things beyond their dollar amount. Van Dijk suggests that left unchallenged, those with powerful and privileged positions in society will exert more active control over discourse, thereby shaping society into a tool for their own enrichment.

*4.2a—Criticism of CDA as an Approach to Research*

It is this focus on CDA as an active critique of power that distinguishes it from many other approaches to textual analysis. But as Meyer (2001) suggests, the political programme of CDA is not without its critics. Meyer states that in many examples of CDA research "the line drawn between social scientific research […] and political argumentation is sometimes crossed" (p. 15). Widdowson (1995) in particular criticises CDA for this approach, suggesting that its overt political agenda presupposes analysis and interpretation of texts, and leads to the selection of texts that support a preferred interpretation. Hammersly (1997) further criticises the intellectual foundations of CDA, arguing that its practitioners ignore their own normative adherence to the critical theory foundations of Marx and the Frankfurt School, and that "its philosophical foundations are simply taken for granted, as if they were unproblematic" (p. 244). The selection of political problems to address is therefore biased by the researcher's own normative principles. Others, such as Stubbs (1997), point out that CDA as a method cannot support its own theoretical claims that language functions to influence attitude and behaviour because its sole focus is on analysing text and speech. They argue it fails to capture actual human interactions and often fails to account for an analysis of the audience as a receiver and interpreter of discourse. Furthermore, Stubbs (1997) suggests the political programme of CDA is a point of common critique because as the research is politically motivated "analysts find what they expect to find" (p. 3). Breeze (2011) argues that while CDA practitioners are "usually careful to make their own political commitments quite explicit […] this does not mean they are absolved from the need for objectivity in their research" (pp. 500-501). And as Haig (2004) states, much criticism has been aimed at CDA for its unsteady philosophical foundations, with some academics remaining unconvinced that it produces valid—or at least empirically defensible—knowledge. As Breeze (2011) summarises, some of the key criticism of CDA include that it is "impressionistic" (p. 520) and lacks rigour when analysing linguistic features of text, it induces researchers to make interpretive leaps and sometimes produces groundless findings as a result of its intrinsically political aims.

CDA practitioners should be cautious and sceptical in their approach to analysis. Interpretation is central to discourse analysis, however as the above criticism suggests

practitioners must consider their own personal biases, be up front in declaring political aims and conscientiously select and interpret texts in a way that limits prejudgement. Furthermore, practitioners should acknowledge that if the political aim of CDA is to achieve genuine social change there is little pragmatism in interpreting texts not as they are, but as they would prefer them to be. CDA is an approach to research but it is only as rigorous and as systematic as the methods employed by each individual study. As Van Dijk (2013) states, the object of CDA is to critique discursive power, but the methods used to do this must be tailored to the particularities of the research agenda. In light of the above criticisms, great care and attention to detail must underpin CDA if it is to provide a substantive critique. That being said, some criticisms of CDA rely on a misinterpretation of its ontological foundations. Breeze (2011) and Haig (2004) for example, argue that CDA should produce as its output objective and valid knowledge. However, as Foucault (2001) states, such appeals to truth echo the discursive influence of the will to truth which pervades scholarly institutions; privileging certain forms of knowledge and pedagogies over others (p. 1462). At its core, CDA can only tell us how some people talk or write about some things. Beyond this, practitioners must establish a case for how these insights reveal the ideological intent behind such words and how they might work to structure perceptions of reality on a socio-political level. This is a fundamentally interpretivist approach to the production of knowledge. However, to discard the results of discursive analysis because they do not meet positivist standards of objectivity and truth is unnecessarily prescriptive. As Foucault argues, the division between true and false is historically constituted; and was preceded by a conception of true discourse that accounted for more than just its Platonic form. For Foucault (2001), true discourse is:

> […] the discourse which dispensed justice and gave everyone his share; the discourse which in prophesying the future not only announced what was going to happen but helped to make it happen, carrying men's minds along with it and thus weaving itself into the fabric of destiny. (p. 1463)

The aim of CDA is not to establish categories of true and false discourses but rather to explore the ways in which language is used to systematically reorganise norms, values, beliefs and

perceptions of reality in society. It does not contend that the practitioner can somehow separate themselves completely from the social and political context in which their research takes place; but instead urges them to acknowledge their place in existing social structures and take steps to ensure that personal bias is limited (Van Dijk, 2008, pp. 85-86). As Kress (1993) acknowledges, "there is always the possibility that practitioners of CDA will replicate the operations of power in the readings which they produce" (p. 170). The practitioner, therefore, must at all times be vigilant, reflexive and open-minded in their selection and interpretation of texts. As Van Dijk (2008) suggests, a crucial tenet of CDA is that its practitioners must have "explicit awareness of their role in society" (p. 85). As such, space within the methodological process must be given over to personal reflection and consideration of the researcher's history, socialisation, class and position within social hierarchy, and how these things might lead them to interpret events and relationships differently. While this is no guarantee against personal bias it is as vital to the CDA process as text selection, interpretation and the reporting of analytical results.

## 4.3—Methodological Approach for this Inquiry

The methodology selected for this inquiry is strongly informed by critical discourse analysis, as articulated by Fairclough (1992). It involved the collection of news articles to be analysed in an initial qualitative analysis of news stories, then the selection of a sub-section of articles to be analysed using a three stage CDA close reading. The first stage involved the identification of features such as word choices, key themes, metaphors, article subject matter, notable sources and other significant linguistic features. The second, more detailed stage, involved interpreting the textual features, discursive practices and social practices related to the production and consumption of each article. The following sections will discuss the fundamentals of CDA and provide details of how it was employed in this research project.

As Van Dijk (2013) says, "CDA is not a method of critical discourse analysis". Rather, CDA is an approach to the analysis of discourse that employs a diverse range of methodological approaches; borrowing from linguistics, social sciences and psychology.

Neither Van Dijk or Fairclough (1992) argue for a uniform model of performing CDA, instead they argue CDA should be left open to employing a range of different methods and analytical techniques. As Van Dijk (2008) suggests, CDA "does not have a unitary theoretical framework" (p. 87) and nor does it have specific steps, instead it should shape itself to the specific goals, texts and backgrounds of researchers involved. As Wodak and Meyer (2009) state "it is important to stress that CDA has never been and has never attempted to be or to provide a single or specific theory. Neither is one specific methodology characteristic of research in CDA" (p. 5). Depending on the particular research, CDA might employ "grammatical […] semantic, pragmatic, interactional, rhetorical, stylistic, narrative or genre analysis" or if the circumstances call for it "experiments, ethnography, interviewing, life stories, focus groups, participant observation, and so on" (Van Dijk, 2013, para. 2). As such, selecting a methodological approach for CDA research requires first establishing a research agenda and examining the characteristics of the corpus of texts to be analysed.

While methods should be tailored to specific research agendas, Van Dijk (2008) does however suggest that all CDA approaches share a number of tenets drawn from critical theory and the principles of a continuing academic tradition "that rejects the possibility of 'value-free' science" (p. 85). He argues the main tenets of CDA are as follows:

1. CDA addresses social problems.
2. Power relations are discursive.
3. Discourse constitutes society and culture.
4. Discourse does ideological work.
5. Discourse is historical.
6. The link between text and society is mediated.
7. Discourse analysis is interpretive and explanatory.
8. Discourse is a form of social action.

Furthermore, Van Dijk (2008) suggests that the focus of a CDA analysis should be social problems, political issues and how social practices and discursive practices "enact, confirm, legitimate, reproduce or challenge relations of power and dominance in society" (p. 86). These

tenets provide guidance as to the kinds of research questions or agendas that CDA would be suited to investigating.

## 4.4—Selection of a Research Agenda and Methods for Analysis

Following a review of literature detailed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of this thesis this inquiry elected to adopt both the theoretic and methodological approach detailed in Fairclough's (1992) *Discourse and Social Change.* As the review of literature in Chapter 2 suggests substantial research in the field of journalism studies does not adequately consider news texts as having a discursive function that can challenge or contribute to systems of knowledge and belief, social relations and social identity. As Chapter 3 shows, public discourses of naval procurement in Australia are not simply a function of normative journalistic values, but are influenced by cultural and historic narratives and distinctive power imbalances between political, military and press institutions. CDA therefore provides additional insight and understanding as to the influence that politics, ideology and institutional change can have on the news reporting of contentious issues. A CDA analysis of the reporting of the Attack class submarine procurement therefore goes beyond established research in the field of journalism studies that evaluates and interprets journalism primarily through its existing normative principles.

Fairclough is acknowledged as one of the leaders of and key contributors to the field of CDA. Additionally, he is noted for having worked to reformulate and develop the approach over time incorporating solutions to criticisms (Haig, 2004; Stubbs, 1997; Rogers et al. 2005; Wodak and Meyer, 2001). To a certain degree Fairclough's approach places more emphasis on the linguistic features of the text than other formulations of CDA (Rogers et al., 2005). Furthermore, Fairclough's approach has been widely used in analysing short texts and newspaper discourses (Bednarek, 2006; Caldas-Coulthard and Coulthard, 2003; Fairclough, 1992; Richardson, 2007). For these reasons Fairclough's articulation of CDA is appropriate given this inquiry's focus on newspaper discourses. The following sections will outline the process by which Fairclough recommends a research agenda be formulated and the particular

methodological steps suggested for preparing a corpus of texts and performing a discursive analysis.

Fairclough (1992) recommends that the initial step when developing a research project for CDA is identifying the social practices that are the focus of the inquiry and their related social structures. The techniques used to analyse text and speech should be shaped to the subject of the inquiry. For example, an inquiry into parent-teacher interactions during consultation meetings would benefit from a different methodological approach to one analysing the speeches of recent political candidates. Fairclough argues that practitioners should draw on techniques that have established roots in relevant disciplines. In studying candidate speeches an approach incorporating rhetorical or narrative analysis would likely be more suitable than others. For a study looking at parent-teacher interactions an ethnographic methodology with closer links to education studies may be more appropriate. The second factor to consider should be the corpus itself. Fairclough argues that the research project should be designed to account for textual characteristics; the number of texts in the corpus, their lengths, their structure, and whether they are transcripts of spoken or written language. Access to and availability of texts may also be factors that influence the selection of particular methods of analysis.

Practitioners must also consider how the corpus will be enhanced by supplementary data such as external texts, interviews and other forms of information that can establish the relationship between texts and their social and political context. As discussed, CDA distinguishes itself from other approaches in its focus on not only the capture and analysis of texts but also of the context and situation in which discourse takes place. As Van Dijk (2008) states, this means that a CDA approach will describe and analyse the "social, cultural historical or political situation" (p. 3) within which discourse occurs, including relevant and related communicative events, economic and commercial elements, temporal and geographic factors, participants and their social roles as well as other special circumstantial or situational elements. Consideration should be given to how such supplementary data should be incorporated into the overall analysis of the corpus.

In collecting texts for analysis CDA practitioners may find a substantial number of documents relating to the social practice they are investigating. Fairclough (1992) suggests that a narrowing process may be appropriate where the corpus contains an unmanageable quantity of texts. A smaller sub-sample is selected from the larger corpus in order to perform more substantive and detailed analysis. Fairclough suggests two approaches. First, practitioners might "scan the whole corpus for particular sorts of feature—certain types of question or formulations" for example (Fairclough, 1992, p. 230). To facilitate this, he recommends "taking advice where one can get it from those being researched, or from colleagues in relevant social science disciplines" (p. 230). The second strategy Fairclough (1992) suggests is focusing on "moments of crisis" (p. 230); which he describes as moments within discourse characterised by heightened conflict, a sudden change in style, something "going wrong", exceptional repetition, a sudden change in frequency or an unusual silence. Moments of crisis are breaks in the status quo of text and speech practices that "make visible aspects of practices which might normally be naturalised" (p. 230). As such, Fairclough argues focusing on these moments may reveal insights into how the rules of discourse shift in response to crisis and conflict. A complementary approach to this is to focus on what Carvalho (2008) refers to as "critical discourse moments" (p. 166). Carvalho defines these as "periods that involve specific happenings, which may challenge the 'established' discursive positions" including but not limited to "political activity, scientific findings or other socially relevant events" (p. 166). Carvalho suggests such moments might lead to revealing insights as they are distinguished by the novel emergence of new discourses, the combination of existing ones or the sudden repudiation of what was assumed to be a dominant view.

Once an agenda has been decided on and a corpus of texts has been selected, Fairclough (1992) recommends an approach to textual analysis involving three distinct stages:

- Stage One: Analysis of the discursive practices related to the text
- Stage Two: A detailed linguistic analysis of the text.
- Stage Three: An analysis that explores the text as part of broader social practices.

Fairclough also details a range of methods that would be appropriate to employ at different levels of the analysis. As he states, this "three dimensional" approach to analysing the texts "will inevitably overlap in practice" (Fairclough, 1992, p. 231) as practitioners gain new insights in one or another stage that prompt further interpretation in others. He argues it is not necessary to proceed in any particular order as "the choice will depend upon the purposes and emphases of the analysis" (Fairclough, 1992, p. 231). The following section will explore each stage in further detail. For the purposes of this research an instrument was prepared based on Fairclough's approach to CDA and this was used as a guide throughout the analysis process (See Appendix B).

### 4.4a—Stage One: Discursive Practice

An analysis of discourse practices should explore aspects of both how the text is produced and how it is received. This may include an interpretation of the characteristics of the text that suggest the manner of its production, the intended audience and the authors' preferred interpretation. Fairclough (1992) suggests this stage should interpret and explain:

- The *interdiscursivity* of the sample texts: as in what existing discourse types or genres they draw upon;
- Texts and their position within *intertextual chains*: meaning the series of types of texts that the text originates from or enters into;
- The *coherence* of texts: meaning how a text would be interpreted by audiences taking into consideration its interdiscursive and intertextual properties;
- The *conditions of discursive practice* relating to the texts: as in what are the social practices relating to the production and consumption of the text;
- And the *manifest intertextuality* of texts: meaning what features are apparent in the text that suggest what has gone into producing the text and what other texts have been drawn upon in the process.

This stage of the analysis is primarily concerned with describing and explaining factors relating to the production and consumption of texts; highlighting patterns and pointing to

examples of transgression or change in established discursive norms. For example, an article prepared for a broadsheet newspaper is produced in a normatively different way to one written for tabloid news (Boykoff, 2008). As Boykoff argues, tabloid news is intended for a more working-class audience; as such articles are produced under different conditions, quote sources that are more recognisable to readers, tend towards established formats of sensationalism and employ frames that are relevant to local audiences. Interdiscursive features might include the use of established tabloid tropes—such as separating the "deserving poor" from the "dole bludgers" (Owen, 2011, p. 37). Intertextually, a practitioner might consider how the article relates to other articles; whether it is part of a regular column, where it is in the newspaper—front page or opinion section—or if it intended for multiple audiences: both in-print and online. Coherence relates to how it might be received: practitioners should consider the size and geographic location of the intended audience, whether the message is ambiguous or how it could be interpreted in a resistant reading. The conditions of discursive practice may also be relevant; whether the article was written be a tenured journalist in a newsroom, or a freelancer rushing to meet a short deadline. All of these factors should be considered in terms of how they relate to, build upon, or challenge norms associated with the broader social practice of news production.

### 4.4b—Stage Two: Textual Analysis

Textual analysis relates specifically to the interpretation and explanation of the linguistic features of a text. Fairclough (1992) suggests this stage should interpret and explain:

- The *grammatic* features of texts and how they might influence interpretation;
- The *ethos* of texts, or how they use discursive features to construct social identities or "selves";
- Features of *transitivity* apparent in the texts: suggesting process types preferred within the texts (as Fairclough suggests, this is mainly about how the author attributes responsibility, causality and agency in the text);

- *Themes*: these being patterns within the texts that indicate particular underlying assumptions, interpretations or suggested outcomes;
- The *modality* of the texts: particularly uses of modality that can be identified through patterns within the text that suggest a certain interpretation of reality or social relations;
- *Wording* and *word meaning*: particularly key words, new or innovative word choices, words with specific cultural or ideological meaning, words and wording that suggest a hegemonic mode of thought, and the intertextual relations suggested by drawing words or word meanings from other texts;
- Use of *metaphor* in texts: as well as a determination of the social, cultural or ideological factors that might lead to the use of such metaphors.

This stage of analysis focuses on how particular language choices reveal the ideological function of the text. In particular, Fairclough (1992) argues practitioners should explore the ways in which language choices reveal how authors reproduce, negotiate or challenge established norms and values associated with social practice. For example, a study exploring racial discourses in news may look at particular word choices—how crimes involving Vietnamese migrants are described using generalising phrases evoking an Asian gangs or violent youth crisis (Teo, 2000). As Teo (2000) shows, texts which present drug dealing behaviour transitively in an agentless passive construction— e.g. "heroin is still being sold here" (p. 32)—frame the drug trade as a characteristic of the community rather than a product of a small number of criminals. Use of thematic language suggesting immediacy, closeness and locality also help to imply a need for urgent and substantial police intervention. And the use of cohesive language over time helps to reinforce and build on previous reporting; the Asian gang crisis is made *real* by a repetition of the same motifs of crime, youth and ethnicity.

While this stage should be detailed, Fairclough counsels that textual analysis should not be so exhaustive as to detract from the other stages of analysis. As a general approach, CDA should "focus on larger units than isolated words and sentences" as well as non-verbal aspects of communication (Wodak and Meyer, 2009, p. 2). This is in part because, as

Fairclough (1992) suggests, CDA at its inception was an attempt to move away from the kind of hyper-detailed analyses performed within functional linguistics (c.f. Halliday, 1985), which he regarded as an having "limited success" in combining language studies and social theory (p. 2). The level of detail in this stage therefore depends on factors such as the size of the sample and the nature of the texts. The goal of CDA is not to provide an exhaustive description of the lexical features of texts but to interpret and explain their ideological function and their influence on social practice.

### 4.4c—Stage Three: Social Practice

An analysis of the social practice itself centres on describing how texts relate to broader social, political, economic, institutional and historical factors that surround and influence their creation. As Fairclough (1992) suggests, the focus of this stage of analysis should be on interpreting and explaining:

- The overall *structure of social and hegemonic relationships* that surround and influence these particular texts and discursive practices, as well as how texts and discursive practices relate to them (i.e. are they oppositional, creative and innovative, normative and hegemonic or otherwise);
- The *orders of discourse* from which the texts and discursive practices draw from; here relating to Foucault's (2001) conception of how broader socio-political structures create divisions and exclusions in acceptable discourse and structure ways of knowing and representations of truth;
- The *ideological and political effects of discourse*: particularly in terms of how the discourse constructs social identities ('selves'), social relationships and systems of knowledge, beliefs and perceptions of reality.

The aim of this stage of analysis is to explain why a certain discursive practice is the way it is, as well as how it influences broader social practices. Fairclough (1992) suggests that this particular stage of the analysis may vary significantly depending on the nature of the research agenda. It should not be limited to exploring only the points mentioned above. Rather, social

practice analysis is an ongoing procedure that is returned to again and again as insights are developed from both textual and discursive practice analysis. The result of this stage of analysis should be an explanation of the bigger picture factors relating to texts, their production and their reception. Joye (2009) for example, explains how news reporting of disasters in Belgian media reinforce a hierarchy that positions suffering in Western contexts as being more significant than the suffering of distant "others" (p. 45) in the developing world. As both a result of the institutional limitations on news production and the language used to characterise international disaster, Australian and American emergencies were rendered "comprehensible and less distant" while a disaster in Indonesia was represented as "no cause for concern or action" (pp. 57-58). Comparing the discursive characteristics of news stories about disaster, Joye (2009) was able to identify a way in which social reality was being shaped by a "hierarchy of global suffering" (p. 45) employed by news producers. This has consequences that arguably extend beyond simply the production and reception of any individual text. Social practice analysis is therefore a way of exploring how texts construct social relationships and reality in a broader social context.

## 4.5—Examples of Critical Discursive Analysis in Scholarly Literature

The following section will discuss some examples of how practitioners have applied CDA to the study of news and journalism to generate insight. CDA has been widely used in a range of contexts to explore diverse research agendas. Some studies apply a version of CDA that is closely linked with Fairclough's (1992) model, but given the variation of social practices explored many adopt a range of methods that are suited to the particular research agenda proposed.

### 4.5a—CDA, Journalism and News

The focus of the research conducted for this thesis is news and national security reporting. CDA is widely used in journalism studies and has been applied to a range of contexts and different news mediums. As Fairclough (1992) argues, news plays a significant

role in selecting and reproducing the views of powerful institutions and elite individuals. Critical discursive analysis of news therefore often focuses on the ideological function of news and its broader impact on social attitudes and beliefs. Samaie and Malmir (2017) for example, use a CDA approach to explore how news language reproduces racialised depictions of Islam and Muslims in the United States. Their analysis of U.S. TV news, magazine articles and newspaper articles found that the words "Islam" and "Muslims" were frequently collocated with the words "radical", "war", "ISIS", "attacks", "violence" and "extremist" (Samaie and Malmir, 2017, p. 1356). Metaphorically Muslims were often represented as being thoughtless followers; for example, articles referred to Muslims "pouring out of" or "flocking" to mosques during Ramadan, al Qaeda "slaughtering" and "butchering" people in Muslim countries, and in rare occurrences simply being referred to as "animals" and "savages" (p. 1358). Samaie and Malmir (2017) argue that U.S. news develops themes that depict Muslims as outsiders and as cause for concern; but point specifically at journalists' overreliance on government and political sources as a factor that is increasingly shaping public perceptions of "foreign" enemies (p. 1352). In a similar article by Kim (2014), the author looks at U.S. cable news representations of North Korea. In their textual analysis they found that North Korea was often characterised as "unpredictable", "starving", "bankrupt" and "desperate" (p. 235). Their discursive practice analysis also found that North Korea was frequently mentioned within stories that discussed Iran, Syria and Russia; despite North Korea not having significant economic or military ties with these countries. The author concludes that a common discursive practice in news production is to lump pro-US and anti-US countries together; reproducing the U.S. administration's dividing of the world into a discursive frame of allies versus enemies. News is often a significant site for the formation of divisive and exclusionary language practices. As Kitis, Milani and Levon (2018) demonstrate, through an analysis of South African newspaper articles they identified emerging discourses used to characterise the growing Black middle class in that country. They found that the growing black middle class were often pejoratively referred to as "black diamonds" (p. 157)—a metaphor meant to encapsulate amoral consumption, reckless spending and snobbishness. They also identified

"clever blacks" as a counter-metaphor often employed by politicians in news to subvert this (Kitis, Milani and Levon, 2018, p. 159). As the above examples suggest, news is not a neutral venue for discourse but instead is a site of continuous production of and challenge to social divisions, identities and realities. What all three of these studies also highlight is that most of the voices that contribute to that discursive debate come from a small circle of commentators, politicians and officials.

The strength of many CDA approaches to news is that they do not only focus on texts, but also broader discourses of journalism that take place within the industry and between journalists and readers. A study by Assimakopoulos, Baider and Millar (2017) for example, analyses audience feedback and deliberation in the comments sections of online news articles from European news outlets. Digital news has created new ways in which audiences can disrupt the traditional unidirectional relationship between journalist and reader. As the authors highlight, however, this has also created new venues for hate speech and exclusionary language directed towards ethnic, religious and sexual minorities. The authors found that news comment sections provided frequent examples of othering, stereotyping and identity formation that perpetuated discourses of anxiety and panic about migrants, homosexuals and Muslims. The rise of digital news has created a circumstance wherein even journalism that adheres to normative tenets of balance and impartiality is amalgamated with partisan commentary that expresses hate speech and advances exclusionary ideologies. In other research by Hujanen (2018), the author takes a CDA approach to exploring how journalism students in Africa and Europe discuss, define and redefine journalistic norms and ideals, particularly in light of the changing business model of journalism and the onset of the social media generation. The study provides venue for the author to explore how a future generation of journalists uses language and discursive practices to promote new discourses of open and collaborative journalism to challenge the orthodoxy of what constitutes 'good' journalism. CDA asks its practitioners to consider the production and consumption of texts in their historic and social context. With regards to news this means

considering current global changes in news industries, the digitisation of news and the ongoing challenges facing contemporary journalists.

CDA has also been widely used in a range of different cultural and political contexts to study journalistic discourses in newspapers. Research by Alkaff and McLellan (2018), for example, looks at Malaysian and English language newspaper reporting of rape of minor cases in Malaysia and Brunei. They used a critical case purposive sampling method to gather newspaper articles and applied a CDA approach to explore how different newspapers in different languages represented social actors when reporting on the same events. In other research, Kelsey (2013) explores how British newspapers used narratives and myths relating to London during the blitz as a lens to report on the July 7th Terror Attack. They argue that the myth of the blitz was used by journalists as a discourse type that reinforced nationalist ideology of British superiority in the face of foreign enemies. While both of these research papers use a CDA approach they are tailored specifically to the problem and area of inquiry the researchers are focusing on. In the article by Kelsey (2013), the author states that their textual and discursive analysis is particularly "concerned with myth, popular memory and national narration" (p. 87) and as such their use of CDA is reflective of this. In the article by Alkaff and McLellan (2018) their concern was more focused on the textual and discursive practices that differed between news articles written in Malay and English. As such they elected to compare texts side-by-side while performing their analysis. Furthermore, they included interviews with journalists working in Malaysia and Brunei to provide more detail and a broader understanding of the social practices and socio-political context in which reporting on such cases took place. As these articles suggest, when employing a CDA approach a researcher can benefit from tailoring and customising their approach to the analysis of the texts based on the significant problems or issues they want to address.

As many of the above applications suggest, CDA approaches journalism in a fundamentally different way to scholarly theories of normative journalism (see Chapter 2). Richardson (2007), for example, argues that analysis and critique of journalism is underpinned by the question: 'what is journalism for?' While some may answer this question

in terms of journalism's role in democracy; or its function as a form of entertainment; or its status as a commodity as part of a business. Richardson (2007) suggests journalism is at times all of these things, and at times none of them. CDA takes the focus on journalism away from what journalism *should* or *should not* be; and redirects it towards whether journalism *is challenging* or *is reproducing* social relationships of inequality and power imbalance. Language in CDA is considered to be inherently ideological, and as such journalism's form and function is less a benchmark to be measured against and more a factor to be considered in analysing its discursive construction of social identity and reality. However, as Bednarek (2006) suggests, this does not mean that journalism should be analysed in the exact same way as other texts. Instead, CDA acknowledges the historically constituted nature of unique discursive practices surrounding news production, including; news values; established styles and genres of news; time and space constraints; audience size and distribution; and other factors that influence news production. For this reason, a critical discursive approach to news must incorporate a critique of journalism as a concept itself, in addition to a critique of the news as a series of textual objects.

## 4.6—A Critical Discursive Analysis of News Reporting of the Attack Class Submarine Procurement

### 4.6a—Defining the Problem

As discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of this thesis journalism is currently facing a period of sustained challenges. Many news organisations have seen a significant decrease in revenue from advertising and as a result the resources and number of journalists available to produce news reporting has contracted substantially (Benson, 2018; Carlson, 2015: Kaye and Quinn, 2010). As Murphy (2015) details, Australian journalists have had to adapt to a new commercial logic that reduces the time they have to research and produce stories and increases pressure to multi-task between different news platforms.

Almost within the same time period the level of secrecy surrounding national security and intelligence matters has increased substantially. The introduction of laws around surveillance of private citizens, collection of intelligence, meta-data retention and increased penalties for whistleblowers have sparked concern that public interest journalism may be losing its ability to scrutinise government (De Zwart, Humphreys and Van Dissel, 2014; Humphreys and De Zwart, 2014; McCulloch and Tham, 2015; Pearson and Fernandez, 2015).

Journalists also face significant problems when trying to apply scrutiny to military projects. Defence as an organisation and a community are both distrustful of and resistant to public scrutiny by journalists (Anderson and Trembath, 2011; Foster, 2012; Foster and Pallant, 2013; 2016; Hibbart and Hannah, 2006; Hibbert and Starr, 2004). Further complicating matters, governments on both sides of Australian politics have become highly sensitive to scandals involving defence and defence procurement have done little in recent years to increase the ADF's public engagement and transparency (Nicholson, 2019; Spong, 2015).

National security journalism cannot function without guaranteed access and safeguards in place that provide transparency of governance and protect journalists and sources from prosecution stemming from genuine public interest disclosures. Given the secretive nature of defence and security issues national security journalists are often the only route through which the public can learn about government policies enacted to secure Australia. Given the enormous size, scale and cost of Australia's national defence the capacity for journalists to be able to report on defence policy is vitally important.

The aim of this inquiry is to understand how journalism has been influenced by these three challenges to national security journalism in Australia. Beginning from the premise that language is ideological, this research will address how changing discourses of national security are working to constitute Australian society and culture. By interpreting and explaining discourses of military procurement this research will seek to understand the mediated power relationship between journalists, politicians and the Australian Defence Force. It will aim to do this while also recognising that discourses of military procurement are constituted within

social, historic and cultural contexts. Finally, it will argue that public interest journalism in Australia is under threat and that the inability for journalists to provide adequate scrutiny of major defence policy decisions is of substantial concern.

### 4.6b—Defining a Project

This inquiry interpreted the discursive features of newspaper reporting of the Attack class submarine procurement. This topic was selected for a number of reasons. As scholars have noted, submarine development in Australia is regarded as a highly confidential state secret but it is also politically controversial and the subject of significant media scrutiny (Spong, 2015; Yule and Woolner, 2008). Between 2013 and 2016 the Attack class submarine was the subject of substantial media reportage. However, the government has publicly released very little information clarifying why key policy decisions were made during its procurement. The Attack class as such represents a nexus of the main problems identified above: secrecy, military opacity and reduced capacity to investigate.

Newspapers were selected as a site for study for two main reasons. As the literature reviewed for this inquiry suggests traditional print and online versions of newspapers remain important agenda setters and continue to be widely used as sources of information in a cross-media environment (Djerf-Pierre and Shehata, 2017; Swart, Peters and Broersma, 2016). Newspaper plays an important role in hybrid media systems where stories may originate in one medium but quickly spread and find distribution within others (Chadwick, 2017; Conway, Kenski and Wang, 2015; Harder, Sevenans and Van Aelst, 2017). Secondly, although there are notable exceptions existing research suggests that a substantial body of national security reporting originates from veteran journalists working for established newspapers (Anderson and Trembath, 2011; Foster, 2012). Additionally, newspapers are recognised as being particularly vulnerable to the decline in advertising revenue facing journalism (Benson, 2018). With the print news industry in Australia facing the possibility of increasing decline there is a pressing need for research in this area.

### 4.6c—Establishing a Corpus

Four major Australian newspapers were selected for this inquiry:

- *The Australian* (National Newspaper);
- *The Australian Financial Review* (National Newspaper);
- *The Advertiser* (Adelaide), and;
- *The Canberra Times* (Canberra)

A decision was made to exclude the Australian Broadcasting Corporation to both limit the scope of the inquiry and focus the analysis on private and commercial newspaper outlets. The final sample of four newspapers incorporates both local and national level publications owned by different major media organisations (News Corp Australia and Nine Entertainment Co—formerly Fairfax Media). The decision was made to select *The Advertiser* as one of the local newspapers because Australia's historic submarine manufacturing is centred on Adelaide (Yule and Woolner, 2008), and as such this would be a particularly newsworthy story for that paper.

Texts were gathered through the news database *Nexis*.

Articles were searched for using search terms relating to the Attack class submarine project including: "SEA1000", "Future AND Submarine(?)" and "Australia AND Submarine". The database was searched in two passes. In the first pass, articles raised by the search terms were reviewed one at a time by the researcher to determine their relevance to the inquiry. This process was aided by Fairclough's (1992) suggestions for approaching data collection, notably to look for "moments of crisis" (p. 230) and other significant changes in the media's reporting of the submarine project. Text selection was also guided by Carvalho's (2008) articulation of critical discourse moments. Carvalho argues that when dealing with large numbers of texts in CDA researchers should seek to identify "periods that involve specific happenings, which may challenge the 'established discursive positions'" (p. 166). Such moments could include political events and activity, the publication of research findings and government reports, or social events that might provoke a change in patterns of argumentation, style and rhetorical

content. Based on the first pass of the news database, a timeline of key political events and moments related to the procurement was created (Appendix A). This timeline of events was used to guide a second pass of the *Nexis* database using the same keywords as above. The second pass focused on identifying and selecting texts around critical discourse moments related to the Attack class submarines. This search process continued until it was determined that there were a significant enough number of texts to cover all key events within the reporting of the Attack class submarine project.

The final corpus of texts amounted to 879 articles, covering the period from when early reporting suggested the Abbott government was commencing planning for the procurement of the submarines (1 September, 2013) to Malcolm Turnbull's announcement that the contract would be given to the French submarine constructor DCNS (Naval Group) (27 April, 2016). This timeframe was selected for two reasons. Firstly, prior to 1 September, 2013 there was limited coverage of the Attack class procurement for long periods of time. Secondly, the 27 April 2016 announcement generated substantial media attention after which coverage of the issue substantially declined.

### 4.6d—Methods for Analysis

An initial qualitative analysis was performed guided by Van Dijk (2008) and Fairclough's (1992) guidelines for CDA. Each article was read and using an Excel spreadsheet key information about each article was recorded including notes. In this stage of analysis information was recorded about the type and genre of discourse featured in each article (commentary, news reporting, op-ed, editorial), significant named politicians and sources, key themes, narratives, word choices, major events, crisis points and any other textual or discursive practices that appeared relevant. This stage of analysis focused on clarifying and better understanding the "critical discourse moments" (Carvalho, 2008, p. 166) in the overall reporting of the Attack class. Additionally, it aimed to lay the groundwork for the next stage of analysis which would employ Fairclough's (1992) more detailed, three stage articulation of Critical Discourse Analysis. As such, the initial qualitative analysis aimed to identify

significant political, military and industry personnel involved in the procurement process, journalists that were distinct in the volume, style and linguistic approach to their reporting of events, and noteworthy ideological or political arguments being made about the Attack class procurement process.

This initial qualitative analysis revealed five aspects of the reporting of the future submarines that represented distinct changes in ordinary reporting of the Attack class procurement. By focusing on critical discourse moments, such as key announcements and political events, patterns began to emerge. Initial analysis revealed that the majority of news reporting was authored by a small number of defence and national security correspondents whose by-lines appeared frequently around important moments. Unauthorised disclosures and leaks of secret information also represented critical discourse moments as they attracted additional coverage and introduced new discourses such as political crisis, leadership instability and secrecy. News reporting of key events was also frequently published alongside discussion of China as a potential political, military and diplomatic threat to Australia. The reporting of China introduced new and distinct discourses regarding how the Attack class might defend against foreign military actions, and how regional allies and rivals might interpret government decision-making on the procurement project. Reporting of key events and moments contained substantial contributions from defence industry public relations officials and advocates. The presence of public relations and advocacy discourses within news reporting of the Attack class marked a change in the kind of arguments used in debate over the submarines. Finally, reporting produced by journalists at *The Advertiser* was characteristically different in style and discursive positioning compared to the other newspapers sampled. *The Advertiser* reported the issue primarily from a local industry perspective, reframing the issue in terms of jobs, unemployment and economic uncertainty in South Australia.

These five themes would form the focus of a deeper CDA examination of news texts. Focusing on and around critical discourse moments outlined in Appendix A, a sub-section of articles were selected to explore each of the five themes:

1. National Security Reporters;
2. Leaks and Unauthorised Disclosures;
3. The Representation of China in News Reporting of the Attack class;
4. Industry Public Relations and Advocacy Discourses; and,
5. *The Advertiser* as a Local Advocacy Newspaper.

Articles were selected on the basis that they contained substantial or noteworthy text relating to the five themes, and that they contained examples of journalists and/or sources discursively positioning the Attack class procurement within historic, social, economic or political context. 188 articles were selected covering each of the five themes. These articles were then subjected to a three stage Critical Discourse Analysis as outlined in 4.4a, 4.4b and 4.4c.

A brief analytical guideline was prepared based on Fairclough's (1992) practical advice listed in chapter 8 of his book *Discourse and Social Change*. The guideline was not designed to be followed prescriptively but presented a series of prompts about the linguistic, discursive and social practice elements that needed to be addressed in a Critical Discourse Analysis. The function of this document was to remind the analyst of the significance of detailed *Discursive Practice Analysis, Textual Analysis* and *Social Practice Analysis* as the organising stages of Fairclough's model for CDA. To maintain awareness of the context in which texts were being reported, the analyst also reviewed the previously prepared timeline of critical discourse moments (Appendix A) throughout the analysis process.

Each article selected was close read. After an initial first reading, key linguistic features such as word choices, grammar, modality, transitivity, use of metaphors, key themes and arguments were highlighted for textual analysis. In an accompanying text document notes and comments were taken on each text so that analysis could be repeated and reconsidered in subsequent stages. Following this, a broader discursive analysis was conducted, highlighting types and genres of texts being drawn on, considering how the text was produced and its intended audiences, examining the coherency and interpretive qualities of the text, and interpreting intertextuality in the text and the kinds of existing discourses it is drawing from and contributing to. Texts were then analysed with regard to their ideological assumptions,

how they structured social and hegemonic relationships and the orders of discourse they draw from and contribute to. Throughout this process steps and processes were often returned to and repeated, with new notes and interpretations being generated as new insights emerged. Texts were returned to and reanalysed on a number of occasions.

Between and during each stage of the analysis reflexive analysis was undertaken. The researcher reviewed and considered their own background and position within the social order and considered how their position or inherent biases might influence their interpretation of the texts. To aid in this—and in service of stage three of the analysis—important related documents were read and considered through a CDA lens. These included documents relevant to the future submarine project, including government and defence press releases and white papers, lobbying materials, websites of industry groups and lobbyists, and policy papers relating to defence and national security in Australia.

A provisional findings document was prepared for each of the five themes chosen as the focus of this analysis. Quotes, notes, comments and interpretations were collected from each text and broadly positioned into three categories based on each stage suggested by Fairclough (1992):

1. Findings from *Discursive Practice Analysis;*
2. Findings from *Textual Analysis;* and
3. Findings from *Social Practice Analysis.*

This material was then analysed collectively to try and address broader questions of discursive and social practice in the reporting of the Attack class as a whole throughout the period between September 2013 and April 2016. This involved comparing, contrasting and drawing links between analytical material resulting from each individual theme that this inquiry focused on.

The following chapters outline the results of this analysis. Chapter 5 discusses the role of national security beat reporters and correspondents in the reporting of the Attack class submarine procurement. Chapter 6 outlines the significant impact that unauthorised disclosures and leaks played in shifting the debate and discussion in news articles about the

submarines. Chapter 7 explores how China was represented as a significant factor in news discourse and decision-making on the Attack class. Chapter 8 addresses the role of public relations and advocacy discourses in the news reporting of the submarines. Chapter 9 specifically looks at the role *The Advertiser* played as a local advocacy news outlet and how it represented the Attack class as a local economic and political issue. Finally, Chapter 10 will summarise these findings and draw conclusions.

## Chapter 5—The National Security Beat

> *The most important organisational device for ensuring the regular flow of newsworthy material, and the strategy which is most likely to produce accurate and penetrating reporting, is the deployment of journalists to particular "rounds".* (Tiffen, 1989, p. 30)

This chapter discusses the role that journalists assigned to the national security *beat* or "round" played in discursive representation of the Attack class procurement programme in newspaper reporting. In particular, it will detail how national security journalists made contributions to reporting about the programme that were substantially different to those of generalist reporters. This chapter will provide a detailed discussion of how beat journalism differs from generalist reporting and detail how these differences manifest in reporting on the Attack class submarine project.

Key findings suggest that national security beat journalists were responsible for the majority of newspaper reporting on the Attack class. This suggests that the discursive practices of beat journalists might have a disproportionate effect on the broader news media representation of the programme. National security journalists were oriented towards official, government and elite individuals as sources of news. However, they also used insider knowledge, expertise and access—characteristics of beat journalism—to produce competitive news stories. National security journalists were often able to find new and competitive angles on the unfolding discourse of the Attack class. They employed access and expertise to find newsworthy information that generalist reporters did not. They were more likely to be the recipients of leaked information from insider sources. And they were significantly oriented towards stories that centred on the political nature of the submarines, as well as the potential for scandals and gaffes in the government's handling of the process.

This chapter argues the newspaper reporting of the Attack class submarine procurement is suggestive of a mutually influential relationship between national security

journalists and Australia's political and military institutions. This analysis suggests that national security journalists have adapted to the logics and procedures of Australia's defence establishment. Their familiarity with and access to insiders often results in the reproduction of elite technocratic and securitising discourses. But in doing so journalists can subvert the opacity of political decision making on defence and security issues.

## 5.1—Beat Journalism and the Changing Nature of News Organisations

The future of beat journalism is uncertain. As discussed in Chapter 2, revenue from advertising is declining significantly and as it does news organisations are consolidating their newsrooms and resources, limiting their capacity to produce investigative journalism (Benson, 2018; Carlson, 2015; Kaye and Quinn, 2010). Some news outlets have redirected their attention and resources towards citizen journalism, data journalism and other forms of distributed information gathering, in the hope that such approaches may reduce the cost of producing news (Parasie, 2015; Peters and Broersma, 2017). In the mass media era, journalism was not reliant on digital methods of news gathering and was more reliant on building human relationships (Ericson, Baranek and Chan, 1989; Tiffen, 1989). Regardless of the communication technology, the work of beat journalists is typically characterised by the building of a network of trusted sources, connections and social capital within a field or community. As Diamond (2017) argues, the kind of trust required to develop sources with insider knowledge of sensitive political and national security issues can take decades. It is also recognised as being slower and more costly than other forms of journalism (Flew, Daniel and Spurgeon, 2010). Comparatively, cost efficient data journalism flourishes when whistleblowers dump huge quantities of information into the media or public domain (Packard, 2017). But such journalism is still reliant on whistleblowers being able to come forward and contact journalists without fear of legal consequences. The passage of laws around data retention, as well as the failure to introduce protections for public interest disclosures and shield laws to protect sources, has left many concerned about the future of whistleblower journalism in Australia (Fernandez, 2017; Humphreys and de Zwart, 2017). Additionally, recent events such

as the prosecution of Witness K (Knaus, 2019, March 27), the prosecution of ATO whistleblower Richard Boyle (Khadem, 2019, March 6) and AFP raids on the offices of the ABC in Sydney and a NewsCorp journalist in Canberra (Worthington and Blumer, 2019, June 7), suggest that the present government is sending a chilling message to would-be leakers: that they will be prosecuted, and that public interest provisions will not protect them.

If news organisations can no longer afford the kind of specialist and investigative journalism required to hold the powerful to account, and whistleblowing becomes too risky for data journalism to provide accountability either: what will the news of tomorrow resemble? This thesis explores the current characteristics of newspaper discourses of defence issues with an aim to understand what is at stake should journalism fundamentally change in the near future.

National security journalism is uniquely impacted by increasing secrecy in Australia. As literature suggests, the military and defence organisations in Australia have a distrustful and at times hostile relationship with the press (Anderson and Trembath, 2011; Foster, 2012; Foster and Pallant, 2013; Hibbert and Starr, 2004). Generally speaking, defence organisations in Australia do not see public affairs engagement with journalists as a central part of their role (Logue, 2010), and serving members in the defence forces are generally restricted from speaking to the press (Nicholson, 2019). Press relations are tightly controlled and generally require the approval and management of the relevant Minister's office. The penalties for leaking national security secrets are significant. But the prospects of receiving leaked information from defence insiders is equally limited by an institutional culture that fosters ambivalence and distrust towards journalists (Foster and Pallant, 2013; Hibbert and Simmons, 2006). Journalists covering national security issues therefore face significant challenges in gathering the kind of information required to produce competitive news stories. As Diamond (2017) argues, mutually trustworthy relationships with military and defence insiders do not come easily and are often the result of years of quid-pro-quo reporting. Journalists reporting on the military must offer potential sources significant social capital and reciprocity to make it worth the risk of being branded a traitor, or worse, spending time in jail.

There has been limited research, particularly in an Australian context, around the characteristics of defence and national security reporting (Foster and Pallant, 2013; 2016). This is particularly true of research looking at issue-based reporting that does not relate to military commemoration, war reporting and the Anzac myth. The intent of this inquiry overall is to provide closer examination of the discursive and reporting strategies employed by national security reporters in Australia. It seeks to answer key questions about the kinds of discursive approaches journalists use to cover national security issues; what sources they tend to use; and what common themes, narratives and issues they are oriented towards. In doing so, this inquiry seeks to lay the groundwork for future research that looks at the relationship between contemporary national security journalism and social change.

National security reporters played a significant role in how newspapers reported on the Attack class submarine procurement. Through the overall qualitative analysis of news and opinion articles written on the subject of the procurement programme between September of 2013 and April of 2016, a majority of articles were written by just ten journalists. In the 878 articles captured in the overall corpus for this study, the following specialist national security reporters were identified:

- Tory Shepherd (*The Advertiser*) was credited on 121 articles;
- Brendan Nicholson (*The Australian*) was credited on 81 articles;
- Cameron Stewart (*The Australian*) was credited on 51 articles;
- John Kerin (*Australian Financial Review*) was credited on 41 articles;
- Greg Sheridan (*The Australian*) was credited on 31 articles;
- Paul Starick (*The Advertiser*) was credited on 34 articles;
- Ian McPhedran (*The Advertiser*) was credited on 26 articles;
- Peter Jean (*The Advertiser*) was credited on 27 articles;
- David Wroe (*The Canberra Times*) was credited on 20 articles; and
- Nicholas Stuart (*The Canberra Times*) was credited on 17 articles.

Between them, these ten journalists accounted for more than half of all newspaper reporting on the Attack class submarines during the time period this research looked at. This suggests that the reporting of the Attack class originated from a traditional model of newspaper journalism production, one that favours placing a primary journalist on a beat and having them be supported by journalists with overlapping portfolios.

At *The Australian* the national security beat was covered by Brendan Nicholson (Defence Editor); whose reporting was supplemented by contributions from Cameron Stewart (Associate Editor) and Greg Sheridan (Foreign Affairs Editor). At the *Australian Financial Review* John Kerin (Senior Reporter) produced significant reporting on the Attack class submarine, and was assisted by contributions from Laura Tingle, Angus Grigg, Phillip Coorey and Tony Walker. At *The Canberra Times* David Wroe (Defence and National Security Correspondent) covered the Attack class procurement as a news journalist; and Nicholas Stuart (Columnist) provided analysis and commentary. And at *The Advertiser* Ian McPhedran (Defence Correspondent) covered the issue extensively, along with news reporters Paul Starick, Peter Jean and Tory Shepherd—who also provided analysis.

This chapter will explore the characteristics of these particular newspaper journalists' coverage of the Attack class submarine programme. Given their outsized contribution to the overall reporting of the issue, in focusing on these journalists this inquiry aims to build a broader understanding of how the traditional model of beat focused journalism applied scrutiny to this important defence and national security issue. It will examine the discursive practices used by national security journalists; and discuss what this reveals about the changing nature of and the increasing pressures faced by journalists reporting on defence and national security issues.

## 5.2—Theories of Beat Reporting in Contemporary Journalism Research

The declining ability of news organisations worldwide to dedicate journalists and resources to long-form and investigative journalism is well documented in journalism studies literature (Franklin, 2014; Carson, 2015; O'Donnell, Zion and Sherwood, 2016; Zion, Dodd,

Sherwood, O'Donnell, Marjoribanks and Ricketson, 2017). The dilemma facing contemporary news organisations is that fewer journalists must produce more news to keep up with 24-hour demand distributed across competitive global and digital networks for news. This has led some news organisations to merge specialisations and reporter responsibilities (Nikunen, 2014; Tameling and Broersma, 2013), or abandon certain investigative reporting specialisations to freelancers (Hunter, 2015). The decline in beat reporting has important consequences for journalism. As the literature suggests there is much in the way of experience and social capital at stake. As veteran journalist Katharine Murphy (2015) from the digital-only platform *The Guardian Australia* states:

> In my view, the journalistic beat is the heart of who we are, and what we do. Technology may have transformed print and broadcast specialists into vaguely harried multitaskers, but technology has not changed the mission. The journalistic mission remains at its simplest: know your patch, and use your knowledge to try and tell readers what is actually going on. (p. 149)

Replacing specialist reporters with generalists and freelancers risks the capacity for news organisations to actively pursue stories. The longer a journalist is on a particular specialisation the better adjusted they are to the production routines of collecting and gathering newsworthy information and producing copy or content (Revers, 2015). Beat journalists focus on sourcing human intelligence by networking with and developing contacts within their field of inquiry (Diamond, 2017). Knowing your beat extends beyond simply the assumed knowledge and skills required to produce journalism (Deuze, 2005), such as being able to judge what is newsworthy, retain impartiality and produce copy. Staying on a particular beat means establishing a familiarity with the people, culture, issues and history of a particular field of inquiry. So that when news breaks, a beat journalist will not only be there to scoop it, but will understand the significance of what they are observing and will know where to take the story next. As Tiffen (1989) states: "specialists are better equipped to know where further information can be obtained, to detect discrepancies or suspicious developments, to be sensitive to the undercurrents and the hidden agenda" (p. 30). In short, specialist reporters

have significant advantages that generalist reporters do not. Not just in terms of experience and access, but also in terms of developing trust in potential sources and their readership (Montpetit and Harvey, 2018). Beat reporters build social capital with sources within their field in order to develop relationships of trust which they then use to try and get the jump on stories as they happen (Richards, 2012). Importantly, as Tiffen (1989) points out: beat journalism is "the precondition for an active rather than a passive orientation in reporting" (p. 31), in that well-connected journalists are essential for gathering information that might otherwise not be released publicly.

## 5.3—The National Security Beat in Australia

Most major news organisations in Australia have—or had until recently—defence and national security reporters. The role of a reporter on the national security beat is to cover issues relating to the military and its actions. The majority of research exploring Australian national security journalism focuses on war reporting (Anderson and Trembath, 2011; Foster, 2013; Hilvert, 1984; Payne, 2007; Williams, 1999). War correspondence is however fundamentally different from other kinds of national security reporting. As Anderson and Trembath (2011) note, throughout much of this history of Australian conflict reporting professional expectations of journalists ensured Australia's military was represented positively. Throughout both World Wars journalists produced a broadly propagandistic vision of military actions focusing on the heroism and successes of Australian soldiers (Hilvert, 1984; Williams, 1999). Significant contemporary reporting of Australia's military centres on commemoration of wartime heroism and sacrifice, and in particular the reproduction of idealised discourses of military service—the Anzac myth (Riseman, 2017; Ubayasiri, 2015; Wilson, 2016). Anzac Day commemorations are marked each year with significant media attention, generally positive, that builds on the discourse of military service as a central aspect of Australia's national identity (Daley, 2018, November 12; Donoghue and Tranter, 2015). Despite this overall trend of positive and compliant reporting, the ADF still regards the press with distrust and hostility (Anderson and Trembath, 2011). It is possible this

hostility could be explained by a perception that the press is oriented—almost prejudicially—towards coverage of military scandals. As research suggests, this other tradition of defence journalism in Australia focuses on unearthing secrets and exposing incidents of bastardisation, hazing and sexual misconduct, often pointing to institutional and cultural problems in the military (Evans, 2013; Habiba, 2017; Wadham, 2011; 2013). As Wadham (2016a) argues, the ADF historically has been hostile towards external inquiries into potential misconduct within its ranks. Incidents such as the "Skype Scandal", in which a number of ADFA cadets were investigated for secretly broadcasting video footage of two colleagues having sex, are suggestive of an institutional culture within the ADF that would prefer misconduct be policed internally, outside of the public spotlight (Wadham, 2016a). There may be some truth in the argument that defence correspondents are oriented towards scandal. As Tiffen (1989) suggests, issue-based journalism is oriented by two main influences "politically consequential controversies and the occurrence of 'spot' news (accidents, crimes, disasters, etc.)" (p. 179). However, Foster and Pallant (2016) point out, existing research is not sufficient to draw conclusions about whether the media cover the ADF accurately or provide sufficient accountability. This thesis does not aim to comprehensively answer such questions about the Australian news media's coverage of defence and national security issues. It does, however, aim to lay the groundwork for future research that may provide a more informed window into the characteristics of press coverage of military issues outside of the context of war correspondence and military commemoration.

## 5.4—Critical Discourse Analysis of the Reporting of the Attack Class by National Security Journalists

As discussed above, the overall qualitative analysis of 879 newspaper articles revealed that a substantial proportion of reporting was done by a small number of journalists. Guided by Fairclough's (1992) principle of moments of crisis and Carvalho's (2008) theory of critical discourse moments, a subset of 36 articles were selected from the total corpus for the detailed

three stage textual, discursive practice and social practice analysis. Articles were selected from key national security journalists around important moments throughout the timeline of the Attack class procurement; including major announcements, prominent leaks of information and events such as leadership spills and the publication of major reports. Carvalho (2008) suggests that such political events may indicate a sudden shift in viewpoints, argumentation or discursive style. The existence of such moments is borne out by the qualitative analysis of the entire sample of 879 articles. Political events coincided with changes in the quantity, style and discursive framing of news articles: events such as the release of the *Defence Issues Paper* (Department of Defence, 2014) in July of 2014; Senator Johnston's controversial statements to parliament on the ASC in November of 2014 stating he "wouldn't trust the ASC to build a canoe"(Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 2014); or the spilling of the leadership of the Parliamentary Liberal Party in February and September of 2015. By exploring these critical moments in the discourse, it became apparent that particular national security reporters were consistently engaged with and central to the reporting of such political events. This led to the decision to focus this chapter on national security reporting as a journalistic beat.

For national security reporters "knowing your patch" (Murphy, 2015) means not only being familiar with the politics of national security in Australia but having insider access and knowing where to look for a story. Research has established that the national security beat is characterised by reliance on active news gathering practices, knowledge, experience and building social relationships and capital. Ericson, Baranek and Chan (1989) suggest that journalism as a whole is characterised by the negotiated relationship of power between journalists and sources. However, as literature suggests national security reporting in Australia is uniquely suggestive of an adversarial power relationship between the press and the military (Anderson and Trembath, 2011; Foster and Pallant, 2013). Literature has addressed the general practices and attitudes of national security reporters (Diamond, 2017), as well as their focus on particular aspects of journalism such as scandal (Wadham, 2016a). This inquiry aims to explore national security journalism in Australia on a more detailed level. As Van Dijk (2008) suggests, discourse analysis can be regarded as the "micro analysis of power" (p. 15) in

that it explores the relationship between social structures and the production of discursive practices and specific textual choices. The beat itself is a structuring aspect that influences the selection of words, themes, narratives and formats for national security journalism. As this analysis will detail, the relationship between national security journalists and the political and military establishment is key to understanding the reporting of the Attack class as a whole.

Analysis of the newspaper texts revealed 11 key discursive practices (5.4a – 5.6), that are described in turn below. These journalistic practices are central to the shaping orders of discourse surrounding the procurement of the Attack Class submarine.

### 5.4a—National Security Reporters Were Oriented Towards Elite Sources of News

As discussed in the literature for this research, journalism is becoming increasingly reliant on sources of convenience and elite sources for news (Berkowitz, 2009; Hecht, Martin, Donnelly, Larson and Sweetser, 2017). Earlier research by Hallin (1984) and Hallin, Manoff and Weddle (1993) suggested that in the U.S. context national security reporters were significantly oriented towards elite sources such as politicians and Government spokespeople. In peace time the national security beat is, to a certain degree, a speciality within the broader context of reporting on politics and Government. This analysis suggests that this is at least partly true for Australian national security reporters as well. Defence reporters were significantly oriented towards political discourses of the Attack class submarine, in part because politicians were significant sources of news, announcements and information. As the following examples suggest:

> Defence Minister Kevin Andrews has pledged the country will not be left without submarines to defend it, despite concerns new boats will not be built in time to replace the Collins-class fleet. (Stewart, 2015, February 28)

In another, the reporter foregrounds their access to a prominent South Australian politician:

> Independent Senator Nick Xenophon has told Japanese executives that their bid to win the Future Submarines contract will become mired in domestic Australian politics unless the boats are built in Adelaide. (Jean, 2015, July 8)

Announcements, public statements and press releases from politicians formed a substantial part of the reporting of the procurement. In articles such as the two above, politicians are treated as credible and authoritative sources with a high degree of affinity towards their statements. News reports written by national security journalists tend to adhere to normative ideals such as impartiality and balance (Deuze, 2005). Pronouncements made by politicians are presented without analysis, and usually in an authoritative voice, leading many news articles to effectively act as venues for contrasting political positions, criticised by Rosen (2011) and others as "he said, she said" journalism. The following articles provide examples of this:

> Prime Minister Tony Abbott said value for taxpayers must outweigh local job creation considerations […] South Australian Premier Jay Weatherill said that it was a broader issue than his state because of the demise of shipbuilding and submarine construction. (Coorey, Kerin and Evans, 2014, September 9)

> SA Senator Sean Edwards said that before yesterday's Liberal vote on the leadership spill, PM Tony Abbott had called and told him there would be a competitive tender […] Frontbench MP Jamie Briggs attacked Senator Edwards, saying he was mistaken and that there was no change in policy. (Shepherd, Jean and McPhedran, 2015, February 10)

A staple format for news articles analysed in this sample is a familiar point-counterpoint political discourse between proponents of one submarine policy or the other. As Fairclough (1992) suggests, this pattern fits the traditional genre of news as being primarily the product of selecting and reproducing the views of political elites, who are newsworthy by virtue of their position. But more than that, journalists are oriented towards discourses of strategic political conflict as an enduring news value (De Vreese, Esser and Hopmann, 2017; Tiffen, 1989). The

frequent selection of politicians as sources means that some articles within the corpus are dominated by the discourse of *political debate*. Take the following articles for example:

- Shepherd (2014, July 29) used the following sources: Chris Burns (industry lobbyist); Martin Hamilton-Smith (state government minster); Nick Xenophon (independent senator); Gai Brodtmann (Labor MP); and David Johnston (government Senator);
- Shepherd, Jean and McPhedran (2015, February 10) used the following sources: Sean Edwards (government Senator); Tony Abbott (PM); Kevin Andrews (Coalition MP); Nick Xenophon (independent Senator); Jamie Briggs (Coalition MP); Chris Burns (industry lobbyist); and Penny Wong (Labor MP).
- Kerin (2015, September 23) used a single source, Defence Minister Marise Payne for an interview piece.
- Wroe and Kenny (2015, September 18) used the following sources: Kevin Andrews (Coalition MP); Sean Costello (DCNS Chief Executive) and David Feeney (Labor MP).

The *political debate* discourse did come to dominate a significant portion of the reporting on the submarines. In part this can be explained by news values that orient towards conflict. But there are broader interdiscursive pressures that also pushed the procurement of the Attack class submarine into a *political debate* format. Most notably, the submarines became part of other news discourses relating to Tony Abbott's leadership crisis:

> Japanese officials have met to discuss whether Tony Abbott's leadership crisis could threaten a potential $25 billion deal to sell submarines to Australia. (Stewart, 2015, February 7)

Defence journalists came to associate Abbott's focus on a potential deal with Japan to build the submarines as another example of a "captain's pick" (Stewart, 2015, September 19). It was also widely reported that Tony Abbott had used the submarines as leverage during the February 2015 spill motion to convince South Australian party members to support him (Nicholson and Owen, 2015, February 10). Abbott and Kevin Andrew's Competitive

Evaluation Process was represented as partly a compromise designed to hold onto leadership of the party (Shepherd, 2016, April 28). Even after Malcolm Turnbull's successful bid to oust Abbott in September of 2015 the discourse of the Attack class remained entangled to a certain degree with the leadership crisis. As Stewart (2015, September 19) reported, while Abbott was in power it was widely perceived that Japan would have the inside line. But after he was ousted questions arose about how far the alleged "secret handshake" deal had gone, and whether losing the bid would strain diplomatic relations between Australia and Japan. From this analysis it is difficult to determine where the submarine procurement *political debate* ends, and the Liberal leadership crisis discourse begins.

### 5.4b—Competition as a Core Journalistic Principle

The literature around journalist-source relations often characterises them as a dance in which it is difficult to determine "who leads the tango" (Gans, 1980). If one were to look solely at journalist's source selection in this analysis it might be easy to conclude that politicians were able to set the agenda of reporting on the submarines. However, this was not the case. In many instances, journalists employed "knowledge of their patch" (Murphy, 2015) to access unique sources and insider information in order to shift the focus of the reporting of the Attack class. This is a key distinction between national security beat journalists and generalist reporters. National security journalists were active pursuers of newsworthy information, seeking new angles for reporting and calling on insider sources to develop new angles on the story. In this, defence journalists exhibit a strong sense of competition seeking out stories and angles that generalist reporters simply would not have access to.

The media narrative of the Attack class procurement was coloured by a degree of frustration about the secrecy around the process of choosing a design partner. While competition is one of the driving principles of journalism (Tiffen, 1989), writing original articles about the Attack class submarine proved difficult. As Tiffen (1989) argues, the production of competitive news is not always framed in terms of breaking new stories but investigating and advancing existing ones. National security journalists engaged in discourses

of *finding a new angle* or publishing an *exclusive* as ways of signalling to readers that they had access and connections other journalists did not. This was most evident in cases where national security reporters had prior knowledge of something that would later become public knowledge anyway. For example, in a story for *The Australian* newspaper:

> PM to surface with plan for submarines: *The Australian* has been told the Prime Minister's announcement is likely to include the creation of a new defence industry entity to work with an experienced international submarine designer. (Nicholson, 2014, December 15)

> The Coalition government is tipped to release its long-awaited defence white paper later this week and will, Fairfax Media understands, maintain the target of spending 2 per cent of GDP by 2023. (Wroe, 2015, February 24)

Access gives journalists a competitive advantage. Having an insider source who is willing to provide prior knowledge of an announcement or policy before it goes into the public domain is significant. It is a low risk leak on the part of the insider source, but for the journalist it represents a boon. Prior knowledge of an emerging story—such as the release of the Defence White Paper—means that journalists have time to line up unique sources, provide analysis and seek out other angles. It is also a mark of prestige; with national security journalists using it to signal a certain degree of insider status.

Analysis of the sample shows Defence journalists also used *exclusives* as ways to signal subject mastery. Using their insider status journalists position themselves discursively as being able to explain and make sense of complex technical and political issues in a way that would be impossible for an outsider.

> The Weekend Australian has been told this capability gap will be avoided by extending the lives of two or three of the Collins by replacing worn parts and batteries and upgrading sensors. (Nicholson, 2016, February 27)

In the above article, *The Australian's* national security reporter Brendan Nicholson uses insider knowledge to produce an explainer article detailing how the navy intends to solve the

problem of the Collins fleet being decommissioned in 2026 and the Attack class submarines not being commissioned until 2030. This insider information in itself is relatively banal. Its newsworthiness is derived from the fact that only *The Weekend Australian* had access to it and the public did not.

Sometimes *finding a new angle* means simply turning up and taking notes at less known events where a journalist knows major stakeholders might be present. John Kerin did as much by attending an Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) conference in April 2014:

> A dispute between the Swedish government and German industrial giant […] ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems threatens to hurt Australia's efforts to build submarines […] The fight […] spilled onto the floor of a submarine conference in Canberra on Thursday when retired Royal Swedish Navy rear admiral Goran Larsbrink […] said it was a mistake to sell Swedish submarine builder Kockums to ThyssenKrupp and the Swedish government should take it back. (Kerin, 2014, April 12)

The article provides a good example of the principle of "knowing your patch" as a professional practice followed by national security journalists (Murphy, 2015). To get that story Kerin needed the awareness and forethought to attend events related to their beat, with no guarantee a story would arise from such activities. Discursively it is a signal, again, that the journalist has experience and familiarity enough with their beat to be considered an insider.

### 5.4c—Doing Background Research and Investigation

In addition to *finding new angles*, national security journalists often developed competitive stories on the Attack class submarine by doing background research to look for novel information. Journalists employed discourses of deep *background research* to challenge government narratives, present newsworthy information and try to take the overall story of the submarines in a new direction. For example:

> Taxpayers have been hit with a $100 million bill for external advice about the navy's Future Submarine program. Documents show the vast extent of work by consultants

> hired by Defence […] the vast majority was in the most recent financial year. (McPhedran, 2015, November 23)

In the above example the newsworthy information is publicly available—but only if you know where to look and how to interpret it. This is another way journalists can signal subject mastery, but it is also significant as many *background research* discourses are designed to short-circuit government control of the agenda of news about an issue. In this sense, many stories engaged in this discourse represent journalists' attempts to use their knowledge of their beat to hold government to account for perceived mismanagement.

> Fat cats weigh on sub: Members of an expert panel overseeing the tender process for the purchase of the new navy submarines will each be paid between $275,000 and $339,000 for a maximum of 50 days work. (Jean, 2015, December 22)

> Between October 2009 and February 2010, the Navy had no submarines available to respond to a national emergency. (McPhedran, 2014, April 12)

Some *background research* discourses centred on access to insiders as sources of newsworthy information that could be used to scrutinise the government. For example:

> PM's office 'runs defence by stealth': A former key adviser to Defence Minister David Johnston has accused Tony Abbott's office of running Australia's defence policy by stealth, leaving Senator Johnston a toothless, 'incidental' minister. (Stewart, 2014, December 3)

In the above-mentioned article, Cameron Stewart interviewed Russell Stranger, a staffer for the Minister for Defence, and convinced them to go on the record with allegations concerning the Prime Minister's personal intervention in the Attack class project. Like other articles about alleged waste and mismanagement, the intention of this discourse is to signal to readers that the journalist is holding the government to account. The widespread use of the *background* discourse suggests that defence journalists were not compliant with or willing to simply reproduce the government's narrative. Instead, many journalists used their insider knowledge and access to overtly counter government rhetoric:

> Industry Minister Christopher Pyne has wrongly claimed that the decision to build all 12 new submarines in Adelaide [..] was based on a recommendation from the Defence Department […] Fairfax Media understands that Defence did not recommend the all-Australian build over the hybrid option. (Wroe, 2016, April 28)

### 5.4d—Springing a Leak

The most significant way in which national security journalists were able to influence overall public discourses of the Attack class procurement was by soliciting confidential information. Due to the highly secretive—and politically sensitive—nature of procuring the submarines, the Government and the Navy made very little information about the process public. This arguably made the story both more difficult to report on, but also more newsworthy when information did become available. The story itself may not have become such a significant media issue were it not for reporters *springing a leak* or two. Discursively, journalists reporting on the submarines used leaked information to challenge or contradict political narratives and scrutinise government handling of the project:

> When asked yesterday what aspects of the Japanese boats might be included in an Australian design, a senior government source replied: "Everything." When pressed on whether that included buying the boats off-the-shelf from the Japanese the answer was an emphatic "yes". (McPhedran, 2014, April 8)

National security journalists were responsible for the majority of reporting of leaks from government and defence insiders. Only around 27 articles published during the sample period used a leak as a primary source of newsworthy information for an article, however the leaks that were published had a significant flow on effect for redirecting the media discourse.

More about this will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 6, which will focus specifically on the role that discourses of leaks and secrecy played in the reporting of the Attack class programme.

What is relevant for this chapter is that national security reporters played a significant role in subverting the opacity of the Attack class programme. Throughout 2014 the

Abbott government began to develop a strategy for how they were going to procure the future submarine fleet. Treasurer Joe Hockey had declared in late 2013 that Australia was facing a "budget emergency". The media debate over the Attack class increased significantly after McPhedran published in April 2014 that a "senior government source" was considering the possibility of Australia buying submarines from Japan. The leaks that followed painted an inside story of submarine manufacturers rushing to make unsolicited bids for a project with no tender process (McPhedran, 2014, April 12; Kerin, 2014, September 11); with the government more or less making a behind closed doors decision to make a purchase framed by price and pragmatism (Nicholson, Wallace and Owen, 2014, September 9). In August Kerin (2014, August 11) cited unnamed "defence sources" as indicating that Japanese submarines were the "leading option" in the procurement process. And in September, McPhedran (2014, September 8) cited a "senior source" as revealing that the submarines were "all but certain to be built in Japan". Throughout this period the government refused to be drawn on what it was planning.

Throughout 2014 national security journalists used their insider sources to effectively set the agenda of reporting on the Attack class. While the Abbott government refused to answer questions, defence reporters provided answers. While the government continued a behind the scenes process to decide what it wanted, journalists continued to apply scrutiny that lead to increased political pressure.

### 5.4e—Anonymous Sources

This analysis suggests that despite the cultural differences between the press and Defence (Anderson and Trembath, 2011; Foster and Pallant, 2013; 2016), journalists were often able to solicit confidential information from defence insiders.

> Defence sources have told *The Australian Financial Review* that talks with Japan on its involvement with Australia's new fleet are "far more advanced than publicly acknowledged". (Kerin, 2014, August 11)

> Confidential Defence analysis shows it will cost about 30 per cent more to build the new fleet of submarines in Australia than to buy them (Uren and Nicholson, 2016 April 20).
>
> Defence sources say the Australian delegation told the Germans in the Kiel debriefing that this cost estimate did not reflect the technical challenges and was "well below expectations". (Stewart, 2016, May 30)

Whether these sources are ADF members or civilian defence officials is unclear. Defence sources appear regularly throughout the reporting of the Attack class procurement. National security reporters were the only journalists who used sources declared as 'defence sources' or 'insiders' regularly. As the above examples suggest, the kind of information revealed by such sources tended to subvert political narratives of the Attack class submarines. Journalists reporting on the submarines tended to use quotes from defence insiders as a discursive strategy to both signal insider status, and place pressure or scrutiny on the government for its handling of defence issues. For example:

> Defence sources have told *The Australian Financial Review* Mr Abbott's new minister Kevin Andrews may not survive on the frontbench […] A senior defence source said there were concerns that vital defence decisions could be delayed. (Kerin, 2015, February 4)

Disclosures, such as the one in the article above, were often treated as newsworthy occurrences in and of themselves. Kerin's article is framed around the leaker as the primary source for the article. Government secrecy itself was regarded as a newsworthy theme for reporting on the Attack class. However, it is clear that journalists did not employ leaked information indiscriminately. As this example by Stewart (2016, February 10) suggests:

> The navy has slapped the first secret classification on the number of Australian submarine commanders and crew […] the move comes as navy faces a critical shortage of qualified submarine commanders, raising claims it is aimed at hiding bad

> news rather than for genuine security reasons. *The Australian* understands the navy has failed to boost its ranks of qualified submarine commanders in the past five years.

National security journalists reporting on the Attack class programme used leaked information to challenge the legitimacy of government secrecy. Leaks provided journalists opportunities to test assumptions about the necessity of strictly behind-closed-doors decision making. This suggests that leaks as a discursive strategy were not motivated by an oversimplified desire to embarrass politicians or the navy. Rather, journalists often sought to test the question of whether the government was using secrecy for genuine security reasons, or whether it was simply to hide bad news of a politically consequential nature.

### 5.4f—Gaffes and Scandals

Holding public officials to account can take many different forms. As Tiffen (1989) suggests, journalists tend to be oriented towards politically consequential controversies. While there are examples within the corpus of journalists applying political scrutiny by challenging political narratives, there are also examples suggesting a more straightforward orientation towards political embarrassment and scandal more generally. Scandal journalism in this analysis tended to follow a relatively reliable format: a politician or public figure does or says something objectionable, journalists report commentary that generally condemns the act, and after a period of time the public figure either apologises, is held to account or both. Some scandals are, of course, more consequential than others. However, even minor gaffes may be the focus of journalistic attention:

> Dead North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il could bid for Australia's $25 billion submarine project under Labor's defence policy, Prime Minister Tony Abbott has said. (Kerin, 2015, February 12)

Abbott's statement that Labor's open tender policy might invite a tender from North Korea was likely nothing more than the PM employing a "rhetorical flourish" during question time. Nevertheless, the comment was considered newsworthy and reported on. Abbott's second gaffe for that week was considered to cause slightly more controversy:

> Prime Minister Tony Abbott last night provoked outrage after invoking the Holocaust when talking about jobs in South Australia. (Shepherd and Jean, 2015, February 13)

Abbott's "holocaust of jobs" comment resulted in a number of articles, calls for an apology, and eventually an admission from Abbott that what he said was wrong and that he would apologise for it (Owen, 2015, February 13). National security journalists reported on gaffes as newsworthy events that reflected the ongoing *political conflict* discourse, and the generally controversial nature of the Attack class procurement process. The most significant example from this discourse was what was considered by journalists to be significantly consequential comments made by Defence Minister David Johnston regarding the ASC:

> Defence Minister David Johnston declared yesterday that he would not trust Adelaide-based, Government-owned shipbuilder ASC "to build a canoe". His comments were labelled "pretty disgusting" and an "outrageous attack". (Shepherd, 2014, November 26)

The 'canoe' gaffe set up a remarkable round of continued coverage from journalists reporting on the submarines. Johnston was censured by the Senate for his comments (Harrison and Wroe, 2014 November 17) for "'insulting' the men and women of the ASC; undermining confidence in Australia's defence capability; threatening the integrity of the Future Submarine Project by demonstrating bias and failing to conduct a competitive tender".

National security reporters covered the gaffe by exploring its political consequences. The political reaction against Senator Johnston was significant enough that speculation grew that the PM was going to sack him. But Johnston apologised, and Abbott dismissed his comments as being said "in the heat of the moment" (Shanahan, 2014, November 28). The story went quiet for a few days before, subsequently, insiders leaked Johnston's entertainment expenses to Ian McPhedran:

> No share of brass platter for soldiers: Aussie troops may be facing a pre-Christmas pay cut but Defence top brass are spending thousands of taxpayer dollars wining and

> dining industry figures […] Documents obtained by *The Advertiser* show that many of the five-star meals hosted during November—at a total cost of $6384 and up to $300 a head—included $200 wines, $20 cocktails and exotic culinary delights such as oysters verjuice. (McPhedran, 2014, December 3)

The article was discursively arranged to invoke a sense of scandal. McPhedran compared the Minister's entertainment expenses to the proposed lower-than-inflation pay increase ADF members were expected to receive in 2015. The focus on "five-star meals", "oysters verjuice" and "$200 wines" builds an image for the reader that Johnston is dining on luxury while "Aussie troops" do it tough. The ABC would later report that prior to the "canoe" gaffe and Johnston's expenses scandal the Government was going to finally announce that it was going to purchase the submarines off-the-shelf (Shepherd, 2015, March 17). The plan was shelved indefinitely during the scandal, which eventually rolled directly into a leadership spill against Abbott in early February.

## 5.5—National Security Reporters as Experts and Translators

This analysis suggests that national security reporters and defence correspondents played a significant role in shaping news discourses of the Attack class submarine procurement. While the quantity of articles written by these journalists is significant it is their discursive qualities and characteristics that reveal the important role beat journalists played. National security reporters appear to be drawn towards reporting on discourses of *political debate* over the submarines, as well as the leadership crisis, political conflict, and gaffes and scandals. However, there are many examples of national security reporters using access to insider sources and knowledge to subvert political control of the overall media narrative. Defence journalists broke stories using unique sources in order to apply scrutiny to government decisions and subvert political discourses. Beat journalists were able to drive interest in the story by *finding competitive angles,* and by using access to government announcements and decisions prior to them taking place. They were able to source

newsworthy *background research* to apply scrutiny to government over its management of aspects of the submarines project. And they were able to solicit leaked information, which in some instances was consequential in applying increased media scrutiny towards an issue. Despite accounts of Defence having a relationship of distrust with the press, national security journalists were able to convince defence sources to provide them with the inside story—on the basis of anonymity—about what was really going on. And due to their sources and connections, journalists were well placed to receive information about gaffes and scandals. In these ways, national security journalists were able to break competitive and newsworthy stories that scrutinised government secrecy, challenged political discourses and set the agenda of reporting on the Attack class submarines as an issue.

### 5.5a—Subject Mastery

The characteristics of the reporting done by national security journalists suggests a form of insider status and subject mastery that is not observed in generalist reporters. One way in which this is obvious is that throughout the reporting of the Attack class submarines, it was national security journalists who most often attempted to explain the complex and technical nature of the submarines. Fairclough (1992) suggests that journalists often write in a way that translates elite perspectives into the "voice of ordinary experience" (p. 110). This can be observed in the way defence journalists took complex technical information and translated it.

For example, Stewart (2013, September 25) explains a leaked DMO report identifying technical problems with the Collins submarines, stating that the subs have "obsolete internal and external communications systems". This is translated using the phrase "that could jeopardise the ability of submarines *to talk* to other navy vessels" (para. 3). It is unlikely a technical report from the DMO would use the metaphor of two submarines "talking" to one another; Stewart is instead making clear what the technical expression "obsolete internal and external communications systems" would mean in terms their assumed audience would more easily understand.

In another example, McPhedran (2014, April 8) explains that Senator Johnston had inspected Japan's implementation of "the Swedish-designed air independent propulsion system (AIP) system)". This is translated as a system that "allows the diesel-electric vessels to remain submerged for long periods of time without the need for fresh air" (para. 4). It is significant to note that McPhedran is not attributing this translation to a source external to the news article. Rather, the voice of the reporter is merged seamlessly with the technical voice of experts and bureaucratic sources above and around them. Different reporters translated the technical information about the AIP system in slightly different ways. Nicholson (2014, September 11) for example, explains that the Japanese Soryu submarines are fitted with the AIP system, and this "allows it to recharge its batteries quietly while submerged, to avoid detection by an enemy. That requires it to travel slowly while 'on station'" (para. 4). But again, in this case the journalist uses their own voice, it is left unclear whether they are drawing from any other texts or sources.

Nicholson, Martin and Murdoch (2014, September 10), use a novel approach to explain how submarine manufacturing work can be shared between Australia and Japan: "the Soryu submarines are built in sections *that resemble soft drink cans* which are each then fitted out and welded together" (para. 10). The sections could as such be made in Japan then easily shipped to Australia to be fitted out and joined. The use of the simile 'like soft drink cans' translates clearly into Australian vernacular. In the transformation however the author has injected a level of triviality to the complex task of moving entire sections of submarine by boat across the long stretch of ocean between Kobe and Adelaide.

In some instances, the level of technical information translated and relayed to readers likely exceeds what is necessary to explain the submarine procurement to a reasonable audience. For example, McPhedran (2014, September 9) details that the Soryu submarine has 533mm torpedo tubes while the Collins has 530mm torpedo tubes. The Collins is also equipped with 44 Stonefish Mark III sea mines. In another example, Nicholson (2015, October 6) states that according to Japanese engineers "the 88m long Soryu would be extended with the addition of a new hull section 6-8m long, which would be placed behind the

submarine's fin" (para. 3). Why the submarine needs to be extended in this manner is left unexplained, nor does the author suggest if this may or may not give the Japanese bidders some advantage over their rivals.

### 5.5b—Journalists and their Connection to Politicians and Staffers

National security journalists 'know their patch'. They represent themselves as having privileged access and expertise, providing themselves with a competitive advantage over other journalists. However, it is unclear from this analysis how much of the reporting of the Attack class procurement might be the result of quid-pro-quo journalism. As mediatisation theory suggests, politicians and government departments are not passive participants in their relationships with the media (Hepp, Hjarvard and Lundby, 2015; Strömbäck, 2008). Politicians are increasingly seeking out ways to subvert media gatekeepers and get their preferred message into the public debate (Fisher, Marshall and McCallum, 2018). Consequentially, the power relationship between political sources and journalists are uncertain. Research suggests that the relationship between journalists and politicians can be characterised as a heavily negotiated one (Erickson, Baranek and Chan, 1989). As such, this discourse analysis must be tempered with a certain degree of scepticism. Through this analysis of the reporting of the Attack class procurement, this inquiry can only observe one side of the process of generating news. Politicians, insiders and elite sources are adept at negotiating relationships with journalists in which their political goals are served as much—or more—than the competitive demands of journalism. As Fisher (2016b) suggests, politicians and their media staff are adept at passing stories to compliant journalists, leaking information, spinning facts and getting ahead of the media cycle. A shortcoming of this inquiry is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the extent to which politicians or other figures might have engaged in such activities to influence the reporting of the Attack class. Textual analysis can only observe the outcome of such negotiations.

### 5.5c—Voices that are Absent from Reporting of the Attack Class

It is also noteworthy that there are perspectives missing from the overall media discourse. Given the Attack class programme is a Navy project, it might be reasonable to presume members of the ADF and its various public affairs offices might have engaged with reporters throughout the procurement process. However, in confirmation of existing research around defence-media relations (Anderson and Trembath, 2011; Hibbert and Starr, 2004; Logue, 2010), official contact between Defence officials and the press was heavily restricted. The Australian Defence Forces elected to vacate the public discussion of the Attack class submarines almost entirely. Instead, politicians—and defence leakers—were allowed to speak on their behalf. In the limited occurrences where Defence officials talked to the press, they were generally dismissive of the political debate being waged throughout the media:

> "Speculation in the media is totally irrelevant to us," [Defence Secretary] Richardson told AFR weekend. "What comes out of this department will be based on a hard-headed assessment of capabilities. People can write what they like, think what they like, this is of very little consequence to us. We'll be making judgements about what's in front of us, and not based upon public relations". (Walker, 2016, March 24)

For defence reporters, members of the ADF were not, generally, sources of newsworthy information. Instead announcements made about consequential changes to defence policy were made by politicians and the Prime Minister. The Attack class programme developed as a political story to a good degree because politicians were most often the sources of newsworthy information relevant to it. The degree of secrecy around the project only served to increase the newsworthiness of the story, and the regular leaking of insider information mean that it was rarely out of the headlines.

An argument could be made here that Defence is repeating the mistakes it made with the Collins class fleet. As Yule and Woolner (2008) argue, the Navy and the project office realised almost too late the effect that negative public sentiment towards Collins was having on the success of the project. At the height of the media's scrutiny of Collins workforce moral

was low and key stakeholders were at loggerheads. Decision paralysis set in as those involved in Collins became increasingly averse to negative media attention. As Yule and Woolner (2008) argue, the politicisation of Collins in the media was a significant factor that led to poor decisions about its management. Spong (2015) argues this same aversion to scandal contributed to the policy paralysis that delayed the starting of the Attack class programme during the Rudd-Gillard-Rudd years. As Yule and Woolner state, one of the recommendations made by subsequent inquiries into the Collins project was that the project office retain a PR firm to manage media relations, so that the project office could respond to negative perceptions of the Collins submarine. The Navy lament that the Collins fleet is still widely known in the public domain as "dud subs" (Nicholson, 2014, April 5; 2016, April 27), but it has arguably done little to try and dissuade the public of that notion from a PR perspective.

There is a fundamental disconnection between the Australian Defence Forces and the press; the widely held view that despite it being funded at huge expense by the Australian taxpayer, that Defence should not have to engage with journalists to seek a public mandate for the work that it does (Foster and Pallant, 2013; 2016). Unless the Navy takes a more proactive role in releasing newsworthy information about the Attack class submarines, it may well suffer a repeat of the political paralysis and mismanagement that the Collins faced.

## 5.6—National Security Journalism and the Influence of Beat Routines

The above findings suggest that national security journalists are oriented towards political and military institutions, and that this informs the discursive practices they employ to report on national security issues. As Hepp, Hjarvard and Lundby (2010) state, the social process of mediatisation is centrally about the reciprocal influence between the media and other social fields and institutions. As institutions such as the ADF become increasingly averse to or influenced by the scrutiny of the press, mediatisation theory suggests that they will adapt to the logics and practices of the press. Likewise, mediatisation argues that journalists who

cover the military will adapt to and orient themselves around the logics and practices of the military.

The state of national security journalism in Australia suggests that beat journalists have adapted to the routines of and oriented their discursive practices around the political and military sources that constitute the bulk of their work. The above examples suggest that national security reporters have developed a familiarity with the military, a level of knowledge of its function and access to contacts and insiders within Defence. The existence of an Australian national security beat itself provides a degree of evidence to the notion that journalists change their practices and adapt to the field and subject matter they are tasked with reporting on. Similarly, it seems likely that the Defence establishment have also adapted to and reoriented their relationship with the press. As Nicholson (2019) argues of the Australian Defence Force:

> A long line of ministers has overseen an accelerating process of change, which has handed more control over information to politicians and their staff while limiting the military's ability to speak. This has had little to do with operational security and a lot to do with avoiding the possibility of a minister being caught out or embarrassed by enquires from the media or questions in Senate hearings.

The results from this analysis suggest that the effect of this gagging of Defence officials is to create a void in media discussions of key procurement issues. National security reporters rarely published articles that included named Defence officials as sources, instead, the most significant sources of news about the Attack class were politicians and other elites. As a political issue, the submarines were perhaps more likely to be discursively structured by the kind of political conflict framing that political reporting is drawn towards (De Vreese, Esser and Hopmann, 2017; Tiffen, 1989). Journalists covering the Attack class tended to produce narratives that focused on gaffes, scandals, leaks and political controversies. And while national security reporters also employed practices such as engaging in *background research,* and seeking out insider information to develop *competitive angles*, these stories too were often presented in terms of their political dimensions. In the absence of sources of information that

might have been considered apolitical, instead journalists were drawn towards sources that were primarily political in their reasons for talking to the press. As Nicholson continues:

> If forced to operate in an information vacuum, the media will find something to fill it. Those stories won't necessarily come from smart and well-informed generals, admirals, air marshals or department secretaries. Some will be accurate and painstakingly assembled by conscientious journalists. Others will come from aggrieved personnel or from someone who thinks they overheard something on a bus.

The politicisation of the Attack class submarine procurement project in media discourses is arguably a reflection of the military's inability to establish a public mandate for the programme independent of partisan politicians. As such, it could be argued that the degree of secrecy and control of information about significant procurement programmes might in actuality hinder rather than help Defence's chances of achieving the best political outcome.

National security reporters are active pursuers of newsworthy stories. The findings from this chapter confirm the portrayal of beat journalists as presented in the literature. Additionally, this chapter provides insight into the characteristics of defence journalism in Australia outside of the context of military commemoration and war correspondence. These findings suggest that reporting of the Attack class procurement was oriented towards discourses of *political conflict*. As politicians and other elite sources were significant sources of newsworthy information, the media debate over the submarines tended to be presented in political terms. However, national security reporters frequently used access to insider sources and knowledge to seek out newsworthy information that did not originate from official government spokespeople. By finding new and competitive angles on the story, doing independent background research and soliciting leaks from insider sources, national security journalists were able to challenge official discourses of the submarines. By knowing their beat, national security journalists were able to seek out competitive angles on news stories that subverted the secrecy of the procurement process and instigated public controversy. They

sparked minor scandals, held politicians to account, and—likely—contributed to a degree of politicisation that changed the outcome of the Attack class programme.

News organisations in Australia are still facing declining revenue and a struggle to keep journalists in their jobs. Should the beat system of reporting in Australia fail, what will go with it will be the knowledge, experience, access and insight required for journalists to actively pursue newsworthy stories. Arguably, what will remain will be a lesser model of the press, one that is broadly generalist and passive, receiving the news that it is given by political and elite sources but without the capability or knowhow to subvert official narratives and discourses. This research suggests that to a certain degree the beat system is already on its way out. John Kerin from *The Australian Financial Review* has left that paper and now works as a lobbyist for Naval Group. Ian McPhedran from *The Advertiser* has retired. Neither journalist has been replaced by a single individual responsible for reporting on the national security beat. As newsrooms shrink individual reporters must take on additional portfolios and multi-task between them. This limits the availability of journalists and turns knowing their patch into a game of juggling responsibilities. And as the government increases pressure on journalists and whistleblowers it seems likely that the slow drip of leaks from inside Defence may become even slower. The resources required to produce active journalism are finite: insider contacts, technical knowledge, social capital, trust. Without those resources, audiences will be left with a lesser version of the news.

The next chapter will discuss in further detail the role that leaked news and anonymous sources played in the reporting of the Attack class submarines. It will further advance the argument that in the absence of official Defence sources journalists were reliant on anonymous government and defence insiders for ongoing coverage of the procurement programme. This chapter will demonstrate how national security reporters were instrumental in advancing and disrupting political narratives of the Attack class procurement, as well as undermining the opacity of the project during its critical first year.

# Chapter 6—Leaking the News: Unauthorised Disclosures and Anonymous Sources

> *"Defence can't use the cloak of national security to hide their failing in planning for our future defence needs," he said. "They need to fix the problem rather than trying to submerge the truth from coming out".* (Stewart, 2016, February 10)

The inside story of the Attack class procurement was told in large part through unauthorised and anonymous disclosures to specialist national security reporters. Carlson (2012) refers to such disclosures as "leaks", arguing that in the U.S. the leaking of state secrets has been a public concern since George Washington's administration. The Attack class procurement was and continues to be a politically sensitive and secretive process, and as such many sources of newsworthy information about it remain anonymous. As discussed in Chapter 3 the use of such sources is generally accepted as a necessary part of reporting on sensitive government and political issues (Carlson, 2011; Tiffen, 1989). However, it is not without its ethical questions. Some journalism scholarship has suggested that the use of anonymous sources undermines the public's faith in the credibility of news (Pjesivac and Rui, 2014; Sternadori and Thorson, 2009). News organisations are mindful of how damaging scandals around news fabrication can be to the reputation of a paper—or the industry as a whole (Duffy, 2014; Gladney, Shapiro and Ray, 2013; Wulfemeyer, 1983). But there is also a professional awareness that anonymous sources have been instrumental to some of the most significant journalism of the 20th century; stories like Watergate and The Pentagon Papers (Duffy and Williams, 2011). The digital era has profoundly changed the nature of political journalism leaks. With the advent of massive coordinated leaks of large quantities of sensitive information such as the Panama Papers, Cablegate and the Edward Snowden leaks, news has entered a new era. These content rich and complex disclosures, what Woodall (2018) refers to as "megaleaks", have provided unique opportunities for journalists to collaborate to produce

newsworthy stories that hold governments and powerful individuals to account (Packard, 2017; Woodall, 2018). However, such occurrences are relatively uncommon and dependent on insiders going to sometimes extreme lengths to disclose large amounts of classified information.

As the previous chapter discussed, the majority of disclosures made to journalists reporting on politics and government are the product of human intelligence gathering: knowing your patch (Murphy, 2015) and making connections with insider sources. Politicians and their media staff are also active participants in cultivating relationships with journalists to leak information to suit their political aims (Fisher, 2016b). In Australia, the future of such disclosures is uncertain as successive governments escalate their monitoring of journalists' communications and reduce protections for whistleblowers making genuine public interest disclosures (Fernandez, 2017; Humphreys and de Zwart, 2017). For example, between 2017 and 2018 the Federal Police accessed journalists' metadata 58 times (Doran and Belot, 2019, July 9), and subsequent raids on the offices of the ABC as well as a NewsCorp journalist suggest that journalists are being investigated as recipients of leaked information (Worthington and Blumer, 2019, June 7). As Knowles, Worthington and Blumer (2019, June 6) reveal, police were targeting journalists who received leaked Defence information—known as "the Afghan files"—that detailed allegations of misconduct by special forces in Afghanistan. While police have responded to these events by highlighting that they are simply enforcing the laws "as prescribed by the Parliament" (Vincent, 2019, July 17), there are some concerns that the raids may be designed to deter individuals from leaking sensitive information in the future—producing a chilling effect (Knaus, 2019, March 27). These actions raise questions about whether public security organisations are no longer content with laying charges against whistleblowers alone, but are also seeking to prosecute journalists who come into possession of classified information and documents.

This chapter will discuss the instrumental role that leaked news played in the reporting of the Attack class procurement process. Through this case study it will also raise questions about how increasing government secrecy may change how leaks are reported on in

the Australian media. Governments have many reasons to extend police powers to prosecute journalists for reporting whistleblower disclosures. As Tiffen (1989) argues, the content of unauthorised disclosures is often not as significant as the resultant perception that the authority of the political class is undermined. As they state: "politicians' responses to leaks are often shaped less by the substance of information, than by their loss of control over the immediate political process" (p. 99-100). As this analysis suggests, there are a number of characteristics of newspaper reporting of leaks that can be observed. Leaks functioned to provide transparency where otherwise the government restricted information. They also functioned to support or undermine political management of news discourses. The factual news content of leaked information was often less significant than the political dimensions of the leak itself. Finally, some leaks were less political in their dimensions and were more related to the commercial debate between competing bidders for the Attack class contract.

This chapter will first discuss some relevant background literature on the role of leaks in news media reporting. Second, it will provide an analysis of how leaked information was reported on in news coverage of the Attack class submarines. Third, it will outline key findings from this chapter. Finally, it will discuss these key findings and the questions they raise regarding the overall reporting of national security issues in Australia.

## 6.1—The Role of Leaks and Anonymous Sources in News Reporting

There is limited research in an Australian context that looks at how leaks are used as part of newspaper reporting of defence and national security issues. More broadly, literature is divided over the discursive use and impact of leaks on political discourse. Significant research in the U.S. context suggests that discursive practices surrounding the use of anonymous and unauthorised disclosures have evolved over time. Contemporary journalists approach the use of anonymous sources with caution (Carlson, 2011), but as Boeyink (1990) notes, for much of the 1960s through to the 1970s professional codes of ethics and journalism textbooks had little to say about their use. Wulfemeyer (1983) details how following the Janet Cooke news fabrication scandal many U.S. newsrooms instituted policies requiring editorial oversight and

the independent verification of sources prior to publication. Duffy (2014), analysing the historic policies of news organisations, argues that by the late 2000s US newsrooms widely adopted a set of principles on what was considered best practice for unnamed sourcing. Duffy suggests this may have been a response to a number of highly publicised scandals involving news fabrication and retractions in the 2000s. Literature suggests that contemporary journalists generally do not use anonymous sources lightly, but instead have established a range of practices and institutional policies around their use. However, others such as Carlson (2011) argue, unnamed sources are sometimes used to try and make a story appear more important than it actually is, or to build the reputation of a journalist as being well connected.

Editorial policies and procedures around the use of unnamed sources are often designed to minimise risk. As Tiffen (1989) explains, using leaks as newsworthy information can backfire on journalists should their content later be proved unreliable, and uncritical reporting of leaks can lead to distorted judgements, manipulation and irresponsible reporting. Beyond the risk of causing a scandal, unnamed sources are sometimes regarded as lacking in credibility and undermining the normative principles of journalism (Deuze, 2005). As Purvis (2015) notes, concealing information about a source from the public generally goes against widely accepted principles of transparency in journalism. Kimball (2011) suggests many journalists report being uncomfortable using anonymous sources. According to research by Kimball, journalists report concern that audiences might view news from anonymous sources as less credible and distrust news that cannot be independently verified. There is mixed research that suggests there may be some basis for these concerns. A study by Sternadori and Thorson (2009) concluded that audiences viewed news stories that used anonymous sources as less credible. Participants consistently rated stories that used more anonymous sources as being less believable and as being lower quality journalism. A larger study by Pjesivac and Rui (2014) with 620 participants found similar results. Participants in both China and the US assessed news stories with anonymous sources as being less credible. However, in another study by Smith (2007), readers of newspaper articles were found to place more significance on whether or not the anonymous source was perceived to be personally attacking someone or

not. Otherwise, participants rated stories with and without anonymous sources as being equally credible.

Studies that have looked at the discursive strategies used by journalists to report on unauthorised disclosures suggest patterns to how they are used and when they are attributed. Sheehy (2008) found that newspaper journalists tended to protect sources significantly by providing limited attributions. Journalists generally partially identified a source using only institutional and organisational affiliations, and with foreign affairs stories sources were often completely anonymised. Martin-Kratzer and Thorson (2007) found that newspaper and television journalists covering war, foreign affairs and government beats were more likely than other journalists to use fully anonymous sources. And research by Duffy and Williams (2011) along with Gladney, Shapiro and Ray (2013) found that since the 1970s and 1980s journalists have become more cautious in the use of anonymous sources, and their use in newspaper journalism has declined.

Overall, the literature suggests it is common for journalists to consider whether or not the use of an unnamed source is justified prior to going to print. Kimball (2011) argues that in many cases one or more of the following principles were followed by journalists prior to using anonymous sources:

1. Evaluating if the information is significant or important enough to publish unattributed
2. Evaluating if the source needed anonymity, what their motivations for seeking anonymity were, and if they were trustworthy
3. Conferring with a supervisor or editor
4. Explaining to the source the exact nature of the confidentiality they will offer

Kimball also notes that almost all participants in their study agreed that once a deal was made protecting an anonymous source was vital to the credibility of a journalist, even if it meant they would face legal consequences. Other research likewise suggests that U.S. newsrooms routinely employ a range of practices to limit the risk of using news provided by an unnamed source. These include:

- Providing an explanation for why a source was offered anonymity (Gladney, Shapiro and Ray, 2013);
- Partial identification of sources (for example by identifying the institution they work for, their position, and/or their level of seniority) (Sheehy, 2008; Duffy and Williams, 2011);
- Independent verification by using multiple sources for information (Duffy and Williams, 2011);
- Editors making the final decision on whether to use the source or not (Smith, 2007).

Despite these principles and procedures being widely accepted by the profession there have still been numerous recent scandals resulting from the misuse of unnamed sources (Carlson, 2011). As Carlson suggests; journalists caught out passing on government talking points; publishing unsubstantiated facts that are later proved false; or getting caught out inventing sources that never existed; can face significant consequences. Journalistic misconduct in scandals such as the Valerie Plame leak case and the Scooter Libby trial have prompted some—both inside and outside the profession—to call for a complete end on the use of unnamed sources in news (Carlson, 2011). Although whether such a thing is either feasible or desirable in the contemporary political landscape is unclear.

Australian audiences are increasingly concerned about the trustworthiness of news in the era of 'fake news' (Park, Fisher, Fuller and Lee, 2018). And as the above literature suggests, the use of anonymous sources and leaked information may have a significant influence on whether news is regarded as credible or not. However, limited research has looked at the discursive characteristics of how Australian journalists use leaks in their reporting. While this research may not be able to address whether it is regarded as credible, it aims to provide a basis for understanding how Australian journalists structure news articles and produce texts around leaks as an element of news. As such, this thesis hopes to lay some groundwork for future research that may explore deeper questions about the practices used and decisions made by journalists using leaked information.

## 6.2—Critical Discourse Analysis of Leaks and Anonymous Sources in News Reporting of the Attack Class Procurement

Leaks and unauthorised disclosures were prevalent throughout the reporting of the Attack class procurement. Following an overall qualitative analysis of news articles, a sub-selection of 45 articles that contained leaks and unauthorised disclosures were selected from the total corpus of 879 articles. These texts were selected based on Fairclough's (1992) principle that they represented moments of crisis in the overall reporting of the procurement. Selection was also guided by Carvalho's (2008) concept of critical discourse moments. Fairclough argues that unusual changes in the style and production of texts often represents a point at which discursive change is more apparent. As Van Dijk (2008) argues, a "major element in the discursive reproduction of power and dominance is the very access to discourse and communicative events" (p. 67). Leaks represent a unique point of access to knowledge and information, access that is generally restricted and managed by those in positions of power and influence. This thesis argues that *these moments of access* can reveal the way leaks influence public debate on an ideological level by drawing attention to and privileging certain secret facts, information or perspectives while others remain concealed. Using a Critical Discourse Analysis approach therefore provides additional insight as it positions the publicising of leaks as both an essentially political act and a product of the balance of power between journalists and sources. Journalists must continuously weigh the price of access with the potential political effects of an unauthorised disclosure. In doing so, they also decide how leaks are framed and represented in the context of public discourse. In other words, the journalist is central to whether a leak functions to reproduce the views of those in positions of power and dominance or challenges them instead.

Key findings of this chapter are outlined as follows. Leaks functioned to provide transparency over what journalists represented as a secretive process. They also supported and undermined political management of the overall discourse. The political dimensions of leaks were often represented as being more consequential than the content of the leaks themselves.

Furthermore, leaks were employed as part of the commercial discourses of competing bidders for the Attack class contract.

### 6.2a—Journalists Established that Secrecy was a Significant Context

During the first year of its procurement process there was limited information released to the public about the Attack class submarine. There were few announcements about the project from government spokespeople; except for occasional public statements by Defence Minister David Johnston. The lack of transparency around the project was reported on by journalists and commentators. As Mark Thomson, researcher at the ASPI, noted towards the end of 2014:

> "At the moment it's a $20 billion guessing game […] people know Australia wants new submarines but they don't know what's wanted. They also don't know the process by which the submarine will be selected, so potential suppliers have no choice but to make unsolicited bids." (Nicholson, 2014, November 19)

In reporting, journalists often characterised the procurement process as secretive. Some regarded it as excessively so. Laura Tingle characterised it as "the government's dance of a thousand veils" (Tingle, 2014, September 12). Brendan Nicholson (2014, November 19) noted that:

> Submarine operations are traditionally shrouded in secrecy, but hardly more so than the government's process of finding a new undersea fleet for the navy.

And Nicholas Stuart suggested that the degree of secrecy surrounding the project was leading it to become a "political plaything", arguing that "transparency is imperative. So let's drag the sordid dealings into the light". (Stuart, 2014, September 13)

The degree of unnecessary secrecy surrounding the project became a discursive device used to explore emerging problems. Journalists such as Nicholas Stuart—as quoted above—suggested the secrecy was a key element in mistakes being made behind the scenes. Other journalists suggested that behind the veil Abbott was not just at odds with political rivals but also at odds with the ADF and senior Defence officials (Tingle, 2014, October 17).

There was criticism that the secrecy might have been used to hide the fact that "Option J"—buying submarines from Japan—was being driven by Prime Minister Abbott's office for political rather than capability reasons (Shepherd, 2014, July 31). And there are instances where journalists used sources that were critical of the lack of transparency around the project:

> "Good policy rarely results from secret deliberations shielded from public scrutiny, so I think it's time to discuss Option J directly, at a level beyond passing media speculation" [Mark Thompson] said. (Shepherd, 2014, July 31)

In the reporting of leaked information, the secrecy surrounding the Attack class was often used as contextual information that in part explained the use of anonymous sources. As McPhedran (2014, April 8) reported, a "senior government source" revealed that the Abbott government was already in "high level defence talks" to access Japanese submarine technology. McPhedran characterised head of Defence Materiel Organisation Warren King's visit to Japan in February as a "top-secret mission". Kerin (2014, October 28) characterises submarine procurement in general as a "notoriously secret business", while revealing leaked information from "defence sources" explaining the government's decision-making process. And Nicholson (2015, February 11) described the debate over the submarines as "impenetrable", further commenting that due to a lack of clarity from government:

> A normally secretive process has become even harder to come to grips with for all involved, not least the nations queuing up for a contract worth at least $20 billion.

There were also numerous reports from journalists—citing different anonymous sources—that Abbott had made a secret "handshake deal" with Japan PM Shinzo Abe for the contract to build the submarines to go to Japan (Debelle, 2014, September 13; Richardson, 2015, February 13; Shepherd, 2015, January 30).

The theme of heightened secrecy became a common feature of news discourses about the Attack Class submarine. This suggests that journalists were oriented towards this secrecy as a newsworthy aspect of the overall narrative of the programme. Many journalists argued that the context in which they were reporting on the Attack class was characterised by

unnecessary secrecy. As such, when journalists used anonymous sources and leaked information in their reporting it was in a context that could potentially infer a justification for such practices. This analysis shows that journalists often use anonymous sources in a casual fashion; commonly using phrasing such as "defence sources say", "government sources say", "one senior source said" or "*The Australian* understands that". Journalists in this sample rarely cited a reason for why a source was granted anonymity—as has been observed in other studies (Gladney, Shapiro and Ray, 2013). Instead, the use of anonymous sources in the reporting of the Attack class submarines was frequent and widespread enough to be characterised as routine.

As Fairclough (1992) argues, the context in which news is produced and consumed impacts how such news discourses are received and their political or ideological affects. By emphasising limited access to information journalists establish a context in which leaks are represented as of heightened importance and significance. Selectively leaked information is therefore contextualised as being inherently more important than other facts or information available about the Attack class. As Van Dijk (2008) suggests, the way that discourses are used to manage (or manipulate) audience expectations can reveal assumptions made about social relationships and reality. For example, where Stuart (2014, September 13) argues that "transparency is imperative. So let's drag these *sordid* [emphasis added] dealings into the light" he is both representing the secrecy around the Attack class procurement is inherently immoral (sordid) and implicitly arguing that the audience should share this view. Likewise, Tingle's (2014, September 12) metaphoric description of the government engaging in a "dance of a thousand veils" is a strong rhetorical argument that the audience should regard the Attack class procurement process as suspicious by virtue of its secrecy. In both examples order and priority in the texts is given *to the secrecy itself* rather than to other facts, information or events relating to the ongoing procurement process. As such, when leaks were publicised throughout the reporting of the Attack class procurement they contributed to and interacted with the established discourse of government opacity. At times this served to justify the publication of leaks, and otherwise camouflage their selective nature and political affect.

### 6.2b—Journalists Represented Leaks as Undermining the Secrecy of the Attack Class Procurement

In their most direct usage leaks functioned to undermine the secrecy of the programme. Having established the narrative that the level of secrecy was unnecessary—with the potential to conceal mismanagement—many journalists published leaks purporting to describe what the government was planning behind the scenes. While the government elected not to publicly discuss aspects of its planning; journalists were allegedly being passed information throughout the process. Some of the key leaks published by journalists suggested the following:

| Leaked information | How the leak was contextualised | Discursive Ideological/Political Affect |
|---|---|---|
| The government was considering buying submarines directly from Japan (McPhedran, 2014, April 8). | Senator Johnston "will make it plain that the government is not a job-creation agency for local shipbuilders" (para. 7). | Characterises social relations: The government is ambivalent or uncaring towards workers, and its policy will hurt employment in South Australia. |
| Government wanted to remove the ASC as its lead shipbuilder due to poor performance on the Air Warfare Destroyer project (Stewart, 2014, July 30). | The policy is part of a "rescue package" and it will "improve the efficiency of the defence project" which is late and $300m over budget (para. 2). | System of belief/knowledge: Government intervention is warranted in cases where industries have failed to maintain efficiency and productivity. |
| Japan had become the leading option, and government was significantly advanced in its plans to purchase submarines (Kerin, 2014, August 11). | Former Rear Admiral Peter Briggs states there is "little verifiable publicly available information on the Japanese submarines" (para. 6) | Characterises social relations: The government is rushing an important military decision in the name of globalist alliance-building with Japan and the U.S. |
| The government had made an "all but certain" decision to buy up to 10 submarines from Japan (McPhedran, 2014, September 8). | Government is "breaking its pre-election commitment" to build submarines in Adelaide, in a "major blow" to workers. | Characterises social relations: The government is uncaring towards workers and has been deliberately deceptive towards South Australians. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Purchasing nuclear submarines had been ruled out as an option (Kerin, 2014, October 3). | "The United States has gone cold on close ally Australia" accessing nuclear submarine technology. | Characterises social relations: Australia is closely linked and dependent on the United States for technological and military support. |
| The ASC would be split into two companies separately focused on submarine building and surface fleet building (Starick, 2014, October 15). | The government's policy "would also boost ASC's positioning for future submarine work" (para. 2) and make an Adelaide build more likely. | System of belief/knowledge: The primary role of government is to maximise local employment, as well as the economic efficiency and productivity in domestic industry. |
| Abbott had conceded to pressure and would hold an international competition for potential bidders for the Attack class (Kerin, 2014, October 28). | Abbott "was all but wedded to buying a Japanese submarine to replace the aging six-boat Collins-class fleet" (para. 7) | Characterises social identity: Abbott is a Prime Minister that irrationally pursues personal preferences without considering all the options. |
| The government would announce a competitive selection process soon (Nicholson, 2014, December 15). | "The Japanese are ahead of the other [bidders] because they have the most experience building conventional submarines" (para. 4). | System of belief/knowledge: Government is correctly following a rationalised process, and has always preferred the most credible bidder, Japan. |
| Defence insiders argued ASC would be unable to build submarines without an international partner (Kerin, 2015, February 11). | Abbott has "been accused of making another disastrous 'captain's call" (para. 1). | Characterises social identity: Abbott has poorly managed and communicated the Attack class procurement process. |
| All bidders were required to submit an option for building the submarines in Australia (Stewart, 2015, August 18). | Japan is "avoiding" promising it could build in Australia and has "never exported a submarine and has no experience in building one outside the country" (para. 11). | Characterises social relations: Japan is a weaker bidder compared to France and Germany because of its historic pacifist constitution and lack of recent global military experience. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Japan was no longer considered the front-runner after Abbott's removal as PM (Stewart, 2015, September 19). | "The deposing of Mr Abbott this week was a major blow to Tokyo's hopes of securing the contract" (para. 3) | Characterises social identity: Abbott irrationally pursued a policy based on personal preference rather than best practice. |
| Turnbull was reportedly "strongly backing" building submarines in Adelaide (Kerin, 2015, September 21). | Turnbull avoided appointing South Australian MP Christopher Pyne to Minister of Defence because this "could have been viewed as too much" (para. 10). | Characterises social relations: Prime Minister Turnbull is constrained by his own party and by broader public concerns of South Australian favouritism. |
| The Defence White Paper would announce that 12 submarines will be built (Wroe, 2016, February 10). | Government is "honouring the pledge made before the 2013 election to build 12" (para. 2) | System of belief/knowledge: Governments make problems for themselves when they break promises. |
| Defence had made a clear recommendation, and the national security committee would decide on the design partner imminently (Sheridan, 2016, April 20). | Submarine project "is attracting a frenzy of rumour" and information "could leak as soon as the government notifies" foreign bidders. | Characterises social relations: Government is struggling to maintain secrecy as insiders within the process are incentivised to leak information. |

As this list of leaks suggests, unauthorised disclosures preceded many of the major decisions and announcements the Abbott then Turnbull governments made concerning the Attack Class. The characteristics of these leaks are noteworthy. Most leaks journalists reported on throughout the Attack class procurement were not embarrassing revelations of political mismanagement or corruption. Rather, leaks tended to provide background information, much of which—while still secret—would eventually become public knowledge anyway due to the nature of the project. Other leaks, such as that the ASC would likely be broken up and partially privatised (Kerin, 2014, December 5), would simply never come to pass. Many leaks constituted relatively innocuous procedural information: an evaluation process will be held (Nicholson, 2014, December 15), bidders must submit a plan to build the submarines in Australia (Stewart, 2015, August 18), and there will be 12 rather than 8 submarines (Wroe,

2016, February 10). Even leaked information about Abbott's preference for Japanese submarines remained hypothetical. Japan was variously described in leaks as "possible", "the leading option", and "all but certain", but despite assurances from anonymous sources that "a handshake deal had already been done" (Debelle, 2014, September 13), Option J never materialised. As these examples suggest, leaked information was almost meaningless outside of its informing political context. Journalists played a key role in how leaks were contextualised and ultimately reflected in the broader political debate surrounding the submarines.

The established context—that the Attack class submarine procurement was uniquely secretive—provided added significance to the ongoing leaks. It suggested that behind "the government's dance of a thousand veils" (Tingle, 2014, September 12) there were government and defence officials who sought to undermine that secrecy. The leaks themselves—separate from their content—thereby came to represent the government's lack of control over the project and the possibility of increasing instability and division within its ranks. Nicholson (2014, December 5) referred to the Senator Johnston's office as a "mess of leaks, sackings" and attributed leaks about their expenses to the office being "wracked by tensions for months". Particular emphasis on word choices such as "mess" and "racked by tensions" suggests that this is not or should not be the ordinary state of things. After Turnbull ousted Abbott David Crowe (2015, September 18) reported that:

> The appointment [of a Defence Minister] is emerging as a key test for the new Prime Minister as he was buffeted by the first cabinet leaks against him, seen as a warning shot from conservatives still bruised by the toppling of Tony Abbott.

Shanahan (2015, December 5) referred to the political infighting as "a continuing vendetta of counter-leaking among his colleagues designed to damage or defend Tony Abbott". And later when draft versions of the Defence White Paper were leaked, Niki Savva (2016, March 3) concluded that "whoever leaked the draft defence white paper (and last week Abbottphiles were keen to claim authorship of it) […] was definitely trying to sink Turnbull". Other journalists suggested—more broadly—that the leaks were simply one symptom of the Liberal

Party's ongoing failure to resolve its leadership issues (Wroe, 2016, March 3). And as Crowe (2016, March 4) reported, the leaking of the draft white paper further "outraged" Liberal MPs as Abbott himself was seen to be amplifying the leak. The ongoing leadership instability within the government created an ambiguity around leaked information, with some journalists suggesting that confidential national security information had simply become another political tool used to attack Turnbull (Crowe, 2016, March 4; Shepherd, 2016, March 4).

Journalists represented leaks as undermining the secrecy of the Attack class programme. But there are different ways this can be interpreted. As shown in examples above, many journalists represented the programme as overly secretive and as such the publishing of leaks suggests journalists sought to fulfil the press's normative obligations to expose the truth where government secrecy is excessive (Papandrea, 2008; Strömbäck, 2005). As Stuart (2014, September 13) argued, they believed there were compelling reasons to "drag the sordid dealings into the light". But the leaks also came to be represented in the discourse as examples of political instability and infighting. Considering the generally innocuous nature of the leaked information itself, many leaks appear to have been interpreted by journalists as part of a developing political conflict. This suggests that the publishing of leaks is regarded by journalists as not simply an aspect of their watchdog role (Strömbäck, 2005) but also significant as newsworthy examples of internal discord within the Liberal party. As Tiffen (1989) argues, "a leaked news story is sometimes read as a public betrayal of private dealings" (p. 98), and as such—in the case of the Attack class procurement—leaks contributed to a broader narrative of the betrayal of Abbott, and then Abbott's subsequent "sniping" of Turnbull (Crowe, 2016, March 3). As this suggests, many leaks published in the reporting of the Attack class procurement were represented as having little to do with national security, and a lot more to do with the politics of Australia's ongoing leadership conflict.

### 6.2c—Leaks Functioned to Support or Undermine Political Management of Narratives

Leaks concerning the Attack class submarines were generally not revelations of misconduct or politically embarrassing information. As such, journalists had to place the leaks within a political context which explained their implications. In this way leaks functioned to support or undermine political management of the discourse of the Attack class programme. Tiffen (1989) suggests that the aim of some leaks is to force political action, mobilise public support for or against a policy, or in some cases simply subvert governmental management of how the public debates an issue. This inquiry cannot determine the exact reasons why a disclosure may have been made, but from this analysis conclusions can be drawn about their discursive consequences. Some leaks functioned to advance key arguments made by the Abbott and Turnbull governments, others undermined these arguments and presented an alternative narrative of policy mismanagement. This section will detail key leaks made throughout the reporting of the Attack class procurement and show the role that journalists played in representing their political implications in the broader discursive context.

### 6.2d—Leaks Functioned to Undermine Government Management of Narratives of the Attack Class

When the Abbott government commenced planning for the Attack class it did so by making publicly clear it would not be prioritising job creation over value for taxpayers. Part of the Coalition's winning election strategy had been to campaign on reducing public spending to prevent a so called "budget emergency" (Tingle, 2015, February 13). The Attack class was thus framed initially as an example of the new government's approach to fiscal responsibility. David Johnston declared that Australia would have a highly effective submarine capability "but not at any cost" (Shepherd, 2014, April 10). And a later Defence Issue Paper formally stated the Abbott government's position: that a decision on the Attack class would be made in terms of capability and not "on the basis of industry assistance or regional imperatives" (Department of Defence, 2014, p. 24). When it became known that the government was considering purchasing Japanese submarines, Senator Johnston publicly stated that: "the

Japanese is the nearest design that comes towards what our requirements are" (Shepherd, 2014, April 10).

Cost, capability and the suitability of the Japanese submarine as such became key arguments put forward by the government. Leaks functioned to undermine those arguments, with journalists providing key contextual information to explain their political implications. For example, Kerin (2014, August 11) cites "defence sources" as informing them that talks with Japan were "far more advanced than publicly acknowledged" and that the Soryu submarine was viewed as the leading option by the government. The leaked information is relatively innocuous, but Kerin places it in context as such:

> But former president of the Submarine Institute of Australia, Retired Rear Admiral Peter Briggs, warned on Sunday there was "little verifiably publicly available information on the Japanese submarine". Pursuing it could lead to higher risk and cost than any other options […] he said.

The leaked source is quoted as saying the planning is "far more advanced than publicly acknowledged", which is contrasted with a warning from another source that implies the government may be acting in haste. A key criticism of the government's handling of the Attack class was that it was proceeding with the procurement without a tender process (Martin, 2014, October 15). Both internally and externally, arguments were made that the Abbott government should be conducting a more thorough process that gave bidders time to present detailed designs (Davies, 2014, November 1). Additionally, Liberal Senator Sean Edwards appeared to confirm that such a detailed tender process was not taking place (Martin, 2014, October 15). Whether it was their aim or not, early leaks functioned to place doubt that the government was handling the Attack class appropriately.

That the government was not following due process became a key political narrative that undermined their management of the public discourse. As McPhedran (2014, September 8) reported, Abbott was publicly insistent that "we have not yet made a final decision on the design and build on the next generation of Australian submarines". However, in the same

article McPhedran states insiders had informed them that the government had effectively made up its mind:

> While both German and French submarines officially remain in the running, senior sources told *The Advertiser* that the Japanese option would be chosen.

Subsequent leaks built on this counterargument that the Abbott government was not actually considering cost, capability and the suitability of the submarine at all, but was instead making a hasty decision driven by politics. Leaks pointed to the possibility that the Japanese submarines were not the most affordable. Kerin (2014, September 11) reported "defence sources" as confirming that German ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems had submitted a bid that was cheaper than the Japanese offer of $20 billion. They note that Abbott "all but confirmed" that they would go with the Japanese submarines anyway. In November, McPhedran (2014, November 8) also reported "industry sources" as leaking information that Saab Group had also submitted a bid to the government that was "a lower price than its competitors" including the Japanese. There were also leaks of technical problems with the Soryu. Wroe (2014, September 10) reported insider sources as suggesting that the range of the Japanese submarine—which was "half the Collins class"—was already considered an issue, with the government having to consider moving its submarine base to Darwin or Broome. There were also suggestions that Abbott—along with notably pro-Japan advisor Andrew Shearer (Wallace, 2013, October 11)—had short circuited the procurement by taking over responsibility for the submarines, bypassing the Defence Minister entirely (Glasgow, 2014, December 18; Stewart, 2014, December 3). Journalists represented these leaks in such a way as to suggest that Abbott was mismanaging the programme and was "all but wedded to buying a Japanese submarine" (Kerin, 2014, October 28) despite there being potentially more affordable and technically proficient options on the table.

Even after the announcement that the government would undertake a "competitive evaluation process", critics seized on the vagueness of the process as evidence the Abbott government still intended to partner with Japan (Shepherd, Jean and McPhedran, 2015, February 10). Further leaks suggested that Abbott had mismanaged the procurement process

by putting politics before getting the right submarine for the job. Nicholson (2015, March 2) reported insider sources as telling them:

> For several months last year, the federal government single-mindedly pursued a plan, driven largely from Tony Abbott's office, to buy the navy's new submarines from Japan.

And that further to this the suggestion to pursue Japan as a potential submarine partner "came first from senior American officials". McPhedran (2015, March 11) reported that "documents obtained by *The Advertiser*" showed that Japanese officials believed that the procurement "would have more to do with the US alliance and protecting Japan from China than jobs or capability". And Graham Richardson (2015, February 13) insisted that inside sources had "very reliably" informed them that documents existed proving Abbott had made a "shake-of-the-hands" agreement with Shinzo Abe to buy submarines from Japan. Separate leaks made to ABC's Four Corners (Shepherd, 2015, March 17) and Brendan Nicholson (2015, March 2), suggested that the government had prepared media releases that were never sent out—declaring that the submarines were to be built in Japan—before Senator Johnston was removed as defence minister. And by August, Tory Shepherd (2015, August 29) reported that Tony Abbott had had a "secret meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe" in April of 2015, and that "*The Advertiser* understands the pair discussed submarines and working together".

In summary, these leaks functioned to undermine the Abbott government's management of discourses of the Attack class procurement. The government insisted that it would make the decision on the basis of cost, capability and suitability; however, many of the leaks published by journalists presented an alternative narrative. Abbott had made a "captain's pick," and the Attack Class would be purchased from Japan for primarily political reasons, despite potentially more cost effective and capable submarines being available. Even after Abbott's dismissal as Prime Minister this narrative would persist as part of the public debate over the Attack class.

### 6.2e—Leaks Functioned to Support Government Narratives of the Attack Class

While the above examples show how leaked information functioned to undermine the Abbott government's preferred narrative, there were also leaks that worked in their favour. Because the Abbott government's stated position was that its decision on the Attack class would not be based on "industry assistance or regional imperatives", some leaks added credibility to the government's argument that it might be better for Australia to purchase submarines offshore. As Nicholson, Wallace and Owen, 2014, September 9) reported:

> Defence sources have told *The Australian* it would cost between $50 billion and $80bn to design and build the submarines in Australia […] as many as 12 Japanese submarines could be bought for about $25bn. (Nicholson, Wallace and Owen, 2014, September 9)

The article also points to cost blowouts in the Air Warfare Destroyer projects—as well as insider concerns that building a domestic submarine could leave Australia with a "serious capability gap." Toohey (2014, September 13) also cited "defence sources" as estimating that even a compromise option—one that could see submarines purchased in parts and integrated in Adelaide— "could cost an estimated $40 billion and still create maintenance nightmares like those afflicting [the Collins]". The implication from these leaks is that an Australian build is simply too risky and too expensive for the government to pursue.

In other reporting this view is supported by commentary suggesting that Australia "could not afford" the kind of domestic project envisioned by Kevin Rudd (Nicholson, 2014, April 8). Leaks also advanced the argument that Australia's domestic shipbuilder, the ASC, was fundamentally not competent to do the work. As Stewart (2014, July 30) reported, the government's unreleased Winter-White Report was "especially critical" of the ASC, which "the review said had failed to exercise due diligence" in its role on the AWD project. Stewart states "*The Australian* understands" that the report suggests delays and cost overruns with the project were so significant that the ASC should be "sacked", and control handed over to the private BAE Industries. This leak fit with the government's stated position, that industry

performance had been "patchy" and was falling short of "international benchmarks" (Department of Defence, 2014). Other leaks supported this assessment, as reported by McPhedran (2014, September 8):

> One insider told *The Advertiser*: "It is ludicrous to think we can design a submarine—nobody believes that".

McPhedran also cites a "senior defence source" as stating that the government had to act fast as it could not afford a capability gap between the Collins and the Attack class. Their source was also critical of the ASC, pointing to cost and budget overruns costing the government an extra billion dollars:

> "With a record like that, is anyone seriously thinking we should proceed and build a fleet of future submarines in the same shipyard?" a government source said.

There were also leaks that acted to shore up support for the Soryu as a design option. Leaks reported by Wallace and Stewart (2014, October 21) played down any technical problems with the submarines:

> Japanese sources said defence authorities were convinced fire risks had been eliminated and the batteries would offer better speed and endurance [than the Swedish AIP system].

And as Kerin (2014, October 28) reported, insiders believed that the Soryu was "considered the closest to Australia's requirements [and] is the only boat in service". Furthermore, a "senior defence source" indicated that there "simply isn't the time" to consider designing and building a submarine in Australia in time to replace the Collins. Kerin (2014, November 13) would also later report that "defence sources" told them a local construction would mean the first Attack class submarines would not see service until the 2030s, a significant delay. And as Starick (2014, November 17) noted, "Coalition sources" were assured that even if the submarines were built overseas Adelaide would still maintain and refit the subs, which represented "two-thirds" of the value of the contract. A notion intended to discredit the

argument that building submarines in Japan would mean the decline of the local shipbuilding industry.

There were also leaks from insider sources that functioned to counter the emerging narrative that the Soryu was Abbott's "Captain's Pick". As McPhedran (2014, November 8) reported, "according to well-placed sources" the government was backing away from plans to simply buy off-the-shelf submarines from Japan. And as Nicholson (2015, March 2) noted, "*The Australian* has been told" that the government was genuinely looking at all options and that "concerns […] that the so-called competitive evaluation process could be a sham are groundless". However, these leaked denials were not nearly as common as the accusations they were perhaps aimed to counter.

The above examples suggest that some leaks served to support government's preferred narratives. The Abbott government publicly stated that its preferred option, building submarines in Japan, was the most cost effective and least risky choice. Subsequently, government and defence insiders leaked information to reporters about the failings of the local shipbuilding industry, the high cost of a possible local build, and the fact that a local build would take much longer: risking a "capability gap". The primarily political nature of these leaks comes from the broader context in which they are published. The simultaneous counter-narrative that the Abbott government had already made up its mind and was hastily choosing Japanese submarines for political reasons; the ongoing Liberal leadership crisis; and the political backlash against the potential loss of jobs in the local shipbuilding industry; all informed how such leaks were represented by journalists.

### 6.2f—The Political Dimensions of Leaks were Represented as Being More Significant than the Content

As leaks functioned to support or undermine political discourses of the Attack class their content became less meaningful in a discursive sense. A good example of this was the leaking of information from the draft of the Defence White Paper prepared under the Abbott government. Greg Sheridan (2016, March 2), reported that they had been leaked sections of

the draft which stated that "the first submarines [were] likely to begin entering service in the late 2020s". This contrasted with the final version produced under the Turnbull government that changed the wording to "likely to begin entering service in the early 2030s". Sheridan characterised the delay as being "at least half a decade, but more likely […] nearly 10 years", and quoted Tony Abbott as being "flabbergasted" by the alleged decision to allow the schedule to slip. Abbott also warned that it was important to replace the Collins quickly as it was a "fragile platform", and Australia could not afford to be unable to field submarines. Whether the leak of this information was designed to "sink" Turnbull, as Niki Savva (2016, March 3) suggested, media coverage of the leak focused less on the leak itself and more on the politics of Abbott commenting on it. As Wroe (2016, March 4) reported, Liberal MP Phillip Ruddock publicly labelled Abbott's interview with Sheridan "inappropriate" while Defence officials at a Senate inquiry denied that any such delay existed. An anonymous Liberal MP characterised Abbott's comments as "sniping" and suggested that Abbott "was intent on 'blowing the place up' even if that mean the political death of his colleagues" (Crowe, 2016, March 3). The Department of Defence requested that the Australian Federal Police investigate the leak (Anderson, 2016, March 3), and Malcolm Turnbull publicly "set the record straight" by contradicting Abbott, arguing that Defence Department advice had been consistent on the timeframe and that nothing had changed (Meers, 2016, March 5). As Coorey (2016, March 4) noted, Abbott became the story:

> One Liberal, who did not wish to be identified, prevailed upon a party elder during the function to counsel Abbott, but was told "he's not listening to anyone".

The substance of the leak mattered less than its political implications. Whether or not two words in the Defence White Paper were changed from "late 2020s" to "early 2030s" was generally represented as inconsequential. As such, subsequent news articles that discussed the leak represented it primarily in terms of Abbott and Turnbull's ongoing political rivalry.

### 6.2g—Leaks Functioned to Support and Undermine Public Relations Discourses during the CEP

Leaks also played a significant role during the reporting of the competition between bidding design companies for the Attack class contract. Following Abbott's removal as Prime Minister, insiders suggested that Japan had lost its advantage and that the competition between French DCNS, Germany ThyssenKrupp and Japan's Mitsubishi/Kawasaki Heavy Industries was set to intensify (Stewart, 2015, September 19). Subsequent leaks were aimed at advancing or undermining the various publicity campaigns being waged by the bidding companies. As Griffiths (2016, March 5) notes, all three bidding parties engaged in indirect attacks on one another in the media, to the extent that the Defence Department had to publicly warn them to adhere to its code of conduct for contract bidding processes. As Tory Shepherd (2016, January 23) describes it:

> Theoretically, experts are coldly assessing the merits of the French, German and Japanese options. In reality […] anonymous stories, contradictory claims and "black ops" […] designed to dent competitors' bids are surfacing.

These "black ops" included a series of leaks to journalists—bolstered with statements from supporters—that undermined one or the other bidders' influence in the public debate over the Attack Class. One of the more significant leaks was reported by Greg Sheridan (2016, January 25):

> Australian officials at the most senior level believe Canberra could experience significant difficulty getting the most advanced US combat systems [for the Attack Class]—unless Japan wins the lead role.

Sheridan quotes "senior American" sources as preferring the Japanese option, stating that "*The Australian* has been told the Americans harbour significant doubts about the German ability to protect critical defence technology from Chinese industrial espionage". The implication being that if French or German subs were chosen then Australia would be receiving second-rate combat systems. The leak coincided with the publication of claims by

Andrew Shearer that they too had been confidentially assured that "senior US officials and military officers" regarded the Soryu as the superior choice (Stewart, 2016, January 22). Reporters from the Financial Times were also told by anonymous sources that US officials were concerned about "leakage" of advanced weapons systems should the French win the contract (Grigg, 2016, February 17).

Subsequent leaks emerged that suggested the Japanese bid was not faring as smoothly as it should have been. Anonymous sources reported to the Financial Times that the Australian government had been pressuring Japan to "tighten the commercial terms of the bid and outline a detailed budget" which they allegedly still had not done (Lynch, 2016, February 13). DCNS also publicly disparaged the Japanese bid, warning that its planned lithium ion battery system for the Soryu was based on technology known to "explode", and that only France could offer "proven and safe technology" (Nicholson, 2016, March 19). And as Nicholas Stuart (2016, April 19) noted, "off-the-record" discussions with insiders suggested that should Australia choose to go with the Japanese bid this would be regarded as "unfriendly" and "provocative" to China. As they argued, "alienating our largest trading partner isn't sensible". And then in series of leaks just prior to the decision:

- Shepherd (2016, April 21) reported anonymous sources as stating Japan "would prefer to build at home" and was now lagging in the rankings;
- Nicholson (2016, April 21) reported that "*The Australian* has been told the Japanese bid was considered the weakest"; and
- Sheridan (2016, April 23) reported that Shinzo Abe was going to personally call Malcolm Turnbull in a last-ditch effort to change the outcome.

Phillip Coorey (2016, April 23) reported that defence insiders were "infuriated" by the leaking of the fact that Japan's bid had been excluded. "Senior sources" informed them that the AFP had been instructed to investigate the leak, and to look specifically at Defence officials and bureaucrats working on the SEA1000 project.

As the above examples suggest, leaks played just as significant a role in the public relations discourse of the Attack class as they did in the political discourse. In particular, there

were a number of leaks that functioned to support the Japanese bid for the contract by casting doubt on the idea that German and French options would be equipped with the top-tier U.S. weapon systems. The key difference between the two categories of leaks may only be the timeframe and quantity. Leaks that detailed confidential information about the various bidding parties and the CEP were confined to the months directly preceding the announcement of the successful design partner. Whereas leaks that functioned to support or undermine general political discourses were prevalent throughout the entire sample explored for this analysis.

## 6.3—Leaks and the Politicisation of the Attack Class Procurement

Key findings from this analysis suggest that publishing of leaks and the use of anonymous sources were routine aspects of news reporting on the Attack class submarines. To an extent, the use of leaked information in this instance could be interpreted a fulfilment of the watchdog role of journalism (Strömbäck, 2005), or professional norms that encourage journalists to expose the truth and provide transparency over government (Harwood, 2017). There is analytical evidence to suggest that journalists problematised the Abbott government's tight information control over the project in its early stages. The project was variously described as "impenetrable", "shrouded in secrecy", a "$20 billion guessing game" and a "dance of a thousand veils". Within this context, as established by journalists, the revelation of secret information concerning the government's planning took on a different significance. However, it is also clear from this analysis that the primary effect of disclosures—which was in part a product of how journalists used leaks discursively—was largely political. Leaks functioned in a way that supported or undermined political management of the discourse of the Attack Class. Most of the leaks analysed throughout this inquiry were not evidence of significant misconduct or ethical overreach on the part of the government. The revelation, for instance, that Senator Johnston spent $6384 wining and dining industry figures, including on such "exotic culinary delights as oysters verjuice" (McPhedran, 2014, December 3), would not likely be considered a whistleblower disclosure on par with the Manning and Snowden leaks.

But that in itself may represent a finding that bears further discussion. The leaks analysed in this study may not have generated the kind of widespread attention as noteworthy "megaleaks", but their role in the ongoing political debate in Australia over submarines was nonetheless substantial. Leaks functioned to subvert the power of the executive to manage public discussion of a highly secretive national security issue. And as such, journalists played a pivotal role in facilitating discourse—where otherwise there may have been no public debate at all.

It is likely, for example, that early leaks about the Abbott government's plans to purchase submarines directly from Japan gave time for political opponents to marshal public and political support against Option J. As Tiffen (1989) states, "more often than not, covert news manoeuvres have a negative intent, to prevent something from being done" (p. 107) in part by alerting and mobilising political opposition to a plan. This research, based on CDA analysis of news texts, cannot discern the motivations behind leaks. However, the close reading of news reporting of the entire Attack class story suggests that the ongoing leaks against Abbott may have been driven by insiders who wanted to prevent Option J from coming to pass. This reiterates Chapter 5's finding that the submarine story was never far from its politics. Tony Abbott has since publicly acknowledged that he "regretted" not being able to strike a deal for Australia to purchase Japanese submarines when he was in government (Tillet, 2019, June 3). And, in retrospect, even if Abbott had decided to make a snap decision to purchase Soryu submarines he would not have been the only Prime Minister to have made such a choice. As Lockyer (2013) details, Abbott's political mentor John Howard famously made the surprise decision in 2002 to sign Australia up to the Joint Strike Fighter program—with effectively no public consultation and a US$150 million buy in. The political function of many leaks concerning the Attack class was both to characterise the Coalition government as unstable and divided, and to undermine its narrative of the procurement as being framed around cost, capability and suitability. Regardless of the content of the leaks, journalists began to represent them through the prism of the ongoing leadership turmoil: wherein the leaks and counter-leaks represented a "vendetta" (Shanahan, 2015, December 5),

or tools designed to damage Abbott's credibility as leader and undermine the Prime Minister's policies. Leaks also served to undermine arguments that the Soryu was potentially more affordable and technically suitable than other options. And significantly, leaks presented a narrative of Abbott having already "wedded to" or committed to a "handshake deal" with Japan; a narrative that fit with more widely used political narrative of Abbott and his impulsive "captain's picks". Facing substantial political pressure from both within and without, it was eventually Abbott's own party that ended his involvement in the Attack class procurement. Leaks after the fact would suggest that South Australian Liberals—most prominently Christopher Pyne and Simon Birmingham—had played a pivotal role in Abbott's removal, in part because Abbott had failed to quell public angst in that state over the submarines (Starick, 2015, September 19; Wills, 2015, September 19). According to Paul Starick, one anonymous Liberal MP stated that even if Abbott had announced the submarines were to be built in Adelaide "he would not have been believed by a public angered by sustained mixed and bungled messages". If such accounts from Liberal insiders can be regarded as credible, that would suggest that the sustained campaign of leaks about the Attack class did play a role in Abbott's removal as Prime Minister. An act that had further reaching consequences for Australian politics than just the Attack class procurement.

Overall, this analysis suggests most leaks regarding the Attack class submarine were represented by journalists primarily in political terms. Leaks provided an inside picture of a Liberal party in disunity on a key national security issue. Even following Abbott's dismissal, leaks suggested that insiders still viewed the Attack class as an opportunity to wedge Turnbull on key issues. Disclosures made to Greg Sheridan (2016, January 25; 2016, March 2) suggesting that Turnbull had "delayed" the Attack class, and that the US would refuse to put its most advanced weapon systems in anything but a Japanese submarine, prompted accusations that Abbott—and his allies—were engaged in political "sniping" and "undermining" (Coorey, 2016, March 5; Crowe, 2016, March 4). Then, leaks were used to undermine Abbott while he was in office, now they were being used to undermine Turnbull. As this analysis suggests, the routine of leaks about the Attack class and their publication in

news bears little resemblance to the isolated cases where whistleblowers reveal examples of serious misconduct and unethical behaviour. Leaks appear to be part of the fabric of political reporting of national security issues. But it remains unclear whether outlier whistleblower cases—such as the disclosure of the Afghan Files—are reported on in a different manner to leaks concerning the Attack class procurement. Or whether the characteristics of domestic Defence related leaks substantially different to those concerning Australia's overseas deployments.

The widespread use of leaked information in news reporting of the Attack class also raises questions about the press and its relationship with political and military institutions. Mediatisation theory argues that institutions that are increasingly reliant on media to achieve their aims adapt the logics and processes of the media in a mutually influential fashion (Hepp, 2013; Hepp, Hjarvard and Lundby, 2015). In this way, as Hepp (2016) states, the everyday practices and routines of organisations become increasingly oriented towards and moulded by the media, and media organisations adapt and are moulded in turn. Some insiders and journalists came to regard Abbott's failure to establish a public mandate for his version of the Attack class was a key factor in both public animosity towards him in South Australia and his eventual toppling as PM (Starick, 2015, September 19; Wills, 2015, September 19). If this can be said to be true, it could be argued that Abbott's failure—and subsequent politicisation of the Attack class in the media—were linked to the government's inability to adapt to a highly mediatised context. By refusing to publicly acknowledge and discuss their plans for the Attack class, the Abbott government allowed others to set the agenda through leaks and covert manoeuvres. Government and defence insiders, likely more oriented towards and familiar with the routines and logics of political media, were able to marshal public support against the government's preferred option. Equally significantly, Defence was unable to manage the public discussion of the Attack class either. As Nicholson (2019) argues, the military's ability to speak publicly has been substantially limited in recent years by the handing of more control of information to staffers and politicians in the Defence portfolio. It is noteworthy then that a significant number of leaks originated from "defence sources" speaking off the record with

journalists. As Nicholson points out, "if forced to operate in an information vacuum, the media will find something to fill it", whether that be "aggrieved personnel", inaccurate sources or political operatives with an agenda. This analysis suggests, that Defence—in its silence on the Attack class—ceded control of public debate over the submarines to leakers and anonymous sources. As such, the institutional relationship between the Australian press and the military—characterised by distrust and opacity (Anderson and Trembath, 2011; Foster and Pallant, 2013)—could be regarded as a potential factor in the Attack class's politicisation in the media. As Tiffen (1989) suggests, leaks are part of an established tradition of covert manoeuvres in political reporting, so much a part of the fabric of Australia's media that it might be considered surprising for news about a contentious political decision *not* to leak. As Nicholson (2019) argues, Defence "should acknowledge that the public wants and deserves better transparency" and be more proactive in its engagement with the public if it wants to ensure procurement policies are publicly debated in an informed, reasoned and depoliticised fashion.

However, Defence's actual responses to leaks suggest this is an unlikely course of action. Key leaks published throughout this analysis were referred by Defence to the Australian Federal Police for investigation (Coorey, 2016, March 5; 2016, April 23; Toohey, 2016, March 8). And as discussed in the introduction to this chapter, the active pursuit of leakers using metadata warrants, raids and other methods has increased substantially in recent years (Doran and Belot, 2019, July 9; Knowles, Worthington and Blumer, 2019, June 6; Worthington and Blumer, 2019, June 7). Surveillance laws and harsher penalties for leakers and whistleblowers also suggest that successive governments intend to at least substantially diminish the role of leaks as part of routine political journalism (Fernandez, 2017; Humphreys and de Zwart, 2017). As this case study suggests, leaks are both a widespread and influential aspect of news reporting on defence and national security issues. Should future governments succeed in stopping the leaks, it is unclear how this would influence the role disclosure journalism plays in marshalling political support, undermining government management of debate and providing transparency over secretive projects. This raises questions of whether

such laws might impact leakers universally, or whether well resourced, connected and powerful leakers might be able to avoid being subject to detection and punishment. The burden of legislation rarely falls evenly across different organisations and institutions, and newspapers—which are already struggling to establish a functional business model alongside advertising giants such as Google and Facebook—may not be prepared and well-resourced to deal with rising secrecy.

In conclusion, leaks played a significant role in the reporting of the Attack class procurement. Journalists represented the degree of secrecy surrounding the Attack class—particularly during the Abbott administration—as being excessive. Within such a context, leaks from defence and government insiders about the management of the programme could be interpreted as fulfilling the watchdog expectations of normative journalism. But leaks were also represented primarily in their political dimensions. Leaks functioned to undermine or support political narratives of the submarines and contributed significantly to political discourses of the Liberal party's ongoing leadership instability. The political dimensions of leaks were often represented as being more significant than the content of leaks themselves. As this analysis suggests, most leaks did not reveal examples of substantial mismanagement or unethical behaviour on the part of the government. Many leaks were simply pre-cursory announcements of policies that the government might take in the future regarding the submarines. Analysis of leaks concerning the Attack class suggest that some leaks may have produced an effect of marshalling public support and media scrutiny against the Abbott government's preferred policy options. The overall function of leaks was to politicise the Attack class submarine, as leaks were generally represented within the political context of Abbott and Turnbull's ongoing leadership struggle. Additionally, leaks were used to undermine or subvert public relations narratives of the Attack class submarine within the context of the three competing bidders for the submarines. In particular, a series of leaks functioned to undermine competitors of the Japanese bid by arguing that key technology and weapons systems would not be integrated into French and German submarines. Many of these examples of leaks suggest some may have been aimed to deliberately disrupt political

management of the public debate over the Attack class. However, as this inquiry only looks at the characteristics of leaks as published in newspaper text, additional research is required to explore the potential aims of these leaks from a strategic communication perspective.

# Chapter 7— "Within Range" – Representations of China in News Discourses of the Attack Class

> *China's growing naval power and long-range missiles threaten to bring Canberra within range of the People's Liberation Army as Australia's geographical isolation no longer protects it.* (Nicholson, 2015, July 13)

> *Imagine if Australia bought a Japanese-built submarine and then Japan went to war with China. Where would that leave us?* (McPhedran, 2014, July 29)

> *We must not be seen as capitulating to coercion from China.* (Dibb, 2016, April 30)

This chapter details the representation of China in newspaper discourses of the Attack class submarine procurement from September 2013 to April 2016. In particular, this chapter looks at how newspapers discursively established the China-Australia relationship and framed arguments about how readers should regard China as an economic and military power. China is mentioned frequently in the reporting of the Attack class programme and is often highlighted by journalists and commentators as a motivating factor in the procurement of new submarines. As such, news reporting of the Attack class is underpinned by broader discourses of China's rise, its growing power and influence in the region and whether it should be regarded by Australians as a threat.

A discursive analysis of newspaper reporting of the Attack class procurement suggests that China is often represented as a potential risk to Australia's interests. Recurring features in news reporting portray China as a cause of instability and tension within the region; as a power that needs to be contained; as a military threat that could invade or attack Australia; and as a complication to diplomatic relationships with other nations in the region. News reporting provided few examples of alternative viewpoints or Chinese perspectives on

the issue. From this analysis it can be argued that the representation of China in news reporting of the Attack class procurement presents a simplified view of China-Australia relations. The complexity of China's historic relationship of trade, migration and cultural exchange with Australia is lost—in part due to the limitations of contemporary journalism practice—and instead narratives of risk, conflict and threat are prevalent.

This chapter will argue that discourses of the China-Australia relationship in newspaper reporting are linked with and contextualised by concurrent discourses of national security preparedness and Australia's vulnerability to military action. As such, China is uniquely prominent in news reporting of national security—as opposed to other states or non-state actors—as a subject of concern and anxiety. The chapter will begin by discussing existing research on China's representation in contemporary Western media narratives. Second, it will discuss historic representations of China in Australian news and media. Third, it will provide a Critical Discourse Analysis of representations of China in newspaper reporting of the Attack class submarine programme. Finally, it will discuss key narratives used to represent China and draw conclusions about the role that reporting of China played in the overall representation of the Attack class submarines.

## 7.1—China-Australia Relations as an Informing Context for National Security Reporting

Australia's relationship with China is increasingly complex. Even in the months prior to the initial reporting of the Attack class procurement China was the subject of media attention. Ongoing PLAN activity in the South China Seas had increased notably in 2012 and 2013—part of ongoing territorial disputes between China and neighbouring nations (Nicholson, 2013, October 8). For some commentators, the announcement of the planning of a new fleet of submarines to replace Collins prompted questions about the nature of risk and security in the Indo-Pacific region. Brown and Medcalf (2013, October 7) argued that Australia's military partnership with the United States—as well as its investment in strategic

assets like ships and submarines—should be considered key to regional stability. Official documents mirrored these sentiments. *The Defence White Paper 2013* (Department of Defence, 2013) the *National Security Strategy* (Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2013) and the *Australia in the Asian Century White Paper* (Department of Defence, 2012) all make clear, in diplomatic language, that China's rapid economic growth and subsequent military expansion could hold both opportunities and consequences for Australia. The 2013 White Paper in particular singles out China's record economic growth and military expansion as factors Australian strategists needed to be mindful of. While the activities of the PLAN in the South China Seas raised widespread concern, Defence Minister David Johnston noted that as the destination for much of Australia's iron ore and liquified natural gas exports China represents a vital economic partner (Nicholson, 2013, November 2.) Australia is also a significant destination for billions of dollars in Chinese investment (KPMG, 2019); is the beneficiary of hundreds of thousands of fee-paying international students coming from China every year (Department of Education, 2019); and has a growing population of Chinese migrants choosing to call Australia home (Simon-Davies, 2018). Australian residents of Chinese ancestry number more than 1.2 million (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2018). Given China's ongoing rivalry with the U.S., its increasing exertion of political, economic and strategic influence throughout the Indo-Pacific region, and its complicated relationship with its overseas Chinese communities (Suryadinata, 2017), the need for informed public debate on Australia's relationship with China is pressing. This chapter aims to explore the characteristics of Australian news reporting on security issues and China, in part to better understand how this complex relationship is presented to media audiences.

Australia's economic relationship with China is significant. As such how the news media represent it is equally significant. Public sentiment in Australia towards China remains conflicted (Jain and McCarthy, 2016). As research from the Lowy Institute suggests, many Australians are distrustful towards China, they regard Australia as too economically dependent on China, and are concerned about Chinese interference in Australia's democratic process (Kassam, 2019). Michael Fullilove argues this represents a souring of Australian

attitudes towards China; he notes, "trust in and warmth towards China are at their lowest points in the [Lowy] Poll's history" (Fullilove in Kassam, 2019, p. 2). This raises questions about whether these sentiments arise from reasoned assessment of risks to Australian sovereignty and interests, or from the discursive construction of China in media and political discourses. As the research for this thesis focuses on the characteristics of news media reporting, a pivotal question is whether the complexity of Australia's relationship with China is being adequately communicated to general audiences.

## 7.2—Contemporary Research on China's Representation in News Media

As literature explored for this inquiry (Chapter 2) suggests, one of the prevailing normative views of journalism is that it should provide for informed debate of issues and facts and provide a balanced venue for public opinion formation (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995; Deuze, 2005; Kovach and Rosenstiel, 2007; McNair, 2000). Some scholarship argues the focus on journalism as being oriented towards the political (democratic) process and on what journalism *should* do has its limitations (Zelizer, 2004; 2012). However, there are legitimate reasons for this inquiry to question how news media uses discourse to construct public perceptions of China. Historically, Australian residents of Chinese ancestry have been marginalised by both officially sanctioned legal discrimination as well as political and media vilification (Fitzgerald, 2007; Fozdar, 2016; Jain and McCarthy, 2016). Regardless of the true extent of risk posed by China's political and strategic actions in the region, news media representations of China present a dilemma to those with Chinese ancestry living, working and studying in Australia. Chinese migrants, and those of Asian heritage in general, continue to face discrimination on the basis of race in Australia in a range of circumstances (Dunn, Blair, Bliuc and Kamp, 2018; Junankar, Paul and Yasmeen, 2010; Li, 2019; Wong, 2017). Furthermore, numerous Australian scholars of China joined Australia's former Race Discrimination Commissioner Tim Soutphommasane in warning that the public debate over Chinese influence is at risk of becoming racialised and stoking anti-Chinese prejudice within the community (An open letter from concerned scholars of China, 2018; Soutphommasane,

2018). While this inquiry does not set out to answer the validity of these concerns, it does hope to shed light on some of the characteristics of news media reporting of China in Australia with such concerns in mind. As Van Dijk (2008) suggests, a critical approach to discourse analysis must include an analysis of the cultural, historical and social context of discourse. A central theoretical tenet of CDA is that discourse reproduces and challenges social relationships of dominance and control. As such, a central point of discussion is how news media reproduce or challenge ideas about how the Australian people should think about the Chinese people, and how they should think about people of Chinese ancestry living and working in Australia.

Modern news media discourses of China in Australia do not exist in a vacuum. Instead they are informed by the historic and recent depictions of China throughout the English-speaking world. Scholarly analysis of Western news representations of China suggests that the West's relationship to China has long been seen as one of conflict and competition. Chang's (1988) earlier content analysis of U.S. newspaper reporting of China from 1950-1984 suggests the news in that period was driven by China's apparent ideological conflict with the West. China emerged in 1949 as a communist state and the United States' backing of Taiwan as a separate liberal democratic China meant events and issues were often framed in negative terms of 'Red' China or 'Communist' China. Chang (1998) argues however that this ideological view of China shifted following Nixon's visit to China in 1971, and thereafter news represented China in a more optimistic light. However, news representations of China changed dramatically in the West following the violent suppression of student protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989 (Broomfield, 2003; Gittings, 2007; Wilke and Achatzi, 2011; Xiang, 2013). Peng's (2004) content and framing analysis of U.S. newspaper reporting of China issues in the years between 1990 and 2001 show that reporting of China's growing economy and international influence increased significantly. Peng concludes that the U.S. media in this period tended to frame China in negative political and ideological frames, focusing on instances where domestic Chinese conditions emerge that appear to conflict with Western cultural principles (particularly regarding individual liberty, democracy and China's human

rights record). Using a discursive and textual analysis approach Ooi and D'Arcangelis (2018) argue that U.S. newspapers since 1990 have continued to represent China using 'Orientalist' discourse, and as a threat due to China's cyber activities, currency manipulation, and maritime dispute. Ooi and D'Arcangelis suggest this fits with a broader U.S. social discourse of China as an exotic "other"; a thief and a bully, yellow peril and 'little brother' that needs to be kept in line (p. 2).

China has been represented negatively in other Western news media as well. Goodrum, Godo and Hayter's (2011) content analysis of Canadian news reporting of China suggests that mainstream Canadian news (television and newspaper) tended to focus on stories about conflict, and that "coverage served to reinforce Canadian national identity and often depicted China in a negative manner" (p. 326). In another content analysis by Wilke and Achatzi (2011), the authors found that German newspapers tended to represent China in a slightly negative fashion with positive tendency towards reporting of some economic issues. They also suggest however that German newspapers often used negative frames and scepticism when reporting social and political issues, including on China's human rights issues. De Swert and Wouters's (2011) quantitative content analysis of Belgian television news reporting suggests that in terms of the tone of reporting on China "negative references are present far more often than positive ones" (p. 342). The authors of this study also conclude that some recurring themes of foreign correspondent reporting on China tended to focus on wealth inequality, China's lack of improvement in human rights and problems with freedom of the press. Leung and Huang (2007) used a content analysis approach to analyse the reporting of China relating to the SARS outbreak in 2003 in English language newspapers from Canada, Australia, Singapore, the United Kingdom and the United States. They argue that the newspapers framed China negatively and focused on its supposed institutional and bureaucratic failures to stop the spread of SARS. Leung and Huang suggest that the Chinese government's own secrecy and desire to limit information about the disease's spread in the media could have contributed to the negative reporting of its actions in Western media. In a content analysis of United Kingdom national newspapers reporting of China prior to the

Beijing Olympics in 2008, Naduvath (2014) suggests portrayals of China were generally negative. They argue that Chinese society and political system were represented in an ideological fashion as being antithetical and in conflict with Western standards and ideals.

Some scholars conclude that the Western media persistently view China through the lens of inevitable conflict with Western society, as the so called 'China threat'. In their content analysis of U.S. newspaper reporting of China, Yang and Liu (2012) argue that newspapers in the 1990s presented the China threat as a political and ideological one, whereas in recent reporting newspapers more frequently represented China as a military and strategic threat. Their analysis suggests that the shift towards representation of China as a military threat in the 2000s may have been triggered by the reporting of events charting relations between China and Taiwan. Okuda's (2016) frame analysis of U.S. and U.K. newspapers suggests that relations between China and the U.S. are often framed using the metaphor of "Thucydides trap" (p. 124), a narrative that intensifies the sense of conflict as it implies the inevitability of war between rising and established powers. The theory that conflict with China is inevitable has been debated for a significant period of time by international relations scholars (Broomfield, 2003; Gries, 2005; Ling, 2013; Roy, 1996), however there is limited research considering how news and journalism may play a role in placing 'China threat' within the broader social and discursive order.

In summary, the literature on Western news media representations of China is incomplete. Few studies look in particular about how China is represented in Australian news media in particular. What this background literature suggests overall is that if Australian journalists follow the overarching contextual trend of Western depictions of China in media then they will likely represent the country in a negative light. Furthermore, as the reporting takes place in an Australian context it is reasonable to assume that it might take on some of the broader characteristics of a society in which people of Chinese heritage face a degree of racial discrimination (Dunn, Blair, Bliuc and Kamp, 2018; Junankar, Paul and Yasmeen, 2010; Li, 2019; Wong, 2017).

## 7.3—Critical Discourse Analysis of the Representation of China in Reporting about the Attack Class submarine procurement

A general qualitative analysis was performed on 879 articles that discussed the Attack class procurement. The results of this analysis suggested that China was a significant topic in news reporting, with China being mentioned in over 230 articles. Following Fairclough's (1992) advice to focus on moments of crisis in discourse, a further subset of 40 articles that addressed China were chosen for more in depth discursive analysis. The results of this analysis suggest that newspaper reporting of the Attack class tended to discursively present China as a potentially hostile entity. Narratives of China concentrated on strategies of military and diplomatic containment and risk management. Reporting showed a pattern of linguistic and thematic representation of China that presented it as more threat than opportunity. While sometimes China was discussed as a nuanced actor in strategic relations with Australia, China was often represented as lacking agency, and more substantial discussion of China's goals and political circumstances was rare.

The characteristics of the reporting analysed in this research is as follows:

China is often referred to in a synecdochic fashion where the actions or motives of the Chinese Communist Party are implied to stand for the country as a whole. The Chinese people themselves and their desires and motives are rarely discussed. Chinese voices are marginalised in this discourse. Of the articles analysed very few quoted Chinese nationals as sources or provided detailed analysis of what individual Chinese might think or feel about the events transpiring. Reporting across newspapers and between journalists tended to repeat a number of key narratives:

- *China as the cause of instability and tension in the Asia Pacific region*
- *China as a power that needs to be contained*
- *China as a military threat that could invade or attack Australia*
- *China as a complication that threatens Japan-Australia relations*

This is by no means an exhaustive list of the themes and narratives employed by journalists in their representations of China, however these represent what inductively appear to be the most favoured by journalists covering news of events relating to the Attack class procurement. This analysis will discuss these narratives in further detail in order to present a broader argument about how the news media represent China as a central element to be considered in defence and national security issues.

### 7.3a—China as the Cause of Instability and Tension in the Asia Pacific Region

This analysis suggests that reporters covering the Attack class programme tended to problematise China as a cause for anxiety and tension between countries in the region. In the context of national security reporting China is discussed often as a source of instability and tension in the Indo-Pacific region. Though individual journalists differ in their language and explanations of why this is the case, as well as possible consequences or responses, that "China has caused tension" within and between nations is given as a statement of fact without qualifying statements. China's motivations, what it hopes to achieve and why it is expanding its military and strategic influence is rarely discussed in depth. In these three examples the root is identified simply as China's "rise" itself:

> In the years to come the 2016 Defence White Paper will be regarded as the moment when Australia acknowledged […] that the security risks posed by China's rise can no longer be ignored. (Walker, 2016, February 26)

> About a quarter [of new defence spending] will go to building a potent navy, partly in recognition of the tension that is growing in Asia in response to the rise of China. (Wroe, 2016, February 26)

> [Prime Minister Turnbull is] on a mission to ensure that the vital relationship with Japan, which is becoming even more important as China rises further […], is not sidetracked. (Shanahan, 2015, December 12)

The above articles were written on the topic of new defence spending, the White Paper and Turnbull's visit to Japan in 2015. The *rise* is a noteworthy textual feature of many reporters representations of China, regardless of context or the topic of the news article. It has a high degree of what Fairclough (1992) describes as intertextuality, in that it draws from an established discourse in Western society (Lee, 2016) and appears across the corpus being used by many journalists independent of one another. Grammatically, when "China's rise" is used as in the above examples it is often in an agentless sentence structure. Linguistically this creates an ambiguity around the cause or reason for China's "rising", positioning it as something that is either uncontrollable or simply a "matter of fact". China's rise is often closely linked to the object of "the region", its effect being "tension" and "instability". By nominalising China's economic and political development this reduces China's agency in the matter further, presenting China's increasing political and economic influence as an inevitability. Tony Walker (2016, February 26) describes it as such, stating that "as China grows it will inevitably seek greater power within the region". China's agency is further diminished by distancing and qualifying statements like "the tension that is growing in Asia in response to the rise of China". Instead of China being attributed deliberately with developing its economy and strategic presence to destabilise the region, the instability is presented as outside of China's control or an unintended effect. In contrast, there are examples in sampled articles that discussed China where journalists characterise the strategic actions of the U.S. and its allies in the region as being deliberate, controlled, stabilising and legitimate:

> The US has several times challenged China's claims to exclusive sovereignty over the islands by sailing naval ships within 12 nautical miles of the disputed islands […] These freedom-of-navigation operations are intended to assert the right of free passage in international waters. (Nicholson, 2016, February 18)

> The [White Paper] says the US will remain the pre-eminent global military power in the next 20 years and will play a "crucial role" in ensuring the stability of the region. (Stewart, 2016, February 26)

> Mr Kishida said submarines were at the core of the Australia/Japan relationship which was the "linchpin" for peace and stability. (Shepherd, 2015, November 23)

Notably, these sentences position the U.S. as having strong agency in its interactions with China, particularly through phrasings such as "has challenged" and "will remain the pre-eminent global military power". Following Kevin Andrew's promotion to Minister of Defence, more specific issues such as China's military expansion were presented as cause for concern:

> There is growing tension between the United States and China as well as between China and India that is fuelling an arms race in the Asia-Pacific region. (Who will be calling the shots? 2015, January 3)

Again, in this example China is presented as having limited agency. "Growing tension" is the subject of the first sentence, but it is not made clear what actions by China or other party nations are responsible for "fuelling an arms race". In other instances, China's impact on the region is reductively attributed to its growing military capabilities. In an article on Defence spending Stewart states:

> The heavy emphasis on maritime power [in the White Paper] reflects ongoing concerns about the pace and scale of China's growing naval capabilities. (Stewart, 2015, September 12)

In this sentence the subject "concerns" are attributed to the object "China's growing naval capabilities", which is a statement that again makes China's agency ambiguous in this process. China's active role in its own decision to increase the size of its military, or any justification for that act, is represented as assumed knowledge. China is also often denied agency over its actions in the South China Sea:

> [Keogh says] "Given these uncertain times and increasing friction over territorial claims in the South China Sea, it is vital Australia has a strong submarine force". (Nicholson, 2014, November 19)

In this instance China is (as with other countries) completely removed from the equation, and the increase in Australia's military capabilities is justified by the nominalised fragment

"increasing friction" resulting from territory disputes. The context of these articles is important. As China is being discussed in the context of the Attack class procurement the metaphoric representation of China as an "uncontrollable risk" rhetorically suggests certain conclusions. Few articles in this study suggest anything other than a military response, with investment in the Attack class often being positioned as the most logical response.

Journalists in the sampled texts also referred to the tension as being caused by China's "belligerence" and "aggression", which are nouns, rather than referring to specific actions or verbs. As Fairclough (1992) argues, nominalisation further abstracts an actual processes or behaviour turning it into an "inherent state or property" (p. 183), one over which the agent has limited control or indirect influence over. Rather than reporting acts that can be identified as aggressive, in this way China is passively characterised as having the *status of being aggressive.* For example:

> [Asian countries are seeking to] modernise their submarine fleets amid rising tension over China's more aggressive stance in the South China Sea and East China Sea. (Kerin, 2014, September 1)
>
> [Teruhiko Fukushima] said Tokyo's eagerness for closer military ties with Australia was to guard against China's increasingly aggressive behaviour in the region. (Grigg, 2016, February 22)
>
> [China] is becoming increasingly belligerent in the South China Sea. (Shepherd, 2016, February 25)
>
> China has had double-digit growth in defence spending each year for more than a decade […] it is adopting an increasingly belligerent approach to claiming contested territory in the South China Sea. (Stewart, 2016, February 26)

These linguistic choices on the part of journalists appear to reflect broader media discourses identified by Yu and Wang (2017) that China's growth is "reckless," and by others that conflict between China and the West is "inevitable" (Broomfield, 2003; Gries, 2005; Liss, 2003; Okuda, 2016). The use of militaristic metaphors by journalists such as "aggressive stance", "to

guard against" and "claiming contested territory", seems to further imply that conflict with China is not only inevitable but already underway. What is conspicuous in many articles is the absence of nuanced discussion of or explanation for the motivations behind China's actions in the region. The absence of complex analysis of China's role in the region is at least partially explained by the limitations of news journalism as a genre. News journalism focuses on short accounts of events as the orientating feature of the article. As such there is limited space and justification for lengthy explanations of the 'why' of China. However, as this analysis suggests: by adopting an authoritative voice, journalists represent China as the cause of tension in the region and often assert this as a statement of fact rather than the result of more complex strategic and international circumstances. Whether intentional or as a consequence of the genre limitations of news journalism, the absence could be seen as resulting in a limitation on audiences' understanding of the full complexity of the situation.

### 7.3b—China as a Power that Needs to be Contained

In articles sampled for this study journalists tended to represent China as a power that needs to be contained. Many articles employed strategic game discourse (Schmuck, Heiss, Matthes, Engesser and Esser, 2017) when discussing China and how Australia should engage with China. The language differs between the writing of different journalists but there are many examples within the articles sampled where in reference to China words and phrases such as: "contain", "counter", "hedge" or "guard against" were used. This particular theme of containment is often placed in the context of Australia possibly purchasing Japanese submarines, the purpose of which would be to create a three-way alliance to encircle China and deter its military expansion:

> It has long been suspected that Washington is quietly supporting Japan's bid as a means of strengthening the Australia-Japan-US alliance against China in the Pacific. (Stewart, 2015, October 22)

> *The Australian* also reported US military officials were quietly urging Australia to favour the Japanese proposal to reinforce efforts to "contain" China's territorial ambitions. (White, 2016, January 29)

> A Japan deal has strong backing from the US and Mr Abbott has been keen to strengthen security ties with Japan as a hedge against China's growing power in the region. (Kerin, 2015, January 7)

Textual analysis of these articles shows that journalists sometimes use containment language when explaining justifications for the purchase of submarines. Presenting the conflict as being driven by "China's growing power" or "China's territorial ambitions" presents China in a passive light, implying limited agency. The use of phrasing such as "backing", "supporting", "strengthening", "quietly urging", "reinforce efforts" and "strengthen ties" is suggestive of strategic game discourse.

When journalists or sources suggested China needed to be contained this was often justified by the size and reach of China's military:

> China's submarine force is set to reach 80 boats and there is a growing view in the region that, while no nation can match that, allies such as Japan […] Australia […] and the US […] add up to a deterrent force. (Nicholson, 2016, February 26)

> China's economic rise in recent decades has been matched by rapid expansion in its defence forces. Already, the world's most populous nation boasts Asia's second-largest navy. (Wills, 2016, April 27)

The inclusion of the qualifier "world's most populous nation" in discussion of China's military expansion evokes well established media metaphors of Australia being "swamped" or "inundated" by outsiders (Nguyen and McCallum, 2016). Where China's militarisation and outward deployment of military forces is characterised as "belligerence" and "aggression" the proposal of a three-way military alliance between Japan, Australia and the US is characterised as providing "stability" and "security".

> "Our partnership is the linchpin of the peace and stability of the Asia Pacific; boosted Australia/Japan cooperation is vital not only for our two nations but also for the international society," [Foreign Minister Kishida] said. (Shepherd, 2015, November 23)

When containment of China is discussed, journalists often do not provide a balancing perspective, or quote a source that might disagree with the notion that China is a danger that needs to be contained. Again, this may be in part due to the limitations of the genre of news journalism, but the absence of dissenting voices, Chinese voices and the Chinese perspective in general in these articles is noteworthy. As discussed in Chapter 2 of this inquiry, journalists are under increasing pressure to produce more news with fewer resources and to tighter deadlines, and as such may not have the time or access to reach sources providing alternate views (Berkowitz, 2009; Murphy, 2015). As a consequence of the patterns of various journalist's source selections, sources that advocate containment of China appear to be overrepresented within this discourse.

### 7.3c—China as a Military Threat That Could Attack or Invade Australia

While some of the discursive approaches to China found in this inquiry could be discussed in terms of limitations of the genre of news reporting, there are some examples of discursive representation that clearly presuppose China as a direct threat to Australian sovereignty. This analysis found some articles that overtly suggested that China should be feared as a direct and likely military and strategic threat to Australia. For some journalists this was represented narratively as the logical conclusion to China's expansion, and a hypothetical war with China is often used to explain and justify defence and security policy.

> Current US projections for a war with China envisage Australia's key contribution would be naval forces at the southern end of China's trade routes to help block the import of commodities. (Toohey, 2014, April 5)

> A submarine can in peacetime (and wartime) lie silently just off the coast of China, or India, or Siberia, sucking up millions of electronic signals from a potential enemy. (Decision on subs not just about cost, 2014, September 13)

> We in Australia can never be sure that the relationship we currently enjoy with the People's Republic of China will not "turn on a dime". We can only hope it doesn't, but hope isn't something we can base our defence policy on – that is why we need submarines. (Bruni, 2015, March 24)

For some authors, the threat of China is represented not as whether or not China is likely to attack Australia, but simply that China has the capacity to attack Australia. For example, Brendan Nicholson from *The Australian* asserts—based on research from an American think tank:

> Heading: LIVING IN THE DANGER ZONE
> China's growing naval power and long-range missiles threaten to bring Canberra within range of the People's Liberation Army as Australia's geographical isolation no longer protects it. (Nicholson, 2015, July 13)

In some articles the assertion that China could or might wage war on Australia is not tempered by discussion of how likely or unlikely this might be, and journalists rarely quote sources or evidence that might suggest China is unlikely to engage in a military conflict with Western powers. Instead, a number of articles in the sample presuppose a rationality in which a conventional Chinese invasion of the Australian mainland is a realistic possibility that readers should be alarmed by:

> The Chinese navy could conduct sporadic attacks on Australia's northern ports and land special forces on the continent, according to a new report by a US think tank. (Stewart, 2013, November 8)

> The latest generation of European subs could, if desired, make a valuable contribution during a war with China […] they could protect Australia's approaches

> and operate in the near neighbourhood avoiding imbalance. (Toohey, 2014, September 13)
>
> A new report suggests the possibility of an uncertain future with the unthinkable catastrophe of a ballistic missile exchange with the nation's main trading partner [China]. (Nicholson, 2015, July 15)

In keeping with the style of national security journalism, the discussion of the potential for war with China uses strategic language. The human aspects of war are glossed over in a way that hyper-simplifies the role that technology and weapons systems plays in strategic warfighting. A noteworthy example of this comes from an opinion article authored by Andrew Bolt in which they envision a hypothetical conflict between Australian and Chinese submarines:

> Somewhere out there, perhaps even 200 metres below [the Australian submarine], are updated versions of what China has now, the so-called "aircraft carrier killer" Type-093G, whispering on nuclear engines, able to stay down longer, and capable of firing supersonic anti-ship missiles vertically. (Bolt, 2015, August 6)

The result is that at least within the context of reporting on the Attack class submarines, the possibility of war with China is often reduced to a linguistic melange of technical and strategic gaming, focused on the relative costs and benefits of "supersonic anti-ship missiles," occupying "chokepoints" and "nuclear engines".

The transition from metaphoric to literal discussion of military conflict between Australia and China reflects the broader context in which the reporting of the Attack class took place. 2013 marked the beginning of China's construction of military facilities on artificial islands throughout the South China Sea (Stashwick, 2019, August 19). The ongoing construction of such facilities throughout 2014 and 2015 meant that the reporting of the Attack class occurred alongside news reports and speculation of a possibly military confrontation between the U.S. and China in the region. No such conflict arose, instead the island facilities have proven to be difficult to maintain, with concrete and weapons systems

deteriorating quickly in harsh tropical conditions, exposed to weather and extremely distant from the mainland (Chen, 2019, July 1). The 2016 *Defence White Paper* (Department of Defence, 2016) positioned the likelihood of conventional military conflict with China as relatively remote, characterising the U.S.-China relationship as one of "a mixture of cooperation and competition depending on where and how their interests intersect" (p. 43). As such, the literal discussion—and imagining—of military confrontation with China have a distinct rhetorical function. Van Dijk (2008) argues that discriminatory discursive practices are often rooted in biased models of events and interactions, and while "this does not mean that discriminatory practices are always intentional, [rather] they presuppose socially shared and negatively oriented mental representations of Us and Them" (p. 103). In the context of reporting on the Attack class submarine procurement news reporting represents China as an uncontrollable danger, presupposing a negative view of China-Australia relations as being first and foremost a relation of *competition* rather than cooperation. The literal discussion of war with China is used to signal to readers that certain facts about China—its investment in military capability, its large population and the apparent "inevitability" of its increasing political power—are more important than other facts. The ideological function of this discourse then is to present China as *already* in competition with Australia, thereby rejecting the possibility of cooperation and collaboration on economic, trade or security matters. While this may be unintentional, this discourse functions using a biased model of events and relationships between nations, one that privileges evidence of perceived competitive behaviour and privileges non-Chinese sources of information.

### 7.3d—China as a Cyberthreat

The second instance in which China is sometimes regarded as a direct threat is in articles discussing Australia's cyber security. While infrequent, some articles focused on the alleged threat of China accessing secret information about the Attack class submarines. In November of 2015, the German bidder for the submarine design contract TKMS reported to journalists that it believed it was the subject of a hacking campaign by China. However, a

limited number of articles were written about the alleged hacking, or on other breaches related to the submarines.

> Chinese and Russian spies have attempted to hack into the top-secret details of Australia's future submarines, with both Beijing and Moscow believed to have mounted repeated cyber-attacks in recent months. (Stewart, 2015, November 9)

> Chinese spies are not just targeting information on the Future Submarines—they're trying to infiltrate every area of Defence, the industry says. (Shepherd, 2015, November 13)

> One of the world's top spy fighters says he would be "shocked" if Chinese spies were not trying to hack our military capabilities. (Shepherd, 2016, March 17)

Throughout the corpus of texts analysed for this inquiry very few articles discussed cybersecurity or potential cyber-treats from state actors with significant detail or complexity. The few articles that discussed China in relation to cybersecurity tended to simplify the issue significantly. As the above examples suggest, both Russian but particularly Chinese cybersecurity attacks are characterised as simply a matter of unquestioned fact. However, when and where they happen, and whether they have any effect, is unmentioned. This is likely due to the limited information available for journalists to publicly assess. The narrative of hacking, presumably Chinese hacking, being a "fact of life" is repeated:

> [TKMS] campaign manager Manfred Klein said the company's Kiel shipyard was the target of hacking attempts […] his colleague on the campaign, Robert Budell, said it was a "fact of life". (Shepherd, 2015, November 9)

> Defence Teaming Centre chief Chris Burns said the industry presumed the attackers were mostly Chinese. (Shepherd, 2015, November 13)

As well as the fact that the hacking attempts received relatively limited coverage, their treatment by journalists and sources quoted as being frequent but possibly banal meant there was little scope to discuss Australia's preparedness to counter such attempts. Hacking is also

discussed as something that is unidirectional and discussion of whether or not Australia and other U.S. allies are engaged in cyber espionage is omitted. That being said, the small number of articles in this corpus discussing China's cyber activity and potential hacking of Australian organisations means there are few conclusions that can be drawn on data from this research alone.

### 7.3e—China as a Complication That Threatens Japan-Australia Relations

Throughout the procurement process for the Attack class submarines Japan was considered a likely contender to eventually build the submarines. As such, there was a significant amount of reporting that discussed how China might react in the event that Japan be given the contract, or if Australia significantly advanced its military cooperation with Japan. Within the sample for this research, the majority of journalists and commentators represented China as likely to be antagonised by Australia should it choose to further cooperate with Japan. For example:

> Australian security analysts said on Monday the talks represented an advance [on Japan and Australia] security arrangements but stopped well short of a formal treaty […] which would almost certainly anger Australia's largest trading partner – China. (Kerin and Coorey, 2014, April 8)

> Quite apart from the fact that Japan has never sold its [submarine propulsion] technology, is determined to keep it secret, and China would be furious. (Stuart, 2014, April 12)

In a number of articles journalists used emotive language to describe how China would react to Australia forging deeper ties with Japan. Journalists suggested China would be "furious", "angry", "threatened" or "fearful" of Australia's defence and national security decisions. This fits into a broader narrative of China being characterised as trying to threaten, influence or bully Australia into taking certain courses of action strategically:

> In a patronising lecture to Australia, Wang told Bishop that Australia should remember history when dealing with Japan […] Wang's comments are a blatant attempt to intimidate Australia. (Sheridan, 2016, February 19)

> China has made it clear that any decision to proceed down this path will have "strategic ramifications [for Australia]". (Stuart, 2015, December 8)

> China will celebrate Japan's failure to sell submarines to Australia and probably believes it bullied Canberra into rejecting Tokyo's bid, the architect of the nation's modern defence policy says. (Stewart, 2016, April 28)

A common representation in this discourse is that if Australia advances its relationship with Japan China could or will use its economic power to punish Australia. For example:

> State Defence Industries Minister Martin Hamilton-Smith warned that doing a deal with Japan could jeopardise SA's trade relationship with China because of tensions between the two Asian nations. (Shepherd, 2014, October 15)

> Australia's $150 billion a year trade relationship and growing security ties with China would be threatened if Canberra turns to Japan for its fleet of new submarines, experts said. (Kerin, 2015, January 19)

> Tensions between China and Japan could see China punish Australia economically if the Government decides to buy submarines from Japan. (Shepherd, 2014, December 13)

The general view of China and Japan relations presented in this discourse was as a zero-sum game. Australia could choose to align its actions to benefit either Japan (and the U.S.) or China and there are few options that would allow Australia to remain on good terms with both countries. Journalists and commentators rarely suggested that this might be unlikely or not the case, and few provided quotes or evidence from other sources that might contradict the idea that choosing closer ties with Japan meant angering or distancing Australia from China.

## 7.4—Socio-political and Contextual Factors Influencing the Reporting of China in News Media

From this analysis a few issues arise that suggest questions for this inquiry overall. Australia's relationship with China recurred as a point of interest for journalists reporting on the Attack class programme. In exploring the characteristics of journalists representations of China a few noteworthy patterns emerge. Whether due in part to the limitations of news journalism as a genre or lack of access to Chinese sources, China was often represented in a manner that did not adhere to journalistic norms of fairness and impartiality (Deuze, 2005). It is arguable however, that given the context of this reporting and its focus on national security and defence procurement, such adherence to journalistic norms might not be expected by either journalist or audience. That being said, the representation of China within this context appears to discard much of the complexity and nuance required for its audience to understand China as a nation with diverse motives. It does this by—intentionally or not—reducing China's agency, representing China as a cause of instability and tension, and marginalising Chinese perspectives. Though there are limitations on this inquiry as to scope, and particularly as it focuses on only one particular subject of reporting (the Attack class) these findings appear to concur with existing literature on Western news media representations of China.

### 7.4a—Conflict with China as a Driving Narrative

A review of the literature on Western media representations of China suggested that representations of China tended towards the negative. A number of studies have suggested that Western news reporting of China tended to use negative political and ideological frames (Peng, 2004), represented China as a threat (Ooi and D'Arcangelis, 2018; Yang and Liu, 2012) and as an inevitable source of conflict with Western power (Okuda, 2016). This analysis suggests that Australian news journalists reporting on defence and security issues also appear to reproduce this consensus view of China. There are few positive representations of China,

with many journalists tending to describe China as producing tensions and instability, and its actions as being aggressive, belligerent or precipitating conflict. It is notable that the United States and its allies are rarely characterised using similar language or discursive techniques. What this analysis also suggests is that generally negative perceptions of China appear to persist across all the newspapers sampled and that most journalists—independent of one another—tend to agree that the West's relationship with China is at the very least problematic. Interestingly, while some researchers suggest that that political consensus on China is that of "threat versus opportunity" (Jain and McCarthy, 2016), within the context of reporting on the Attack class procurement there appeared to be few representations of the "opportunity" and a good deal of the "threat" offered by China. The combined ideological function of these discourses then is to privilege certain facts and information that appear to confirm the view of China as an "Other" (Van Dijk, 2008, p. 105) that is inevitably—and already—in competition with Australia. This discourse precludes and often downplays facts, events and evidence that might suggest the possibility of a collaborative relationship between the two countries.

One possibility to explain this is that *conflict* as an organising theme drives China reporting because journalists are drawn to conflict as a newsworthy angle for reporting. As Bartholomé, Lecheler and De Vreese (2015) have suggested, political journalists construct conflict frames in news stories by focusing on the "drama" of a story, using exaggerated language and emphasising possible consequences (p. 442). Journalists are also selective in what they report on and some research has suggested that they are drawn to reporting on conflict (Mutz and Reeves, 2005) at the exclusion of less high-stakes issues. It could be argued then that possible conflict with China—diplomatic, strategic, economic or otherwise—represents an irresistible topic of reporting for journalists. And further as Bartholomé, Lecheler and De Vreese suggest, journalists are compelled to keep abreast of unfolding stories being reported on by other media outlets and journalists. In this sense the reporting of China analysed in this study represents a rather unremarkable confirmation of journalistic and discursive practices that emphasise conflict at the exclusion of other narratives.

There are however some important differences between this particular discourse and other general political conflict narratives. As Aalberg, Strömbäck and De Vreese (2011) suggest, in Western news media the strategic conflict frame is very much a narrative borrowed from politics, where the central drama is electoral success or failure. Political conflict is an attractive frame for journalists as it allows readers to "pick a side" (Bartholomé, Lecheler and De Vreese, 2015, p. 448) and as such feel a personal stake in the outcome of the conflict. For Australian journalists reporting for an Australian audience about Australia's strategic and defence relationship with China, the notion of "picking a side" seems redundant. Furthermore, potential conflict between Australia and China holds significantly higher stakes than the outcome of an election. As Deuze and Witschge (2017) suggest, objectivity is generally considered an important value in journalism. When reporting on China-Australia security relations however, this becomes a more complicated ideal.

### 7.4b—The Limitations of Contemporary Journalism

There are significant limitations to the work that any journalist can put into each article they publish. It is widely acknowledged that journalists work to often tight deadlines, with limited access to sources of information, news-gathering resources, limited ability to fact check and commercial and editorial pressure to report on particular issues in particular ways (Broersma, 2010; Fengler and Ruß-Mohl, 2008; Murphy, 2015). Reporting on China is also becoming increasingly difficult for Western news outlets. Foreign correspondents are globally declining in numbers. The resources available for foreign postings are diminishing, and furthermore the time constraints and working conditions on foreign correspondents deteriorating (Brüggemann, Keel, Hanitzsch, Götzenbrucker and Schacht, 2017; Willnat and Martin, 2012). Foreign correspondents posted in China are in similar decline (Zeng, 2017). It seems likely therefore that any reporting on China from an Australian news media perspective would be limited in scope and insight.

This analysis appears to confirm as much. The decline in resources available for journalists who wish to report on China is part of the broader social context in which this

discourse takes place. It is not surprising then that there are few foreign correspondents who contributed to the articles explored in this analysis. There are also few Chinese voices present in this discourse. Of the texts analysed through the CDA part of this analysis only two articles contained substantive contribution from China experts or Chinese sources. Many of the articles in this analysis specifically focused on China and issues of Sino-Australian relations, so the absence of Chinese perspectives is particularly noteworthy. Some exceptions come from articles by Angus Grigg (2016, February 26) and by John Kerin (2015, January 19) which quote a number of China experts.

In Kerin's article on January 19, 2015, the journalist quotes Wu Xinbo from the Shanghai-based Institute of International Studies:

> […] China's concerns are twofold. "One is how far the Japan-Australian security relationship will go and whether it becomes a de facto alliance […] another is how this will challenge China's security interests". (Kerin, 2015, January 19)

And Associate Professor You Ji of the University of NSW:

> [You Ji] said while Chinese PLA officers do not consider the ADF as a threat, "they do ask why Australia needs 12 advanced conventional submarines". (Kerin, 2015, January 19)

Angus Grigg (2016, February 26) quotes "government-linked commentators in China" Li Jie a researcher for the People's Liberation Army Navy and Wang Zhenyu from the China Institute of International studies:

> [Li Jie] said via phone from Beijing Australia's military build-up will threaten its economic relationship with China and is part of a "dangerous regional trend".
>
> [And Wang Zhenyu] said Australia's economic relationship with China could be hurt by its security arrangements with the United States and Japan. (Grigg, 2016, February 26)

However, as the above quotations suggest, when Chinese sources are quoted they rarely contradict the consensus view of China as being locked in a competitive relationship with Australia and the United States.

## 7.5—The China-Australia Relationship and the Reporting of the Attack Class

This chapter argued that discourses of Australia's relationship with China featured prominently in the reporting on the Attack class submarine procurement. As such, it was often the case that news reporting of the Attack class programme was contextualised by reporting of China as a key justification for the purchase of the submarines. As the above examples suggest, China was characterised in reporting as a cause of instability and tension in the region; as a power that needed to be contained; as a military threat that could invade or attack Australia; and as a complication to regional diplomatic relationships. Significantly, where China was represented in news reports relating to the Attack class rarely did journalists quote sources that provided alternate views to these representations. Narratives of risk, conflict and the threat posed by China were prevalent, where in contrast it was uncommon to find reporting that highlighted other economic, historic and cultural aspects of the China-Australia relationship.

Key findings from this chapter suggest that China is uniquely prominent in newspaper reporting of the procurement programme as a potential military threat to Australia and its interests. No other country is discussed within this context with as much frequency or depth of characterisation as China. The linguistic features of this reporting also suggest a representation of China as an *inevitable* risk to Australia, with limited agency and a hostile and belligerent outlook on international relations. Furthermore, the representation of China as a strategic risk appears to be a consistent pattern across a range of publications and articles published within the timeframe this inquiry covers.

The use of militaristic metaphors and the language of conflict further suggest that the "China threat" is contextualised within Australia's cultural history of war. News reporting of the Attack class often metaphorically and sometimes literally imagines a future armed conflict

between Australia and China. As Fairclough (1992) and Van Dijk (2008) argue, contemporary discourses can be understood in terms of the cultural and historic themes, narratives and myths that they draw from. By imagining the China-Australia relationship as a relationship of conflict, war and risk, news reporting of the Attack class is occasionally evocative of deeply engrained Australian cultural myths of "national crisis", geographic isolation, vulnerability and the mythic Anzac heroes who defend against an often culturally alien "Other" (Donoghue and Tranter, 2015; Hilvert, 1984; Ubayasiri, 2015). Because such myths are deeply entrenched in the cultural context of military reporting the "Othering" of China emerges unquestioned. It is possible this is an ideological function of the increasing centrality of war commemoration and military heritage in contemporary Australian cultural experience and national identity (Robertson, 2015; Waterton and Dittmer, 2016; Wilson, 2016). If the importance of war is such that it is regarded as "the birth of the nation" (Donoghue and Tranter, 2015, p. 260), it could appear logical then to assume that militaristic competition is the natural state of relations between countries.

While individual articles provide some substantial depth and nuance to the discussion of Australia-China relations, taken as a whole and over a period of time newspaper reporting appears to oversimplify the issue. The 2016 Defence White Paper (Department of Defence, 2016) provides the most comprehensive official government position on Australia, China and the security of the region. While the White Paper does state that "territorial disputes between claimants in the East China and South China Seas have created uncertainty and tensions in our region" (p. 30), it is careful to note that China is not the only country in the region that is modernising its military. Importantly it singles out China an important contributor to the security of the region, stating:

> Australia welcomes China's continued economic growth and the opportunities this is bringing for Australia and other countries in the Indo-Pacific. […] The Government will seek to deepen and broaden our important defence relationship with China while recognising that our strategic interest may differ in relation to some regional and global security issues. (p. 44)

In contrast to many of the above examples of reporting that characterise China as a hostile neighbour, in 2016 the Foreign Minister Julie Bishop stated that:

> Our comprehensive strategic partnership [with China] has grown significantly. Our Free Trade Agreement came into force in December. Australia is a reliable trading partner for China and we look forward to our trade diversifying across the established areas of commodities, agriculture, but also into services. […] Our joint defence exercises [with China] are continuing for we have a common interest in the maintenance of peace and security and stability in our region. (Department of Foreign Affairs, 2016, February 17)

The position of the Australian government has been to downplay any possible conflict that Australia might have with China in regional security terms. And while the Government's articulation of Australia's relationship with China may be couched in diplomatic terms it still attempts to address some of the complexity of Australia's relationship with China.

The findings of this research suggest that Australian journalists covering the Attack class tended to reproduce discourses that were marginalising of views that represented Australia's relationship with China in positive terms. As Fairclough (1992) argues, discourse functions to reproduce social relationships and construct social reality, particularly by emphasising certain facts, ideas and perspectives and minimising the prevalence of alternate discourses. Taking a critical discourse approach, this analysis suggests that—intentionally or not—newspaper reporting perpetuates discourses that represent China as a hostile "Other" (Van Dijk, 2008, p. 105). China is represented as an abstract other with limited discussion of the complex motives underpinning its political and military actions as a state. The Chinese people themselves are discursively absent from media discussion of Australia-China relations, as reporting tends to take a strategic game lens that represents China as a political entity rather than a population of individuals with diverse motives and beliefs. As such, within the context of reporting on the Attack class, it can be argued that China often came to be discursively constructed as the enemy for which the Attack class was intended to defend against.

However, more research is needed to draw conclusions about the overall influence such discourses might have on Australia's public sentiment towards China and Chinese people. The literature as discussed suggests that Australian residents of Chinese descent continue to face discrimination (Dunn, Blair, Bliuc and Kamp, 2018; Li, 2019; Junankar, Paul and Yasmeen, 2010; Wong, 2017), and that Western news representations of China tend to be racialised (Ooi and D'Arcangelis, 2018). Additionally, Australia's Race Discrimination Commissioner has expressed concern that political and media discourses of China could be leaning towards a discriminatory and racialised representation of China, that could be undermining informed public debate (Soutphommasane, 2018). That being said, the small sample size for the CDA component of this research as well as the limited context of the Attack Class submarine procurement in which it explored China as a news issue, limits the conclusions that can be drawn from this research. This inquiry cannot determine that Australia's history of racial and discriminatory public discourse can be credited with the observed representation of China in this study. The salient points this analysis can draw upon relate more to the ways in which national security reporting in Australia tends to represent international relationships between nation states. Through a Critical Discourse Analysis of news reporting of the Attack class, it can be seen that journalists tend to deny China agency and privilege facts, events and sources that reinforce an ideological view that international relations are primarily relationships of *inevitable competition* rather than of potential cooperation.

Many examples of reporting on the Attack class submarine presented a unidimensional view of Australia's relationship with China. A pragmatic narrative, in which the existence of a proposed weapon—the Attack class—appeared to presuppose a potential target to use it against—China.

This representation of China in the reporting of the Attack class programme can—in part—be explained by the limitations of contemporary journalism. As Katherine Murphy (2015) argues, the cycle of rolling news, ever shorter deadlines and the need to produce competitive news across multiple platforms, often leave journalists with little time to gather

sources and explore all the angles. Unless a journalist happens to be a China correspondent; Chinese sources and perspectives appear distant in comparison to sources of convenience such as local politicians, think tank researchers and defence insiders. Literature suggests that as newsrooms face ongoing limitations journalists are becoming increasingly drawn towards incentives provided by political, public relations and other elite sources of news (Berkowtiz, 2009; Hecht, Martin, Donnelly, Larson and Sweetser, 2017; Lewis, Williams and Franklin, 2008; Lee and Lin, 2017). Subsequently, it is argued that journalists tend to reproduce the perspectives of the established and powerful. If this is the case, it could be argued that the representation of China as a threat represents in part the reproduction of consensus views within the Australian political and military establishment. China is likely represented through the prism of opportunity versus threat, or the inevitability of conflict, in part because those are the available discourses presented to journalists by the sources they have access to.

As journalism in Australia continues to face financial uncertainty and declining resources, the findings from this chapter raise questions as to the capacity of the press to provide detailed and informative news. National security and international relations are complex—yet the representation of China in the context of reporting on a key national security issue was at times oversimplified and marginalising of Chinese perspectives. As argued in previous chapters, should the decline of journalism in Australia continue this could mean the further consolidation of reporting beats, a reduction in the scope of investigative journalism and increasing reliance on official sources for news. This would further restrict in-depth reporting and analysis of Australia's political and military involvement with China and other countries. This would represent a significant loss—and a detriment to Australia's capacity to look outward as a nation towards potential friends and opportunities beyond our borders.

The following chapter will explore some of these themes further in an analysis of the role of lobbying and public relations officials in the reporting of the Attack class procurement. In a similar sense, as journalists struggle to produce news under increasing constraints on time and resources, public relations and lobbying officials represent significant subsidies for

news production. As this following chapter will discuss, the rise and increasing influence of lobbying and PR in Australia likely has significant consequences for how the press discuss and debate national security issues.

# Chapter 8—Advocacy and Public Relations in News Discourses of the Attack Class Procurement

> *What industry, indeed the nation, needs is a 30-year strategic vision and a plan for shipbuilding in Australia that realises the security, sovereignty and economic benefits to the nation of sustaining an indigenous shipbuilding industry.* (Burns, 2015, March 24)

This chapter discusses the discursive practice of using public relations practitioners and industry advocates as sources in news production, and the impact on news discourses. While previous chapters focused on production factors such as the structure of the national security beat (Chapter 5) and the use of unnamed sources (Chapter 6), as well as textual factors such as the representation of China in news (Chapter 7), this chapter addresses the increasing integration of commercial discourses into news reporting.

Key findings from this chapter suggest that throughout the reporting of the Attack class procurement journalists made frequent use of public relations practitioners and industry advocates as sources of news. In doing so they amplified messages and arguments that framed the debate over the submarines as a choice between investing in local jobs and industry or sending taxpayer dollars overseas. Journalists gave industry sources substantial opportunities to advance arguments in favour of submarine work being directed towards local industry. During the competitive evaluation stage of the procurement, the widespread use of industry sources meant that reporting on the Attack class submarine programme was often framed in commercial terms. News became a venue in which rival companies engaged in publicity campaigns designed to pressure the government by influencing public opinion.

This chapter will argue that the power relationship between journalism and defence industry advocacy has become substantially unbalanced. This was reflected in the widespread presence of industry discourses throughout the reporting of the Attack class procurement.

Through journalists, advocates and PR practitioners were able to subvert the government's framing of the Attack class procurement as a question of what was best in terms of both cost and capability. Rather than adhering to norms of journalistic scrutiny and public service (Deuze, 2005), reporters frequently allowed commercialised discourses of national security to pass largely unquestioned. Furthermore, the disclosure of source affiliations was often ambiguous, so it remained unclear that many sources were paid advocates employed by industry.

First, this chapter will review additional background literature discussing the relationship between journalism and defence industry PR and advocacy in Australia. Second it will discursively analyse PR and advocacy discourses in news reporting of the Attack class procurement. Finally, it will discuss and draw conclusions about the influence of commercial discourses on broader journalistic practices relating to national security reporting.

## 8.1—Public Relations, Advocacy and Information Subsidies

As discussed in Chapter 2, news organisations internationally and in Australia are facing significant cutbacks as advertising revenue is redirected towards digital and social media platforms (Benson, 2018; Carlson, 2015; Kaye and Quinn, 2010). Some scholarship has argued that these pressures have resulted in journalists becoming more reliant on sources of convenience when reporting on news (Berkowtiz, 2009; Hecht, Martin, Donnelly, Larson and Sweetser, 2017; Lee and Lin, 2017; Lewis, Williams and Franklin, 2008). As Lee and Lin (2017) explain, information subsidy is a public relations concept that refers to low cost, easy to access information and materials provided to journalists by corporate communicators. The rise of information subsidies has seen press releases, pre-packaged news or pre-recorded soundbites and offers of easy to contact interviewees become routine aspects of journalistic practice. Some scholarship regards this encroachment of public relations into journalism as being an ethical compromise because it subverts the normative function of journalism: the provision of balanced and impartial news in the service of informed public debate (Macnamara, 2014; Moloney, 2007). Others suggest a more complicated reality, one in which a new hybrid media

system is emerging, further increasing the entanglement between public relations practitioners and journalists (Chadwick, 2018; Chadwick and Stanyer, 2010; Fisher, 2018). The power relationship between journalists and corporate communicators is often characterised as a dance in which either party can lead, and trading places is common (Gans, 1980). This chapter sets out to explore whether consumerist discourses represented in the reporting of the Attack class procurement suggest a pattern of dominance or of partnership between journalists and corporate sources.

There is also academic discussion around the influence of privately funded think tanks that also offer significant information subsidies for journalists. For many of the reasons mentioned above, and as discussed in Chapter 3, journalists have become more oriented towards think tanks as sources of news (Anstead and Chadwick, 2018; Rashid, 2013). Think tanks are organisations that aim to influence public opinion and/or policy through the publication and dissemination of novel analysis and research (Hart and Vromen, 2008). Distinct from universities, think tanks rarely teach educational courses and often market their research directly to the public and political elites through self-publication or mass media, rather than through peer-reviewed journals and academic publishers (Lupton and Hayes, 2017; Mendes, 2003). Concern has been expressed that think tanks funded by private industry might—through their research output and their access to journalists—produce a form of covert advocacy that can pressure politicians to support industry agendas (Gurran and Phibbs, 2015; McKewon, 2012; Mendes, 2003; Smith and Marden, 2008). In Australia, many think tanks are structured as not-for-profit entities and do not publicly disclose the amounts and sources of their funding from the private sector (Sammut, 2016). Additionally, there is some research that suggests that many policy oriented not-for-profit organisations in Australia are subjected to pressure by funding organisations to self-censor or amend public statements (Maddison and Carson, 2017). Think tanks are often founded as non-partisan research organisations, however their limited access to funding means they are reliant on donations or discretionary funding from the Government. As Gyngell (2016) and McKewon (2012) suggest, some think tanks in Australia elect to discard any pretence of academic

impartiality in favour of overt advocacy for particular policy outcomes. And as Bruckner (2019) argues, it is not unknown for think tanks to be revealed as simply well-funded paid experts, who advocate for the corporate entities that fund their work. As sources of news, think tank members fall into an ambiguous category of advocates that may or may not be financially compensated for their lobbying activities. This chapter will briefly discuss this form of advocacy in the broader context of how journalists incorporate industry linked sources into news.

## 8.2—Industry Power Rises as Journalism Declines

CDA aims to analyse how discourse is used to reproduce or challenge social relationships of inequality and marginalisation (Fairclough, 1992; Van Dijk, 2008). In the case of journalism and its relationship to the defence industry in Australia there is a clear disparity of power. Since the 1980s Australia's manufacturing of defence materiel has gradually privatised as successive governments shuttered publicly owned factories and shipyards (Aulich and O'Flynn, 2007). A large private sector of companies now competes for the substantial government funding directed towards designing and manufacturing solutions to Australia's national defence. The industry is the recipient of significant public expenditure as well as private and international sales. The defence industry in Australia is a 10 billion dollar a year enterprise (Hinz, 2018). Dozens of companies domestically compete for public funds as well as the growing 1.5 to 2.5 billion dollars per year export market (Department of Defence, 2018a). The industry includes some of the world's largest defence industrial organisations. Defence organisations operating in Australia include; the U.S. giants Boeing, Raytheon, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman; British multinational BAE Systems; French based Airbus and Thales; and the partly public owned ASC (formerly Australian Submarine Corporation). They are joined by a constellation of facilities management companies, information technology providers, material supply organisations and textile manufacturers (notably Lendlease, Broadspectrum Limited (formerly Transfield), Serco Australia, Leidos and Downer EDI) and consulting organisations. Collectively the defence industry receives a

substantial portion of the $38 billion-dollar annual Defence budget (Department of Defence, 2019). The capacity and resources available to the industry to lobby for increased spending on military hardware is significant.

It is also a protected industry. The *2016 Defence White Paper* (Department of Defence, 2016) states that the government intends to increase public expenditure on defence, earmarking $195 billion of long-term funding through to 2025-26. The release of the *Naval Shipbuilding Plan* (Department of Defence, 2017b), as well as the *Defence Export Strategy* (Department of Defence, 2018b) and *Defence Industry Capability Plan* (Department of Defence, 2018c), also suggest two significant beliefs underlying Government decision-making:

1. That it is in the national interest that Australia have a *sovereign* defence industry, and that;
2. It is the responsibility of the Australian Government to ensure the *maximum economic growth* of that industry.

To this end the Government has not only increased spending on defence but made industry involvement in planning for capabilities and acquisitions a higher priority. The Government's recent publications on the industry therefore represent a frank admission of aligned priorities between the publicly elected Government and the for-profit defence industry. This alignment manifested itself recently in a public and visible dispute between Thales, the Australian Office of National Audit and the Attorney General's department in 2018. Then Attorney General Christian Porter allegedly interceded at the behest of the French arms manufacture to censor large portions of text in an ANAO report into a light tactical vehicle procurement (Knaus, 2018, October 18). In legal preceding it was revealed that the reason given for this censorship was the protection of Thales' commercial interests. However, it was later revealed that the paragraphs the Attorney General agreed to suppress revealed that if Defence had opted to purchase vehicles from a United States supplier it could have saved hundreds of millions of dollars (Knaus, 2018, October 22). It's possible the decision to award the contract to Thales was made with the goal of supporting local industry in mind. However, the decision to censor

government reports that revealed the financial cost of building locally is arguably more suggestive of politics than policy.

## 8.3—Theories of Power and Influence in PR and Advocacy Research

The social and political context around lobbying in Australia is complex. Additionally, there is significant concern about the ways in which industry advocacy, public relations or think tanks might be influencing public discourse. These concerns focus broadly on two particular aspects of lobbying in Australia. The first, is how much and to what extent lobbyists might influence news media reporting of certain issues, thereby influencing public opinion. The second, is the so-called 'revolving door' nature of the lobbying and PR industries. The following literature review will discuss the existing research around these two aspects as a means to foreground how this analysis will address the role advocacy has played in the reporting of the Attack class procurement.

While lobbying traditionally has been considered a 'behind closed doors' approach to political influence, research suggests that in recent years lobbying has become increasingly oriented towards media (Tresch and Fischer, 2015). In general, researchers divide lobbying strategies into two categories. Inside (direct) lobbying—strategies that target decision makers using interpersonal contact, correspondence, financial contributions etc.—and outside (indirect) lobbying—strategies that target public opinion through protests, advertising, public addresses etc. (Dellmuth and Tallberg, 2017; Dür and Mateo, 2013; Tresch and Fischer, 2015; Victor, 2007). It is this strategy of outside lobbying that directs the attention of industry advocates towards journalists, with the aim of instigating media scrutiny to pressure politicians. Indirect lobbying also includes activities such as organising protests and boycotts, giving public addresses and organising letter writing campaigns. Hanegraaff, Beyers, and De Bruycker (2016) state that the relative focus that lobbying organisations place on inside or outside lobbying techniques depends on their particular policy-influence agendas as well as competition for and access to campaign resources. They argue that NGOs and research organisations are more likely to employ outside lobbying strategies when faced with a higher

degree of competition. Other studies have suggested that the choice to employ indirect media strategies is often related to whether or not organisations have direct access to decision makers (Binderkrantz, 2005) and the type of lobbying organisation (i.e. whether business, NGO, labour union, charity, research or political) (Bruycker and Beyers, 2015; Dellmuth and Tallberg, 2017; Tresch and Fisher, 2015). In some instances, lobbying campaigns targeting media and public opinion are described as grassroots campaigns because their aim is to incite community organised activism and lobbying of politicians (Bergan, 2009; Cluverius, 2017; Myers, 2018). As Myers suggests, such outward focused public and media centric campaigns blur the lines between where lobbying ends and public relations begins. Other researchers have argued it is important to distinguish between grassroots advocacy campaigns—which build genuine support in the community—and so called 'astroturf' lobbying (Lock and Seele, 2017; Lock, Seele and Heath, 2016). Astroturfing refers to media focused campaigns centrally controlled and funded by corporate or political groups but camouflaged to appear as though they arose from community directed activism. Hobbs and Swiatek (2019) argue, astroturfing and other media focused activities have become a routine element of advocacy campaigns in Australia. Such activities include running advertisements, interviewing with receptive journalists and seeking out public allies—often celebrities—to speak on behalf of the campaign. There are some questions over whether such paid advocacy techniques actually work to shift public policy—however, this inquiry will not seek to address this issue. Rather, this research aims to interpret to what extent the characteristics of news reporting have been influenced by such lobbying and public relations activities.

A second concern within political communication literature is the 'revolving door' nature of lobbying and public relations. There is research suggesting it is common practice for companies and lobbying organisations to retain the services of former politicians and staffers with insider knowledge of policy relevant to their business (Halpin and Warhurst, 2015; Hogan, Murphy and Chari, 2011; Makse, 2017; Miller and Harkins, Tyllström, 2019). Some have suggested that Australia in particular is permissive of this relationship between politics and the private sector, with Adam Lucas going so far as to refer to it as: less of a "revolving

door"—more of a "golden escalator" (Lucas, 2018, para. 11). It is argued that politicians and lobbyists in Australia associate in a quid-pro-quo relationship, wherein favourable treatment by politicians may be rewarded with paid work upon leaving government (Knaus and Evershed, 2018, September 17; Murray and Frijters, 2015; Rennie, 2016). The lesser researched revolving door is the one that exists between journalism and public relations/lobbying (Fisher, 2016a; 2016b). Due to the unstable financial rewards offered by journalism, many contemporary journalists opt for a career as hybrid practitioners, stepping between roles ranging from public relations to political staffer (Deuze and Witschge, 2017; Fisher, 2016b). Relationships between journalists and sources—including PR practitioners—are often regarded as a negotiated relationship (Ericson, Baranek and Chan, 1989). Journalists are increasingly dependent on the information subsidies offered by PR practitioners for their work (Fisher, 2018) and as such, concerns have been voiced about the potentially corrupting influence of quid-pro-quo journalism (Maurer and Beiler, 2017; Tambini, 2010). This research analyses the characteristics of reporting on the Attack class procurement and examines how PR and advocacy discourses are integrated into national security reporting. It aims to determine whether journalists privilege such discourses in the course of their work and the influence this might have on the overall discursive framing of the programme.

## 8.4—Critical Discourse Analysis of Public Relations and Advocacy Discourses in Reporting

Following a broad qualitative analysis of the total corpus of 879 news articles, 32 articles were selected using Fairclough's (1992) principle of moments of crisis for further discursive analysis. Fairclough argues that "sudden shifts in style" (p. 230) and other clear changes in the way texts are produced should be a focal point of Critical Discourse Analysis. The presence of PR discourses in news represents an interruption of the ordinary language of informational news. As such, the selection of articles for analysis aimed to provide clear examples of the interruptive or disruptive presence of commercial discourses in articles that would otherwise

employ a more informational style. Selection was also guided by Carvalho's (2008) concept of critical discourse moments. Public relations and advocacy discourses coincided with and emerged from political events such as the release of major government reports, political announcements and leaks of government information. By focusing on such moments in the reporting of the Attack class it became apparent that public relations and advocacy discourses arose not only in response to political events but were creative of newsworthy occurrences as well. A three-stage analysis was performed exploring the textual features, discursive practices and social practices related to these articles.

The presence of industry advocacy and public relations discourses was substantial in the reporting of the Attack class submarines. Journalists routinely used lobbyists and corporate officers as sources of news and provided them with opportunities to advance industry's preferred framing of events as they unfolded. A discursive practice analysis of texts revealed that PR officers and lobbyists were presented as legitimate sources of news. Journalists often represented industry sources as being of coequal significance to politicians and government officials as sources of information. Additionally, journalists often treated PR and advocacy announcements, publications and activities as newsworthy events.

The contributions of lobbyists to the discourse of the Attack class procurement was significant. Particular lobbyists were sourced frequently throughout the reporting of the submarines, while others contributed only in a handful of articles. This analysis provides some mixed evidence that suggests that lobbyists provided journalists with significant information subsidies, and this was evident both in the frequency with which lobbyists were used as sources of news and technical information. As detailed below, this helped shape the journalistic discourses about the procurement of the Attack Class submarine.

### 8.4a—Journalists Privileged the Voices and Perspectives of Lobbyists

Fairclough's (1992) Critical Discourse Analysis aims to explore the ways in which discourse is used to construct social reality, including through the establishment of rhetorical models around social relationships and identities. In the case of news journalism, this often

manifests by indicating passively *who* should be listened to, and *whose* voices matter more than others. As Fairclough states:

> Newsworthy events originate from the contracted set of people who have privileged access to the media, who are treated by journalists as reliable sources, and whose voices are the ones which are most widely represented in media discourse. (p. 110)

In this sense, when journalists use lobbyists as sources of news this provides lobbyists—and their organisations—with a degree of legitimacy. And as Fairclough goes on to suggest, journalists tend to "explicitly identify and demarcate" sources of news in ways that suggest how an audience should interpret their words.

In this analysis it is clear that journalists use various textual and discursive practices to constitute lobbying sources as experts, authorities and trustworthy sources of news. For example:

> Australian Industry Group chief executive Innes Willox says the multi-billion-dollar decision on the next generation of submarines is not as simple as "make or buy" […] Willox says given the submarine fleet will have to provide capabilities for 30 years or more, a not insignificant consideration is the need to have the domestic capacity to sustain the fleet over its life. (Maher, 2014, September 17)

In the article reference above Willox—a lobbyist for the industry funded Ai Group, former journalist and chief of staff to Alexander Downer—is the main source and the focal point of the article. The subject of the article is technical, and Willox's words are given a high degree of affinity. The phrasing "Willox says […] the multi-billion-dollar decision […] is not as simple as 'make or buy'" is a categorical statement, one that uses a technical and authoritative voice: Willox is represented as an insider. To further reinforce Willox's authoritative status, the journalist quotes: "Mr Willox says 'it is just plain dumb to label as protectionists' those who suggest there should be a role for Australian industry". It is significant to note that in addition to being the main source for this article, Willox published an 800-word opinion piece in the same newspaper (Willox, 2014, September 17).

> There are numerous similar examples throughout the texts analysed in this inquiry: Defence Teaming Centre chief executive Chris Burns said cost overruns with the destroyers could be partly blamed on the Federal Government buying a Spanish design that had never been built outside its shipyards. (Willis, 2014, September 11)

Again, in this article above Burns, a representative of the defence industry funded Defence Teaming Centre, is the main source: it is Burns' announcement that is the subject of the news article. Burns is represented with an authoritative voice, and the overall discourse type of the article is informational.

> AIG Defence Council executive director John O'Callaghan said the "weakest link" in big projects could be the smallest suppliers. "A lot of effort goes into ensuring that the smaller members […] are protected". (Shepherd, 2015, November 13)

> Advanced Manufacturing Council chair Goran Roos warned on Tuesday that the Japanese submarines could end up costing Australia twice as much as a locally build [sic] subs because of their short lifespan. (Willis, 2014, September 11)

From both the first and second stage of this analysis it is clear the above examples represent a pattern in how lobbyists are often characterised. In the context of reporting on the Attack class submarines, lobbyists were likely to be used as informational sources: they deal in facts and matters of knowledge. Even while attributing the sources, it is common to use authoritative titles such as "executive director" or "chief executive" rather than a more neutral attribution such as "spokesperson". Importantly, lobbyists are rarely attributed as "lobbyist" or "advocate", and in general it is never made explicit to the reader that these sources are paid communicators representing industry groups. Nor do journalists often explain the organisational affiliations of the sources. It is left for the reader to understand whether the banal sounding "Advanced Manufacturing Council" or the "AIG Defence Council" are paid advocacy groups or not. In truth, both are subsidiary organisations connected to Willox's Australian Industry Group.

### 8.4b—Industry Public Relations and Advocacy Discourses

Journalists reporting on the Attack class procurement provided lobbying representatives significant opportunities to advocate for industry's preferred policies. The industry funded Defence Teaming Centre, and its spokesperson Chris Burns for example, was used as a source in over 70 separate news and opinion articles in the corpus analysed for this inquiry. Some of the positions advocated by Burns include:

- Privatisation of the ASC (Holderhead, 2014, November 2).
- That Saab Kockums be included in a tender for the submarines (Wills, 2015, February, 23). [Saab was on the board of the Defence Teaming Centre]
- More significant industry involvement in defence procurement planning and policy (Abernethy, 2016, March 8; Shepherd, 2015, January 14; 2015, January 23).
- All or most of the submarine work be done in Australia (Jean, 2015, September 17).
- The continuous building of submarines, rather than a set number in a fleet (Shepherd, 2015, September 18).

*The Advertiser* in particular gave Burns significant opportunities to advocate for pro-industry positions such as those listed above. Between 2013 and 2016 Burns was used as a source by *The Advertiser* in at least 40 separate articles that were collected as part of the sample for this study. Many of the discourses that Burns puts forward are representative of those other industry advocates used to argue for increased industry involvement in the Attack class programme. Using a CDA approach the following themes were identified as patterns within the lobbying discourse of the Attack class submarines.

*"The government must act in haste"*

> Chris Burns said the White Paper, due at the beginning of March, needs to be released on time so that the Government can establish a Submarine Construction Authority […] "If that's delayed then the whole process will get delayed and we'll end up losing half of 2015 as well," he said. (Shepherd, 2015, January 23)

> Chris Burns said South Australia was already "very, very close" to the "valley of death", when jobs start to dry up to the point that the skills will not be here when they are needed. (Shepherd, 2014, October 15)

Burn's frequently used the rhetorical device of the "valley of death" when speaking to journalists as a way to emphasise the need for hastening action to begin construction on the submarines. The theme of "running out of time" or that the industry might be "heading towards the valley of death" was used often not only by Burns but other journalists and sources throughout the corpus. The "valley" metaphor is used to imply and reinforce a certain logic where the more time passes the more likely there will be an economic disaster. It is an emotive appeal that colours the discourse with a sense of fatalism and urgency. As Burns states: "every day the federal government delays decisions, more jobs are lost, valuable skills leave the sector" (Booth, 2016, February 10). The metaphor itself is interesting, as whether intentionally or not it references Tennyson's poem "The Charge of the Light Brigade" (Tennyson, 2014): a poem ironically about a noteworthy military failure caused by haste and miscommunication.

*"Defence needs to buy as many submarines as possible*"

> "The more you get the cheaper it is… because with less you don't get that economy of scale". (Holderhead, 2015, December 27)

> "To say there's an economy argument is ridiculous," he said. A failure to commit to a continuous build cycle for a fleet of 12 submarines would drag the local defence industry deeper into a shortage of skills known as the "Valley of Death", according to Mr Burns. (Gothe-Snape, 2016, January 18)

The second plank in the industry advocacy discourse is the theme of 'more is better'. This discourse assumes a logic that by adopting a continuous build strategy for the submarines the industry can make the submarines more efficiently and retain more skilled workers. In contrast the "stop-start approach, so we have peaks and troughs" (Abernethy, 2016, March 8),

is characterised as a negative. The 'continuous build' argument is a persuasive logical argument that was adopted by other industry advocates as well.

*'Industry will make jobs'*

> A 12-submarine continuous build would generate a boom in confidence. "(Firms) would be going to their banks and saying 'We need to hire people'," he said. (Gothe-Snape, 2016, January 18)

> "If there was a firm commitment to building the OPVs, the frigates and the submarines here in SA, industry would have to start upskilling the workforce now". (Shepherd, 2015, October 1)

The 'continuous build' argument feeds into a broader narrative of jobs creation in South Australia. This is a significant element of interdiscursivity because it taps into the broader narrative the government was pushing in 2015/2016 around employment: Turnbull's slogan of "jobs and growth" being the most obvious manifestation of that rhetorical push (Hutchens, 2017, December 14).

*'The defence industry is a national/sovereign industry'*

> Defence Teaming Centre chief Chris Burns said shipbuilding had to be a "national effort" but that most of the build should be done in SA (Shepherd, 2015, November 24).

> "We call on the Federal Government to accept the Opposition's offer of bipartisanship to move forward in developing a long-term strategy in the best interest of Australia's security, sovereignty and economy". (Shepherd, 2015, March 26)

Finally, Burns and other industry lobbyists used the argument that the domestic construction of the submarines was justified because it was in the national interest to develop and maintain a skilled workforce. A phrase that became widely used in this period was the term: "sovereign industry" or "sovereign capability" with regards to the shipbuilding industry.

> [Chris Burns said] "The government should not focus on the price, but value for money in terms of sovereignty, security and economic benefits to the nation". (Wills, 2015, February 23)
>
> AMWU national secretary Paul Bastian said […] "The public knows what's at stake with this decision—our sovereign capability as a nation" (Jean, 2014, September 17).
>
> Herve Guillou, global chairman and chief executive of the DCNS group, told *The Australian* the submarines were a vital strategic asset and the nation needed full sovereignty over them. (Nicholson, 2015, October 8)

The effect of this discourse is to conflate the interests of private corporations—most of which are subsidiaries of foreign companies—with the national interest, and in particular the authority of a state to legislate in its own interests.

### 8.4c—Lobbying Discourses Represented as Newsworthy Occurrences

It is apparent from this analysis that on a number of occasions lobbyists were able to—in effect—create newsworthy moments that reporters were incentivised to cover. Additionally, lobbyists in the defence industry were given many opportunities to make direct contributions to the news discourse. This was done so in three ways: first, by instigating news stories using announcements; second, by publishing or producing industry funded research and then providing commentary on it; and third, by writing articles to be published as analysis and commentary in newspapers.

There are a number of examples of articles written where a lobbyist is the primary source, or their discourse is the primary focus of the news article. As in the article by Willis (2014, September 11) which centres on statements made by Chris Burns about the possibility of cost overruns if the submarines are built in Japan. An article by Nicholson (2014, December 3) is based primarily around Innes Willox as the primary source of news, the article beginning by stating:

> A key industry organisation has urged the Abbott government to seek tenders from international and local shipbuilders to provide the navy's new submarine fleet.

Another article by Maher (2014, September 17) centres on Willox again by discussing an article Willox wrote for *The Australian*. And then a further article by Shepherd (2014, October 17) focuses on Advanced Manufacturing Council's Goran Roos:

> Other nations would keep their best submarine technology secret and sell us second-rate vessels, Professor Goran Roos has warned.

What these articles—and other in this corpus—suggest is that it is relatively common for a lobbyist to be the starting point for a news story. The words of lobbyists are treated as newsworthy pronouncements in and of themselves. The article on Goran Roos for example ran with the headline "Foreign subs will fall short, *expert* warns".

The second way in which lobbyists were able to create newsworthy moments is by publishing research. A significant example of this is when in August 2015 Defence Teaming Centre released costings that suggested South Australia would not receive a significant windfall from announced funding for continuous shipbuilding. In a front-page article Shepherd (2015, August 20) wrote the following:

> Just $8 billion of the promised $39 billion for shipbuilding, and much less than half of the $50 billion submarine spending, will come to South Australia, the peak defence industry body estimates […] Defence Teaming Centre, has crunched the numbers from that major announcement and its breakdown shows just a third of that $89 billion will end up in the state.

By publishing their own costings on government spending Defence Teaming Centre attracted significant attention from journalists, with a number of subsequent articles including op-eds referring to the research being published. Another example of this comes from an article published in October of 2014:

> Professor Goran Roos, a former Adelaide Thinker in Residence and current chair of the Advanced Manufacturing Council, spoke to the Future of Australia's naval

> shipbuilding industry inquiry yesterday. [He said] building them overseas would see between $15 and $16.5 billion lost to that country instead of being kept here through taxes and wages. His figures are based on modelling a build through the development, building and sustainment phase. (Shepherd, 2014, October 9)

The above article entitled "Sub cost 'same to build here'" centres on Roos's statements to a Senate inquiry into naval shipbuilding. Roos's credibility as a source is emphasised by the use of both academic title and reference to his former position as a government advisor. The Advanced Manufacturing Council he is chair of is an industry funded advocacy group, whose leadership team includes executives from Boeing Australia and Northrop Grumman.

Finally, lobbyists were offered significant opportunities to reach audiences of news as newspapers published oped or commentary pieces prepared by lobbyists. Between March of 2015 and April of 2016, *The Advertiser* published at least six articles written by Chris Burns:

- We Need 30-Year Strategic Shipbuilding Vision & Plan (Burns, 2015, March 24)
- Fewer Than 12 Subs a Pointless Exercise (Burns, 2015, July 29)
- The Tide is Turning with People Power (Burns, 2016, January 8)
- Shipbuilding Plan will End Costly Waste (Burns, 2016, March 17)
- We Must Commit to Control of Our Future (Burns, 2016, April 19)
- Defence Industry Key to Driving Innovation (Burns, 2016, April 27)

These articles are clearly labelled as opinion pieces or OPEDs, however, Burns and Defence Teaming Centre are never identified explicitly as industry funded lobbying organisations. Nor is it clear that his employment position is designed to target the media and influence public opinion. Instead, each article ends with a statement that "Chris Burns is the chief executive officer of the Defence Teaming Centre" and later as spokesperson for the "Australian Made Defence Campaign". In addition to these articles:

- *The Advertiser* published 'The Manufacturers State Has Unique Advantages', an article written by Innes Willox (2015, March 24);

- As well as 'Change Policy or Rue Plunge in Living Standards', an article written by Goran Roos (2015, March 24); and
- *The Australian* published 'Subs Decision is More Than a Simple "Build or Buy" choice', an article written by Innes Willox (2014, September 17).

Again, while these articles are clearly labelled as opinion or commentary, they also contain limited attributions that would suggest the authors are lobbyists working for industry advocacy groups. Overall, the publishing of articles written by lobbyists appears to be limited over the timespan this inquiry explored, however in conjunction with the frequency that lobbyists are used as sources in news stories it is clear lobbyists and their discourses are privileged by news organisations as sources of news.

### 8.4d—Journalists Accepted Significant Information Subsidies from PR Sources

In addition to privileging industry discourses from advocacy groups, journalists also provided significant opportunities for public relations practitioners and corporate spokespeople to communicate to the public. These sources differed from lobbyists and industry advocates in that their corporate affiliations were more clearly attributed in text. The use of PR practitioners as sources of news was particularly apparent during the period after the announcement of the Competitive Evaluation Process (CEP) involving the three main bidding design companies: French DCNS, German ThyssenKrupp and Japanese Mitsubishi/Kawasaki Heavy Industries. In the lead up to the decision to award the design contract in April 2016, all three bidders made significant contributions to the news discourse of the Attack class procurement. In some ways, journalists treated PR officers similarly to lobbyists. Corporate spokespeople were often used as sources of news in articles about the Attack class submarines. Announcements and public statements by corporate spokespeople were sometimes the primary source of an article, or the focus of a news moment. And journalists accepted subsidies provided by corporations such as offers for interviews.

As with lobbyists, corporate spokespeople were often treated as informational sources providing expertise and technical background information. In particular, PR sources

were used to explain the differences between the three submarine designs as well as the differing build strategies that the winning candidate might embark upon. For example:

> Sean Costello, chief executive of the Australian subsidiary of the French submarine builder, DCNS, [said] that the company could do more than 70 per cent of the construction in Australia after building the first boat in France. (Nicholson, 2015, September 18)
>
> TKMS Australia chief Philip Stanford, who is in Germany showing media the company's submarine shipyard in Kiel, said the first job was to recruit a human resources team to start hiring. (Willis, 2016, April 15)

Public relations officials and corporate spokespeople were generally characterised by journalists as credible sources of news. It was also not uncommon for announcements made by companies to be framed in a positive light:

> The German company bidding on the nation's new fleet of submarines has given the state a ray of hope, saying Australia is the cheapest and best option to build. (Willis and Griffiths, 2015, July 23)

Public relations discourses gradually came to dominate a significant proportion of the news reporting of the Attack class procurement throughout the latter half of 2015 and into 2016 as the CEP came to a close and the government set about selecting a design partner.

### 8.4e—PR Discourses Dominated News Reporting of the Attack Class CEP

The competition between DCNS, Thyssenkrupp and the Japanese consortium became a focal point for reporting of the Attack class submarines in late 2015. As a consequence, public relations officials for each of the three companies were represented often during the CEP period as significant sources of news and information. In some reporting the competition between the three companies became the most newsworthy aspect of the Attack class programme at that point in time. Journalists offered frequent opportunities for the rival companies to engage in their respective publicity campaigns:

> [Mitsubishi Heavy Industries] has told *The Advertiser*, however, that it is the only bidder that "is a global player across a wide range of industries". "Our track record of building the world's largest conventional submarine over decades is incomparable to any other country or company," it states. (Shepherd and Willis, 2016, April 20)

> DCNS Australia chief executive officer Sean Costello has been playing up a French-Australian military alliance stretching back more than a century, including famed World War 1 battles. (Starick, 2016, April 19)

The above referenced articles focused entirely on the public bidding war between the three companies. As such, all the sources quoted in these articles—as with many others observed throughout this analysis—were PR officials and corporate spokespeople. 'The bidding war' became an overriding discourse, one that shares similar characteristics with the strategic game or horse race framing common to political news reporting (Aalberg, Strömbäck, and De Vreese, 2011). Many news articles written during the CEP focused on winners and losers, as well as the tactics and strategies each rival company employed:

> French defence giant DCNS last year strategically placed billboards at prime Adelaide locations trumpeting 2900 jobs, seizing early on the political imperative for a domestic build of 12 submarines. (Starick, 2016, April 19)

> [Shunichi Miyanaga] dismissed a report published in the *Financial Times* this week that the Australian government had […] been laying increased pressure on Japan to tighten the commercial terms of the bid and outline a detailed budget. (Lynch, 2016, February 13)

> German shipbuilder ThyssenKrupp has launched a media campaign promoting its "safe pair of hands". An advertising campaign encompassing print, television, radio and online would focus on a "For Australia. Built by Australians" tagline. (Shepherd and Willis, 2016, April 20)

> France has moved to undermine Japan's bid to build the navy's new submarines, saying only a "complete submarine power" such as France can provide the strategic partnership Australian needs for its future defence, (Stewart, 2016, February 9)

The above articles characterise the public relations activities of the bidding companies using language suggestive of competition and conflict. DCNS "seized early on the political imperative", Mitsubishi was under "increased pressure", ThyssenKrupp "launched" a "campaign" and DCNS in turn, "moved to undermine" its rival in the tender. Building on the theme of military procurement, some journalists opted to use pugilistic word choices to characterise the interactions between the rival companies:

> Headline: 'Paris out to torpedo Japanese bid'. (Stewart, 2016, February 9)

> Signalling the gloves are well and truly off in the contest between France, Japan and Germany, […] DCNS warned Australia that it would be taking on Japan's strategic baggage if it tightens its relationship with China's historic rival […] The remarks are the latest sortie in the increasingly bare-knuckled spin brawl between the three bidders. (Wroe, 2016, March 19)

Other articles instead focused on the so called "charm offensive" angle of the publicity campaign wherein each company set out the soft benefits of their bid to win the contract:

> The French are in town wooing South Australia with everything from a film festival and art exhibitions to a bilingual school, as they attempt to showcase what France has to offer. (Debelle, 2016, March 17)

> A barbie and a beer fridge could be among the changes Japan make to their Soryu-class submarines to "Australianise" them. (Shepherd, 2015, October 23)

And while different journalists used different discursive approaches to characterise the publicity campaigns, the end result for many articles was a blending of informational news discourse with the commercial discourse of public relations. As Fairclough (1992) suggests, a degree of social change can be observed in the "novel configuration of existing types" of

discourse, into new forms of discourse (p. 115). This is a form of constitutive intertextuality, wherein news is represented as publicity and publicity represented as news.

### 8.4f—Journalists Received Incentives to Report on the Publicity Campaigns of Bidders

By October of 2015, Malcolm Turnbull had successfully ousted Tony Abbott as leader of the Liberal Party. As insiders at the time argued Japan went from being the most likely to win the CEP to the process becoming an open field again. It is likely this prompted a surge in PR activities from the bidding parties. From this analysis, during the CEP period towards the end of 2015 and beginning of 2016 journalists were significantly incentivised to report on the publicity campaigns of the rival companies as a news discourse. This can in part be explained by the degree to which the three companies were oriented towards the media and provided significant incentives for reporters to cover their publicity campaigns. While press releases about beer fridges and the like might explain some of this, another way to explain the orientation is by looking at instances where journalists were paid to travel internationally by companies bidding on the Attack class submarines.

Saab paid for Nicholas Stuart from *The Canberra Times* to travel to Sweden in April of 2014 (Stuart, 2014, April 12). The next year, Saab paid for Ian McPhedran from *The Advertiser* and Brendan Nicholson from *The Australian* to travel to Stockholm to tour their facilities and interview their sales executives and the Swedish Defence minister (McPhedran and Jean, 2015, February 19; Nicholson, 2015, February 19).

ThyssenKrupp Marine Services paid for Andrew White from *The Australian* and Tory Shepherd from *The Advertiser* to travel to Kiel, Germany to tour their facilities and interview their executive staff in November of 2015 (Shepherd, 2015, November 6; White, 2015, December 14).

The Japanese government paid for Cameron Stewart from *The Australian* to travel to Japan to interview government officials in February of 2015 (Stewart, 2015, February 12).

Later that year, the Japanese government again paid for Tory Shepherd from *The Advertiser* to travel to Kobe to tour their Soryu submarine and their manufacturing facilities,

as well as interview Japanese officials and spokespeople (Shepherd, 2015, October 23). They did the same for Brendan Nicholson from *The Australian* in early 2016 (Nicholson, 2016, February 8).

Siemens, which was part of the joint venture with ThyssenKrupp, paid for Ben Potter from *The Australian Financial Review* to travel to Germany in April of 2015 to interview Siemens officials and executives (Potter, 2016, March 10).

ThyssenKrupp again paid for Belinda Willis from *The Advertiser* to travel to Germany and tour its operations as well as interview staff in 2016 (Willis, 2016, April 15).

DCNS paid for Cameron Stewart from *The Australian* and Tory Shepherd from *The Advertiser* to travel to Cherbourg, France, to tour their facilities and interview DCNS executives and officials (Shepherd, 2015, November 14; Stewart, 2015, October 22). [redacted]

All of the above-mentioned journalists declared in their articles that they had travelled courtesy of the parties bidding for the Attack class contract. It is unclear from the sampled texts how many journalists from other organisations accepted offers to travel and report on the publicity campaigns of the major bidding companies.

Tory Shepherd provides some candid insight into the degree to which the companies involved in selling their respective designs for the Attack class submarine were oriented towards the media, and the public, as objects of persuasion:

> They are all wooing the Government, the media and the public. […] If you've never been on a media tour before, you probably picture a bunch of journalists living it large on the company's purse. And that's partly true. But they're also gruelling schedules, often from sunrise to sundown and beyond, with hours touring factories and shipyards and watching PowerPoint presentations and having slightly awkward lunches with people who want to sell you something. Yes, there was a cruise down the Seine in Paris and excellent wine in a former presidential palace in Berlin and luxurious Kobe beef in Tokyo. But there were also hours learning about the technical

> details of building submarines and getting to grips with the politics of a foreign land. (Shepherd, 2015, November 14)

The effect of this charm offensive is apparent from this analysis. Whether journalists were sold on one company or the other's submarine is irrelevant; the public relations discourse came to dominate newspaper reporting of the submarines in this period. PR practitioners and corporate spokespeople were privileged by being sourced extensively and their views represented widely throughout reporting of the Attack class procurement.

### 8.4g—Think Tanks Offered Significant Information Subsidies to Journalists

Though not to the same extent as public relations officers and lobbyists, think tank members also played a significant role as sources of news relating to the Attack class procurement. Most notably the Australian Strategic Policy Institute was used as a source in at least 110 of the 879 articles analysed as part of this inquiry. The ASPI is a defence policy think tank established by the Howard government in 2000 as an independent body jointly funded by the government and through donations and revenue from consulting services (Gyngell, 2016). While still funded by the Department of Defence it receives a large portion of its funding from defence industry donors: including Thales Australia, Raytheon Australia, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman (ASPI, 2019).

ASPI researchers were often used as sources in news articles about the Attack class submarines. Researchers were characterised as expert sources providing technical information. In discursive terms ASPI researchers were used as explainers to provide clarity around complex military, strategic and technological elements of the news. For example:

> Australian Strategic Policy Institute budget director Dr Mark Thomson said [the ASC] would be "virtually worthless in its current state" because of cost blow outs building new destroyers. (Kerin, 2014, December 9)

> Australian Strategic Policy institute senior analyst Mark Thomson said any estimate of the subsidy to the submarine project would need to take account of the exchange rate, which can have a big impact. (Uren and Nicholson, 2016, April 20)

Think tank members are represented as credible sources and are often introduced using titles such as "analyst" or "senior analyst". Much like lobbyists, think tank members are constituted as experts often, however in contrast with lobbyists they tend to be represented as having a moderate affinity for their statements: as in for example the statement "[the ASC] *would be* "virtually worthless in its current state", using the auxiliary verb "would be" instead of "is". In other examples researchers are quoted as follows:

> Andrew Davies from the government-funded Australian Strategic Policy Institute says, a European option would *likely* involve a work-share partnership with ASC. (McPhedran, 2015, February 14)

> Andrew Davies says *it appears* two quite different options have emerged. (Nicholson, 2014, November 19)

The use of modifiers such as "likely" and "it appears" suggests that the sources are speaking in the voice of academic writing (Fairclough, 1992, p. 162). In this way the journalist blends the informational discourse of news with the circumspect academic discourse of probabilities and likelihoods. The practice of referring to ASPI sources as "analysts" or "specialists", and the use of academic titles such as "Dr", further contributes to the characterisation of think tanks as academic institutions and think tank discourses as academic discourses.

What is apparent from this analysis is that think tanks, but in particular the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, are significantly oriented towards the media and that think tank members make themselves available to journalists to provide quotes or interviews. Mark Thomson provided quotes for at least 20 articles captured in this analysis, including quotes for all four newspapers that are the focus of this inquiry (Wroe and Snow, 2014, November 29; Kerin, 2015, January 6; Shepherd, 2016, January 20; Stewart, 2016, January 22). Andrew Davies contributed a similar number of quotes and was used as a source in all four newspapers at various points during the coverage of the Attack class procurement. The think tank's executive direction Peter Jennings and chairman Stephen Loosley also made significant contributions as sources. Notably, think tank members were also given the opportunity by

newspapers to publish a number of whole articles as commentary or opinion pieces. These include contributions by:

- Stephen Loosley in *The Australian* (2014, April 7);
- Peter Jennings in *The Australian* on four occasions (2015, August 8; 2015, October 29; 2015, November 14; 2016, February 27). And;
- Andrew Davies in *The Advertiser* (2015, March 24), *The Australian Financial Review* (2016, April 27) and *The Australian* (2013, November 2).

Overall the contribution made by the ASPI to the news discourses of the Attack class submarines was substantial. However, unlike lobbying organisations or public relations officers the extent to which the ASPI can be seen to be advancing a particular policy agenda is unclear. Think tank sources are inherently ambiguous because the source of their funding and their links to industry are undisclosed. In keeping with the 'voice of academia' characterisation of think tanks, ASPI members tended to put forward an explanation for the range of options and possibilities the government might take with the Attack class procurement. ASPI contributions tend to be open ended, and open to interpretation. As one example suggests:

> Australian Strategic Policy Institute director Peter Jennings said "Australia should examine the nuclear options even if it is just to gather the evidence to rule them out". (Kerin, 2014, August 12)

As such, while the contributions of think tank researchers to discourses of the Attack class were substantial the broader influence of this remains unclear.

## 8.5—The Combination of News and Advocacy Discourses

This chapter set out to explore the characteristics of lobbying, public relations and think tank discourses as represented in newspaper reporting of the Attack class submarines. As discussed, the starting point for this chapter was an overview of research literature, some of which pointed to the increasing reliance of journalism on sources of convenience and

information subsidies provided by paid advocates (Berkowitz, 2009; Hecht, Martin, Donnelly, Larson and Sweetser, 2017; Lee and Lin, 2017; Lewis, Williams and Franklin, 2008). Further, one of the overriding questions for this inquiry as a whole has been whether or not journalists continue to adhere to traditional journalistic norms of impartiality, balance and a commitment to informed debate: or what Deuze (2005) refers to as the ideology of journalism. As this inquiry takes a critical approach to discourse it also asks further questions about how the amplification of public relations and lobbying discourses might reproduce or challenge social relationships of inequality and marginalisation: particularly in terms of the power relationship between journalism and the defence industry. The defence industry in Australia arguably enjoys a protected and influential position, and this inquiry asks whether journalism in Australia has the capacity to effectively scrutinise such a powerful institution.

The evidence from this analysis suggests that the reality of contemporary journalism is that there is limited distinction between journalism and advocacy. As Fisher (2016a) argues, advocacy in journalism exists on a continuum between overt displays of advocacy and more subtle elements stemming from the selective nature of journalism itself. The social and political context in which news is reported, as well as organisational factors and discursive practices, lead journalists to make selections and decisions about how lobbying, public relations and think tank discourses are characterised.

Lobbying organisations funded by the defence industry were able to provide substantial incentives for journalists to amplify industry discourses of the Attack class submarines. Journalists privileged the voices and perspectives of lobbyists by routinely quoting lobbyists as sources of news, and by identifying and demarcating lobbyists as authoritative, expert sources who were knowledgeable and credible. In many of the texts sampled for this study journalists treated lobbyists and their pronouncements as newsworthy. Furthermore, journalists routinely obscured the paid-for nature of lobbyist discourses by providing limited descriptions of their organisational affiliations. Journalists used ambiguous descriptors such as “industry body” or “industry group” to refer to advocacy groups and referred to lobbyists using generic corporate descriptors such as “executive” or “chief

executive". The use of such terminology disguises paid advocacy by deflecting attention from the sources' status as being employed in a role specifically tasked with targeting media and influencing public opinion. These finding echoes research by Strong and Tyler (2017) that found a similar pattern of representation of lobbyists in New Zealand news media. Strong and Tyler refer to this process as the media "camouflaging" lobbying (p. 150). By incorporating lobbyists as frequent sources in news articles journalism privileges the voice of industry while simultaneously providing discretion to the powerful companies acting behind the scenes.

Public relations practitioners also acted as sources of convenience and journalists gave them significant opportunities to engage in publicity campaigns. This became particularly apparent during the three-way publicity 'war' between rival submarine designers DCNS, ThyssenKrupp and Mitsubishi/Kawasaki Heavy Industries. Public relations officers were characterised as expert, insider sources, and a significant number of articles observed in this analysis focused almost entirely on the public relations campaigns waged by the rival companies. The discourse of 'winners and losers' dominated the reporting of the Attack class procurement in the leadup to the announcement of the design partner in April of 2016. And the pattern of reporting that focused on the three-way publicity campaign was facilitated, in part, by all three companies paying for extensive travel arrangements for journalists to cover their bid.

Industry funded think tanks also offered themselves as sources of convenience—but very specifically and more apparently than any other: the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. In this regard however, this analysis can report only mixed findings. ASPI perspectives were widely reported throughout the news media coverage of the Attack class procurement, and in this sense, it can be said journalists advocated for and privileged their perspectives. ASPI discourses were characterised as expert and technical, and tended to be represented in a scholarly or academic voice. However, the ASPI and its representative tended not to advocate for specific policy positions.

The pattern of frequency with which industry funded lobbyists and public relations officials were used as sources suggests a confirmation of the existing research: that journalists

are oriented towards sources of convenience as a routine aspect of their work. By routinely selecting industry lobbyists and PR officials as sources, journalists provide subtle advocacy for the interests of the defence industry. By routinely characterising lobbyists and public relations officials as legitimate sources of news, there is a mixing of the discourses of informational news with the discourses of commercialised public relations. The result, as in the case of the bidding war between the three submarine design companies, is that public relations becomes news.

## 8.6—The Rising Influence of Commercialisation in Discourses of National Security

The defence industry in Australia is a powerful and well-resourced institution. By contrast, news media industries are facing a financial climate wherein the production of daily news is becoming increasingly difficult. As news organisations struggle to retain staff and must centralise their resources, their ability to scrutinise powerful institutions becomes limited. At the same time, an ascendant defence industry has received Government assurances of increased revenue and economic protections: "a sovereign defence industry" promised "maximum economic growth" (Department of Defence, 2018c, p. 7). Under the shadow of an increasingly secretive government, state actors reach out to shield defence companies from scrutiny that might jeopardise their commercial interests (Knaus, 2018, October 18).

This chapter has shown, through close critical analysis of newspaper texts produced during the decline of journalism (2013-2016), how at key moments industry voices and interests began to dominate the submarine procurement discourse. The scale and extent of lobbying in news reporting of the Attack class submarines was significant. Local industry funded organisations such as Chris Burn's Defence Teaming Centre and Innes Willox's Australian Industries Group provided subsidies to journalists, and in return their perspectives were amplified and represented as a legitimate part of the media debate around the submarines. It is significant that both Burns and Willox, as well as other industry lobbyists,

were some of the most vocal proponents of building the submarines in Adelaide rather than purchasing the submarines off-the-shelf:

> National spokesman for the Australian Made Defence campaign Chris Burns said the white paper represented a "significant vote of confidence" for the defence industry, but urged the government to commit to a local build for the 12 new submarines. (Kelly, 2016, February 26)

Burn's Australian Made Defence campaign was launched along with a website which stated the campaigns case that "Australia's defence industry can build future fleets to secure our nation's interests" (Australian Made Defence, 2015). The language and iconography of the website is suggestive of a national enterprise, with big maps of Australia and promises of jobs and benefits to the economy. The language of the campaign couched the idea of building submarines in Australia in terms of "our nation's interests", as well as the "sovereignty, security and economic benefits" of a domestic shipbuilding industry.

Less publicised was the fact that the Australian Made Defence Campaign received not only funding from industry, but funding from the South Australian Government (Puddy, 2016, May 2).

After leading the "Australian Made Defence" campaign to success, Chris Burns left Defence Teaming Centre only three months after the announcement of the winning bidder DCNS. He was awarded a senior government position as the South Australian Mental Health Commissioner in July of 2016 (SA Mental Health Commission, 2016).

The success of Burns' Australian Made Defence Campaign—and pro-local industry advocacy in general—perhaps explains part of the reasons behind the eventual capitulation of all the bidding submarine companies to an Australian build policy.

> Sean Costello, head of France's DNCS Australia, says Australia and France are now fighting side by side against Islamic State but this strategic engagement will be entrenched for decades at an unprecedented level if Australia chooses to buy its new submarines from France. (Stewart, 2016, February 9)

> Herve Guillou, global chairman and chief executive of the DCNS group, told *The Australian* the submarines were a vital strategic asset and the nation needed full sovereignty over them. […] "The end game has to be that Australia is able to host a sovereign industry around its submarines". (Nicholson, 2015, October 8)

> "MHI will now move quickly and earnestly to build collaborative partnerships with Australian universities and trigger a wave of innovation investment and jobs in Australia," [Chairman of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Hideaki Omiya] said (Chambers, 2016, March 4).

In the end, the industry got what it wanted. And wittingly or not, the press helped them get there.

A conclusion that can be drawn from this inquiry is that for a range of structural reasons—such as limitations on time and resources—journalists may well have no choice but to accept the subsidies provided by lobbying and public relations to produce the kind of commercial news needed to fund their industry. It is evident in this study at least, that the practice of relying on such sources to produce daily journalism is relatively widespread in the reporting of defence issues. The effect of this is the relatively widespread reproduction of discourses that favour powerful vested interests, at perhaps the cost of more critical questioning of defence industry policy. It also leads to the reproduction of discourses of sovereign industry, and of unification of government and private interests. As the lines between advocacy and journalism fade, and with the increasing likelihood that the industry of journalism will become more dependent on public relations to make its way, questions remain about the role the press plays in the political process.

The relationship of power between journalists and industry PR practitioners and advocates is becoming increasingly unbalanced. The widespread presence of lobbying and advocacy discourses in news reporting of the Attack class suggests that news discourses are becoming increasingly commercialised as secrecy and lack of resources limit the capacity of journalism to procure newsworthy information. Given the enormous cost and scale of the

Attack class programme this is a significant cause for concern. Although as Murphy (2015) suggests, many Australian journalists still aspire to norms of scrutiny and public service, the limitations of the 24-hour newsroom and its "vaguely harried multitaskers" is taking its toll.

# Chapter 9—*The Advertiser* and Local Advocacy Journalism

> "*As a single father to two high school kids, there's no fallback for me really and the uncertainty is taking its toll," he said. "Others have told me the situation is having a strain on family relationships*". (Changarathil, 2016, January 24)

As journalism faces diminishing resources and rising secrecy its future is uncertain. As new models of journalism arise consideration should be given to whether they adequately provide for journalism that is both viable and in the public interest. This thesis has already discussed the vulnerability of journalism that relies on labour-intensive beat reporting (Chapter 5) and on insider informants and leaks as sources of news (Chapter 6). The previous chapter examined how journalistic discursive practices have adapted to incorporate PR practitioners and industry advocates as routine sources of news. As discussed, through close textual analysis it can be demonstrated that resultant discourses of the Attack class procurement have tended to centre on commercialised and politicised themes. This chapter will address an alternative model of journalism that purports to privilege the voices of the community as the orienting focus of news reporting: local advocacy journalism.

The work of journalism is often to translate the complexity of current events into the voice of ordinary experience. Orientation towards the community is as much a part of the ideology of news journalism as other tenets such as impartiality and independence. As Tiffen (1989) states, "all news organisations, but particularly popular newspapers, place great stress on communicating with, and reflecting, their community" (p. 53). Tiffen also notes, that genuine knowledge of that community is unfixed and difficult to attain. While news organisations might commission market research, track consumer behaviour, receive unsolicited letters or emails from the community, or discuss news and current affairs with friends and acquaintances: "their presumptions about audience interests are often wrong" (p. 55). The problem of knowing one's audience has arguably been made more complex by the

rise of digital, decentralised and globally oriented networks (Castells, 2012), the networked fourth estate (Benkler, 2013; Jericho, 2012) and the general decline and fragmentation of audiences for news (Lindell and Hovden, 2018; Young, 2009; Wilson, 2014). Meadows (2013) argues that the reorientation towards globalised news has led mainstream journalists to adapt an approach to news that is not interested in and separated from their communities. With increasing concern over the rise of "fake news" eroding trust in journalism (Örnebring, 2019), and the growing gap between "news seekers" and "news avoiders" (Ksiazek, Malthouse and Webster, 2010, p. 552), questions arise about the meaning of community in the context of 21st century news audiences.

Advocacy journalism is regarded as going against the traditional journalistic norms of impartiality and balance (Deuze, 2005). Waisbord (2009) defines advocacy in journalism as the use of reporting to promote the viewpoints of certain groups, to speak on behalf of those without a voice in the community and to collaborate with civic organisations to further a particular cause. With the collapse of traditional funding models for journalism some scholarship has argued that advocacy may be a way to move the profession forward. Hess and Waller (2017) argue that the future of journalism in local news may depend on news organisations and their ability to act as "connectors, advocates and champions" (p. 111) representing the community they serve. This may mean crossing the line between knowing one's audience and representing one's audience. Communities in rural, regional and smaller cities are often socially and economically marginalised by the increasing urbanisation driven by post-industrial capitalism (Li, Westlund and Liu, 2019; Nel, 2017). Particularly in Australia the regions outside of major centres such as Sydney and Melbourne face significant depopulation and economic hardship as mining, manufacturing and agricultural industries contract. Local news organisations—particularly newspapers—face declining circulation and advertising revenue, leading to many being closed or merged with larger media organisations. As Hess and Waller (2017) suggest, there is concern that voices and perspectives in marginalised communities are being gradually shut out of the national media discourse. With that comes the possibility that regional considerations might be overlooked in decisions about

significant national issues. Should local news organisations fail, the audiences they serve are likely to lose journalists experienced in making national issues relevant and contextual for local audiences. They will also lose a valuable platform to publicise and advocate for local concerns.

The risk is that such communities will become isolated from mainstream news discourses. Van Dijk (2008) argues that CDA is an approach that can be used to explore the ways in which discourse reproduces or challenges social inequality by constructing and reconstructing norms, attitudes and beliefs around established social relationships. Hess and Waller's (2017) research suggests many news organisations based in regional areas are adopting overt advocacy journalism in a challenge to traditional norms of journalism as information only. The tacit acknowledgement that news might fulfil the need for local community advocacy is in some ways an acknowledgement that journalism exists on a continuum between subtle and overt advocacy (Fisher, 2016a). It may be the case that in the ideology of news (Deuze, 2005) it is no longer widely accepted that informing and advocating should be treated as mutually exclusive activities for journalists. However, there is limited research looking at the presence of advocacy in journalism, how it manifests and what characteristics of it can be said to challenge or reproduce social relationships of marginalisation and inequality. With this in mind, this chapter aims to explore some of the characteristics of news reporting on the Attack class submarines from the perspective of local community advocacy.

South Australia—with its capital Adelaide—has typically trailed the other states in Australia in economic performance for the past decade (Jericho, 2018). With a population of 1.7 million people it is the second smallest of the six original states, dwarfed by News South Wales with over 7.5 million and Victoria with over 6.3 million. The city of Adelaide represents around 75% of the state's population. A small state, it has been historically dependent on manufacturing, automobile assembly and primary industries such as mining and agriculture (South Australian Centre for Economic Studies, 2017). As manufacturing work has dropped off unemployment has risen. In 2015/2016 unemployment peaked at 10 per cent in the City of

Adelaide, and almost 8 per cent in the Greater Adelaide area (City of Adelaide, 2018), well above the national average. Following a long decline in the local automotive industry, the remaining manufacturers—Ford, General Motors Holden and Toyota—announced in 2013 and 2014 they would be closing their Australian operations, including Holden's factory in suburban Adelaide. This followed on the heels of the announcement by BHP Billiton in 2012 to cancel a significant expansion to their mining operations at Olympic Dam, a common destination for fly-in-fly-out workers from Adelaide. So, when rumours were reported in early 2014 that Osborne based shipbuilder ASC—which employed more than 2400 people—would not be offered the contract to build the Attack class submarines, reporters from *The Advertiser* did not interpret this as a national story. Rather, it was interpreted as a continuation of economic events that directly and negatively impacted their local community.

This chapter will explore how *The Advertiser* engaged in advocacy journalism in their reporting of the Attack class procurement. It will seek to ask questions about how journalists from that newspaper characterised the submarines as a local issue; how they constituted the community that they represent; and whether they engaged in the kind of connecting, championing and advocating that Hess and Waller (2017) suggest may be the way forward for journalism. Additionally, in keeping with the critical approach for this research, this chapter will explore the nature of discourses constructed by *The Advertiser* around its role as an institution that mediates between powerful stakeholders—defence, industry and government—and relatively disempowered communities. It details how local advocacy can both challenge and reproduce relationships of influence and control in social relationships between powerful elites and marginalised communities. And it addresses whether such models of advocacy journalism can be considered to provide scrutiny and public service in their reporting of government policies.

This chapter will first discuss some of the key literature relating to local news journalism and advocacy. Second, it will provide an analysis of the characteristics of *The Advertiser's* reporting of the Attack class procurement from a local news perspective. Third, it will discuss the extent to which *The Advertiser's* advocacy journalism can be seen to be

discursively reproducing social power relationships, and how it represents the views and perspectives of the marginalised communities it seeks to speak for.

## 9.1—*The Advertiser* as a Historic Advocate for South Australia

South Australia's capital Adelaide is both geographically and culturally distant from other Australian cities, particularly the more populous Sydney and Melbourne. The only colony founded by private enterprise, South Australia was ambitiously planned to be a self-sufficient colony that did not employ convict labour, the extensive use of which had been central to the economic development of New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land (Tasmania). Established in 1836, South Australia was to finance its own development through the private sale of land allotted to the South Australia Company—land wilfully misrepresented as "waste and unoccupied" despite abundant evidence of its continued economic use by the sizable Aboriginal population (Sendziuk and Foster, 2018, Chapter 1, para. 24). Throughout its formative decades South Australia's effectively privately-run administration was fiercely proud and defensive of its independence from the broader British colonial enterprise (Sendziuk and Foster, 2018). Sendziuk and Foster also argue that its local population developed a distinctive social character due to a large population of German Lutherans, a higher proportion of women and the widely held sentiment that excluding convicts helped maintain the "respectability" of the colony (Chapter 4, para. 23). Prior to Federation in 1901, Australian colonies tended towards separatism, enforcing their own customs, trade and borders with one another and even establishing their own militaries (Sendziuk and Foster, 2018). As Foster and Nettelbeck (2012) state, even among the colonies South Australia was uniquely patriotic and "regarded itself as a nation in its own right and reflected on the qualities that distinguished itself as a nation" (Chapter 5, para. 2). Although South Australia was in favour of joining the Commonwealth the final wording of Australia's federalist constitution ensured that it retained a great deal of its own political sovereignty (Sendziuk and Foster, 2018). Similarly, South Australian society remained both culturally and politically distinct from other Australian states throughout the 20th century.

*The Advertiser* has a long history of being South Australia's newspaper. As Young (2019) states the paper was founded in 1858 with a "strong local identity" and became particularly influential after 1931 when the closure of its rival *The Register* gave it a near monopoly as the sole morning broadsheet in the state (Appendix, para. 2). In 1929, a controlling stake in the paper was sold to the Herald and Weekly Times—lead at the time by Keith Murdoch. As Young notes, *The Advertiser* was enlisted in Murdoch's campaign to advance his political influence in Australia through newspapers. Murdoch Sr. never owned or edited the paper but was persuasive in convincing its editors to support politicians and causes that he perceived as being preferential. Young states, "Murdoch could deftly lead his editors without ever being so coarse. 'I hope… you will print', and 'we must, of course' were usually enough to get the desired result" (Chapter 11, para. 7). When Keith died in 1952 control of *The Advertiser's* main competitors *The News* and *The Mail* passed to his son Rupert. Advertiser Newspapers made a bid to take over News Limited in 1953. It was rebuffed. Instead, *The Mail* launched a front-page assault on Advertiser Newspapers accusing them of strong-arming Keith's widow by threatening that if the takeover was refused, they would publish their own weekend paper to compete with *The Mail* (The newspapers of South Australia, 1953, November 21). *The Mail* pointed out that *The Advertiser* was owned by Melbourne financiers—implying that only News Limited truly represented South Australia. The directors of Advertiser Newspaper responded:

> All four of us were born in South Australia. The policy of *The Advertiser* is known to all our readers […] It is based on a profound pride and belief in South Australia and the system of private enterprise which has made this State what it is. […] No one in Melbourne has ever sought to influence the policy which is laid down by the Adelaide board, and no one would ever dream of doing so. (The newspapers of South Australia, 1953, November 24)

The contemporary paper owes much of its identity to this history of strident local reporting with a political edge. It describes itself as being "deeply engrained in the roots of South Australia and its residents" (The Advertiser, 2019). As this chapter discusses, the current

paper builds on this historic identity through its editorial policies and deliberate local advocacy stance. *The Advertiser* presents itself as both of and *for* South Australia and as such its social and discursive practices are distinct from other newspapers in this study.

## 9.2—Academic Literature on Local Journalism

Hess and Waller (2017) define local journalism as "broadly a practice and a product that relates to a specific geographic area and the events and people connected to it" (p. 5). They distinguish this from small news outlets that define themselves as "local" but mostly relay content from distant newsrooms operated by parent corporations. Local journalism scholarship often addresses small rural, regional and suburban news outlets whose circulation is centred on a particular geographic area. But as Hess and Waller (2017) argue, local journalism "is as important to people living in big cities as it is to those in regional and remote locations" (p. 5). Its function is both to report on events and circumstances affecting the people of a region as well as translate national and international events through a local perspective. Local journalism plays an important role in the broader media system. As Medhurst (2018) suggests, many journalists still regard locally focused regional and suburban newspapers as a traditional career steppingstone between being a cadet and working at a national level news organisation. And as Bowd (2003) states, there are complexities that exist between country papers, suburban or community papers, and regional papers, that do not manifest in the same way between metropolitan news organisations. According to Bowd, this sometimes centres particularly around which issues and events are *excluded* from coverage, as much as what the paper tends to focus on.

Research into local journalism suggests it plays an important role in the social and cultural lives of those living in the local community. As Meadows (2013) and Ewart (2014) suggest, local and community radio services are highly regarded in regional communities as outlets for gathering and discussing the local significance of news stories. Ewart in particular points to the significant role that non-populist talkback radio platforms play in sharing stories and producing mini narratives around local listeners' shared experiences. Much research

focuses on this as a centrally important aspect of local news: that it builds on and contributes to a sense of shared circumstances and community identity (Bowd, 2017; Ewart and Massey, 2005; Hess and Waller, 2014). As Vine (2012) argues, the news values of journalists working at smaller newspapers in rural communities differ significantly from metropolitan journalists. They suggest that journalists working for regional newspapers are more oriented towards stories that they see as contributing to their local community's economic, political and social progress. This echoes research by Bowd (2012) which suggests that regional journalists tended to make themselves more accessible to the community, and felt they had a personal stake in the outcomes of their journalism. In part, it appears that journalists may feel a greater degree of accountability to their audience as a reflection of their social and geographic proximity. As Ewart and Massey (2005) argue, local journalism is often assumed to be more genuinely representative of community views because these journalists are "closer to readers" (p. 94). However, Ewart and Massey argue this closeness does not always lead to less representation of elite sources and more representation of local sources. Other research by Freeman, Hess and Waller (2017) notes that local journalism enjoys widespread public support in part because geography still plays a significant role in shaping how audiences decide what issues matter and how to interpret news. Bowd (2017) argues that traditional news themes take on different meanings in the context of local newspaper coverage. The us-and-them frame for example is often reproduced through the prism of local and community issues; small towns being ignored by big government or big business. Regional newspapers often step into this space as "the glue that holds the idea of 'community' together" (Hess and Bowd, 2015, p. 22); and in doing so adopt a platform of organising and leading community advocacy against decisions by outsiders that conflict with local interests.

Despite being owned by multinational giant News Limited, *The Advertiser* is a distinctly local newspaper. Hess and Waller (2014) note there has long been contention among researchers over the word 'community' to describe small news outlets. Local news is often the product of news organisations that share a "sense of place" (p. 122) with an audience living in a particular geographic area. But particularly with the advent of digital news,

audiences for community news may lose geographic contact with a place or region but maintain social and cultural connections. In this, having a sense of place may extend beyond the physical, to also the social and psychological connections with a geographical space. Local journalism is also increasingly connected and aware of the broader context of global news in which it functions. Hess and Waller (2014) propose the concept of "geo-social" journalism as a term that encapsulates the work of local journalists producing news for an audience that shares a sense of connection to geographic territory, but also an awareness of their relationship with broader national and global news contexts. To practice geo-social journalism is to not only "engage with and develop an understanding of the land (environment/agriculture/industry), populations, histories and cultures" of the places they report on but also to acknowledge and situate news in the "constellations of global and national systems, issues and social relations in the digital era" (Hess and Waller, 2014, p. 122).

As this analysis will detail, reporting by journalists at *The Advertiser* shares many of the characteristics of local advocacy journalism. Adelaide may be a metropolitan city, but it is set apart from mainstream Australia for geographic, economic and demographics reasons. In keeping with this, journalists from *The Advertiser* constitute their audience as having a "sense of place" and a shared set of values and ideals that are unique and set apart from the other regions. The Attack class procurement is represented as a local issue, in part because *The Advertiser's* proximity to industries and communities affected by submarine policy—the newspaper's offices on Waymouth Street are a mere 30-minute drive from ASC's dry dock. It is also a newspaper that is aware of how its advocacy discourses are perceived in the broader context of national and digital news spaces. However, there is a clear tension that exists between *The Advertiser's* role as a geo-social advocate and the procedural requirements of producing news on a budget and to a deadline. This will be discussed in further detail towards the end of the chapter.

## 9.3—Critical Discourse Analysis of *The Advertiser's* Reporting of The Attack Class Procurement

As discussed in Chapter 4 this analysis initially sampled 879 articles from four newspapers. The initial analysis of these texts was guided by Fairclough's (1992) concept of moments of crisis, where there is a sudden or exceptional change in the production of a text or texts, a shift in style or an unusual combination of discourses. Selection of texts was also guided by Carvalho's (2008) concept of critical discourse moments. As Carvalho suggests, specific political events or occurrences may result in a shift in style or discursive positions. Focusing on key political events, announcements and occurrences throughout the reporting of the Attack class it became apparent that reporting by journalists from *The Advertiser* was stylistically distinct from other newspapers and employed novel arguments and discursive strategies. The style employed by *The Advertiser* used a range of themes and narratives that more closely resembled a form of advocacy journalism. Based on this distinction, a selection of 35 articles published in *The Advertiser* containing themes of local advocacy were analysed using a three stage Critical Discourse Analysis. The findings of this analysis are as follows.

Journalists working for *The Advertiser* characterised the Attack class procurement as a local issue rather than a national one. In doing so, they employed a number of discourses that reinforced both their status as 'speaking on behalf of Adelaideans' while also identifying as part of the Adelaide community. As Bowd (2012) and Vine (2012) suggest, locally oriented—or geo-social journalism—often manifests in a shared sense of ownership of the outcomes of reporting. In addition, journalists seek to amplify the voices of people living in the community to produce geo-social narratives (Hess and Waller, 2014). This analysis shows that journalists from *The Advertiser* used various discursive strategies to signal to their audience that they share a sense of place and ownership of local issues and the consequences of their reporting. They also constituted their community by providing opportunities for local voices to be heard and amplified.

### 9.3a—Shared Sense of Community and Orientation Toward Local Issues

At the height of public debate over the Attack class, in mid-2015, News Corp changed the masthead of its print edition of *The Advertiser* to include a new slogan: "Inspired

by South Australia". It came with a memo, that journalists needed to "build consumer and business confidence" and focus on positive and inspiring local stories (Washington, 2015). The slogan reflects the paper's view—or at least its owners' and editors' view—that it shared a sense of place and community with its readers. This slogan and its accompanying memo suggest a blending of commercialising discourses (building business confidence) and local journalistic orientation. As the front-page headline reads for November 16, 2014 edition:

> OUR STATE, OUR FUTURE
>
> Give us jobs, cut our costs, show some leadership. (Starick, 2014, November 16)

"Our State, Our Future" encapsulates the newspaper's self-assigned identity as both community cheerleader, but also prophesier of what community readers should consider to be important and significant issues. In focusing on local issues, the newspaper must necessarily make selections as to what local issues the community should concern itself with and what national issues should be interpreted through a local perspective.

*The Advertiser* presents this selective discursive practice as a community driven process. The paper surveyed 5248 readers in what it called the "Your State, Your Say" survey, and asked readers to identify what they considered to be the core concerns and issues the newspaper should focus on. The article "Our State, Our Future" reports that 73% of respondents said the greatest challenge facing the state was unemployment. Throughout the reporting of the Attack class programme *The Advertiser* often framed the issue in terms of jobs and employment. In keeping with its self-described role as a locally focused newspaper *The Advertiser's* reporting of the submarine procurement translated the issue into terms that were relevant to what their readers had indicated was a substantial concern in the community. Many articles show examples of how the Attack class procurement was translated as a jobs and employment issue:

> Buying foreign submarines would hit South Australia much harder than the closure of Holden, the State Government says. (Shepherd, 2014, July 29)

> South Australia is in the grip of a jobs crisis. This bleak situation is not simply due to grim unemployment figures, which have been hovering around 8 per cent for some months. (Holman, 2015, October 11)

> Senator Nick Xenophon said all sides of politics needed to work together to address the state's jobs crisis. (Jean, 2015, June 12)

> More than 800 jobs have gone from shipbuilder ASC, and more will be axed this year as the so-called Valley of Death deepens. (Shepherd, 2016, January 12)

The theme of a "jobs crisis" was developed in many articles discussing the Attack class. The textual features of such articles represented the issue as emotive and personalised; as something aggressive to be feared. In the above examples, the threat of further job losses is characterised textually as a hard "hit", "bleak" and "grim" and the state is said to be "in the grip" of crisis and at risk that more jobs "will be axed". Reporters were also quick to adopt the "valley of death" metaphor—which appears in a series of articles on the Attack class. *Advertiser* journalists used this metaphor often to characterise the graveness of the situation for South Australia:

> The nation is already in the jobs "Valley of Death", outgoing Defence chief Warren King warned yesterday. (Shepherd, 2015, February 26)

As discussed in the previous chapter (section 8.4b), the "valley of death" metaphor was also used widely in PR and industry advocacy discourses. As a metaphor it implies a sense of time running out, the need for urgent action and a logic of fatality. Other articles characterised further job losses as "devastating" (Shepherd, 2016, January 12), warning that Adelaide's shipbuilding industry was on the verge of collapse:

> The Advertiser revealed yesterday that the industry was concerned ASC would effectively hit "zero" shipbuilding employees if they don't get the $5 billion contract to build Offshore Patrol Vessels. (Shepherd, 2016, February 10)

The newspaper's position is summarised by its editor Andrew Holman (2015, October 11):

> Entire communities are having a knife plunged into them. Adelaide's northern suburbs are already shuddering ahead of Holden's closure by the end of 2017. […] We must act decisively and urgently to prevent our state from languishing. We must act now.

The jobs crisis discourse emerged from a blending of both the genre of "informational news" and the more audience focused "local issues" genre that is common in local news (Vine, 2012). This represents what Fairclough (1992) refers to as the transforming of discourses, wherein one discourse—say a political and strategic discourse—is represented in a different way to emphasise a different set of assumptions and interpretations. When the Defence Issues Paper was released in July 2014, for example, Shepherd stated that "[the paper] repeats the Government's position that Defence purchase decisions are made for capability reasons and not 'on the basis of industry assistance or regional imperatives" (Shepherd, 2014, July 29). This discourse is transformed by interpreting it in terms of what that might mean for the Adelaide shipbuilding workforce. Shepherd concludes—supported by government and industry sources—that concern that "the Coalition will buy submarines overseas" is legitimate and that scenario "increases the likelihood of other naval shipbuilding projects going offshore, which would put the $250 billion industry at risk". By using the metaphor of the "valley of death" and adopting more emotive terms such as "crisis", "cuts" or "axed" the Attack class procurement is recontextualised as a threat to the community if not handled properly.

While the discursive construction of "the crisis" was a central part of *The Advertiser's* reporting of the issue, the newspaper also positioned itself as having a stake in the outcomes of its reporting. As this quote from an oped by Tory Shepherd suggests:

> When Defence Minister David Johnston pushed out the canoe—saying we were incapable of building one—it's fair to say a frisson passed through The Advertiser section of the Canberra press gallery. (Shepherd, 2014, November 28)

Other examples are revealed in sub-editors' and editor's choices of headlines:

- Don't let bad decisions sink our SA-built subs (Penberthy, 2014, September 12)

- Battle for our slice of $195bn Defence blitz (Shepherd, 2016, February 26);
- Our Great Submarine Fightback (Shepherd, 2014, October 15).

The use of the possessives "our" and "we" positions the audience and the journalist in a different relationship than the normative ideology of impartial and disinterested journalism (Deuze, 2005). There is a clear distinction between articles marked as news and those marked as opinion. In news articles journalists tended to revert to the third person. For example, Shepherd (2016, February 26) wrote in a news article:

> Decades of work and billions of dollars—including up to $150 billion for submarines—has been put on the table, setting up South Australia to fight for the biggest share possible.

However, in oped pieces she constituted herself overtly as a resident in the community and an advocate for its interests:

> Many South Australians feel in their bones that no matter how often the Federal Government promises jobs for South Australia, we're not really on the radar. The cold truth is: of course, we're not the biggest blip on the radar. There are so few seats in SA to worry about […] We know that. We're no Western Sydney. (Shepherd, 2015, January 10)

Opinion pieces were an important aspect of *The Advertiser's* overt local advocacy. They help to build an identity of the newspaper and its journalists as being personalised representative of the local community. In combination with the paper's news reporting they build an intertextual identity of a news organisation that is both possessive of and oriented towards local issues. The use of personalised language coupled with the continuous reporting of local issues reframes the relationship between journalists and audience members. As the following section will discuss, a key way in which this was reinforced was in discursive practices such as source selection. Local government, industry and community sources played an instrumental role in interpreting the Attack class through a local perspective.

### 9.3b—Source Selection as Subtle Advocacy

*The Advertiser* provided substantial local advocacy by routinely interviewing South Australian sources that were vocally in favour of a local build project for the Attack class. *Advertiser* journalists frequently used pro-SA industry advocates such as Chris Burns (see section 8.4b) as sources of news. Additionally, they also sourced news from local state and federal politicians such as then Senator Nick Xenophon and then State Premier Jay Weatherill:

> "I made it crystal clear that unless there was at least the 70 per cent component of Australian content […] it would cause serious problems politically in Australia," Senator Xenophon said. (Jean, 2015, July 8)

> Premier Jay Weatherill claimed [the Defence White Paper] as an "unambiguous win for South Australia" while also basking in the success of his own political campaign. (Wills, 2016, February 27)

There were numerous examples of articles that were significantly unbalanced in their selection of sources. In an article by Willis (2014, September 11) for example, sources quoted included Chris Burns, South Australian Liberal Senator David Fawcett, Goran Roos, all of whom were vocal proponents of building the submarines in South Australia. No balancing sources were quoted.

In an article by Jean (2014, September 17), sources quoted were an Essential Report poll suggesting most respondents did not support buying submarines from Japan, as well as Chris Burns and Australian Manufacturing Workers Union secretary Paul Bastian, both of whom were in favour of building the submarines in South Australia. No balancing sources were quoted.

In an article by Shepherd (2015, July 17), sources quoted included Chris Burns, Nick Xenophon and Opposition Defence spokesman Stephen Conroy, who were all in favour of more work for the local industry. Kevin Andrews is included as a balancing source but only received three lines at the very end of the article.

In an article by Changarathil (2016, January 24), sources quoted included State Defence Minister Martin Hamilton-Smith and Chris Burns and an AMWU delegate, all of whom are in favour of building the submarines in Adelaide. No balancing sources were quoted.

*The Advertiser* also published many opinion pieces written by local government and industry proponents that were campaigning to have the submarines built in Adelaide, for example:

- History shows we should build here (Weatherill, 2015, March 24).
- A historic milestone for our state (Weatherill, 2016, April 25).
- Thousands of SA workers breathe easier (Weatherill, 2016, April 19).
- Fewer than 12 subs a pointless exercise (Burns, 2015, July 29).
- SA will be shipwrecked unless voters arc up into one big lighthouse the whole nation can see (Xenophon, 2016, April 1).
- We should be shouting 'show us a contract!' (Xenophon, 2016, April 19).
- Defence needs a rocket put up under it, so long as they're not responsible for procuring it (Xenophon, 2015, November 24).

Overall analysis of *The Advertiser's* reporting of the Attack class revealed that few sources were used that advocated for building the submarines overseas. There is a pattern in discursive practices then that favours one particular perspective—the local perspective—over the views of interstate or national politicians and commentators. In keeping with the model of local advocacy journalism *The Advertiser* does not provide balanced or impartial reporting. Instead it presents the "jobs crisis" as being of vital significance to the community and focuses on sources that concur with this preconceived agenda.

### 9.3c—The Voice of the Community

A significant difference between *The Advertiser* and other newspapers explored throughout this inquiry is its use of ordinary members of the community as sources of news. As Hess and Waller (2017) suggest, one of the most significant characteristics of local

advocacy journalism is that it reproduces the perspectives and concerns of the people who associate with a particular geographic area. In this case, *The Advertiser* and its journalists were drawn towards those who might be impacted most by unemployment should the shipbuilding industry in Adelaide collapse. Throughout the reporting of the Attack class procurement the paper provided a number of opportunities for community members to express their views:

> Air Warfare Destroyer worker Kosta Eftaxiadis is getting married in a month but is already worried about his family's future. […] "I can't see why you would spend all that money overseas and not where the money will go back into the community," [Ryan Richter] said. (Willis, 2014, September 10)
>
> "I think it's a blinkered point of view if you send the submarine work elsewhere," Ms Cleasby said. "It would be tragic if it was lost". (Building Family Tradition, 2015, March 24)
>
> "What the submarines project has done for many people is upped their skill levels to first class, top shelf, which is what Australia is now known for," [Mr Kennedy] said. (Working Class Workforce, 2015, March 24)

Because the focus of the articles explored for this study was the Attack class programme, the community sources used by *The Advertiser* tended to be people whose livelihoods were dependent on industries related to shipbuilding. There is a strong emphasis on humanising perspectives that support the advancement of the community and projects that would help to develop the economic security of the region. A common theme is 'education' and 'upskilling':

> Electrician Anika Williams graduated from the [ASC apprentice] program in 2015 and said the program "taught me everything I need to know for my chosen career". (Willis, 2015, August 4)
>
> "I got offered an apprenticeship elsewhere, I thought, if I'm going to do a boilermaker apprenticeship this is where I'm going to do it," [Ms Bird] said. (Building Family Tradition, 2015, March 24)

One article focused on a pilot secondary education program being run in Adelaide schools called "Subs in Schools":

> WHAT THE STUDENTS SAID: Elise, 15 "The Subs in Schools program has shown me ways in which math and science are used in careers such as engineering. (Simos, 2015, November 18)

Another discursive strategy used by journalists was to highlight the theme of 'family' as being a point of both pride and vulnerability for the community. Interestingly, the theme of 'family' was often presented alongside themes of 'tradition' and the intergenerational characteristics of manufacturing communities:

> When mother and daughter team Jayne Cleasby and Courtney Bird joined ASC they notched up five generations of family members working in shipyards. (Building Family Tradition, 2015, March 24)

> Industry worker and single father David Coulthard, 45, said he had given up on his dream to own a home […] "As a single father to two high school kids, there's no fallback for me really, and the uncertainty is taking its toll," he said. "Others have told me the situation is having a strain on family relationships". (Changarathil, 2016, January 24)

> "We've got mortgages, we've got families, we need security," Mr Richter said. (Willis, 2014, September 10)

The families are characterised here using sympathetic and humanising language: what Fairclough (1992) refers to as the "voice of ordinary experience". Kosta Eftaxiadis is "getting married in a month", and David Coulthard is a "single father to two high school kids". Personalised, stories are also used to humanise the experience of ASC workers:

> When Stephen Bitmead joined the Australian Submarine Corporation in January, 1988, its current Osborne home was just a swamp with a small ship lift and crane. (Good Stories are Never Told, 2015, March 24)

> Ms Bird's work focuses on metal work, consolidation and fabrication on the foundations of the Air Warfare Destroyers—an easy decision after trying work experience on her other favoured option, childcare work. "I've never dealt with so much s--t in my life," she said. (Building Family Tradition, 2015, March 24)

In articles such as the ones above, these discourses of threat to family and lived experience sit uncomfortably alongside informational news of political announcements on defence procurement policy. This discursive framing emphasises the distance between the lives of Adelaide shipbuilders and those of bureaucrats or politicians working in Canberra. Furthermore, it recontextualises a broadly political decision made at a federal level and rearticulates it as an external threat that is being imposed upon members of the community. As Bowd (2017) and Vine (2012) argue, conflict between the internal regional community and those who are outsiders is a common characteristic of local advocacy reporting. Overall this suggest that *Advertiser* journalists were blending the humanising community discourses of local advocacy with more normative discourses of conflict typical of news journalism.

### 9.3d—South Australia: The Forgotten State.

The us-versus-them frame plays out in regional newspapers where community interests and needs are depicted as being disadvantaged by the actions of a large outsider faction, such as big business or big government (Bowd, 2017). Throughout *The Advertiser's* reporting of the Attack class procurement journalists routinely employed the us-versus-them frame to emphasise their local advocacy position. In many examples, South Australia is collectively represented as being in conflict and rivalry with the wealthier larger states in the Commonwealth, and that the conflict is an extension of a history of South Australia's interests being overlooked. For example:

> South Australia is officially joining forces with old foe Victoria in a bid to ward off threats to send the nation's $50 billion future submarine project overseas. (McGuire, 2015, February 22)

> The battle for the nation's warship and submarine contracts turned nasty yesterday after Premier Jay Weatherill was accused by another state leader of being a "dill". (Jean, 2015, December 17)

When then Premier of Victoria, Daniel Andrews, announced in February 2015 that they along with Jay Weatherill would join forces to lobby the Federal government to keep defence manufacturing work in Australia, Victoria was characterised as an old foe. And when the Western Australian Chamber of Commerce lobbied the government to direct some of the submarine work to WA an article ran with the headline: 'WA tries to gloss over our ship bid' (Shepherd, 2015, November 24). State leaders publicly spoke out against WA lobbying for what *The Advertiser* saw as "our ship bid", leading to a public exchange between Colin Barnett and Jay Weatherill. *The Advertiser* reported articles on the event positioning it as an example of the negativity directed towards South Australia:

> As the war of words between the state's escalated, Mr Barnett labelled the South Australian premier a "dill" and suggested Mr Weatherill "get out of Adelaide occasionally". Last night Mr Weatherill declined to respond to the undignified name calling. (Jean, 2015, December 17)

The positioning of this story as front page news is indicative of the newspaper and its journalists' rhetorical constitution of SA as being overlooked and forgotten. In an oped written following Senator Johnston's 'canoe' remark, Tory Shepherd wrote the following:

> […] we South Australian hacks were a little fired up. Our interstate colleagues? Not so much. […] That's how journalists feel, and that's how politicians feel. SA barely rates. We have 11 federal electorates. NSW has nearly 50. That's a lot more seats to worry about. (Shepherd, 2014, November 28)

This subtext can be looked at as one of the significant underlying themes for much of *The Advertiser's* reporting of the Attack class procurement. Following its "Inspired by South Australia" editorial line, journalists represented themselves as locals, amplified local voices and perspectives, and highlighted the human cost should the government choose not to build

the submarines in Adelaide. The discourse of the 'jobs crisis' was a central prism through which journalists at *The Advertiser* interpreted unfolding events. That the paper was engaged in a deliberate advocacy campaign was something of an open secret, as reporter Daniel Wills stated following the announcement in April 2016 that the submarines were to be built in Adelaide:

> A combination of public and political pressure from all sides and relentless media coverage has forced a change at the top. When an overseas build seemed inevitable, some powerbrokers accused *The Advertiser* of being obsessed in pushing the SA case for submarines. (Wills, 2016, April 23)

With the submarine design contract won, journalists at *The Advertiser* were vocal in announcing a shared sense of victory with the community.

> Pop the champagne corks. No, really. […] The fact the Government has committed to building the $50 billion Future Submarines in Adelaide is definitely worth a clink and a "Santé!" […] More importantly for South Australians, we will have thousands of jobs. (Shepherd, 2016, April 27)

The paper stopped short of claiming *The Advertiser* had been central to the success of SA's bid, but its triumphal framing of the contract being awarded to DCNS was unique from other newspapers analysed in this inquiry. In part, this can be seen in how the framing of 'victory in SA' quickly reverted to regional us-versus-them discourses seeking to defend the community against accusations of pork-barrelling:

> Spitting the dummy like a torpedo, some people over the border are clearly sour about South Australia winning the lucrative submarines project. (Humphreys, 2016, April 27)

> There is a hairy-chested group of eastern states journalists whose computers have been fitted with a handy command-F 10 button which spits out template comment pieces disparaging any policy initiative of benefit to South Australia. (Penberthy, 2016, April 29)

Tory Shepherd was particularly pointed:

> The Daily Telegraph […] called South Australia "hapless" and a "failed state" My colleague Daniel Meers, a great guy having a ginger snap wrote: […] "The failed state will receive taxpayer-funded billions […] to avoid going into virtual liquidation with unemployment rising into double digits." Ouch. But, then, I'd be snarky too if I had no hope of affording a house within cooee of the CBD and if at night I dreamt of a 30-minute commute to work. (Shepherd, 2016, April 30)

*The Advertiser's* reporting of the decision to build the submarines in Adelaide crossed the line between knowing one's audience and representing one's audience. In this sense it closely resembles what Hess and Waller (2014) describe as geo-social journalism that connects, advocates for and champions for a community. However, in assuming the role of community advocate the newspaper also sought to constitute the social relationship South Australians should have with other Australians. In this way, the frequent use of us-versus-them and 'forgotten state' framing in news and opinion pieces reinforces the idea that South Australians are characteristically unique from other Australians. This is Foucault's procedures of division at work (section 4.1a). *The Advertiser's* reporting of the Attack class can therefore be considered as both a form of local advocacy but also an example of how discourse is used to structure social identity and reality.

### 9.3e—Campaign Journalism

Throughout *The Advertiser's* reporting of the Attack class procurement there are a number of examples of journalism that campaigns for and champions the interests of the community. In mid-2014 the paper launched what it called the "Northern Fightback" campaign which aimed "to highlight ways to grow the northern suburbs economy" of Adelaide (Weir, 2014, July 30). As part of the campaign reporter Belinda Willis (2014, July 30) interviewed Chris Burns and Saab director Dean Rosenfield who advocated for "more than 3500 jobs in Adelaide's northern suburbs, with global defence giants such as Saab, Babcock, BAE Systems and Lockheed Martin":

> Spending taxpayer's money on defence projects in Australia is critical to creating new technology and jobs for the northern suburbs, according to industry leaders.

Further, in March 2015 the paper released a feature edition that focused entirely on the Attack class and the case for building them in Adelaide. Headlines from the feature included:

- Let's be masters of our own destiny (Willis, 2015, March 24).
- History shows we should build here (Weatherill, 2015, March 24).
- A proud history of defending our seas (McPhedran, 2015, March 24).
- The manufacturers' state has an advantage (Willox, 2015, March 24).

Though it had articles that also provided opposing views from Kevin Andrews and Chris Kenny, the balance of the feature overall was weighted heavily in favour of those who wanted to see the submarines built in South Australia. The editor, Sam Weir, signals how the feature should be read as a whole:

> The conclusion which can be drawn from the expert analysis in the Submarine Dossier is that the national interest is best served by constructing the submarines at Adelaide-based ASC. (Weir, 2015, March 24)

Between 1 January 2014 and when the successful bidder was announced on 27 April 2016 *The Advertiser* published at least 351 articles of news and opinion on the subject of the Attack class fleet and related defence and political issues. This suggests that for *The Advertiser* the Attack class programme was not just another news story. Special and particular attention was made to report on and continuously cover the story, representing it from a local perspective, through the prism of local unemployment, and representing local voices of people who worked in the industry. Both in the overt advocacy shown in editorials and opinion pieces, and through the subtle advocacy shown in news articles, journalists from *The Advertiser* used discourses of 'us-versus-them', 'threat to family' and the 'jobs crisis' to translate a national security policy issue into a local issue. In such a way, *The Advertiser* bound itself to advocate and lobby for the outcome that would advance its readership economically and politically.

The end result was represented not just as a victory for the ASC or DCNS, but a victory for the people of South Australia. As Daniel Wills (2016, April 23) reported it:

> A forgotten state with seemingly little leverage in Canberra held the Federal Government for ransom, and won big. Power to the people. It's never over until it's over.

## 9.4— "A Profound Pride and Belief in South Australia"

Fairclough (1992) and Van Dijk's (2008) approach to CDA suggest that one of the aims of discourse analysis is to explore ways in which discourse is used to reproduce or challenge relationships of social inequality, particularly those that impact marginalised communities. In many ways the form of local advocacy employed by *The Advertiser* provided voice to communities struggling with unemployment and pressured politicians and decisionmakers to support local workers. In other ways, the use of divisive us-versus-them rhetoric reproduced a view that the interests of South Australians and other Australians were mutually exclusive.

South Australians are, to a certain degree, marginalised by economic circumstances and are searching for solutions. In recent years, regional and so called 'rust belt' communities in the developed world have experienced economic disadvantage as manufacturing and primary industries have declined. In Australia there is still a two-speed economy separating the major cities of Melbourne and Sydney with smaller and regional centres around the country (Kelly, Donegan, Chisholm and Oberklaid, 2014). South Australia's unemployment rate still hovers around 6 per cent today, down from a high of almost 8 per cent in 2016 (Letts, 2019). Research suggests that among Western nations there is a strong relationship between urban decline, rising unemployment and the rise of voting for non-mainstream parties and populist parties (Algan, Papaioanou, Guriev and Passari, 2017). Distrust in the major political parties—and public institutions—is a hallmark of the populism that has arisen in Europe, the United Kingdom and the United States. Woods, Daley and Chivers (2018) also argue that populism and minor party voting is on the rise in Australia, stating that at the 2016 election

the vote for minor parties reached its highest level since World War Two. It is not surprising then that in 2016 as unemployment in South Australia was peaking, populist candidate Nick Xenophon and his NXT party emerged as a challenge to the political establishment.

It could be argued that *The Advertiser* challenged the status quo of globalism (outsourcing submarine building to Japan) by advancing a broadly populist discourse. An inward focused and parochial advocacy for the economic advancement of the community it seeks to represent. However, as Hess and Waller's (2017) research on local journalism suggests it is unlikely that *The Advertiser* selected a particular populist ideology as a part of a deliberate political strategy. As Hess and Waller suggest, small newspapers with readers concentrated in a particular geographic area are oriented towards and connected to the priorities of their community out of necessity. This orientation is as much about the newspaper's survival as a commercial entity as it is about advocating for the collective economic success of the community. Diminishing financial resources and declining circulation mean that smaller newspapers in Australia have had to adopt new models of journalism to stay in business. As Tiffen (1989) argues, communicating with and reflecting the views of a community are fundamental institutional values that newspapers operate with. In the case of regional newspapers this institutional value of knowing one's audience is transformed into a deeper need to engage with and advocate for the community that journalists are a part of (Hess and Waller, 2017). Given the decline of advertising revenue and other financial problems facing the news industry, connecting, advocating and championing the community they serve may represent one of the few financially sustainable models of journalism. *The Advertiser's* editorial decision to adopt its "Inspired by South Australia" approach to news production suggests a calculated decision to appeal to readers' shared sense of place and community.

Despite limited resources, *The Advertiser* did provide a voice for a community of people that were at risk of being disadvantaged by policy decisions made by those with more power and influence. They did so by employing strategies similar to those described by Bowd (2017); including reframing issues as "us versus them" discourses, translating the local

impacts of nationally significant issues and providing a voice for individuals living in the community. Through the reporting of the Attack class procurement *The Advertiser* also constituted itself as sharing a "sense of place" with the community by emphasising a clear advocacy position for the advancement of their collective economic and political success. Their reporting of the issue also suggests a shared sense of accountability in the outcomes of their journalism, and a shared sense of achievement in the successes of the community.

This chapter set out to explore whether this model of advocacy journalism could represent a way forward for the profession in a time where revenue is significantly declining. More research is needed to understand whether this could be the case or not. The analysis suggests that adopting an advocacy position as a news organisation is complicated. As Fisher (2016a) argues, the degree of advocacy adopted by journalists depends on a range of practical, organisational, production and sourcing factors. It is arguable that taking an advocacy position is more acceptable in a news organisation as *The Advertiser.* As Fairclough (1992) suggests, texts must be interpreted in their historic context. Rather than advocacy being a particularly new strategy for the paper it has a long history of strong local identity, with editorial decisions driven by "a profound pride and belief in South Australia". As Hess and Waller's (2017) research suggests, small news organisations are often more directly connected with their readers as they cannot rely on the kind of resources larger organisations have to generate news. From this analysis it is clear that many journalists at *The Advertiser* share a sense of common interest with their audience as well as an ownership of the outcomes of their journalism. Their discursive practices privilege local industry and political sources, but they also amplify the voices and perspective of ordinary South Australians as well. However, it is unclear whether the balance between the interests of ordinary South Australians and elite political and industry members is always struck. Additionally, in representing one's audience journalists from *The Advertiser* sometimes use divisive language to constitute South Australians as having social realities that put them in competition with other Australians. *The Advertiser's* local advocacy is complex: there are unique geographic, historic and economic circumstances in Adelaide that legitimise their use of a community focused approach to news

production. Applied to a different newsroom in a different city in Australia; such an approach to advocacy may not find such success.

This chapter also sought to answer broader questions related to this thesis: such as whether local advocacy journalism provides for scrutiny and public interest journalism. As this thesis has discussed, rising secrecy and increasing restrictions on the reporting of defence and intelligence matters are of significant concern. *The Advertiser* was vocal and direct in its criticism of the government's proposed policies for the Attack class procurement. Throughout the entire process its journalists continued to put pressure on the federal government to ensure that the maximum economic benefit of the submarine programme was directed towards South Australia. As Wills stated, *The Advertiser* was accused of "being obsessed in pushing the SA case for submarines" (Wills, 2016, April 23). The paper's campaigning had a widespread influence on the broader discourse of the Attack class and placed substantial political pressure on the government. However, it is unclear whether the scrutiny and pressure applied by *The Advertiser* resulted in more transparency or simply a deeper politicisation of the procurement process. Furthermore, while the result of the CEP process was the decision to build the submarines in South Australia, it remains to be seen who will benefit more from this; the community or the private defence companies that also lobbied heavily for a local build. *The Advertiser's* local advocacy journalism provided a form of scrutiny and a form of public interest journalism. But the circumstances of the push for the Attack class to be built in South Australia are particular. *The Advertiser* was greatly helped by the fact that its interests were aligned with influential state politicians and well-resourced defence industry lobbyists. If *The Advertiser's* local advocacy was in competition with the voices of powerful politicians and industry figures, the outcome could well have been different. *The Advertiser* translated a complex national security policy through a local perspective and gave ordinary members of the community the opportunity to voice their concerns—and this in itself is significant and powerful. However, it may be many years before it becomes known whether building the submarines in South Australia was in the public interest or not.

## 9.5—Local Advocacy Journalism in a Changing News Environment

This chapter looked at discourses of local advocacy in *The Advertiser's* reporting of the Attack class procurement. The aim of this chapter was to examine the way in which journalists used locality and community representation as orienting aspects of news production. It addressed questions of whether through local advocacy news *The Advertiser* constructed and mediated the relationship between marginalised communities and powerful stakeholders in government and industry. A discursive analysis of texts revealed that journalists used textual and discursive practices to build a shared sense of community with their audience. The Attack class as a defence policy was translated through a local perspective in terms of how the programme might help to alleviate the jobs crisis facing South Australia. Journalists used emotive language and developed the jobs crisis and other discourses of the Attack class to emphasise the economic and political risks associated with the programme. They privileged local and community perspectives in their sourcing practices by routinely using local politicians, industry figures and advocates as significant sources of news. Furthermore, they provided a voice for the community by sourcing ordinary members of the community to amplify their perspectives. Journalists characterised members of the community using humanistic language, focusing on themes such as 'family', 'education', 'tradition' and the voice of ordinary experience. *The Advertiser* also worked discursively to constitute South Australian identity and its relationship to other states by characterising it as the 'forgotten state', using us-versus-them discourses and characterising interstate politicians and journalists as hostile towards them. Through their campaigning, journalists at *The Advertiser* both advocated vocally for the interests of South Australia and celebrated publicly on the announcement of the successful bid. In all these ways it can be regarded that *The Advertiser* engaged in the "connecting, championing and advocating" that Hess and Waller (2017, p. 111) considered to be key to the viability of many small local and regional news outlets. The paper's local advocacy was significant in challenging the power of the federal government by leveraging public support for a local build and putting pressure on

politicians. *The Advertiser* also gave a voice to ordinary people, providing them with the opportunity to speak directly to powerful stakeholders and individuals that might otherwise have not heard them. Its advocacy was in many regards a challenge to the Abbott government's discursive framing: that the Attack class should be a matter of cost and capability, not regional considerations. But it must also be considered that the historic and contextual circumstances surrounding *The Advertisers* reporting of the Attack class are unique. It had the support and assistance of powerful industry and state political advocates. It also has a long history of advocating for the social and economic prosperity of South Australia. The lessons learned from this analysis therefore may not apply to other circumstances in other cities and newsrooms. The key findings of this analysis however suggest that local advocacy arises in varied circumstances and influences discourse in different ways. *The Advertiser* played a substantial role in the overall reporting of the Attack class procurement: applying political pressure and scrutiny to both the Abbott and Turnbull governments' with the aim of ensuring that defence policy was made to serve the public interest. There are likely many journalists at *The Advertiser* who—like Daniel Wills—believe their reporting made a difference in the outcome of the Attack class procurement. Whether or not that is true, the belief alone suggests that journalists still see advocacy journalism as central to their discursive practice. And that has consequences, for the textual choices they make, the sources they use and the way the constitute their own and their audiences' identities as South Australians.

# Chapter 10—Conclusions

This chapter provides an overview of the findings for this thesis and draws together its conclusions. The aim of this inquiry was to explain and interpret the discursive features of newspaper reporting of the Attack class procurement. To that end it set out to provide a substantive overview of the newspaper reporting of the Attack class from initial planning stages in late 2013 to the finalising of a design partner for the programme in April of 2016. This analysis explored the characteristics of newspaper reporting of the procurement to better understand the changing nature of journalism and the impact of increasing secrecy in government and military institutions. Using an approach informed by Critical Discourse Analysis, a research agenda was formulated that focused on how this analysis could reveal the impact of rising secrecy and the decline of resources for journalism on public debate over national security issues. A corpus of 879 news articles was drawn from four Australian newspapers and a two-stage analysis was conducted. The first stage of analysis involved a broad qualitative analysis of each article in the corpus observing key information such as discourse types and genres, patterns of word choices and phrasing, significant named politicians and sources, narratives, themes and major events described in the articles. Guided by Fairclough's (1992) principle of moments of crisis, as well as Carvalho's (2008) critical discourse moments, a further sub-selection of 188 articles was selected for a second stage of in-depth discourse analysis. At the conclusion of this analysis a range of key findings were highlighted. This chapter will summarise and discuss these findings.

Overall, this thesis demonstrates the mutually influential and interconnected nature of participants in discourses of national security and military procurement. It demonstrates that when journalists, politicians and other communicators discuss military procurement they necessarily draw from and contribute to broader discourses and in doing so participate in broader movements of social change or conservation. In news, the discursive contributions of journalists, public relations practitioners, lobbyists, politicians, members of the public and anonymous sources are aggregated together. As such their influence is refracted through the

prism of history, political and economic context, journalistic values and practices, commercial interests and media logics. Understanding the relationships between these diverse participants is key to understanding the reporting of the Attack class and the changing nature of news production in Australia. As this thesis discussed in Chapter 2, much research done in the field of journalism studies concerns itself primarily with the analysis of journalism as a cog in the greater functioning of liberal democracy (Zelizer, 2004; 2012). Because such scholarship centres on the study of the role of journalism in democracy and how journalism should ideally support democracy, normative scholarship provides a limited framework within which to understand the complexities of news discourses as mutually influential, ideological and socially constitutive. Chapter 2 argues instead that it is possible to address discourse through a mediatisation framework (Hepp, 2016), wherein the ideological function of journalism is considered reciprocal and partly mediated by the logics of the social institutions in which journalism is produced and connected to. Mediatisation theory argues that seemingly disconnected participants of discourses (journalists, politicians, public relations officials and anonymous sources) are becoming increasingly interdependent as they are moulded by media use and the logics of media production and consumption (Hepp, Hjarvard and Lundby, 2015; Hepp, 2016; Hjarvard, 2013). This thesis argues that only though an approach such as Critical Discourse Analysis can mediatised news discourses be understood broadly in terms of their production and consumption, socio-political influence and textual characteristics.

This thesis used CDA to provide a more complete understanding of newspaper reporting of the Attack class submarine procurement, one that placed emphasis on power, influence and the role of news discourses in challenging or advancing social and political change. This approach is derived from Foucault's (2001) conception of structural power being rooted in the social control of language, speech and written expression. Foucault describes the orders of discourse as procedures by which society excludes certain text and speech behaviours, establishes social relationships that divide those who can speak and write from those are prohibited, and shapes normative assumptions of truth and reality. Fairclough (1992) extended Foucault's work by applying it to the discursive and linguistic analysis of

actual talk and text. Fairclough argues that Foucault's conception of power is limited in that it does not identify "the detailed mechanisms of change" and that "he gives the impression that resistance is generally contained by power and poses no threat" (p. 57). CDA argues that discourse is not simply the deliberative process in which power is observed and directed but also the process in which it is disrupted and challenged. Just as mediatisation can be regarded as a "metaprocess" that stems from everyday practices being moulded by increasing reliance on media (Hepp, 2016, p. 919); *discourse disruption* can be regarded as a metaprocess that stems from the changing balance of power between established and emerging participants in the digital media landscape. As this thesis demonstrates the decline of traditional news outlets, the rise of defence industry public relations and advocacy, and the increasing opacity of government and the military, are reshaping the orders of discourse relating to the public discussion of defence procurement. Discourse disruption is reshaping the processes by which societies collectively decide who is permitted to speak or write about national defence and military procurement, who should be considered an expert on such matters, and in what ways they should speak or write about it. However, it is too simplistic to attribute the root of this change to a single social or economic factor; such as the defunding of journalism, the rise of social media giants such as Facebook and Google, or the 'war on terror' and rising government secrecy. Equally, no sub-class of participants (journalists, politicians, the Navy, defence industry PR officials or anonymous leakers) can be singled out as the origin of this shift. Instead, discourse disruption can be regarded as the sum of all intended and unintended consequences that shape the way we collectively deliberate.

The findings of this thesis reflect the complexity and interconnectedness of media discourses in the era of digital news.

This thesis has found that in newspaper reporting of the Attack class submarine procurement between September 2013 and April 2016, journalists discursively represented the issue primarily as a political debate. A small number of national security journalists, who relied on beat journalistic methods to gather information, produced the majority of reporting on the issue during this period. Using insider access to mostly political sources, national

security reporters framed the Attack class procurement largely in terms of how it reflected on the Liberal Party of Australia's ongoing internal leadership crisis. Later, the focus of reporting became the ongoing public relations activities of the three main bidding parties competing to win the design contract to build the submarines. In this sense, specialist reporters were drawn towards elite political and corporate sources of news (Berkowtiz, 2009; Hecht, Martin, Donnelly, Larson and Sweetser, 2017) and the discursive representation of the Attack class reflects this. This can be understood as an example of the mutual reliance of politicians, PR officers and journalists on each other to achieve their respective communication goals. However, journalists also actively pursued competitive news stories that challenged government narratives, unearthed political scandals and discredited politicians. Examples such as the reporting of David Johnston's 'canoe' remarks and the subsequent publishing of his ministerial expenses reinforce Gans' (1980) characterisation of journalist-politician relations. It is indeed difficult to determine 'who leads the tango'. However, the small number of active journalists consistently reporting on the Attack class is reflective of both the diminishing resources of journalism and the increasing independence politicians and PR officers have from them.

Findings from this thesis also suggest that leaks played a key role in the representation of the Attack class in news discourses. Journalists with insider access were able to use leaked information to subvert government narratives, challenge the legitimacy of the procurement process and undermine the various bidding defence companies in their public relations activities. Leaks also provided an inside picture of the Liberal Party of Australia's disunity on a key national security issue. However, as this thesis demonstrates, leaks about the Attack class were more often political in their dimensions than substantive technical, policy or procedural information. The discursive function of leaks was often less to do with providing transparency over the Attack class procurement (although this was a concern of journalists), but rather leaks functioned to highlight political instability, infighting among Liberal Party politicians and conflict between rival bidders for the design contract to build the submarines. The relationship between journalists and insider or anonymous sources is complex, but these

findings suggest at least some degree of complicity between journalists and those who leak secret information for strategic political gain. This is a significant reflection of the changing balance of power between journalists, who must publish competitive news stories, and political insiders who are increasingly media savvy and can be selective in the journalists they choose to leak information to.

In the newspaper reporting of the Attack class China was characterised as a cause of instability and tension in the region, as a power that needed to be contained and as a military threat that could invade or attack Australia. As Chapter 3 argued, journalists writing about contemporary national security issues must necessarily draw from and contribute to deeply established discourses of Australia's military, war and history of conflict. A key component of the reporting of the Attack class therefore centred on notions of risk, uncertainty and the potential for armed conflict in the Indo-Pacific region. This thesis argues that this tendency in reporting of military issues resulted in the erasure of the complexity of China's historic relationship of trade, migration and cultural trade with Australia in news discourses of the Attack class. Chapter 7 shows, the reporting of defence issues necessarily takes place within the social and political context of Australia's racial discrimination against and othering of people of Chinese ancestry, including Chinese-Australians. As such, it draws upon and uses discourses such as rising China and 'the China threat' that carry with them prejudiced and stereotypical assumptions and interpretations. Close textual analysis of news articles discussing China reveal an exclusion of Chinese voices and perspectives, as well as the unchallenged assertion of China's aggressiveness as an innate characteristic. Journalistic representations of China are thus suggestive of contemporary journalisms' interconnectedness with historic discourses of race, migration and conflict in Australia.

This thesis also demonstrates that throughout the reporting of the Attack class procurement public relations officials and lobbyists provided journalists with significant information subsidies. This is evident in both the frequency with which lobbyists and PR officers were used as sources of news and the way in which industry sources were characterised as legitimate and expert sources. Industry sources were able to advance

discourses that reframed the submarine procurement in terms of providing domestic jobs and supporting South Australia's local economy. As Fairclough (1992) argues:

> Newsworthy events originate from the contracted set of people who have privileged access to the media, who are treated by journalists as reliable sources, and whose voices are the ones which are most widely represented in media discourse. (p. 110)

In this sense, the findings from Chapter 8 suggest a privileging of commercial discourse and the representation of paid advocates as newsworthy, important and reliable sources of information about the Attack class procurement. Additionally, journalists rarely questioned the newsworthiness of discourses advanced by paid advocates and in many cases passively camouflaged the paid-for nature of their contributions. This arguably reflects the normalisation of industry subsidised journalism in newsrooms that are increasingly limited in their financial resources to pursue news. As the balance of power between journalists, government and commercial industry shifts it is likely such reporting will become further entrenched in the logics of media production.

Chapter 9 of this thesis addressed the reporting of the Attack class by *The Advertiser* as a unique example of local advocacy journalism. This thesis argues that *The Advertiser's* reporting of the procurement programme was influenced by its historic, geographic and cultural position in Adelaide as a local advocate for civic issues. In this sense, *The Advertiser* used discourses of "us and them", the "jobs crisis" and "the forgotten state" to reframe the submarine procurement in terms of its local economic and political consequences. Additionally, it more frequently represented the voice of its community by privileging local community members, State politicians and local industry officials as sources of news and opinion on the matter. For *The Advertiser* this does not represent a newly developed strategy, rather, as Chapter 9 has shown the newspaper has a long history of advocacy that continues to provide it with a competitive advantage as a news outlet within its own State. From a critical perspective however, *The Advertiser's* professed advocacy status arguably leads it to be particularly accepting of paid for defence industry public relations and advocacy where the political interests of industry and the interests of the newspaper are aligned.

In summary, as the above findings suggest the newspaper reporting of the Attack class represents far more than simply the reporting of facts and events about the government's decision to purchase a fleet of 12 submarines. The political story of the Attack class, as told by journalists, politicians, PR officials, industry advocates and anonymous sources, eclipsed any deliberation over potentially more substantive technical and strategic issues. As a consequence of the historic, social, political and economic context of Australia in the period between 2013 and 2016, journalists drew from concurrent political discourses (the LNP leadership crisis), economic discourses (South Australian unemployment), cultural discourses (history of regional conflict and discrimination against Chinese-Australians) and journalistic principles (competitive news in a declining media industry), to deliberate on and construct an image of the Attack class in the collective imagination. However, as discussed earlier in this chapter, existing discourses are rarely fixed and change as the balance of power shifts between participants of discourse. The Attack class submarine is still in its early stages of development. Furthermore, this research captures a particular period in time prior to some substantial changes that have taken place both in Australian politics and media industries. Many facts remain unknown about how, why and for what reasons the government elected to choose the specific design partner that they did. Additional research may well be needed in the future to extend this thesis's findings to better understand the full context and the complete story of the Attack class.

The following sections will discuss these key findings in more detail and draw some additional conclusions, as well as the application of CDA in this research and possible future research.

## 10.1—National Security Reporting and Shrinking Resources

Journalism is a selective process in which some perspectives on social reality are reflected and others excluded. What shapes that process is a constellation of interconnected decisions and factors ranging from institutional pressures, self-censorship, access, language and writing practices, sourcing practices, advocacy inclination, commercial pressure,

competition and experience. This thesis set out to consider how news discourses are being impacted by the ongoing commercial decline of media industries and the increasing secrecy of both the Australian government and military. The results of this inquiry shed some light on this. A small group of national security journalists in Australia are producing the bulk of reporting on procurement issues in a politically charged environment dominated by the voices of well-resourced and financed politicians, industry PR practitioners, advocates and lobbyists. There is limited engagement between journalists and members of the ADF as sources of news. Leaking is prevalent and the routine use of anonymous sources serves to provide a degree of government transparency. However, leaks are also a key feature in discourses of political infighting, conflict and scandal. Advocacy is a central feature of news reporting of national security issues, but there is a degree of camouflage and ambiguity in the way such advocacy is represented. In a complex and ongoing process informational news discourses are being blended with commercial political conflict, public relations, local advocacy and geo-political discourses. In summary, journalism is in an inherently vulnerable position as it continues to try to provide news reporting about a highly technical, politicised and opaque aspect of government policy.

## 10.2—Beat Journalism as Central to Active News Gathering and Reporting

As discussed in Chapter 5, discursive practices associated with beat journalism significantly influenced the overall reporting of the Attack class submarine project. National security beat journalists were better equipped than generalists in the routines and practices they employed to gather information and report on the programme. National security journalists provided nuanced reporting of complex technical and political issues surrounding the submarines, were more likely to access key political and insider sources of information and develop competitive news angles that countered political control and framing of events. Textually, national security journalists were able to translate complicated political and military discourses into the language of ordinary experience. Furthermore, beat journalists have developed a familiarity with, and adapted to, the logics of the increasingly opaque

institutions they are tasked with reporting on. This includes the fostering of anonymous insider sources within both defence and the government who are routinely the source of leaked information about ongoing procurement issues. These findings appear to support Katherine Murphy's (2015) assessment of the enduring significance of beat journalism routines:

> In my view, the journalistic beat is the heart of who we are, and what we do. Technology may have transformed print and broadcast specialists into vaguely harried multitaskers, but technology has not changed the mission. The journalistic mission remains at its simplest: know your patch, and use your knowledge to try and tell readers what is actually going on. (p. 149)

As this thesis shows, beat journalism remains at the core of the production of national security news in Australia. However, that may not always be the case. During the course of this inquiry a number of the journalists whose work was the subject of analysis have left the profession; including Brendan Nicholson of *The Australian*, Ian McPhedran of *The Advertiser* and John Kerin of *The Australian Financial Review*. As the resources news organisations can allocate to beat journalism diminish, so too does the likelihood that outgoing reporters will be replaced by similarly experienced and well-connected defence journalists. While the routines of journalism may survive the ongoing decline of news organisations, defence reporting may face more significant challenges than other beats given its uniquely secretive, technical and political features.

## 10.3—Victory or Defeat: Political Conflict and Commercial Competition as Driving Discourses

As active pursuers of competitive and newsworthy information national security journalists were key to the overall production of news discourses about the Attack class submarine. However, as this thesis shows, journalists were generally oriented towards discourses and sources of news that were political in nature. As both Chapter 5 and 6 show,

the reporting of the Attack class procurement was intimately tied to the concurrent political narratives of leadership uncertainty, conflict, gaffes and scandal. Particularly throughout 2015, news reporting of the Attack class became progressively entangled with the reporting of the collapse of the Abbott government. As shown in Chapter 9, *The Advertiser* oriented much of its reporting around discourses of conflict between the local South Australian community and a hostile Federal government. Its reporters framed the public debate over the Attack class as an us-versus-them issue in which the threat of unemployment and job losses in Adelaide was allegedly ignored by politicians who advocated for building the submarines overseas. Chapter 8 shows, reporting of the Competitive Evaluation Process centred on the three-way conflict between rival publicity campaigns launched by Naval Group (DCNS), ThyssenKrupp Marine Services and Mitsubishi/Kawasaki Heavy Industries. As the CEP progressed towards a final decision, news reporting became increasingly oriented towards the antics of rival public relations practitioners, a campaign of leaks designed to undermine rival bids, and corporate sponsored media tours. Conflict is an enduring news value, however at times the focus on discourses of 'winners and losers' detracted from the reporting of informational news and gave opportunities for public relations and industry advocacy discourses to rise in prominence. Furthermore, in the ongoing political drama of the Liberal Party's leadership conflict the political mismanagement of the Attack class increasingly came to be used as a rhetorical device to undermine rival politicians. Just as the Collins class was used as a device for political point scoring (Yule and Woolner, 2008), so too was the Attack class; first, to undermine Tony Abbott's leadership and then later in an attempt to undermine Malcolm Turnbull's.

The politicisation of the Attack class was therefore the product of a combination of factors; journalistic practices that favoured politicians as sources of news; orientation towards conflict as a news value; the promotion of public relations and industry advocacy discourses in news; *The Advertiser's* organisational identity and history as an advocacy newspaper; and political infighting over the leadership of the Liberal Party. No single factor explains why the Attack class became a political matter rather than a policy one, instead a network of discursive

interactions mediated the process. As Foucault (2001) argues, discourse is "not simply that which translates struggles or systems of domination, but is the thing for which and by which there is struggle" (p. 1461). It is the balance of discursive power between institutions and groups that ultimately determines the outcome of such struggles. In the case of the Attack class submarine those arguing in favour of a South Australian build outnumbered and outmanoeuvred their opponents through local advocacy, public relations, industry advocacy and political rhetoric. Subsequently, rival companies conducted sophisticated public relations campaigns raising the profile and esteem of private industry and justifying their lucrative subsidisation by the taxpayer. Journalistic decisions shaped this process and gave legitimacy to industry figureheads and lobbyists. As such, this thesis provides an example of the rising influence of commercialisation in discourses of Australia's national security.

## 10.4—Journalism's Role in Facilitating Industry Public Relations and Advocacy Discourses

A significant finding from this thesis is that journalists reporting on the Attack class procurement often accepted substantial information subsidies provided by the defence industry. As discussed in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9, industry figures such as Chris Burns from the Defence Teaming Centre and Innes Willox from Ai Group were prominent contributors to the public debate about the submarine. Journalists facilitated this by providing industry advocates such as Burns and Willox substantial opportunities to amplify their preferred interpretations of the ongoing procurement process. As well as being used routinely as sources of news across hundreds of articles journalists discursively represented industry sources as technical and authoritative experts, legitimising their place within the broader political discourse. Journalists treated research prepared and released by industry advocacy groups as newsworthy information. And industry PR practitioners and advocates were also given substantial opportunities to publish op-ed and commentary pieces in newspapers. Furthermore, journalists camouflaged the presence of paid advocacy within news reporting by

routinely failing to clearly disclose that sources were funded by industry and employed in roles specifically tasked with targeting media and influencing public opinion. This represented a blending of the informational discourse of news with the commercialised discourses of paid advocacy.

The widespread presence of public relations practitioners and defence industry advocates in news discourses of the Attack class suggests two underlying factors at play. First, there is likely truth to the concerns that journalism is becoming more reliant on sources of convenience and public relations. Contemporary journalists are required to meet tighter deadlines, publish news across many platforms and function as generalist reporters writing across a range of different news areas (Murphy, 2015). Journalists are placed at a disadvantage with increasingly limited time and resources for the production of news and this incentivises the gathering of news from sources engaged in paid advocacy. The results of this inquiry suggest that this practice has become normalised. Second, the widespread presence of industry advocacy in news reporting of the Attack class is indicative of the ascendance of commercialisation within discourses of Australia's national security. It is clear from the degree of engagement with and direct targeting of journalists by defence industry companies that the industry views strategic communication as important for commercial success. The investment of resources into media tours, paying for journalists to travel internationally and purchasing of advertising space, are all unusual tactics in this field. Defence companies do not market products to the general public. As such, these activities are likely a form of outside lobbying designed to put pressure on politicians to pass legislation more favourable to the industry or specific companies. The employment of such strategic communication tactics in Australia is an area that has received limited scholarly attention. As such, future research should address these phenomena in order to better understand the changing relationship between government and industry.

## 10.5—Leaks and Anonymous Sources Provide Transparency and Politicisation

As discussed in Chapter 6, the Abbott government's handling of the procurement was characterised by journalists as being excessively secretive. National security journalists used insider sources within defence and government as routine sources of news information. Unauthorised disclosures and leaks were common, but the content of leaks was generally not information that revealed significant misconduct or mismanagement of the procurement. Journalists used leaks as signifiers of insider access, to connote exclusive status and as a competitive edge over other journalists. Leaks from government and defence sources were relatively common throughout the procurement process. The heightened secrecy and prevalence of leaks became discursive features of the reporting of the Attack class overall. Journalists used the continued disclosure of insider information to represent the government as lacking control over information, as being the subject of infighting and disruption, and as an example of political vendettas and undermining. A number of leaks were likely deliberate releases of information designed to directly undermine political authority. For example, the leaking of draft sections of the 2016 White Paper to Greg Sheridan was suspected by journalists to be an attempt to directly undermine the Turnbull administration. As Chapter 6 details a number of other leaks were also characterised as being political in motivation and effect.

Journalists represented leaks primarily in political terms. Leaks were used in ways that undermined or supported political control over discourses of the Attack class procurement. As such, leaks featured prominently in discourses of political conflict particularly during the ongoing leadership contest between Malcolm Turnbull and Tony Abbott in 2015. A number of leaks functioned to undermine government narratives of the Attack class and present the government as rushing to make a 'captain's pick' for the procurement without due process. Abbott's preferred narrative that the procurement would be driven by capability and cost was undermined by leaks suggesting the deal with Japan was more about geo-politics than anything else. Throughout 2014 and 2015 there was continued leaking of information that appeared to be designed to undermine the secrecy of ongoing negotiations with Japan. While leaks played a significant role in the reporting of the Attack

class procurement in terms of providing transparency, journalists often focused on the political dimensions of leaks rather than their substantive content. As such, leaks functioned to further politicise the Attack class procurement and reframe the process as being inseparable from the ongoing leadership instability.

## 10.6—Representing 'the Enemy' in News Discourses of Procurement

As discussed in Chapter 5, national security journalists played a significant role in reporting of the Attack class as translators and interpreters of complex national security information. Journalists were therefore instrumental in constructing a discursive explanation for the government's decision to undertake a process to design and build a fleet of 12 submarines. In news reporting of the Attack class China was frequently presented as one of the primary reasons for military hardware procurement. News reporters represented China as; a cause of instability and tension in the region; a power that needs to be contained; a military threat that could invade or attack Australia; and as a complication that threatened Japan-Australia relations. As Chapter 7 details, news journalists often problematised China's 'rise', its growing power and influence in the region, and presented China as a source of inevitable conflict with Australia and its Western allies. This discourse of the 'China threat' is used frequently in discussions about the Attack class submarine programme. Despite the regular discussion of China in the context of national security and procurement reporting, journalists rarely quote Chinese sources or academic experts on Australia-China relations as sources of news. News media discourses of China in this context therefore exclude Chinese voices and perspectives. Journalists are, in effect, talking *about* China but not *with* China. The "China threat" is consistently repeated unchallenged and unquestioned throughout the reporting of the Attack class submarines. The implications for this are troubling. Australia's economic and political relationship with China is complex and evolving. Both countries are intimately linked not just economically, but through migration, cultural exchange and shared history. In contemporary Australian society there are also over 1.2 million residents of Chinese ancestry. The construction of China as a hostile "other" (Van Dijk, 2008, p. 105) and the general

exclusion of Chinese voices and perspectives from news reporting may serve to undermine narratives of Chinese-Australian cooperation and coexistence. Thus, the reporting of China in news discourses of the Attack class can arguably by considered undermining of informed public debate.

## 10.7—Rethinking the Professional Ideology of Journalism: The Role of Advocacy in News

The presence of advocacy journalism was significant in the reporting of the Attack class procurement. As outlined in Chapter 9, *The Advertiser* acted as a local advocacy newspaper; amplifying the voices of its community and translating national events through a local perspective. In doing so *The Advertiser* framed the Attack class primarily in terms of local issues such as the jobs crisis and the risk of rising unemployment during the decline of the local shipbuilding industry. Subtle examples of advocacy include the selection and focus on the Attack class as an employment issue, the use of emotive and personalised language, and the overrepresentation of sources advocating for the local construction of the submarines. *The Advertiser* also published numerous op-eds and commentary articles that constituted overt advocacy in favour of building the submarines in Adelaide. News reporting of the procurement process was reflected through us-versus-them discourses that represented South Australia as being in rivalry with wealthier and larger states. As such, the final decision to build the submarines in Adelaide was depicted by journalists as a victory for the state and an example of people power successfully pressuring the Federal Government to adjust defence policy to favour regional assistance. *The Advertiser* presented itself as a voice for its community, an advocate, and signalled that its reporting of issues was aimed at advancing the collective economic and political success of the region. In this sense, the newspaper breaks with the traditional ideology of journalism in favour of a model of news production that directly aims to achieve social change. As Fisher (2016a) argues, advocacy journalism arises from a range of factors including political, economic, organisational, source and journalistic

production factors. *The Advertiser's* advocacy can therefore be interpreted as being a response to discursive practice factors such as limited resources, access to local political and industry sources, and competition with other news outlets. Equally, the newspaper's history as a regional advocate and the economic circumstances of the region also are significant in explaining the approach taken by journalists reporting on the Attack class procurement. As the chapter suggests, the normative conception of news journalism as being antithetical to advocacy does not accurately convey the complexity of contemporary journalistic practice; particularly within the context of local and community-based news organisation. Advocacy has long been a part of *The Advertiser's* institutional identity. With this in mind, future research should consider advocacy not as an aberration within journalism but as a central feature of its discursive fabric.

## 10.8—The Reporting of the Attack Class Influenced Political Decision-Making

In light of previous research into the media's role in the Collins class procurement, this thesis set out to discuss the role that newspaper reporting has in influencing political decision-making on national security policy. Yule and Woolner (2008), Kelton (2004) and Spong (2015), argue that media scrutiny placed pressure on politicians leading to delays and mismanagement of the Collins and subsequent delays in the advancement of the Attack class programme. On the question of whether news reporting was a factor that influenced political decision-making regarding the Attack class, this thesis argues a number of points.

It is likely that news reporting of the Attack class contributed to the political pressure on the Turnbull government to build all twelve submarines in Adelaide. No single factor contributed to the politicisation of the Attack class, but a range of discursive practices and journalistic decisions contributed to the overall media debate. First, local defence industry public relations practitioners and advocates waged a sophisticated campaign to successfully co-opt newspaper reporting of the Attack class to increase the profile and awareness of pro-industry positions. Second, journalists were receptive to PR and advocacy incentives and this is likely due to practical limitations on time and resources for reporting. Third, journalists

from *The Advertiser* for a variety of reasons were already predisposed to an advocacy position in favour of policies that benefited South Australia, and this is evident in their reporting. Fourth, journalists were drawn to political conflict as a news value, and through their reporting the Attack class procurement became enmeshed with the Liberal Party's ongoing leadership contest. Finally, leaks and unauthorised disclosures continuously undermined the government's control of media discourses of the Attack class, which contributed to the failure of the Abbott and Turnbull administrations to establish a clear public mandate and support for their policies.

Whether or not the news reporting of the Attack class submarine influenced the final decision on the design partner is less clear. All three bidding parties invested substantially in public relations campaigns and targeted journalists in order to advance their bid through outside lobbying strategies. As such, during the CEP period public relations discourses came to dominate news reporting of the Attack class. It is possible that the degree of media scrutiny on the programme had a substantial influence on the decision-making process that underpinned the selection of a design partner. As was the case with the Collins, it was found that Navy and political insiders were acutely aware of the publicity implications of their decisions and that this influenced their judgement (Yule and Woolner, 2008). However, the information required to conclude on this is beyond the scope of this inquiry. What can be concluded is that driven by a range of factors the news reporting of the Attack class became deeply politicised, dominated by industry and commercialised discourses, and was used as a political device during a protracted period of infighting within the Liberal Party. This would have likely burdened the final decision with a degree of political and circumstantial weight that might otherwise have not been there.

## 10.9—Addressing the Problems Facing National Security Reporting

The aim of this inquiry was also to explain and interpret the characteristics of newspaper reporting in light of the changing nature of journalism and rising secrecy in both government and military institutions. In the digital media environment journalists are

increasingly asked to do more with less; publish across multiple platforms for news, meet tighter deadlines, and cover issues more broadly than a dedicated beat. As this thesis shows commercial and industry discourses of military procurement were substantial features of the news reporting of the Attack class procurement. This suggests that journalists remain substantially incentivised to use paid advocates as sources of news, resulting in the widespread blending of information news discourses and discourses of commercialisation. This is a problem that needs to be addressed. Government decisions on national security have consequences for all Australians and as such the privileging of the voices of well-resourced and financed industry advocacy campaigns is a disservice to the community. There is a need to establish a funding model for news organisations that provides for public interest journalism that it not distorted by the unequal distribution of wealth in society.

Government and military secrecy was also a factor that influenced the reporting of the Attack class submarine procurement. Most notably this could be seen in the absence of ADF voices within the public debate over the submarines. As Nicholson (2019) argues, the ongoing limitation of Defence-media relations and the transfer of control of Defence communication to politicians and political staffers reduces the ADF's capacity to publicly advocate for its own interests. Additionally, increasing surveillance and restrictions on whistleblower journalism have created a counterproductive environment for public debate. As this thesis has shown leaks continue to happen, but they are primarily political in form and consequences and do not provide genuine transparency over government decision-making processes. The function of rising secrecy has thus been to centralise control of information about national security policy into the hands of a limited number of politicians and staffers, who use its release primarily for strategic communication purposes. The politicisation of the Attack class in media discourses was due to a range of factors; but its use as a political wedge throughout the ongoing leadership dispute in the Liberal Party in 2015 was a significant contributor. Future governments need to be more open about their approach to defence procurement policy and the ADF must be brought into that communication process. The politicisation of national security issues and the continued use of leaked defence information

to undermine political opponents is of no benefit to the Australian public. Furthermore, as Brendan Nicholson (2019) states, the progressive tightening of restrictions on the ADF's public facing communication has made informative journalistic coverage of procurement issues more difficult:

> This makes it much harder for journalists to do their job. Under deadline pressure, they'll find other ways to get information. Editors, seeing delays as unnecessary, bureaucratic and political, will opt to run a story without a Defence response if the response doesn't arrive in time. If the story is inaccurate then the damage has been done. *If forced to operate in an information vacuum, the media will find something to fill it.* Those stories won't necessarily come from smart and well-informed generals, admirals, air marshals or departmental secretaries. Some will be accurate and painstakingly assembled by conscientious journalists. Others will come from aggrieved personnel or from someone who thinks they overheard something on a bus (paras. 19-20, emphasis added).

As this thesis demonstrates, when confronted with an information vacuum, journalists are often pressured to resort to political, public relations and industry sources of news. The consequences of this are manifest in the reporting of the Attack class procurement. A constellation of small compromises has resulted in a public debate over a national security issue becoming dominated by politicisation, discourses of conflict and the voices of commercialisation and military industry. As a consequence, news discourses of submarine procurement in Australia continue to be characterised by scandal and political embarrassment.

## 10.10—Limitations of this Thesis and Proposed Future Research

Critical Discourse Analysis can provide a great deal of insight through the exploration of texts and documents relating to an issue. The main limitation of this research is that it was not able to fully explore the discursive practices relating to national security

journalism from the perspectives of journalists working in that field. Because this research design focused mainly on the interpretation and explanation of discursive features in texts it can only observe the final product of journalistic practices and not the full process. To assist in this analysis scholarly research was reviewed that explored the processes by which Australian national security journalists gather sources and information to produce news articles. However, there are limitations to this. The bulk of such scholarship has focused on conflict reporting. The practices of journalists reporting on war in conflict zones are likely to be substantially different to those working in domestic newsrooms reporting on procurement and capabilities news. There is currently limited research that has examined the journalistic practices of defence reporters in Australia that focuses on their industry and procurement reporting. The findings of this thesis could be clarified by further research that includes the interviewing of national security journalists. More work is needed to better understand the pressures journalists face in their reporting of secretive defence and national security issues.

The second limitation relates to the application of Critical Discourse Analysis. CDA was selected as a robust approach to textual analysis that explores the historic, social and political contexts in which texts and produced and received. However, its proponents advocate that CDA should not simply interpret and explain the existing orders of discourse and how they perpetuate social inequality. As Caldas-Coulthard and Coulthard (2003) state:

> Critical Discourse Analysis is essentially political in intent with its practitioners acting upon the world in order to transform it and thereby help create a world where people are not discriminated against because of sex, colour, creed, age or social class (p. xi).

CDA asks its practitioners to think consciously about the society that they live in and consider the capacity for their research to effect change in the world. The application of this to the topic of national security reporting is complex. As this thesis has discussed, there are a multitude of factors that influenced the reporting of the Attack class; the crisis in journalism, rising secrecy in defence and government, the Abbott-Turnbull leadership contest, the history of the Collins class, the existence of a well-resourced defence industry with PR and advocacy goals, *The*

*Advertiser's* history as an advocacy newspaper, the decline of the manufacturing industry in South Australia, and so on. Power in this context is diffuse; and in some circumstances unseen or concealed by national security legislation. The limitation on CDA in this context is that even through a substantive investigation and exploration of the issue, the path forward remains unclear. If CDA advocates that researchers should aim to "transform" society, they must also consider what that process of transformation looks like. However, as Peter Leahy (2016) asked: "Do we even have an answer to the question, what does victory look like?" (p. 85). Resolving the issues currently facing journalism in Australia will not be easy.

This chapter has overviewed the findings of this doctoral research, concluding that newspaper reporting of the Attack class procurement drew from and was connected to broader discourses of power, secrecy and social change in Australian society. The aim was to provide a substantive analysis of Australian newspaper reporting of the Attack class submarine procurement in the context of the changing nature of journalism and rising secrecy in government and military institutions. It further set out to explore the political features of news reporting of the Attack class and discuss the role that reporting played in influencing government decision-making through the adoption and shaping of discourses. The findings conclude that news discourses of the Attack class were a blend of information, political and commercialised discourses, and that these had significant implications for the way discourses of power and secrecy were deliberated on in Australia. News discourses of the Attack class procurement became entangled with ongoing discourses of the Liberal Party of Australia's leadership crisis, South Australia's growing unemployment, strategic alliances between Western powers and the emerging 'China threat'. A small group of national security journalists were responsible for the majority of reporting; and as such the discursive practice of beat reporting was influential in the reporting of the programme. Procurement discourse was greatly influenced by leaks, ongoing political conflict, politicised reporting, public relations and advocacy discourses. A range of factors: political, geographic, economic and institutional, all influenced the discursive practices of journalists reporting on the issue. News reporting of the Attack class represented it primarily in political terms and in doing so the

submarines became inextricably linked to discourses of the ongoing Liberal Party leadership contest. It was also linked to broader discourses of Australia's relationship to China, and in this context, it was linked to discourses of China's rise as an economic, military and strategic threat to Australia and its interests. In reporting by *The Advertiser,* the Attack class was combined with local advocacy journalism and as such was combined with discourses of South Australia's economic decline, unemployment and the need for industry assistance. And in industry discourses the construction of the Attack class was characterised as a national endeavour, with industry companies positioning themselves as part of Australia's sovereign defence. This thesis concludes that the politicisation of the Attack class is a response to structural influences within the changing news media environment, including the financial decline of news media organisations, increasing government secrecy and pressure from a well-resourced public relations industry. Over the course of three years, news reporting the Attack class submarines constituted a story of military procurement in the digital age. The journalistic work of reporting on the Attack class submarine will continue for many years and will continue to be historically and contextually situated in discourses of power and secrecy. History will determine whether the Attack class submarine will be remembered as a success, or as yet another 'dud sub'.

## References

Aalberg, T., Blekesaune, A. and Elvestad, E. (2013). Media choice and informed democracy: Toward increasing news consumption gaps in Europe? *The International Journal of Press/Politics, 18*(3), 281-303.

Aalberg, T., Strömbäck, J. and De Vreese, C. H. (2011). The framing of politics as strategy and game: A review of concepts, operationalizations and key findings. *Journalism, 13*(2), 162-178.

Abb, P. and Koellner, P. (2015). Foreign policy think tanks in China and Japan: Characteristics, current profile, and the case of collective self-defence. *International Journal, 70*(4), 593-612.

Ahmed, J. and Hussain, S. (2016). Coverage of Pakistan general election 2008 in leading Pakistan English newspapers: Exploring agenda setting. *Global Media Journal: Pakistan Edition, 9*(2), 1-16.

Ahva, L. (2012). Public journalism and professional reflexivity. *Journalism, 14*(6), 790-806.

Algan, Y., Papaioanou, E., Guriev S. and Passari, E. (2017). The European trust crisis and the rise of populism. *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall*, p. 309-400.

Alkaff, S. N. H. and McLellan, J. (2018). 'Stranger in the dark': A comparative analysis of the reporting of rape cases against minors in Malay and English newspapers in Brunei and Malaysia. *GEMA Online Journal of Language Studies, 18*(3), 17-34.

Allern, S. and Pollack, E. (2017). Journalism as a public good: A Scandinavian perspective. *Journalism,* OnlineFirst, 1-17.

Althaus, S. L., Edy, J. A., Entman, R. M. and Phalen, P. (1996). Revisiting the indexing hypothesis: Officials, media, and the Libya crisis. *Political Communication, 13*(4), 407-421.

Althusser, L. (2004). Ideology and ideological state apparatuses. In J. Rivkin & M. Ryan (Eds.), *Literary Theory: An Anthology* (2nd ed.) (pp. 693-702). Maiden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Anderson, F. and Trembath, R. (2011). *Witnesses to war: The history of Australian conflict reporting.* Carlton, Vic: Melbourne University Press.

An open letter from concerned scholars of China. (2018). Asia & The Pacific Policy Society. Retrieved on May 20, 2019 from https://www.policyforum.net/an-open-letter-from-concerned-scholars-of-china-and-the-chinese-diaspora/

Anstead, N. and Chadwick, A. (2018). A primary definer online: The construction and propagation of a think tank's authority on social media. *Media, Culture & Society, 40*(2), 246-266.

AppNexus. (2018). The digital advertising stats you need for 2018. Retrieved on May 12, 2019, from https://www.appnexus.com/blog/digital-advertising-stats-you-need-2018

ASPI. (2019). *Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Annual Report 2018-2019*. Canberra, ACT: Author.

Assimakopoulos, S., Baider, F. H. and Millar, S. (2017). Analysis of online comments to news reports. In *Online Hate Speech in the European Union*: *A discourse analytic perspective*. SpringerBriefs in Linguistics. Springer, Cham.

Atal, M. R. (2018). The cultural and economic power of advertisers in the business press. *Journalism, 19*(8), 1078-1095.

Aulich, C. and O'Flynn, J. (2007). From public to private: The Australian experience of privatisation. *The Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration, 29*(2), 153-171.

Australian Bureau of Statistics (2018). ABS reveals insights into Australia's Chinese population on Chinese New Year. Retrieved on 21 May, 2019 from https://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/mediareleasesbytitle/D8CAE4F74B82D446CA258235000F2BDE?OpenDocument

Australian Made Defence. (2015). Australia's defence industry has the workforce and skills to build our fleets [online]. Archived version: https://web.archive.org/web/20160529121308/http://australianmadedefence.com.au/

Australian National Audit Office. (2014). *Air Warfare Destroyer Program: Progress Report.* Canberra: ACT: Author.

Bakhtin, M. (2001). From Marxism and the Philosophy of Language. In P. Bizzell & B. Herzberg (Eds.), *The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present* (pp. 1206-1210). Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin's.

Bartholomé, G., Lecheler, S. and De Vreese, C. (2015). Towards a typology of conflict frames.: Substantiveness and interventionalism in political conflict news. *Journalism Studies, 19*(12), 1689-1711.

Bednarek, M. (2006). *Evaluation in media discourse: Analysis of a newspaper corpus.* New York, NY: Continuum.

Bell, E., Owen, T., Khorana, S. and Henrichsen, J. R. (2017). *Journalism after Snowden: The future of the free press in the surveillance state.* New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Benkler, Y. (2013). Wikileaks and the networked fourth estate. In B. Brevini, A. Hintz & P. McCurdy (Eds.), *Beyond Wikileaks: Implications for the future of communications, journalism and society* (pp. 11-34). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bennett, W. L. (1990). Towards a theory of press-state relations in the United States. *Journal of Communication, 40*(2), 103-125.

Bennett, W. L. (1996). An introduction to journalism norms and representations of politics. *Political Communication, 13*(4), 373-384.

Bennett, W. L., Lawrence, R. G. and Livingston, S. (2006). None dare call it torture: Indexing and the limits of press independence in the Abu Ghraib scandal. *Journal of Communication, 56*(3), 467-485.

Benson, R. (2018). Can foundations solve the journalism crisis? *Journalism*, *19*(8), 1059-1077.

Bergan, D. E. (2009). Does grassroots lobbying work? *American Politics Research, 37*(2), 327-352.

Berkowitz, D. (2009) Reporters and their sources. In K. Wahl-Jorgensen & T. Hanitzsch (Eds.), *The handbook of journalism studies* (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Routledge.

Berkowitz, D. and TerKeurst, J. V. (1999). Community as interpretive community: Rethinking the journalist-source relationship. *Journal of Communication, 49*(3), 125-136.

Besley, T. and Prat, A. (2006). Handcuffs for the grabbing hand? Media capture and government accountability. *The American Economic Review, 96*(3), 720-736.

Binderkrantz, A. (2005). Interest group strategies: Navigating between privileged access and strategies of pressure. *Political Studies, 53*, 694-715.

Bisley, N. and Envall, H. D. P. (2016). The morning after: Australia, Japan and the submarine deal that wasn't. *Asia Pacific Bulletin, 346,* June 7.

Bizzell, P. and Herzberg, B. (2001). *The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present*. Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin's.

Blasco-Duatis, M., Saez, M. and García, N. F. (2018). Compositional representation (CoDa) of the agenda-setting of the political opinion makers in the main Spanish media groups in the 2015 general election. *Communication & Society, 31*(2), 1-24.

Blumler, J. G, and Cushion, S. (2014). Normative perspectives on journalism studies; Stocktaking and future directions. *Journalism, 15*(3), 259-272.

Blumler, J. G. and Gurevitch, M. (1995). *The Crisis of Public Communication.* New York, NY: Routledge.

Boeyink, D. E. (1990). Anonymous sources in news stories: Justifying exceptions and limiting abuses. *Journal of Mass Media Ethics, 5*(4), 233-246.

Bowd, K. (2003). How different is 'different'? Australian country newspapers and development journalism. *Asia Pacific Media Educator*, *14*(9), 117-130.

Bowd, K. (2012). Considering the consequences: Australian country newspapers and news impact on communities. *Rural Society, 21*(2), 126-135.

Bowd, K. (2017). Keeping it local: News themes on regional newspaper front pages. *Australian Journalism Review*, *38*(1), 63-75.

Boykoff, M. T. (2008). The cultural politics of climate change discourse in UK tabloids. *Political Geography, 27*, 549-569.

Breeze, R. (2011). Critical discourse analysis and its critics. *International Pragmatics Association, 21*(4), 493-525.

Broersma, M. (2010). The unbearable limitations of journalism: On press critique and journalism's claim to truth. *The International Communication Gazette, 72*(1), 21-33.

Broomfield, E. V. (2003). Perceptions of danger: The China threat theory. *Journal of Contemporary China, 12*(35), 265-284.

Bruckner, T. (2019). Navigating the grey zones of third-party lobbying via non-profits: Transparify's experiences with think tanks and fake news. In D. Dialer and M. Richter (Eds.), *Lobbying in the European Union: Strategies, Dynamics and Trends.* Switzerland: Springer Nature.

Bruycker, I. and Beyers, J. (2015). Balanced or biased? Interest groups and legislative lobbying in the European news media. *Political Communication, 32*(3), 453-474.

Brüggemann, M., Keel, G., Hanitzsch, T., Götzenbrucker, G. and Schacht, L. (2017). Diverging worlds of foreign correspondence: The changing working conditions of correspondents in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. *Journalism, 18*(5), 539-557.

Cacciatore, M. A., Scheufele, D. A. and Iyengar, S. (2016). The end of framing as we know it… and the future of media effects. *Mass Communication and Society, 19*(1), 7-23.

Caldas-Coulthard, C. R. and Coulthard, M. (2003). *Texts and practices: Readings in critical discourse analysis.* New York, NY: Routledge.

Cahill, D. and Beder, S. (2005). Neo-liberal think tanks and neo-liberal restructuring: Learning the lessons from project Victoria and the privatisation of Victoria's electricity industry. *Social Alternatives, 24*(1), 43-48.

Callison, C. (2004). The good, the bad, and the ugly: Perceptions of public relations practitioners. *Journal of Public Relations Research, 16*(4), 371-389.

Callison, C., Merle, P. F. and Seltzer, T. (2014). Smart friendly liars: Public perception of public relations practitioners over time. *Public Relations Review, 40*(5), 829-831.

Carey, J. W. (2007). A short history of journalism for journalists: A proposal and essay. *Press/Politics, 12*(3), 3-16.

Carlson, M. (2011). *On the condition of anonymity: Unnamed sources and the battle for journalism.* Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Carlson, M. (2015). When news sites go native: Redefining the advertising-editorial divide in response to native advertising. *Journalism, 16*(7), 849-865.

Carlyle, T. (2008). *Heroes and hero worship* [online]. Project Gutenberg. Retrieved on March 12, 2019 from https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1091/1091-h/1091-h.htm

Carvalho, A. (2008). Media(ted) discourse and society. *Journalism Studies, 9*(2), 161-177.

Castells, M. (2012). *Networks of outrage and hope: Social movements in the internet age.* Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Chadwick, A. (2017). *The hybrid media system: Politics and power.* New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Chadwick, A. and Stanyer, J. (2010). Political communication in transition: Mediated politics in Britain's new media environment. APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper. Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1642858

Chang, T. (1988). The news and U.S.-China policy: Symbols in newspapers and documents. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 65*(2), 320-327.

Charland, M. (1987). Constitutive rhetoric: The case of the people Québécois. *The Quarterly Journal of Speech, 73*(2), 133-150.

Chen, S. (2019, July 1). Can a new graphene coating save the Chinese military from rusting away in the South China Sea? *South China Morning Post,* [online]. Retrieved on October 22, 2019 from https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3016480/can-new-graphene-coating-save-chinese-military-rusting-away

Christians, C. G., Glasser, T. L., McQuail, D., Nordenstreng, K. and White, R. A. (2009). *Normative Theories of the Media: Journalism in Democratic Societies.* Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press.

City of Adelaide. (2018). City of Adelaide Unemployment. Retrieved on March 12, 2016, from https://economy.id.com.au/adelaide/unemployment

Cluverius, J. (2017). How the flattened costs of grassroots lobbying affect legislator responsiveness. *Political Research Quarterly, 70*(2), 279-290.

Cocking, J., Davis, C. and Norwood, C. (2016). *Australia's requirement for submarines.* Canberra, ACT: Defence Science and Technology Group, Department of Defence.

Coleman, R., McCombs, M., Shaw, D. and Weaver, D. (2009). Agenda setting. In K. Wahl-Jorgensen & T. Hanitzsch (Eds.), *The handbook of journalism studies* (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Routledge.

Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates. House of Representatives. 25 November, 2014. 9200. https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/chamber/hansards/edf5b96a-d52d-4197-bf93-30e1e6514fbb/toc_pdf/Senate_2014_11_25_3083_Official.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22chamber/hansards/edf5b96a-d52d-4197-bf93-30e1e6514fbb/0000%22

Conway, B. A., Kenski, K. and Wang, D. (2015). The rise of Twitter in the political campaign: Searching for intermedia agenda-setting effects in the presidential primary. *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 20*, 363-380.

Cookes, T. (2013, August 23). Seasprite—The billion-dollar blunder. *SBS News* [online]. Retrieved on March 22, 2019, from https://www.sbs.com.au/news/seasprite-the-billion-dollar-blunder

Corneo, G. (2006). Media capture in a democracy: The role of wealth concentration. *Journal of Public Economics, 90*(1-2), 37-58.

Cunningham, B. (2003). Re-thinking objectivity. *Columbia Journalism Review, 42*(2), 24-32.

Cushion, S., Kilby, A., Thomas, R., Morani, M. and Sambrook, R. (2018). Newspapers, impartiality and television news. *Journalism Studies, 19*(2), 162-181.

Dahlgren, P. (2006). Doing citizenship: The cultural origins of civic agency in the public sphere. *European Journal of Cultural Studies, 9*(3), 267-286.

Daley, P. (1999, February 7). The sub that sank morale. *Sunday Age*, p. 10.

Daley, P. (2018, October 28). The story of us: How the inflated Anzac myth obscures our national identity. *The Guardian* [Online]. Retrieved on 14 February 2019, from https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/oct/28/the-story-of-us-how-the-inflated-anzac-myth-obscures-our-national-identity

Daley, P. (2018, November 12). Australia has reached peak Anzac. And not before time. *The Guardian,* [online]. Retrieved on March 22, 2019, from https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/postcolonial-blog/2018/nov/12/australia-has-reached-peak-anzac-and-not-before-time

Davies, A. (2013). The future submarine project. *Security Challenges, 9*(2), 83-90.

Dellmuth, L. M. and Tallberg, J. (2017). Advocacy strategies in global governance: Inside versus outside lobbying. *Political Studies, 65*(3), 705-723.

Department of Defence. (2009). *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific century: Force 2030.* Canberra, ACT: Author.

Department of Defence. (2012). *Australia in the Asian Century: White Paper October 2012.* Canberra, ACT: Author.

Department of Defence. (2013). *Defence White Paper 2013.* Canberra, ACT: Author.

Department of Defence. (2014). *Defence Issues Paper: 2014.* Canberra, ACT: Author.

Department of Defence. (2016). *2016 Defence White Paper.* Canberra, ACT: Author.

Department of Defence. (2017a). *The CASG business framework: Working together to deliver Defence capability to our customers.* Canberra, ACT: Author.

Department of Defence. (2017b). *Naval Shipbuilding Plan.* Canberra, ACT: Author.

Department of Defence (2018a). Defence Export Strategy – Fact Sheet. Retrieved on June 20, 2018, from http://www.defence.gov.au/Export/Strategy/Default.asp

Department of Defence. (2018b). *Defence Export Strategy.* Canberra, ACT: Author.

Department of Defence. (2018c). *Defence Industry Capability Plan.* Canberra, ACT: Author.

Department of Defence. (2019). A safer Australia – Budget 2019-20 Defence overview. Retrieved June 2, 2019, from https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/cpyne/media-releases/safer-australia-budget-2019-20-defence-overview

Department of Defence Ministers. (2014). Minister for Defence: Transcript, ASPI conference. Retrieved on May 22, 2019, from https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/david-johnston/transcripts/minister-defence-transcript-aspi-conference

Department of Education. (2019). Student numbers. Retrieved on January 29, 2019 from https://internationaleducation.gov.au/research/DataVisualisations/Pages/Student-number.aspx

Department of Foreign Affairs. (2016, February 17). Foreign and Strategic Dialogue Opening Remarks [media release]. Retrieved on March, 22, 2019 from https://foreignminister.gov.au/transcripts/Pages/2016/jb_tr_160217b.aspx?w=tb1CaGpkPX%2FlS0K%2Bg9ZKEg%3D%3D

Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. (2013). *Strong and Secure: A strategy for Australia's national security.* Canberra, ACT: Author.

Deuze, M. (2005). What is journalism? *Journalism, 6*(4), 442-464.

Deuze, M. and Witschge, T. (2017). Beyond journalism: Theorizing the transformation of journalism. *Journalism, 19*(2), 165-181.

De Swert, K. D. and Wouters, R. (2011). The coverage of China in Belgian television news: A case study on the impact of foreign correspondents on news content. *Chinese Journal of Communication, 4*(3), 331-347.

De Vreese, C. H., Esser, F. and Hopmann, D. N. (2017). *Comparing political journalism.* London, UK: Routledge.

De Zwart, M., Humphreys, S. and Van Dissel, B. (2014). Surveillance, big data and democracy: Lessons for Australia from the US and the UK. *UNSW Law Journal, 37*(2), 713-747.

Diamond, J. M. (2017). The media: Witness to the national security enterprise. In R. Z. George & H. Rishikof (Eds.), *The national security enterprise: Navigating the labyrinth* (2nd ed.) (pp. 353-381). Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

Diehl, T., Barnidge, M. and De Zúñiga, H. G. (2018). Multi-platform news use and political participation across age groups: Towards a valid metric of platform diversity and its effects. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 96*(2), 428-451.

Djerf-Pierre, M. and Shehata, A. (2017). Still an agenda setter: Traditional news media and public opinion during the transition from low to high choice media environments. *Journal of Communication, 67*(5), 733-757.

Doherty, B. (2014, June 16). F-35 Joint Strike Fighter purchase 'a great national scandal' says Coalition MP. *The Sydney Morning Herald,* [online]. Retrieved on March 22, 2019 from https://www.smh.com.au/national/f35-joint-strike-fighter-purchase-a-great-national-scandal-says-coalition-mp-20140616-zs9po.html

Dolata, U. (2017). Apple, Amazon, Google, Facebook, Microsoft: Market concentration, competition, innovation strategies. *Research Contributions to Organisational Sociology and Innovation Studies, SOI Discussion Papers 2017-01*. University of Stuttgart, Institute for Social Sciences, Department of Organisational Sociology and Innovation Studies.

Donoghue, J. and Tranter, B. (2015). The Anzacs: Military influences on Australian identity. *Journal of Sociology, 52*(3), 449-463.

Doran, M. and Belot, H. (2019, July 9). Australian Federal Police accessed journalists' metadata, stoking new media freedom concerns. *ABC News* [online]. Retrieved July 17, 2019 from https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-07-09/afp-access-journalist-metadata-60-times-in-12-months/11290888

Dreyfus, S., Lederman, R., Bosua, R. and Milton, S. (2011) Can we handle the truth? Whistleblowing to the media in the digital age. *Global Media Journal – Australian Edition, 5*(1), 1-6.

Drezner, D. W. (2015). American think tanks in the twenty-first century. *International Journal, 70*(4), 637-644.

Duffy, M. J. (2014). Anonymous sources: A historical review of the norms surrounding their use. *American Journalism, 31*(2), 236-261.

Duffy, M. J. and Williams, A. E. (2011). Use of unnamed sources drops from peak in 1960s and 1970s. *Newspaper Research Journal, 32*(4), 6-21.

Dunn, K. M., Blair, K., Bliuc, A. and Kamp, A. (2018). Land and housing as crucibles of racist nationalism: Asian Australians' experiences. *Geographical Research, 56*(4), 465-478.

Dür, A. and Mateo, G. (2013). Gaining access or going public? Interest group strategies in five European countries. *European Journal of Political Research, 52*, 660-686.

Earl, J. (2009). Information access and protest policing post-9/11. *American Behavioural Scientist, 53*(1), 44-60.

Eberl, J., Boomgaarden, H. G. and Wagner, M. (2017). One bias fits all? Three types of media bias and their effects on party preference. *Communication Research, 44*(8), 1125-1148.

Edgerly, S. and Vraga, E. K. (2017). News, entertainment, or both? Exploring audience perceptions of media genre in a hybrid media environment. *Journalism, 20*(6), 807-826.

Edwards, L. and Pieczka, M. (2013). Public relations and 'its' media: Exploring the role of trade media in the enactment of public relations' professional project. *Public Relations Inquiry, 2*(1), 5-25.

Entman, R. M. (2004). *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Public Policy.* Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

Entman, R. M., Matthes, J. and Pellicano, L. (2009). Nature, sources and effects of news framing. In K. Wahl-Jorgensen & T. Hanitzsch (Eds.), *The handbook of journalism studies* (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Routledge.

Ericson, R. V., Baranek, P. M. and Chan, J. B. J (1989). *Negotiating control: A study of news sources.* Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press.

Evans, R. (2013). Hazing in the ADF: A culture of denial? *Australian Army Journal, 10*(3), 113-127.

Ewart, J. (2014). Local people, local places, local voices and local spaces: How talkback radio in Australia provides hyper-local news through mini-narrative sharing. *Journalism, 15*(6), 790-807.

Ewart, J. and Massey, B. L. (2005). 'Local (people) mean the world to us': Australia's regional newspapers and the 'closer to readers' assumption. *Media International Australia, 115*(1), 94-108.

Fairclough, N. (1992). *Discourse and social change.* Cambridge, UK: Polity.

Falasca, K. (2014). Political news journalism: Mediatization across three news reporting contexts. *European Journal of Communication, 29*(5), 583-597.

Fayle, R. (2015, March 11). Former subs commander: Stop the Spin. *In Daily* [online]. Retrieved on August 20, 2019, from https://indaily.com.au/opinion/2015/03/11/former-subs-commander-stop-the-political-spin/

Fengler, S. and Ruß-Mohl, S. (2008). Journalists and the information-attention markets: Towards an economic theory of journalism. *Journalism, 9*(6), 667-690.

Ferguson, A. (2019, February 27). ATO whistleblower faces six life sentences, roughly the same as Ivan Milat. *The Canberra Times* [online]. Retrieved on February 27 from https://www.canberratimes.com.au/business/small-business/ato-whistleblower-faces-six-life-sentences-roughly-the-same-as-ivan-milat-20190226-p510d2.html

Fernandez, J. M. (2017). Pass the source: Journalism's confidentiality bane in the face of legislative onslaughts. *Asia Pacific Media Educator, 27*(2), 202-218.

Ferrucci, P. (2015). Public journalism no more: The digitally native news non-profit and public service journalism. *Journalism, 16*(7), 904-919.

Fisher, C. (2016a). The advocacy continuum: Towards a theory of advocacy in journalism. *Journalism, 17*(6), 711-726.

Fisher, C. (2016b). Managing conflict of interest: Shifting between political PR and journalism. *Journalism Practice, 10*(3), 373-386.

Fisher, C. (2018). News sources and journalist/source interaction. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Communication.* Published August 31.

Fisher, C., Marshall, D. and McCallum, K. (2018). Bypassing the press gallery: From Howard to Hanson. *Media International Australia, 167*(1), 57-70.

Fitzgerald, J. (2007). *Big White Lie: Chinese Australians in White Australia.* Sydney, Australia: University of New South Wales Press.

Flew, T., Daniel, A. and Spurgeon, C. L. (2010). The promise of computational journalism. In K. McCallum (Ed.), *Media democracy and change: Refereed proceedings of the Australian and New Zealand Communications Association Annual Conference* (pp. 1-19). Australia and New Zealand Communication Association, Canberra, ACT.

Fortunato, J. A. (2000). Public relations strategies for creating mass media content: A case study of the National Basketball Association. *Public Relations Review, 26*(4), 481-497.

Foster, K. (2013). *Don't mention the war: The Australian Defence Force the media and the Afghan conflict.* Melbourne, Australia: Melbourne University Publishing.

Foster, K. and Pallant, J. (2013). Familiarity breeds contempt? What the Australian Defence Force thinks of its coverage in the Australian media and why. *Media International Australia, 148*(1), 22-38.

Foster, K. and Pallant, J. (2016). More connected, less attached: Factors shaping junior ranks' perceptions of the Australian media's coverage of the Australian Defence Force. *Media International Australia, 159*(1), 94-107.

Foster, R. and Nettelbeck, A. (2012). Proclamation Day and the rise and fall of South Australian nationalism. In R. Foster and P. Sendziuk (Eds.), *Turning points: Chapters in South Australian history.* Wakefield, SA: Wakefield Press.

Foucault, M. (2001). From the order of discourse. In P. Bizzell & B. Herzberg (Eds.), *The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present* (pp. 1460-1470). Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin's.

Fowler, R. (2003). On critical linguistics. In C. R. Caldas-Coulthard & M. Coulthard (Eds.), *Texts and practices: readings in critical discourse analysis* (pp. 3-14). New York, NY: Routledge.

Fowler, R., Hodge, B., Kress, G. and Trew, T. (1979). *Language and control.* London, UK: Routledge.

Fozdar, F. (2016). Asian invisibility/Asian threat: Australians talking about Asia. *Journal of Sociology, 52*(4), 789-805.

Fraile, M. (2011). Widening or reducing the knowledge gap? Testing the media effects on political knowledge in Spain (2004-2006). *International Journal of Press/Politics, 16*(2), 163-184.

Fraile, M. and Iyengar, S. (2014). Not all news sources are equally informative: A cross-national analysis of political knowledge in Europe. *International Journal of Press/Politics, 19*(3), 275-294.

Franklin, B. (2014). The future of journalism. *Journalism Studies, 15*(5), 481-499.

Fraussen, B. and Halpin, D. (2017). Think tanks and strategic policy-making: The contribution of think tanks to policy advisory systems. *Policy Sciences, 50*(1), 105-124.

Freeman, J., Hess, K. and Waller, L. (2017). Making inroads: A critical examination of the ABC's commitment to local news. *Media International Australia, 165*(1), 117-130.

Frisch, N., Belair-Gagnon, V. and Agur, C. (2018). Media capture with Chinese characteristics: Changing patterns in Hong Kong's news media system. *Journalism, 19*(8), 1165-1181.

Fulgoni, G. M., Lipsman, A. and Davidsen, C. (2016). The power of political advertising: Lessons for practitioners: How data analytics, social media, and creative strategies shape U.S. presidential election campaigns. *Journal of Advertising Research,* September 2016, 239-244.

Gans, H. J. (1980). *Deciding what's news: A study of CBS evening news, NBC nightly news, Newsweek and Time.* New York, NY: Vintage.

Garcia, S. and Scopelianos, S. (2016, August 26). Submarine timeline: Looking back at promises and policy regarding Australia's next fleet. *ABC News* [online]. Retrieved on December 21, 2019 from https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-04/submarine-timeline-looking-back-at-promises-and-policy/6672206

Gepp, C. G. and Haigh, A. E. (1914). *A Latin-English dictionary.* London, UK: Longmans, Green, and Co.

Gibson, R. K. and McAllister, I. (2015). New media, elections and the political knowledge gap in Australia. *Journal of Sociology, 51*(2), 337-353.

Gittings, J. (2007). A historical view of Western reporting on China. *China Media Research, 3*(1),

Given, J. (2014). Regulating radio speech: The rise, fall and diffusion of influence. *Australian Journalism Review, 36*(2), 91-102.

Gladney, G. A., Shapiro, I. and Ray, R. (2013). Reasons for veiled sources spike after 2004 scandals. *Newspaper Research Journal, 34*(2), 61-64.

Glasser, T. L. and Craft, S. (1996). Public journalism and the prospects for press accountability. *Journal of Mass Media Ethics, 11*(3), 152-158.

Glasser, T. L., Awad, I. and Kim, J. W. (2009). The claims of multiculturalism and journalism's promise of diversity. *Journal of Communication, 59*(1), 57-78.

Glasser, T. L. and Ettema, J. S. (1989). Investigative journalism and the moral order. *Critical Studies in Mass Communication, 6*(1), 1-20.

Glasser, T. L. and Ettema, J. S. (2008). Ethics and eloquence in journalism: An approach to press accountability. *Journalism Studies, 9*(4), 512-534.

Glasser, T. L., Varma, A. and Zou, S. (2019). Native advertising and the cultivation of counterfeit news. *Journalism, 20*(1), 150-153.

Goodrum, A. A., Godo, E. and Hayter, A. (2011). Canadian media coverage of Chinese news: A cross-platform comparison at the national, local, and hyper-local levels. *Chinese Journal of Communication, 4*(3), 311-330.

Graber, D. A. and Dunaway, J. (2017). *Mass media and American politics* (10th ed.). Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Grattan, M. (2017, April 26). Abdel-Magied Anzac row is a storm over not much. *The Conversation* [online]. Retrieved on 20 July, 2018 from https://theconversation.com/abdel-magied-anzac-row-is-a-storm-over-not-much-76708

Graziano, P. R. and Percoco, M. (2017). Agenda setting and the political economy of fear: How crime news influences voters' beliefs. *International Political Science Review, 38*(5), 520-533.

Green, A. (2018, March 20). How many seats did John Howard lose at the 1998 GST election? *ABC News* [online]. Retrieved on 10 March, 2019, from https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-02-04/how-many-seats-did-john-howard-lose-at-the-1998-gst-election/9388732

Greene, G. (1998, June 3). Minister slams defence force. *The Age,* p. 5.

Greene, A. (2015, May 9). Companies building multi-million-dollar warships feared defects would damage their reputations, leaked documents show. *ABC News* [online]. Retrieved on 12 March 2018 from https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-05-09/leaked-documents-reveal-further-problems-with-awd-program/6456848

Gries, P. H. (2005). Social psychology and the identity-conflict debate: Is a 'China threat' inevitable? *European Journal of International Relations, 11*(2), 235-265.

Guo, L. and Vargo, C. J. (2017). Global intermedia agenda setting: A big data analysis of international news flow. *Journal of Communication, 67*(4), 499-520.

Gurevitch, M. and Blumler, J. G. (2000). Political communication systems and democratic values. In J. Lichtenberg [Ed.], *Democracy and the Mass Media.* Sydney, Australia: Cambridge University Press.

Gurran, N. and Phibbs, P. (2015). Are governments really interested in fixing the housing problem? Policy capture and busy work in Australia. *Housing Studies, 30*(5), 711-729.

Gyngell, A. (2016). The rumble of think tanks: National security and public policy contestability in Australia. In D. Marston & T. Leahy (Eds.), *War, Strategy and History: Essays in Honour of Professor Robert O'Neil* (pp. 265-283). Canberra, ACT: ANU Press.

Haas, T. and Steiner, L. (2001). Public journalism as a journalism of publics. *Journalism, 2*(2), 123-147.

Habermas, J. (1989). *The structural transformation of the public sphere.* Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Habiba, P. (2017). The Australian Defence Force Academy Skype sex scandal: Understanding the implications of containment. *Armed Forces & Society, 43*(2), 300-321.

Haig, E. (2004). Some observations on the critique of critical discourse analysis. *Studies in Language and Culture, 25*(2), 129-149.

Hall, S. (1985). Signification, representation, ideology: Althusser and the post-structuralist debates. *Critical Studies in Mass Communication, 2*(2), 91-114.

Halliday, M. A. K. (1978) *Language as Social Semiotic: The social interpretation of language and meaning.* London, UK: Edward Arnold.

Halliday, M. A. K. (1985). *Introduction to Functional Grammar.* London, UK: Edward Arnold.

Hallin, D. C. (1984). The media, the war in Vietnam, and political support: A critique of the thesis of an oppositional media. *The Journal of Politics, 46*(1), 2-24.

Hallin, D. C., Manoff, R. K. and Weddle, J. K. (1993). Sourcing patterns of national security reporters. *Journalism Quarterly, 70*(4), 753-766.

Halpin, D. and Warhurst, J. (2015). Commercial lobbying in Australia: Exploring the Australian Lobbying Register. *Australian Journal of Public Administration, 75*(1), 100-111.

Hammersly, M. (1997). On the foundations of critical discourse analysis. *Language & Communication, 17*(3), 237-248.

Hanegraaff, M., Beyers, J. and De Bruycker, I. (2016). Balancing inside and outside lobbying: The political strategies of lobbyists at global diplomatic conferences. *European Journal of Political Research, 55*(3), 568-588.

Hanitzsch, T. and Mellado, C. (2011). What Shapes the News around the World? How Journalists in Eighteen Countries Perceive Influences on Their Work. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, *16*(3), 404–426.

Hanitzsch, T., Hanusch, F., Ramaprasad, J. and de Beer, A. (2019). *Worlds of journalism: Journalistic cultures around the globe.* New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Hanusch, F. (2017). Web analytics and the functional differentiation of journalism cultures: Individual, organisational and platform-specific influences on newswork. *Information, Communication & Society, 20*(10), 1571-1586.

Hanusch, F. and Bruns, A. (2017). Journalistic branding on Twitter. *Digital Journalism, 5*(1), 26-43.

Harder, R. A., Sevenans, J. and Van Aelst, P. (2017). Intermedia agenda setting in the social media age: How traditional players dominate the news agenda in election times. *The International Journal of Press/Politics, 22*(3), 275-293.

Hart, P. and Vromen, A. (2008). A new era for think tanks in public policy? International trends, Australian realities. *The Australian Journal of Public Administration, 67*(2), 135-148.

Harwood, W. G. (2017). Secrecy, transparency and government whistleblowing. *Philosophy and Social Criticism, 43*(2), 164-186.

Hayes, D. and Guardino, M. (2010). Whose views made the news? Media coverage and the march to war in Iraq. *Political Communication, 27*(1), 59-87.

Hecht, D., Martin, F., Donnelly, T., Larson, M. and Sweetser, K. D. (2017). Will you run it? A gatekeeping experiment examining credibility, branding, and affiliation within information subsidies. *Public Relations Review, 43*(4), 738-749.

Hepp, A. (2016). Pioneer communities: Collective actors in deep mediatisation. *Media, Culture & Society, 38*(6), 918-933.

Hepp, A., Hjarvard, S. and Lundby, K. (2015). Mediatisation: Theorising the interplay between media, culture and society. *Media, Culture & Society, 37*(2), 314-324.

Herman, E. S. and Chomsky, N. (1998). *Manufacturing consent.* New York, NY: Pantheon.

Hess, K. and Bowd, K. (2015). Friend or foe? Regional newspapers and the power of Facebook. *Media International Australia, 156*(1), 19-28.

Hess, K. and Waller, L. (2014). Geo-social journalism. *Journalism Practice, 8*(2), 121-136.

Hess, K. and Waller, L. (2017). *Local journalism in a digital world.* New York, NY: Palgrave.

Hibbert, Z. and Hannah, M. (2006). The chain of command model: A case study of one organisation's journey to re-value public affairs. In C. Anyanwu (Ed.), *Empowerment, Creativity and Innovation: Challenging Media and Communication in the 21st Century* (pp. 1-12). Adelaide, Australia: ANZCA & University of Adelaide.

Hibbert, Z. and Simmons, P. (2006). War reporting and Australian defence public relations, an exchange. *Prism, 4*(2), 1-10.

Hibbert, Z. and Starr, A. (2004). Conflict communication management: Why Australians didn't see their troops in Iraq. *Media International Australia, 113,* 66-74.

Hillebrand, C. (2012). The role of news media in intelligence oversight. *Intelligence and National Security, 27*(5), 689-706.

Hilvert, J. (1984). *Blue pencil warriors: Censorship and propaganda in World War II.* St Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press.

Hindman, E. B. and Thomas, R. (2014). When old and new media collide: The case of Wikileaks. *New Media & Society, 16*(4), 541-558.

Hinz, J. (2018). ADM's top 40 Defence contractors 2017. *Australian Defence Magazine* [online], 8 January. Retrieved on March 25, 2018, from

http://www.australiandefence.com.au/top-40/adm-s-top-40-defence-contractors-2017

Hjarvard, S. (2008). The mediatisation of society: A theory of the media as agents of social and cultural change. *Nordicom Review, 29*(2), 105-134.

Hjarvard, S. (2013). *The mediatisation of culture and society.* New York, NY: Routledge.

Hobbs, M. and Swiatek, L. (2019). Public relations and lobbying: Influencing politics and policy. In M. J. Sheehan (Eds.). *Advocates and Persuaders*. North Melbourne, VIC: Australian Scholarly Publishing.

Hoffman, L. H. (2012). When the world outside gets inside your head: The effects of media context on perceptions of public opinion. *Communication Research, 40*(4), 463-485.

Hogan, J., Murphy, G. and Chari, R. (2011). Regulating the influence game in Australia. *Australian Journal of Politics and History, 57*(1), 102-113.

Hujanen, J. (2018). Renegotiating the journalism profession in the era of social media: Journalism students from the global north and south. *Journalism & Mass Communication Educator, 73*(3), 282-292.

Humphreys, S. and De Zwart, M. (2017). Data retention, journalist freedoms and whistleblowers. *Media International Australia, 165*(1), 103-116.

Hunter, A. (2015). Crowdfunding independent and freelance journalism: Negotiating journalistic norms of autonomy and objectivity. *New Media, & Society, 17*(2), 272-288.

Hutchens, G. (2017, December 14). Turnbull declares 'jobs and growth' a reality as employment surges. *The Guardian,* [online]. Retrieved on October 20, 2018, from https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/dec/14/turnbull-declares-jobs-and-growth-a-reality-as-employment-surges

Isocrates. (2001). Antidosis. In P. Bizzell & B. Herzberg (Eds.), *The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present* (pp. 75-79). Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin's.

Iversen, M. H. and Knudsen, E. (2017). When politicians go native: The consequences of political native advertising for citizens' trust in news. *Journalism, 20*(7), 961-78.

Iyengar, S. (1990). Framing responsibility for political issues: The case of poverty. *Political Behaviour, 12*(1), 19-40.

Iyengar, S. and Kinder, D. R. (1987). *News that matters: Television and American opinion*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Jacobs, K. (2015). The 'politics' of Australian housing: The role of lobbyists and their influence in shaping policy. *Housing Studies, 30*(5), 694-710.

Jain, P. and McCarthy, G. (2016). Between centrality and anxiety: China in Australia. *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, 1*(3), 244-259.

Jericho, G. (2012). *The rise of the fifth estate: Social media and blogging in Australian politics*. Brunswick, VIC: Scribe Publications.

Jericho, G. (2018). The jobs boom continues – but not for everyone. *The Guardian* [online], April 10. Retrieved on March 22, 2019 from https://www.theguardian.com/business/grogonomics/2018/apr/10/the-jobs-boom-continues-but-not-for-everyone

Joye, S. (2009). The hierarchy of global suffering. *Journal of International Communication, 15*(2), 45-61.

Junankar, P. N., Paul, S. and Yasmeen, W. (2010). Are Asian migrants discriminated against in the labour market? A case study of Australia. *The Singapore Economic Review, 55*(4), 619-646.

Kalogeropoulos, A., Svensson, H. M., Van Dalen, A., De Vreese, C. and Albæk, E. (2015). Are watchdogs doing their business? Media coverage of economic news. *Journalism 16*(8), 993-1009.

Kassam, N. (2019). *Lowy Institute Poll 2019: Understanding Australian attitudes to the world.* Sydney, NSW: Lowy Institute.

Kaye, J. and Quinn, S. (2010). *Funding journalism in the digital age: Business models, strategies, issues and trends.* New York, NY: Peter Lang.

Keane, D. (2018, December 13). Future submarines renamed 'Attack class' but concerns remain about project rollout. *ABC News* [online]. Retrieved on May 12, 2019 from https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-12-13/future-naval-submarines-renamed-attack-class/10614876

Kelly, J., Donegan, P., Chisholm, C. and Oberklaid, M. (2014). *Mapping Australia's economy: Cities as engines of prosperity.* Melbourne, VIC: Grattan Institute.

Kelsey, D. (2013). The myth of the "Blitz spirit" in British newspaper responses to the July 7th bombings. *Social Semiotics, 23*(1), 83-99.

Kelton, M. (2004). *New depths in Australia-US relations: The Collins class submarine project.* Bedford Park, South Australia: School of Political and International Studies, Flinders University.

Khadem, N. (2019, March 6). Blowing the whistle on the Australian Taxation Office could land this man in jail. *ABC News* [Online]. Retrieved May 10, 2019 from https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-06/ato-whistleblower-faces-161-years-prison-possibility/10872350

Kim, K. H. (2014). Examining US news media discourses about North Korea: A corpus-based critical discourse analysis. *Discourse & Society, 25*(2), 221-244.

Kim, S. J. (2016). A repertoire approach to cross-platform media use and behaviour. *New Media & Society, 18*(3), 353-372.

Kimball, M. B. (2011). Granting sources anonymity requires complex process. *Newspaper Research Journal, 32*(2), 36-49.

Kiousis, S., Strömbäck, J. and McDevitt M. (2015). Influence of issue decision salience on vote choice: Linking agenda setting, priming, and issue ownership. *International Journal of Communication, 9*(1), 3347-3368.

Kitis, E. D., Milani, T. M. and Levon, E. (2018). 'Black diamonds', 'clever blacks' and other metaphors: Constructing the black middle class in contemporary South African print media. *Discourse & Communication, 12*(2), 149-170.

Kleemans, M., Schaap, G. and Hermans, L. (2015). Citizen sources in the news: Above and beyond the vox pop? *Journalism, 18*(4), 464-481.

Knaus, C. (2018, October 18). Coalition hiding criticism to help arms manufacturer a dangerous precedent – auditor. *The Guardian* [online]. Retrieved December 22, 2018, from https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/oct/18/coalition-hiding-criticism-to-help-arms-manufacturer-a-dangerous-precedent-auditor

Knaus, C. (2018, October 22). Coalition supressed auditor's findings that $1.3bn Thales arms deal could have cost half with US. *The Guardian* [online]. Retrieved on December 12, 2018 from https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/oct/22/coalition-suppressed-auditors-finding-that-13bn-thales-arms-deal-could-have-cost-half-with-us

Knaus, C. (2019, March 27). Former judge says delays in Witness K case an 'abandonment' of open and fair justice. *The Guardian,* [online]. Retrieved May 10, 2019, from https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/mar/27/former-judge-delays-witness-k-case-abandonment-open-fair-justice

Knaus, C. and Evershed, N. (2018, September 17). 'In the family': majority of Australia's lobbyists are former political insiders. *The Guardian,* [online]. Retrieved on June 20, 2019 from https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/sep/16/in-the-family-majority-of-australias-lobbyists-are-former-political-insiders

Knowles, L., Worthington, El. And Blumer, C. (2019, June 6). ABC raid: AFP leave Ultimo building with files after hours-long raid over Afghan Files stories. *ABC News* [online]. Retrieved July 17, 2019 from https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-06-05/abc-raided-by-australian-federal-police-afghan-files-stories/11181162

Koch, T., Obermaier, M. and Riesmeyer, C. (2017). Powered by public relations? Mutual perceptions of PR practitioners' bases of power over journalism. *Journalism,* OnlineFirst, 1-17.

Kovach, B. and Rosenstiel, T. (2007). *The elements of journalism: What newspeople should know and the public should expect.* New York, NY: Three Rivers Press.

KPMG. (2019). *Demystifying Chinese investment in Australia.* Sydney, NSW: Author.

Kress, G. (1993). Against arbitrariness: The social production of the sign as a foundational issue in critical discourse analysis. *Discourse & Society, 4*(2), 169-191.

Kress, G. and Hodge, R. (1979). *Language as ideology.* London, UK: Routledge.

Krotz, F. (2007). The meta-process of 'mediatisation' as a conceptual frame. *Global Media and Communication, 3*(3), 256-260.

Ksiazek, T. B., Malthouse, E. C. and Webster, J. G. (2010). News-seekers and avoiders: Exploring patters of total news consumption across media and the relationship to civic participation. *Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 54*(4), 551-568.

Labor would try to trade F-111 (1969, October 15). *The Canberra Times,* p. 12.

Larkin, P. and Uhr, J. (2009). Bipartisanship and bicameralism in Australia's 'War on Terror': Forcing limits on the extension of executive power. *The Journal of Legislative Studies, 15*(2-3), 239-256.

Lasswell, H. D. (2007). *The structure and function of communication in society*. Retrieved from https://pracownik.kul.pl/files/37108/public/Lasswell.pdf

Lasswell, H. D. (2013). *Propaganda Technique in the World War.* Eastford, CT: Martino Publishing.

Lawrence, R. G. and Bennett, W. L. (2000). Civic engagement in the era of big stories. *Political Communication, 17*, 377-382.

Lax, M. (2010). *From controversy to cutting edge: A history of the F-111 in Australian service.* Canberra, ACT: Air Power Development Centre, Department of Defence.

Leahy, P. (2016). Firing line: Correspondence. *Quarterly Essay, 63*. Melbourne, Australia: Schwartz Publishing.

Lee, P. S. N. (2016). The rise of China and its contest for discursive power. *Global Media and China, 1*(1-2), 102-120.

Lee, S. T. and Lin, J. (2017). An integrated approach to public diplomacy and public relations: A five-year analysis of the information subsidies of the United States, China, and Singapore. *International Journal of Strategic Communication, 11*(1), 1-17.

Lepore, J. (2019, January 28). Does journalism have a future? *The New Yorker* [online]. Retrieved on February 20, 2019 from https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/01/28/does-journalism-have-a-future

Letts, S. (2019). Unemployment keeps rising to 5.3 per cent in August. *ABC News* [online]. Retrieved on October 22, 2019, from https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-09-19/unemployment-continues-to-rise-hitting-5.3-per-cent-in-august/11527108

Leung, C. C. M. and Huang, Y. (2007). The paradox of journalistic representation of the other: The case of SARS coverage on China and Vietnam by western-led English-language media in five countries. *Journalism, 8*(6), 675-697.

Lewis, J., Williams, A., and Franklin, B., (2008). A compromised fourth estate? *Journalism Studies, 9*(1), 1-20.

Li, Y. (2019). "It's not discrimination": Chinese migrant workers' perceptions of and reactions to racial microaggressions in Australia. *Sociological Perspectives, 62*(4), 554-571.

Li, Y., Westlund, H. and Liu, Y. (2019). Why some rural areas decline while some other not: An overview of rural evolution in the world. *Journal of Rural Studies, 68, 135-143.*

Lidberg, J. and Muller, D. (2018). *In the name of security: Secrecy, surveillance and journalism.* London, UK: Anthem Press.

Lidberg, J. and Muller, D. (2019). Submission to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security inquiry into the impact of law enforcement and intelligence powers on the freedom of the press. Retrieved on December 11, 2019, from https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Intelligence_and_Security/FreedomofthePress/Submissions?main_0_content_1_RadGrid1ChangePage=2_20

Lim, T., Bali, A. and Moo, M. (2017). New digital realities and old public service broadcasting models—the case of public access and participation in Singapore's televisual landscape. *Media International Australia, 170*(1), 100-114.

Lindell, J. and Hovden, J. F. (2018). Distinctions in the media welfare state: Audience fragmentation in post-egalitarian Sweden. *Media, Culture & Society, 40*(5), 639-655.

Ling, L. G. M. (2013). Worlds beyond Westphalia: Daoist dialectics and the "China threat". *Review of International Studies, 39*(3), 549-568.

Lingard, B. (2016). Think tanks, 'policy experts' and 'ideas for' education policy making in Australia. *The Australian Educational Researcher, 43*(1), 15-33.

Lippmann, W. (1965). *Public Opinion.* New York, NY: Free Press.

Lippmann, W. (1993). *The Phantom Public.* New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Liss, A. (2003). Images of China in the American print media: A survey from 2000 to 2002. *Journal of Contemporary China, 12*(35), 299-318.

Livingston, S. (1997). Clarifying the CNN effect: An examination of media effects according to type of military intervention. *The Joan Shorenstein Center for Press, Politics and Public Policy, Research Paper R-18.* Harvard, CT: Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government.

Lock, I. and Seele, P. (2017). The consequences of astroturf lobbying for trust and authenticity: Findings and implications from an experiment. *Communication Management Review, 2*(1), 30-52.

Lock, I., Seele, P. and Heath, R. L. (2016). Where grass has no roots: The concept of 'shared strategic communication' as an answer to unethical astroturf lobbying. *International Journal of Strategic Communication, 10*(2), 87-100.

Lockyer, A. (2013). The logic of interoperability: Australia's acquisition of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. *International Journal, 68*(1), 71-91.

Logue, J (2010). Rethinking information domination and influence battlespace effects. *Australian Army Journal, 7*(3), 151-168.

Lucas, A. (2018). Revealed: the extent of job-swapping between public servants and fossil fuel lobbyists. *The Conversation* [online], March 5. Retrieved on January 20, 2019 from https://theconversation.com/revealed-the-extent-of-job-swapping-between-public-servants-and-fossil-fuel-lobbyists-88695

Lück, J., Wessler, H., Maia, R. and Wozniak, A. (2018). Journalist-source relations and the deliberative system: A network performance approach to investigating journalism's

contribution to facilitating public deliberation in a globalised world. *The International Communication Gazette, 80*(6), 509-531.

Lupton, R. and Hayes, D. (2017). Think tanks and the pedagogical dispositions and strategies of socially critical researchers: A case study of inequality in schooling. *Policy Futures in Education, 16*(2), 202-216.

Lynch, L. (2010). "We're going to crack the world open": Wikileaks and the future of investigative reporting. *Journalism Practice, 4*(3), 309-318.

Macnamara, J. (2014). Journalism-PR relations revisited: The good news, the band news, and insights into tomorrow's news. *Public Relations Review, 40*(5), 739-750.

Macnamara, J. (2016). The continuing convergence of journalism and PR: New insights for ethical practice from a three-country study of senior practitioners. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 93*(1), 118-141.

Matheson, D. (2005). *Media discourses*. Milton Keynes, UK: Open University Press.

Maddison, S. and Carson, A. (2017). *Civil voices: Researching not-for-profit advocacy*. Melbourne, VIC: University of Melbourne.

Maiden, M. (1997, April 19). Melbourne bid to control key defence assets. *The Age,* p. 1.

Makse, T. (2017). A very particular set of skills: Former legislator traits and revolving door lobbying in congress. *American Politics Research, 45*(5), 866-886.

Manning, P. (2001). *News and news sources: A critical introduction.* London, UK: Sage Publications.

Marti, S. (2018). "The symbol of our nation": The slouch hat, the First World War, and Australian identity. *Journal of Australian Studies, 42*(1), 3-18.

Martin-Kratzer, R. and Thorson, E. (2007). Use of anonymous sources declines in U.S. newspapers. *Newspaper Research Journal, 28*(2), 56-70.

Maurer, P. and Beiler, M. (2018). Networking and political alignment as strategies to control the news: Interaction between journalists and politicians. *Journalism Studies, 19*(14), 2024-2041.

McChesney, R. W. (2008). *The political economy of media: Enduring issues, emerging dilemmas.* New York, NY: NYU Press.

McCombs, M. E. (1993). The evolution of agenda-setting research: Twenty-five years in the marketplace of ideas. *Journal of Communication, 43*(2), 58-67.

McCombs, M. E. and Shaw, D. L. (1972). The agenda-setting function of mass media. *The Public Opinion Quarterly, 36*(2), 176-187.

McCombs, M. E., Shaw, D. L. and Weaver, D. (1997). *Communication and democracy: Exploring the intellectual frontiers of agenda-setting theory*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

McCombs, M. E., Shaw, D. L. and Weaver, D. (2014). New directions in agenda-setting theory and research. *Mass Communication and Society, 17*(6), 781-802.

McCulloch, J. and Tham, J. C. (2015). Secret state, transparent subjects: The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation in the age of terror. *The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 38*(3), 400-415.

McKewon, E. (2012). Talking points ammo: The use of neoliberal think tank fantasy themes to delegitimise scientific knowledge of climate change in Australian newspapers. *Journalism Studies, 13*(2), 277-297.

McKnight, D. (2012). *Rupert Murdoch: An investigation of political power.* Allen & Unwin.

McNair, B. (2000). *Journalism and democracy: An evaluation of the political public sphere.* New York, NY: Routledge.

McNair, B. (2009). Journalism and democracy. In K. Wahl-Jorgensen & T. Hanitzsch (Eds.), *The handbook of journalism studies* (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Routledge.

McNair, B. (2011). *An introduction to political communication* (5th ed.). New York, NY: Routledge.

McNutt, K. and Marchildon, G. (2009). Think tanks and the web: Measuring visibility and influence. *Canadian Public Policy, 35*(2), 219-236.

McPhedran, I. (1998, October 8). US buckets our subs. *The Herald Sun,* p. 7.

McQuail, D. (2006). Media roles in society. In N. Carpentier, P. Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt, K. Nordenstreng, M. Hartmann, P. Vihalemm & B. Cammaerts (Eds.), *Researching media, democracy and participation: The intellectual work of the 2006 European media and communication doctoral summer school.* Tartu, Estonia: Tartu University Press.

MEAA (2019a). *The public's right to know: The MEAA report into the state of press freedom in Australia in 2019.* Redfern, NSW: Media, Entertainment & Arts Alliance.

MEAA (2019b). Media, Entertainment & Arts Alliance: Journalist code of ethics. Retrieved on December 11, 2019, from https://www.meaa.org/meaa-media/code-of-ethics/

Meadows, M. (2013). Putting the citizen back into journalism. *Journalism, 14*(1), 43-60.

Medhurst, T. (2018). Surviving the decline of local papers. *The Standard* [online]. Retrieved, May 22, 2019, from http://www.theswinstandard.net/2018/01/10/the-death-of-local-news/

Mendes, P. (2003). Australian neoliberal think tanks and the backlash against the welfare state. *Journal of Australian Political Economy, 51,* 29-56.

Meyer, M. (2001). Between theory, method, and politics: Positioning of the approaches to CDA. In R. Wodak & M. Meyer (Eds.), *Methods of critical discourse analysis* (pp. 14-31). London, UK: Sage Publications.

Miller, D. and Dinan, W. (2000). The rise of the PR industry in Britain, 1979-98. *European Journal of Communication, 15*(1), 5-35.

Miller, D. and Harkins, C. (2010). Corporate strategy, corporate capture: Food and alcohol industry lobbying and public health. *Critical Social Policy, 30*(4), 564-589.

Milosavljević, M. and Poler, M. (2018). Balkanization and pauperization: Analysis of media capture of public service broadcasters in the Western Balkans. *Journalism, 19*(8), 1149-1164.

Mo, J. P. T, Zhou, M., Anticev, J., Nemes, L., Jones, M. and Hall, W. P. (2006). A study on the logistics and performance of a real 'virtual enterprise'. *International Journal of Business Performance Management, 8*(2-3), 152-169.

Moeller, J. and De Vreese, C. (2015). Spiral of political learning: The reciprocal relationship of news media use and political knowledge among adolescents. *Communication Research, 46*(8), 1078-1094.

Moloney, K. (2007). *Rethinking public relations: PR propaganda and democracy.* London, UK: Routledge.

Montpetit, E. and Harvey, A. (2018). Media storms and policy expertise: How environmental beat journalists gained influence during a shale gas controversy. *Environmental Communication, 12*(7), 895-910.

Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2008). How media and politics shape each other in the new Europe. *Romanian Journal of Political Science, 8*(1), 70-78.

Murray, C. K. and Frijters, P. (2015). *Clean money in a dirty system: Relationship networks and land rezoning in Queensland. IZA Discussion Paper no. 9028.* Bonn, Germany: IZA.

Murphy, K. (2015). The changing role of journalism: Embracing the audience in the new era. *Asia Pacific Media Educator, 25*(2), 146-155.

Mutz, D. C. and Reeves, B. (2005). The new videomalaise: Effects of televised incivility on political trust. *American Political Science Review, 99*(1), 1-15.

Myers, C. (2018). Public relations or "grassroots lobbying"? How lobbying laws are re-defining PR practice. *Public Relations Review, 44*(1), 11-21.

Naduvath, J. (2014). Examining representation of the non-local: China in the UK media in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics. *China Report, 50*(2), 109-129.

Nechushtai, E. (2018). Could digital platforms capture the media through infrastructure? *Journalism, 19*(8), 1043-1058.

Nel, E. (2017). Responses to regional and local economic change in New Zealand and Australia. *Regions Magazine, 307*(1), 22-24.

Nelson, J. L. and Taneja, H. (2018). The small, disloyal fake news audience: The role of audience availability in fake news consumption. *New Media & Society, 20*(10), 3720-3737.

Nguyen, L. and McCallum, K. (2016). Drowning in our own home: A metaphor-led discourse analysis of Australian news media reporting on maritime asylum seekers. *Communication Research and Practice, 2*(2), 159-176.

Nicholson, B. (2015, April 1). A class act under the sea. *The Australian* [online]. Retrieved on August 22, 2019, from https://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/features/a-class-act-under-the-sea/story-e6frg6z6-1227288344378

Nicholson, B. (2019). Defence's journey: Remembering to bring Australians along. *The Strategist* [online]. Retrieved on August 1, 2019 from https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/defences-journey-remembering-to-bring-australians-along/

Nieminen, H. (2006). What do we mean by a European public sphere? In N. Carpentier, P. Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt, K. Nordenstreng, M. Hartmann, P. Vihalemm & B. Cammaerts (Eds.), *Researching media, democracy and participation: The intellectual work of the 2006 European media and communication doctoral summer school.* Tartu, Estonia: Tartu University Press.

Nikunen, K. (2014). Losing my profession: Age, experience and expertise in the changing newsrooms. *Journalism, 15*(7), 868-888.

Noam, E. (2018). Beyond the mogul: From media conglomerates to portfolio media. *Journalism, 19*(8), 1096-1130.

Obermaier, M. and Koch, T. (2015). Mind the gap: Consequences of inter-role conflicts of freelance journalists with secondary employment in the field of public relations. *Journalism, 16*(5), 615-629.

O'Donnell, P., Zion, L. and Sherwood, M. (2016). Where do journalists go after newsroom job cuts? *Journalism Practice, 10*(1), 35-51.

Ohlsson, J., Lindell, J. and Arkhede, S. (2017). A matter of cultural distinction: News consumption in the online media landscape. *European Journal of Communication, 32*(2), 116-130.

Okuda, H. (2016). China's "peaceful rise/peaceful development": A case study of media frames of the rise of China. *Global Media and China, 1*(1-2), 121-138.

Ooi, S. and D'Arcangelis, G. (2018). Framing China: Discourses of othering in US news and political rhetoric. *Global Media and China, 20*, 1-15.

Örnebring, H. (2019). Journalism cannot solve journalism's problems. *Journalism, 20*(1), 226-228.

Ostrowska, U. (2014). Discourse - from the theoretical and methodological perspective. *Forum Oświatowe, 1*(51), 91-109

Owen, A. (2011). Making poverty history? The impact of the recession on poverty discourses in Australia. *The Australian Community Psychologist, 23*(1), 36-45.

Packard, N. (2017). No place to hide, before and after data(driven) journalism. *International Journal of Latest Research in Humanities and Social Science, 1*(2), 24-36.

Papandrea, M. (2008). Lapdogs, watchdogs, and scapegoats: The press and national security information. *Indiana Law Journal, 83*(1), 233-306.

Parasie, S. (2015). Data-driven revelation? Epistemological tensions in investigative journalism in the age of 'big data'. *Digital Journalism, 3*(3), 364-380.

Park, S., Fisher, C., Fuller, G. and Lee, J. Y. (2018). *Digital news report: Australia 2018*. Canberra, ACT. News and Media Research Centre, University of Canberra.

Patterson, T. E. (1998). Time and news: The media's limitations as an instrument of democracy. *International Political Science Review, 19*(1), 55-67.

Pautz, H. (2010). Think tanks in the United Kingdom and Germany: Actors in the modernisation of social democracy. *British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 12*(2), 274-294.

Pautz, H. (2013). The think tanks behind 'Cameronism'. *British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 15*(3), 362-377.

Payne, T. (2007). *War and words: The Australian press and the Vietnam war*. Carlton, VIC: Melbourne University Press.

Pearson, M. and Fernandez, J. M. (2015). Censorship in Australia: Intrusions into media freedom flying beneath the international free expression radar. *Pacific Journalism Review, 21*(1), 40-60.

Peng, Z. (2004). Representations of China: An across time analysis of coverage in the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times. *Asian Journal of Communication, 14*(1), 53-67.

Peters, C. and Broersma, M. (2017). *Rethinking journalism again: Societal role and public relevance in a digital age.* London, UK: Routledge.

Petrova, M. (2008). Inequality and media capture. *Journal of Public Economics, 92*(1-2), 183-212.

Plaisance, P. L., Skewes, E. A. and Hanitzsch, T. (2012). Ethical orientations of journalists around the globe: Implications from a cross-national survey. *Communication Research, 39*(5), 641-661.

Pjesivac, I. and Rui, R. (2014). Anonymous sources hurt creditability of news stories across cultures: A comparative experiment in America and China. *The International Communication Gazette, 76*(8), 641-660.

Polar. (2019). State of digital media: Market brief Q1 2019. Retrieved on July 22, 2019, from https://polar.me

Prosser, B. and Denniss, R. (2015). Lobbying and minority government in Australia: The concept of the marginal member. *Australian Journal of Political Science, 50*(3), 496-512.

Puddy, R. (2016, May 2). Canoe sledge 'set off our subs campaign'. *The Australian*, p. 4.

Purvis, H. (2015). Anonymous sources: More or less and why and where? *American Journalism, 31*(2), 236-261.

Raeijmaekers, D. and Maeseele, P. (2017). In objectivity we trust? Pluralism, consensus, and ideology in journalism studies. *Journalist, 18*(6), 647-663.

Rashid, A. K. (2013). The dynamics of relationship between media and think tanks in Bangladesh. *Asia Pacific Media Educator, 23*(1), 175-196.

Reese, S. (1991). Setting the media's agenda: A power balance perspective. *Communication Yearbook, 14*, 309-340.

Reich, Z. (2008). The anatomy of leaks: Tracing the path of unauthorised disclosure in the Israeli press. *Journalism, 9*(5), 555-581.

Reinardy, S. (2011). Newspaper journalism in crisis: Burnout on the rise, eroding young journalists' career commitment. *Journalism, 12*(1), 33-50.

Rennie, G. (2016). Lobbying 101: How interest groups influence politicians and the public to get what they want. *The Conversation* [online], June 9. Retrieved on January 20, 2019 from https://theconversation.com/lobbying-101-how-interest-groups-influence-politicians-and-the-public-to-get-what-they-want-60569

Revers, M. (2015). The augmented newsbeat: Spatial structuring in a Twitterized news ecosystem. *Media, Culture & Society, 37*(1), 3-18.

Richards, I. (2012). Beyond city limits: Regional journalism and social capital. *Journalism, 14*(5), 627-642.

Richardson, J. (2007). *Analysing Newspapers: An Approach from Critical Discourse Analysis.* London, UK: Red Globe Press.

Ridout, T. N., Fowler, E. F., Franz, M. M. and Goldstein, K. (2018). The long-term and geographically constrained effects of campaign advertising on political polarization and sorting. *American Political Research, 46*(1), 3-25.

Riseman, N. J. (2017). 'Just another start to the denigration of Anzac Day': Evolving commemorations of Australian LGBTI military service. *Australian Historical Studies, 48*(1), 35-51.

Roberts, P. (2015). A century of international affairs think tanks in historical perspective. *International Journal, 70*(4), 535-555.

Robertson, T. (2015). The Anzac myth: Holocaust denial and the birth of the Australian nation. *Kill Your Darlings, 22,* 45-59.

Rodden, J. (2016). The past is a… native land? *Society, 53*, 112-115.

Rogers, R., Malancharuvil-Berkes, E., Mosley, M., Hui, D. and Joseph, G. O. (2005). Critical discourse analysis in education: A review of the literature. *Review of Educational Research, 75*(3), 365-416.

Rosen, J. (2011). We have no idea who's right: Criticizing "he said, she said" journalism at NPR. PressThink [Online]. Retrieved December 11, 2019, from http://pressthink.org/2011/09/we-have-no-idea-whos-right-criticizing-he-said-she-said-journalism-at-npr/

Roy, D. (1996). The "China Threat" issue: Major arguments. *Asian Survey, 36*(8), 758-771.

Saikkonen, S. (2017). Interpreting expertise: Finnish journalists' accounts on journalistic judgement of expertise on healthy eating. *Journalism,* OnlineFirst, 1-17.

Sallot, L. M. and Johnston, E. A. (2006). Investigating relationships between journalists and public relations practitioners: Working together to set, frame and build the public agenda, 1991-2004. *Public Relations Review, 32*(2), 151-159.

Salter, L. (2005). The communicative structures of journalism and public relations. *Journalism, 6*(1), 90-106.

Samaie, M. and Malmir, B. (2017). US news media portrayal of Islam and Muslims: A corpus-assisted critical discourse analysis. *Education Philosophy and Theory, 49*(14), 1351-1366.

SA Mental Health Commission. (2016). Chris Burns became the South Australian mental health commissioner in July 2016. Retrieved March 22, 2019, from https://samentalhealthcommission.com.au/the-commission/the-commissioner/

Sammut, J. (2016). *The role of think tanks: A reply to the critics.* CIS Occasional Paper 145. Sydney, NSW: Centre for Independent Studies.

Sarrimo, C. (2017). The press crisis and its impact on Swedish arts journalism: Autonomy loss, a shifting paradigm and a 'journalistification' of the profession. *Journalism, 18*(6), 664-679.

Schauster, E. E., Ferrucci, P. and Neill, M. S. (2016). Native advertising is the new journalism: How deception affects social responsibility. *American Behavioral Scientist, 60*(12), 1408-1424.

Schank, J. F., Ip, C., Kamarck, K. N., Murphy, R. E., Arena, M. V., Lacroix, F. W. and Lee, G. T. (2011). *Learning from experience volume IV: Lessons from Australia's Collins submarine program.* Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

Scheufele, D. A. (1999) Framing as a theory of media effects. *Journal of Communication, 49*(1), 103-122.

Schiffrin, A. (2018). Introduction to special issue on media capture. *Journalism, 19*(8), 1033-1042.

Schmuck, D., Heiss, R., Matthes, J., Engesser, S. and Esser, F. (2017). Antecedents of strategic game framing in political news coverage. *Journalism, 18*(8), 937-955.

Schudson, M. (1989). The sociology of news production. *Media, Culture & Society, 11,* 263-282.

Schudson, M. (2001). The objectivity norm in American journalism. *Journalism, 2*(2), 149-170.

Schlesinger, P. and Doyle, G. (2015). From organizational crisis to multi-platform salvation? Creative destruction and the recomposition of news media. *Journalism, 16*(3), 305-323.

Sendziuk, P. and Foster, R. (2018). *A history of South Australia.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Sheehy, M. (2008). Foreign news stories more likely to include unnamed sources. *Newspaper Research Journal, 29*(3), 24-36.

Sherwood, M. and Nicholson, M. (2017). Who controls sport news? Media relations and information subsidies in Australian sport media. *Media International Australia, 165*(1), 146-156.

Sherwood, M. and O'Donnell, P. (2018). Once a journalist, always a journalist? *Journalism Studies, 19*(7), 1021-1038.

Simone-Davies, J, (2018). Population and migration statistics in Australia. *Parliament of Australia Research Papers.* Retrieved 15 May 2019, from https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1819/Quick_Guides/PopulationStatistics

Simpson, C. (2010). From ruthless foe to national friend: Turkey, Gallipoli and Australian nationalism. *Media International Australia, 137*(1), 58-66.

Sinaga, S. and Callison, C. (2008). Credibility of PR practitioners: The impact of professional journalism background on trustworthiness, expertness, and homophily evaluations. *Public Relations Review, 34,* 291-293.

Sinclair, J. (1998, March 17). Digital dream in new submarine. *The Age,* p. 6.

Sjøvaag, H., Pedersen, T. A. and Owren, T. (2018). Is public service broadcasting a threat to commercial media? *Media, Culture & Society, 41*(6), 808-827.

Smith, G. (2016). The timing of partisan media effects during a presidential election. *Political Research Quarterly, 69*(4), 655-666.

Smith, R. F. (2007). Impact of unnamed sources on credibility not certain. *Newspaper Research Journal, 28*(3), 8-19.

Smith, M. and Marden, P. (2008). Conservative think tanks and public politics. *Australian Journal of Political Science, 43*(4), 699-717.

South Australian Centre for Economic Studies (2017). The decline of manufacturing in South Australia. Retrieved on August, 22, 2019 from https://blogs.adelaide.edu.au/saces/2017/04/03/the-decline-of-manufacturing-in-south-australia/

Soutphommasane, T. (2018). Confronting the return of race politics. Lecture to the Whitlam Institute, Western Sydney University, August 6, 2018. Retrieved on March 22, 2019 from https://www.humanrights.gov.au/about/news/speeches/confronting-return-race-politics

Splendore, S. (2017). The dominance of institutional sources and the establishment of non-elite ones: the case of Italian online local journalism. *Journalism,* 1-17.

Spong, A. (2015). Why isn't Australia's future submarine project further advanced? *Indo-Pacific Strategic Papers.* Canberra, ACT: Australian Defence College, Centre for Defence Strategic Studies.

Stashwick, S. (2019, August 19). China's South China Sea militarization has peaked. *Foreign Policy*, [online]. Retrieved on October 22, 2019 from https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/19/chinas-south-china-sea-militarization-has-peaked/

Sternadori, M. M. and Thorson, E. (2009). Anonymous sources harm credibility of all stories. *Newspaper Research Journal, 30*(4), 54-66.

Stewart, C. (2016). Our French submarine builder in massive leak scandal. *The Australian* [online]. Retrieved on March 22, 2019, from https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/defence/our-french-submarine-builder-in-massive-leak-scandal/news-story/3fe0d25b7733873c44aaa0a4d42db39e

Stewart, J. and Ablong, T. (2013). When Australian defence procurement goes wrong: Improving outcomes in a troubled contractual environment. *The Economic and Labour Relations Review, 24*(2), 238-254.

Strömbäck, J. (2005). In search of a standard: Four models of democracy and their normative implications for journalism. *Journalism Studies, 6*(3), 331-345.

Strömbäck, J. (2008). Four phases of mediatisation: An analysis of the mediatisation of politics. *Press/Politics, 13*(3), 228-246.

Strömbäck, J. and Nord, L. W. (2006). Do politicians lead the tango? A study of the relationship between Swedish journalists and their political sources in the context of election campaigns. *European Journal of Communication, 21*(2), 147-164.

Strong, C. and Tyler, F. (2017). New Zealand media camouflage political lobbying. *Pacific Journalism Review, 23*(2), 144-158.

Stubbs, M. (1997). Whorf's children: Critical comments on critical discourse analysis. In A. Ryan & A. Wray (Eds.), *Evolving models of language* (pp. 100-116). Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Suryadinata, L. (2017). *Rise of China and the Chinese Overseas.* Singapore: ISEAS Publishing.

Swart, J., Peters, C., and Broersma, M. (2016). Navigating cross-media news use. *Journalism Studies, 18*(11), 1343-1362.

Tambini, D. (2010). What are financial journalists for? *Journalism Studies, 11*(2), 158-174.

Tameling, K. and Broersma, M. (2013). De-converging the newsroom: Strategies for newsroom change and their influence on journalism practice. *The International Communication Gazette, 75*(1), 19-34.

Tennyson, A. (2014). Poem of the Week: The Charge of the Light Brigade by Alfred Tennyson. *The Guardian* [online], January 20. Retrieved on March 20, 2019, from https://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2014/jan/20/poem-of-the-week-charge-light-brigade-tennyson

Teo, P. (2000). Racism in the news: A critical discourse analysis of news reporting in two Australian newspapers. *Discourse & Society, 11*(1), 7-49.

The Advertiser. (2019). About. Retrieved on August 22, 2019 from https://www.adelaidenow.com.au/help/about

The newspapers of South Australia. (1953, November 21). *The Mail*, p. 1.

The newspapers of South Australia. (1953, November 24). *The Advertiser*, p. 2.

Thompson, R. (2007). *Lessons Not Learned: The U.S. Navy's Status Quo Culture.* Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.

Thomson, M. (2013, October 18). A folly of strategic proportions. *The Strategist* [online]. Retrieved on March 22, 2019 from https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a-folly-of-strategic-proportions/

Tiffen, R. (1989). *News and Power.* North Sydney, NSW: Allen and Unwin.

Tillet, A. (2019, June 3). Toby Abbott's regret: No deal on Japanese subs. *Financial Review* [online]. Retrieved on July 1, 2019 from https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/tony-abbott-s-regret-no-deal-on-japanese-subs-20190702-p523el

Tranter, B. and Donoghue, J. (2015). National identity and important Australians. *Journal of Sociology, 51*(2), 236-251.

Tresch, A. (2009. Politicians in the media: Determinates of legislators' presence and prominence in Swiss newspapers. *International Journal of Press/Politics, 14*(1), 67-90.

Tresch, A. and Fischer, M. (2015). In search of political influence: Outside lobbying behaviour and media coverage of social movements, interest groups and political parties in six Western European countries. *International Political Science Review, 36*(4), 355-372.

Turcotte, J. (2017). Who's citing whom? Source selection and elite indexing in electoral debates. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 94*(1), 238-258.

Turner, G. (2016). Surviving the post-broadcast era: The international context for Australia's ABC. *Media International Australia, 158*(1), 17-25.

Tyllström, A, (2019). More than a revolving door: Corporate lobbying and the socialization of institutional carriers. *Organisational Studies,* OnlineFirst, 1-20.

Ubayasiri, K. (2015). The Anzac myth and the shaping of contemporary Australian war reportage. *Media, War & Conflict, 8*(2), 213-228.

Ungar, S. (1990). The role of a free press in strengthening democracy. In J. Lichtenberg (Ed.), *Democracy and the Mass Media.* Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Valentini, C. (2014). Do public relations and journalism's converging roles affect how they perceive each other? An Italian outlook. *Revista Internacional de Relaciones Públicas, 8*(4), 111-138.

Valenzuela, S., Puente, S. and Flores, P. M. (2017). Comparing disaster news on Twitter and television: An intermedia agenda setting perspective. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 61*(4), 615-637.

Van Aelst, P. and Walgrave, S. (2011). Minimal or massive? The political agenda-setting power of the mass media according to different methods. *International Journal of Press/Politics, 16*(3), 295-313.

Van der Wurff, R. and Schoenbach, K. (2014). Civic and citizen demands of news media and journalists: What does the audience expect from good journalism? *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 91*(3), 433-451.

Van Dijk, T. A. (2008). *Discourse and Power*. Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Van Dijk, T. A. (2013). CDA is not a method of critical discourse analysis. Retrieved on August 22, 2019, from https://www.edisoportal.org/debate/115-cda-not-method-critical-discourse-analysis

Vesa, J., Blomberg, H. and Kroll, C. (2015). Minimal and massive! Politicians' views on the media's political agenda-setting power revisited. *The International Journal of Press/Politics, 20*(3), 279-296.

Victor, J. N. (2007). Strategic lobbying: Demonstrating how legislative context affects interest groups' lobbying tactics. *American Politics Research, 35*(6), 826-845.

Vincent, M. (2019, July 17). AFP was not attempting to intimidate journalists; Commissioner Andrew Colvin says. *ABC News* [online]. Retrieved July 17, 2019 from https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-07-16/afp-raids-not-attempting-to-intimidate-journalists-colvin-says/11314982

Vine, J. (2012). News values and country non-daily news reporting: The online revolution's impact. *Rural Society, 21*(2), 158-171.

Vine, P. (2017). When is a journalist not a journalist? *Pacific Journalism Review, 23*(1), 43-53.

Visentin, L. (2016, April 11). Sacked reporter Scott McIntyre and SBS resolve dispute over Anzac Day tweets. *Sydney Morning Herald* [online]. Retrieved on 20 July, 2018 from https://www.smh.com.au/business/companies/sacked-reporter-scott-mcintyre-and-sbs-resolve-dispute-over--anzac-day-tweets-20160411-go37vt.html

Vliegenthart, R. and Roggeband, C. (2007). Framing immigration and integration: Relationships between press and parliament in the Netherlands. *The International Communication Gazette, 69*(3), 295-319.

Vliegenthart, R. and Walgrave, S. (2010). When the media matter for politics: Partisan moderators of the mass media's agenda-setting influence on parliament in Belgium. *Party Politics, 17*(3), 321-342.

Wadham, B. (2011). Cultural camouflage: Trouble in the ranks. TASA Conference Paper. Retrieved on June 22, 2019 from https://www.tasa.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Wadham-R0008-Final.pdf

Wadham, B. (2013). Brotherhood. *Australian Feminist Studies, 28*(76), 212-235.

Wadham, B. (2016a). The minister, the commandant and the cadets: Scandal and the mediation of Australian civil-military relations. *Journal of Sociology, 52*(3), 551-568.

Wadham, B. (2016b). The dark side of Defence: Masculinities and violence in the military. In R. McGarry & S. Walklate (Eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Criminology and War.* London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Waisbord, S. (2009). Advocacy journalism in a global context. In K. Wahl-Jorgensen & T. Hanitzsch (Eds.), *The handbook of journalism studies* (2nd ed.) (pp. 371-385). New York, NY: Routledge.

Waisbord, S. (2010). The pragmatic politics of media reform: Media movements and coalition-building in Latin America. *Global Media and Communication, 6*(2), 133-153.

Walgrave, S. (2008). Again, the almighty mass media? The media's political agenda-setting power according to politicians and journalists in Belgium. *Political Communication, 25*(4), 445-459.

Walgrave, S., Soroka, S. and Nuytemans, M. (2008). The mass media's political agenda-setting power: A longitudinal analysis of media, parliament and government in Belgium (1993 to 2000). *Comparative Political Studies, 41*(6), 814-836.

Walgrave, S. and Van Aelst, P. (2006) The contingency of the mass media's political agenda setting power: Toward a preliminary theory. *Journal of Communication, 56,* 88-109.

Ward, I. (2003). An Australian PR state? *Australian Journal of Communication, 30*(1), 25-42.

Ward, S. J. A. (2009). Journalism ethics. In K. Wahl-Jorgensen & T. Hanitzsch (Eds.), *The handbook of journalism studies* (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Routledge.

Washington, D. (2015). Media week: ABC news changes; journalism or PR? *In Daily* [online], July 24. Retrieved on March 22, 2019, from https://indaily.com.au/news/business/2015/07/24/media-week-abc-news-changes-journalism-or-pr/

Watanabe, K. (2017). Measuring news bias: Russia's official news agency ITAR-TASS' coverage of the Ukraine crisis. *European Journal of Communication, 32*(3), 224-241.

Waterton, E. and Dittmer, J. (2016). Transnational war memories in Australia's heritage field. *Media International Australia, 158*(1), 58-68.

Weisbrod, H. (1969). Australia's decision to buy the F-111. *The Australian Quarterly, 41*(2), 7-27.

Weitzel, P. (2004). The steady march of government secrecy: Journalists strategize to gain access to information the public has a right to know. *Nieman Reports, Fall-2004,* 84-88.

White, C. and Park, J. (2010). Public perceptions of public relations. *Public Relations Review, 36,* 319-324.

Widdowson, H. G. (1995). Discourse analysis: A critical view. *Language and Literature, 4*(3), 157-172.

Wilke, J. and Achatzi, J. (2011). From Tian'anmen Square to the global world stage: Framing China in the German press, 1986-2006. *Chinese Journal of Communication, 4*(3), 348-364.

Williams, J. F. (1999). *Anzacs, the media and the great war.* Sydney, Australia: UNSW Press.

Willnat, L. and Martin, J. (2012). Foreign correspondents: An endangered species? In D. H. Weaver and L. Willnat (Eds.), *The global journalist in the 21st century* (pp. 495-510). New York, NY: Routledge.

Willnat, L., Weaver, D. H. and Wilhoit, C. (2019). The American journalist in the digital age. *Journalism Studies, 20*(3), 423-441.

Wilson, J. (2014). Kevin Rudd, celebrity and audience democracy in Australia. *Journalism, 15*(2), 202-217.

Wilson, J. (2016). 'Colonize. Pioneer. Bash and slash': Once on Chunuk Bair and the Anzac Myth. *Journal of New Zealand Literature, 34*(1), 27-53.

Wise, D. and McLaughlin, B. (2016). In media we distrust: The interplay of message, context, and media trust on campaign message effects. *Electronic News, 10*(2), 105-120.

Wodak, R. and Meyer, M. (2001). *Methods of critical discourse analysis.* London, UK: Sage Publications.

Wodak, R. and Meyer, M. (2009). Critical discourse analysis: History, agenda, theory and methodology. In R. Wodak & M. Meyer (Eds.), *Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis (2nd ed.) (pp. 1-33). London, UK: Sage.*

Wojdynski, B. W. (2016). The deceptiveness of sponsored news articles: How readers recognise and perceive native advertising. *American Behavioral Scientist, 60*(12), 1475-1491.

Wong, A. (2017). Transnational real estate in Australia: New Chinese diaspora, media representation and urban transformation in Sydney's Chinatown. *International Journal of Housing Policy, 17*(1), 97-119.

Woo, Y. P. (2015). On the future of foreign policy think tanks in Canada. *International Journal, 70*(4), 629-636.

Woods, D., Daley, J. and Chivers, C. (2018). *A crisis of trust: The rise of protest politics in Australia*. Melbourne, VIC: Grattan Institute.

Woodall, A. (2018). Media capture in the era of megaleaks. *Journalism, 19*(8), 1182-1195.

Woodford, J. (1998, October 9). US called in to help advise on new sub repairs. *Sydney Morning Herald,* p. 4.

Woodford, J. (1998, October 10). Kookaburra. *Sydney Morning Herald,* p. 34.

Woolner, D. (2001). *Lessons of the Collins submarine program for improved oversight of Defence procurement.* Canberra, ACT: Parliamentary Research Papers. Accessed from https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp0102/02RP03

Worthington, E. and Blumer, C. (2019, June 7). What do the AFP raids on the media mean for journalists and their sources? *ABC News* [online]. Retrieved on July 2, 2019, from https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-06-06/abc-raids-what-they-tell-us-about-press-freedom/11187364

Wulfemeyer, K. T. (1983). Use of anonymous sources in journalism. *Newspaper Research Journal, 4*(2), 43-50.

Xiang, D. (2013). China's image on international English language social media. *Journal of International Communication, 19*(2), 252-271.

Yamamoto, M., Lee, T. and Ran, W. (2016). *Communication Research, 43*(1), 131-154.

Yang, Y. E. and Liu, X. (2012). The 'China threat' through the lens of US print media: 1992-2006. *Journal of Contemporary China, 21*(76), 695-711.

Young, S. (2009). The decline of traditional news and current affairs audiences in Australia. *Media International Australia, 131*, 147-159.

Young, S. (2019). *Paper emperors: The rise of Australia's newspaper empires.* Sydney, NSW: UNSW Press.

Yu, G. and Wang, M. (2017). The change of Beijing image in the foreign media: An analysis of coverage by mainstream English media. *Global Media and China, 2*(3-4), 333-351.

Yule, P. and Woolner, D. (2008). *The Collins class submarine story: Steel, spies and spin.* Port Melbourne, Victoria: Cambridge University Press.

Zelizer, B. (2004). *Taking journalism seriously: News and the academy.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Zelizer, B. (2012). On the shelf life of democracy in journalism scholarship. *Journalism, 14*(4), 459-473.

Zeng, Y. (2017). Detached disseminator, populist watchdog and facilitative change agent: The professional role perception of foreign correspondents in China. *Journalism, 19*(9-10), 1397-1416.

Zerfass, A. and Schramm, D. M. (2013). Social media newsrooms in public relations: A conceptual framework and corporate practices in three countries. *Public Relations Review, 40*, 79-91.

Zhu, J. and Boroson, W. (1997). Susceptibility to agenda setting: A cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis of individual differences. In M. McCombs, D. L. Shaw and D.

Weaver (Eds.), *Communication and democracy: Exploring the intellectual frontiers in agenda-setting theory.* Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Zion, L., Dodd, A., Sherwood, M., O'Donnell, P., Marjoribanks, T. and Ricketson, M. (2017). Working for less: The aftermath for journalists made redundant in Australia between 2012 and 2014. *Communication Research and Practice, 2*(2), 117-136.

Zoizner, A., Sheafer, T. and Walgrave, S. (2017). How politicians' attitudes and goals moderate political agenda setting by the media. *The International Journal of Press/Politics, 22*(4), 431-449.

# Appendix A

**Key Political, Strategic and Procurement Events (Critical Discourse Moments)**

1. 25 September, 2013 – *The Australian* reports a leaked DMO document showing that 68 problems with the Collins were deemed "critical".
2. 8 April, 2014 – MINDEF David Johnston appears to publicly suggest low likelihood of the contract going to local shipbuilding industry. *The Advertiser* reports anonymous disclosure that Japan-Australia submarine talks significantly advanced, "all options" reported on the table.
3. July 28, 2014 – DEFENCE releases an issue paper which articulates the need for strategic policy to be placed above industry assistance. *AFR* reports anonymous disclosure from DEFENCE saying Soryu "leading option".

Period of Intense Media Coverage (8 September – 22 January)

4. 8 September, 2014 – *The Advertiser* reports anonymous disclosures from insider sources stating that the Government will "all but certainly" build the subs in Japan, and that the announcement would be made before the end of the year.
5. 26 November, 2014 – David Johnston declares in parliament that he "wouldn't trust the ASC to build a canoe".
6. 6 December, 2015 — SA Liberals lose the Fisher by-election (7.3% swing).
7. 22 December, 2014 – Johnston is dumped as MINDEF, replaced with Kevin Andrews.
8. 22 January 2015 – Kevin Andrews announces that the Government will now be prioritising "sovereign capability".
9. 31 January, 2015 — 3.1% swing against SA Liberals in Davenport by-election, Liberals retain.

Period of Intense Media Coverage (9 February – 5 March)

10. 9 February, 2015 – Leadership of the Liberal Party of Australia spilled, PM Abbott retains power by a smaller margin than expected. Abbott is alleged to have "struck a deal" with SA members to hold a more transparent tender process.

11. 10 February, 2015 – Kevin Andrews announces that the submarines contract will be opened up to a "competitive evaluation process" (CEP).
12. 24 March, 2015 – *The Advertiser* publishes special edition with 25 + articles on the Attack class submarines.
13. 4 August, 2015 – PM Tony Abbott announces $89 billion shipbuilding plan, but won't publicly commit to building the submarines in Australia.
14. 29 August, 2015 – *The Advertiser* reports that Abbott and Japanese PM Abe had "secret meetings" about the submarines.
15. 15 September, 2015 – PM Abbott is removed in a second leadership spill, PM Malcolm Turnbull replaces him. Kevin Andrews to be removed as MINDEF. *The Australian* reports that Japanese are no longer the frontrunners in the CEP.
16. 6 October, 2015 – Japan agrees to hand over submarine technology to Australia, marking the beginning of an extended "bidding war" between DCNS, TKMS and Japan.
17. 18 December, 2015 – DCNS publicly accuses the Japanese Soryu submarines of being less lethal than the French.
18. 22 January, 2016 – Andrew Shearer (former Abbott staffer) publicly argues that US officials would prefer Australia buy Japanese subs. On the 25th Greg Sheridan writing in *The Australian* reports US officials saying they would not put US weapons systems in French/German subs.
19. 25 February, 2016 – DEFENCE releases the 2016 White Paper – Announcing 12 submarines will be built, all three bidders commit to building in Australia.
20. 2 March, 2016 – Greg Sheridan (*The Australian*) claims to obtained leaked documents showing that the submarine schedule is pushed out by a decade. Tony Abbott publicly argues that Turnbull has "kicked the ball down the road".
21. 5 March, 2016 – Defence warns bidding parties about disparaging each other publicly.
22. 19 April, 2016 – DCNS announced as successful bidder, submarines to be built in SA.

# Appendix B—Critical Discourse Analysis Instrument/Guide

**Part 1: Section 1—Intertextuality—References to, use and transformation of external texts, genres or discourses (All references drawn from Fairclough, 1992).**

| Data Point | Evidence | Analysis Questions | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Manifest Intertextuality** (Direct reference to other texts). | Use of **quotation marks** (“”); **reporting verbs** (… said, … told); **paraphrasing; ‘scare quotes’**; etc. | How is the incorporated text transformed, restructured, or altered? What ideological assumptions are reproduced/challenged? (See Fairclough, 1992, p. 119) | Look for: **paraphrasing, explicit marking** of incorporated texts; **representation** of sources; **ambiguity** between author/source voices; **translation** or **recontextualization** of incorporated text; etc. |
| **Presupposition** (What is taken as a given or common sense?) | Constitutive **‘that’** statements (‘We know **that** Australia is a lucky country’); **‘the’** statements with existential meanings (‘**the** Canberra bubble’). | What historic, social, political and ideological ‘preconstructed’ ideas, themes, narratives or keywords does the author use? How are they employed to constitute the subject/author/audience? | Look for: **broad generalisations;** appeals to **common sense** or **right mindedness;** use of **enthymemes**; use of common **idioms** or **maxims;** etc. |
| **Negation** (A negative sentence that presupposes the existence of an opposite position). | **‘Not’; ‘un-’** or **‘isn’t’** statements that constitute an alternate existential position. (‘Driving an electric ute is un-Australian!’; ‘Police say that they found no evidence the rioters were Antifa’). | What ‘preconstructed’ ideas, themes or narratives are being introduced only to contest or reject them? How does the author use the negated text to reinforce certain views, identities or concepts? | Look for: **binary representations** of individuals and groups (i.e. ‘lifter vs leaner’ discourse); **loaded negative** arguments (i.e. ‘the China threat is a myth’). |
| **Metadiscourse** (Author distances or disowns themselves from the text using a hypothetical or metaphorical ‘other text’). | **Hedging** language (‘kind of’, ‘sort of’); **Marking as alien** (‘traditional owners might say that…’, ‘in academic terms…’); **hypothetical couching** (‘if Australia were to go to war with China…’). | What statements does the author make without *really* taking ownership of them? How do they represent ‘other texts’ as having authority? Do they paraphrase key terms or ideas? If so, why? | Look for: use of **distancing, hedging** and **paraphrasing** that puts the author above or apart from what they are saying. |
| **Irony** (An echoing of an original text taken to mean the opposite). | **Repurposed** words, phrases or sentences from another text in a context that refutes or contradicts their original meaning. | How and in what way does the author recontextualise the text ironically? What is the desired effect of making the ironic statement? | Look for: **mismatch** between context and apparent meaning; **sarcastic tone;** use of ‘scare quotes’. |

**Part 1: Section 2—Constitutive intertextuality—The origination of a new discourse type constituted through a novel configuration of existing ones**

**Identify and interpret how the following are used, combined or subverted in the text, and the intent behind their use.**

| Data Point | Evidence | Analysis Questions | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Genre** (A stable set of social conventions associated with a type of text or activity, both in terms of production and consumption) Examples: **Informal chat** **Job interview** **News report** **Opinion piece** | **Procedural differences** in the use of format, grammar, sourcing, evidence etc. Different **protocols** for reading and interpreting the text. **Limited options** for how a text is presented, arranged and consumed. A **clear structure** that emphasises preferred production of and interaction with the text. | In what way does the genre set limits on how the text is produced and consumed? How does it emphasise a preferred relationship between author and audience (or others)? What power relations are reinforced by the social conventions associated with the genre? (See p. 129) | Look for: **established format**, **structure** and **rhythm** of text. A genre implies a certain preferred process of producing, distributing and consuming the text. As they are informed by social convention, reconfiguring and subverting genre can represent a challenge to existing social relations. |
| **Style** (The tenor, mode and rhetorical mode of the text). | The **tenor** of relations between participants, i.e. author and reader ('formal', 'casual', 'official' etc.). The **mode** of the text; written, spoken or otherwise (i.e. written-to-be-read, written-to-be-spoken). The **rhetorical mode** of the text (i.e. 'argumentative', 'expository', 'descriptive). | How is the style of the text designed to orient the reader and the author? Does the style create contextual cues that suggest a preferred interpretation? Does the style and format imply a certain expected narrative structure, or a socially conventional start and end-point? | Look for: **tone of voice, turn-taking, simple vs complex vocabulary, buzzwords,** etc**.** Style can be useful to understand how the author codes their communication with others. A technical style for instance can position the author as an expert. |
| **Discourse** (A particular way the subject-matter is constructed, in terms of content, topic, ideational meanings etc.) (See p. 62-63). | **Constitution** of a subject-matter or topic that imposes a hierarchy of importance or significance. **Privileging** of some points-of-view over others. The **mediation** of content by external political or ideological assumptions. | In what way does the text draw on or contribute to existing **social structures, norms** and **conventions?** How does it constitute **social identities** and **relations?** | Look for: **in-group/out -group identification,** the use of **myths** and **metaphors,** language that highlights **social stratification** and **objectification** of certain individuals or groups. (see p. 64) |

## Part 1: Section 3—Intertextuality and discursive practices

| Data Point | Evidence | Analysis Questions | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Intertextual Chains** (A series of types of texts related to one another, where each text is transformed in a reliable and predictable fashion). | The text **originates** or is a **response** to another text, and the relationship is part of a conventional **pattern** or **network** of text production and consumption, for example in a particular industry or medium (i.e. press release -> news article -> interview etc.) | Is the text part of a routine pattern of text production, if so, what texts precede or succeed it in the chain? How do genre, style and discursive elements change at different points in the sequence? What principles govern the production of new 'links' in the chain? Are the established routines of this chain **contested**, **stable** or **otherwise**? | Look for: an **origin point,** what texts (spoken/written etc.) were required to produce this text? **Distribution;** in terms of how narrowly or widely the text will influence 'links' further down the chain. **Routine;** any evidence the text is expected by social convention to draw from and contribute to other texts. |
| **Intertextual Transformations** (Changes that emerge from a text entering into or drawing from a particular intertextual chain). | As a result of entering into the intertextual chain there are changes in **vocabulary, word choice, tone, grammar, sourcing, mode, tenor, rhetorical mode** etc. | How are elements of style, discourse and genre **reinterpreted** and **constituted** differently at different 'links' in the chain? Are there changes in **phrasing, word meaning, vocabulary,** the use of **metaphors** and **narratives?** Are the **discourses** employed by the new text different from those that came before? | Look for: signs that the author expects a **different audience** than that of previous 'links'. Are the routine changes in this chain **stable, contested** or **otherwise?** |
| **Coherence** (The ease by which the text can be interpreted as having certain meanings and ideological functions). | The text sets up **clear positions**, and makes coherent **connections** and **inferences** that a reasonable person would understand as leading to a certain interpretation of to text and its meaning. | What is the degree of ambiguity in the text as to what the author is really trying to say? Do arguments follow a logical sequence? Do they draw on common associations or fringe beliefs? How do they connect cause and effect? | Look for: word choices that might have **double meaning** to certain audiences. Arguments and phrases that might be **resisted**, or **misinterpreted** by certain readers. |
| **Conditions of Discourse Practice** (The social practices associated with the production and consumption of the text). | Names of the **author** and/or **institution** or **company.** Explicit references to and constitutions of the **audience.** | Is the text produced or consumed **individually** or **collectively?** Who helped in its production? What was needed to resource it? What **economic factors** are involved? | Look for: traces and cues of how the text was produced. Industry standards and practices. Limitations of the medium, etc. |

**Part 2: Section 1—Textual analysis—Close analysis of the linguistic features of the text**

| Data Point | Evidence | Analysis Questions | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Interactional Control** (Language used to orient the author/reader as participants in the communication). | Cues or signals for **turn taking, exchange structure,** signals for a **response** or a **call to action etc.** Status or **social position** that might dictate relations between participants. | Are the participants on equal footing, do they have asymmetrical obligations/responsibilities? Who sets the agenda, has control of introducing new topics? Is one participant evaluative of the other? What capacity do participants have to resist or subvert controls? | Look for: **policing;** a participant setting boundaries of **acceptable speech;** appeals to expertise/authority. **Call and response/turn-taking.** |
| **Politeness** (Language that mitigates force or impact of text on self-esteem/face of subject or reader). | The presence of **politeness strategies** (see p. 162-166) | How are positive/negative politeness strategies used to protect the face of participants? Are some participants presented as deserving of politeness? Does the author extend 'off record' privileges to a participant? | Look for: whether politeness follows particular **social conventions;** who benefits from the politeness; use of politeness to signal **social relations** or subvert them. |
| **Ethos** (Voice; how the comportment of style and tone signal the author's social identity and subjectivity). | Implicit **verbal and non-verbal signals** that connote the authors **social identity**. Use of **titles, technical** or **professional** terms, **jargon,** or **catchphrases etc.** | How does the author signal their position in society, their personal identity and in doing so constitute their relationship with their audience? Does their position command a certain level of respect or derision in society? Are they subverting social expectations through using a certain voice/ethos? | Look for: **status signalling;** using **technocratic** or **profession specific** language; the **voice of ordinary experience;** signals of **insider status; talking-up/talking-down;** paternalistic language etc. |
| **Transitivity** (Grammar: How the text represents processes and participants). | Linguistic characterisation of **actions, events, relations and mental** processes; the positioning of **agents** in relation to acts and events. | What is the order of **subjects**, **objects** and **verbs**? Is the author using active or passive language to describe events? How does the grammar suggest agency, causality and responsibility for actions or events? | Look for: **action statements** (who is actually doing what, to whom, and how?) **agentless passive** statements; **nominalisation** that turns acts or events into agentless nouns. |
| **Theme** (Grammar: What tends to be selected as the focal point for a clause, paragraph or text etc.) | The **initial part of a clause** and how it functions to reinforce certain commonsense | What is the author selecting as themes and why? What assumptions are suggested in their choice of themes? How does employing this theme | Look for: selection of themes that **reinforce dominant social relationships/divisions;** using themes to select |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | assumptions, and 'granted' knowledge. | work to structure readers interpretation of events? | what is **important** or the **focus** of the text; etc. |
| **Modality** (Grammar: The degree of affinity expressed towards a statement or clause). | Auxiliary verbs **'must', 'may', 'can';** modal adverbs used for distancing **'it's probable' 'likely' 'possible';** hedging language, **'sort of', 'a bit', 'or something', etc.** | How does the author use language to hedge, distance themselves or transform statements into less/more categorical ones? Why might the author be employing high affinity/low affinity language? Intertextually, does affinity change between different speakers/authors? | Look for: patterns for how the author uses **high affinity versus low affinity statements**. Does the author **eliminate modal verbs**, **adjectives** and **hedges** in quoting another text? By making **categorical** statements what is the author presupposing? |
| **Word Meaning** (The meaning of a word as it is socially variable and contested, within different social and political contexts). | The use of **keywords** that have salient cultural or social meanings. The use of words with **contested meaning** or **political connotations.** | Why did the author use certain words instead of others? Were certain words selected for their dominant, negotiated or contested meaning? Was the author aware of the contested meanings of the word? Is the word politically or ideologically weighted in a particular way? | Look for: words that **signal a particular meaning to particular audiences;** word choices that reflect the author's **social position** and **relations;** words with **loaded meaning**; words that function as **metaphors** or **enthymemes.** |
| **Wording** (The use of words in a particular sequence to connote a particular meaning). | The configuration of words to create **new 'lexical items';** The use of **word order, substitution** and **removal** to transform meaning between texts. | Intertextually, how does the author change the meaning of original texts through rewording? How does their wording suggest a particular theoretical, cultural or ideological perspective? To what degree is the wording open to interpretation or rejection? | Look for: the use of **nominalisation;** combining or reconfiguring words to create **new meanings**; **overwording** by using too man words particular to a certain domain/genre (p. 192-193). |
| **Metaphor** (A phrase or word that evokes a concept or idea that isn't literally applicable in the context suggested). | The use of a **metaphor;** of **metaphorical language,** or an **allusion** to a concept, idea or meaning that isn't applicable to the given context. | What does the use of the metaphor reveal about the author's point of view and their social and political beliefs? Is the metaphor intentional or simply an expression of an ingrained cultural perceptions? How does the metaphorical language highlight or disguise underlying assumptions the author might hold? | Look for: metaphors that might be **common** or **familiar** in a certain domain; i.e. war metaphors in sports/politics. Use of metaphors leading to **scripting** or **assumed** outcomes or events. Metaphors that perpetuate **stereotypes** and **social hierarchies and relationships**. |

**Part 3: Social Practice Analysis**

| Data Point | Evidence | Analysis Questions | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Social Matrix of Discourse** (The social and hegemonic relations and structures that inform and influence the social or discursive practice). | Practitioner will need to establish through additional research an understanding of the economic social, political and structural forces that influence the creation, distribution and consumption of the text. This includes an understand of how the text fits within this matrix and its particular cultural and political significance. | What industry, business or individual produced the text? What social, cultural, financial or hierarchical pressures affect them? Is the text conventional, normative or oppositional to the kind of texts normally produced in the context? Does the text demonstrate a cross-over or transference between this social matrix and others? | Look for: established **hierarchy** of the social matrix; **mandated social relations**, **norms, values and systems of knowledge** that are inherent in the social matrix; **hegemonic** viewpoints and **ideological** assumptions common to people within the social matrix; an established **moral code** or system of control and policing that dominates the social matrix. |
| **Orders of Discourse** (How does the social or discursive practice relate to broader socio-political structures that govern norms of acceptable and unacceptable speech) | Practitioner will need to locate the text within the broader social and political context that structures norms governing speech. Particularly, the kind of institutional, cultural and political forces that set the rules for acceptable discourse, limit who is permitted to speak about certain topics, and exclude certain perspectives and systems of knowledge. | Who is not being heard in this text? Which voices are marginalised and which ones are instead privileged and amplified? Who has control of and sets the parameters of public discussion in this context? What are the normative assumptions of truth and reality that underpin this text? How is its production and consumption influenced by social and political power structures? | Look for: **selectiveness** in the use of sources of information; **privileging** certain ways of knowing and learning; **dismissal** of viewpoints and beliefs that are considered 'irrational' or 'crazy'; **othering** of individuals and groups who are considered unqualified to speak; **refusal** to discuss topics or ideas that are taboo or forbidden by convention. |
| **Ideological and Political Effects of Discourse** | Practitioner will interpret the degree to which the text challenges or perpetuates **systems of knowledge and belief; social relations; and social identities.** | Does the text reinforce hegemonic views or subvert them? Does it confirm stereotypes or challenge them? Who is marginalised or excluded by the text, and who in-turn benefits from that? | Look for: whether all the features of the text are explained. What power structures are reinforced by the text? Overall, who is the text trying to influence and how? |